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The following currently popular vignette suggests itself as
metaphor for following some of the ideas contained herein.

a

A scientist was studying jumping behavior in the frog, so he placed
a frog on a measured grid.

"Jump frog.
Jump".
The frog jumped, and in his notebook, the scientist
wrote: Frog with four legs jumps six feet. So the scientist cut
off the frog's front leg.
"Jump frog.
Jump". And the frog jumped.
In his notebook, the scientist
wrote:
Frog with three legs jumps four feet. So the scientist cut
off its other front leg.

"Jump frog.
Jump". And the frog jumped.
In his notebook, the scientist
wrote:
Frog with two legs jumps two feet. So by now the pattern
being clear, the scientist cut off its two remaining legs.
"Jump frog.
"Jump frog.

Jump".
But the frog didn't jump.
Jump".
But the frog still didn't jump, so the scientist
wrote in his notebook. Frog with no legs - is deaf.

.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In several ways this dissertation is a summary statement of my

graduate education and, as such, it shows the influence of several
people
to

whom

I

owe thanks

Harold Raush's teaching, research, and example widened the boundaries
of what is recognized by many as legitimate and substantial scholarship;

because of his continuing influence the present sort of work is possible,

conceptually and practically.
Howard Gadlin agreed to chair this dissertation when it had no set
form or conclusions.

He helped me to conceptualize and present the

material in a manner that met the accepted standards of scholarship without insisting upon the usual format.

The dissertation reflects a good

deal of his thinking and practice in which psychology is considered a

responsible science.

Also, his flexibility and support during a par-

ticularly grim time, and his understanding of what

I

was attempting to

do, made this dissertation possible.

Hal Jarmon's ability to relate the present meta-scientif ic analysis
to processes and phenomena encountered in clinical practice validated

and enriched this dissertation.

Also, his insistence upon the use of

appropriate methods and approaches in the research of clinical processes

have permeated the dissertation.
Al Winder has provided a wide-ranging sophistication of theory and

clinical practice that has informed my analysis, and at times, supported
it in unexpected ways.

His use of the present analysis for a wholly

different area in which he is involved highlighted strengths and weak-

nesses in a manner that was supportive while being
rigorous.
Peter Park has, in practically every meeting, furthered
the con-

ceptual base of my analysis, extending it

to

new areas, and expanding

certain points to see them more clearly or to see what new
interpretations
they could provide.

Thanks are also owed to friends for their frequent, and appreciated,
support.

Here

I

would like to thank especially Allison Cook, Marcia

Howard and Joel Feinman, Harold Seewald, and Adin Dela Cour
lieb and

I

.

Sue Gott-

spent several months meeting for suppers and library sessions;

Elaine Faunce shared with me some of her experiences and materials from
her work at MRI

.

These friends gave me support and affection, and under-

stood without pique, my inability to spend time or energy with them.
My special thanks go to my partner Mark Karpel for his wholehearted

support during the many months of this dissertation's making.

appreciation

His

of the difficulty of working while writing a dissertation,

and his practical as well as emotional support were invaluable.

I

thank

him for his intellectual and emotional companionship.
Finally, my thanks go to Mrs. Doris Maynard, who typed and often

corrected, a 450 page manuscript for me in thirteen days - and all the

while maintained a bouyant, if progressively fatigued, demeanor.

ABSTRACT

Conceptual Frameworks in Psychology: Modified
Kuhnian Analysis for the Emergence of
Double Bind Family Therapy
May,

1978

Denise J. Gelinas, B.A., University of Massachusetts
M.S., University of Massachusetts

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Howard Gadlin

The presence of a felt crisis in psychology is reviewed in its

various manifestations: concern about lack of long-term progress, questions of sub-disciplinary identity and the presence of long-standing

"sterile" controversy.

Previous attempts to use Thomas Kuhn's schema

for scientific change to interpret this situation have met with little

success because no provisions had been made to modify the schema for use

with a social science.

In the present investigation,

these provisions

were made and the modified Kuhnian analysis was used to interpret events

leading up to, during, and immediately after the emergence of family
therapy.

This Kuhnian analysis made it possible to see that family

therapy had arisen in reaction to classical psychoanalysis' inability to
deal with certain clinical phenomena, including neurotic complementarities

among married couples, the precipitation of psychoses in borderline personalities, and the homeostatic dynamics in the families of schizophrenic
patients.

Controversies between classical analysts and Sullivanian

analysts in the 1950

's

are interpreted in Kuhnian disciplinary matrix

viii

ix

terms rather than methodological terms.

The development of the "double bind hypothesis" by Bateson,
Jackson, Haley, and Weakland is interpreted as meeting the necessary
criteria

for a Kuhnian revolutionary paradigm.

Then the ten-year formal history

of Bateson's research group is reviewed and interpreted in disciplinary

matrix terms.

The elaboration of the communicational and homeostatic

aspects of the paradigm and the major lines of activity are documented,
as well as the 1959 split.

Interpretation in disciplinary matrix terms

also helps to explain how the group was able to continue productive work
for several years after splitting in 1959.

Certain elaborations of the Kuhnian analysis are then offered and
found to be helpful in understanding the inception and development of
the double bind paradigm and disciplinary matrix.

These modifications

emphasized the group structure of these activities and the importance of
a shared disciplinary matrix for communication and the resolution of con-

troversy.

Several ostensibly methodological controversies involving

classical and Sullivanian psychoanalysts and double bind adherents were
interpreted as controversies between disciplinary matrices and therefore not resolvable if argued on the methodological level.

In a Kuhnian

analysis, methodology is not independent from a disciplinary matrix.
Also, an emphasis on the group structure of scientific activity combined

with the paradigm concept allowed an interpretation of the relationship

among the classical psychoanalysts, the Sullivanian analysts and family
therapists during the early 1950's.

.

Two new concepts were proposed.

The first was termed the "border

of applicability"; it provides a criterion, created by emerging
anomalies

by which to recognize the reasonable limits of usefulness for a particular

paradigm.

The second proposed concept was the "meta-disciplinary matrix"'

the meta-disciplinary matrix is a philosophical/ conceptual constellation

which includes a philosophical orientation (e.g., logical positivism, or
dialectics) level of phenomena of focus (e.g., behavioral, or phenomenological)

,

value systems (e.g., predictive, or interpretive understanding),

and models of explanation (e.g., mechanistic, organismic, or formalistic)
It was proposed as an explanation of why several family therapy disci-

plinary matrices "clustered" together.

As an example,

the double bind

matrix was shown to share the same mechanistic^ behavioral and predictive
preferences as Minuchin's structural family therapy group.
The meta-disciplinary matrix concept was also used to help explain

along what dimension the first "cluster" differed from the second "cluster" identified - one formed by the disciplinary matrices of Ackerman,

Boszormenyi-Nagy

,

and Laing.

This second cluster is characterized by a

preference for phenomenological plus behavioral thinking, and a preference for interpretive understanding.

The meta-disciplinary matrix

is seen as preceding and subsuming paradigms and disciplinary matrices.

It was proposed that the present felt crisis in psychology was amenable
to a

modified Kuhnian analysis if one focused on the differences and

relationships among, paradigm, method, disciplinary matrix, and metadisciplinary matrix.
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INTRODUCTION
During the several chapters following,

I

hope to demonstrate there

is a felt crisis in the discipline of psychology, and to propose
a

modified Kuhnian analysis to interpret this felt crisis.

As will be

seen the presence of a felt crisis is being expressed in a number of
ways.

Some are concerned about a lack of long-term progress, while

others point to an episodic quality in the development of the discipline

whereby research results and conceptualizations rise and fall but very
seldom accumulate with a consensually
ledge.

validated, lasting body of know-

Similarly, others have drawn attention to crises of identity,

either in the discipline as a whole, or in sub-disciplines. Finally,

other authors are challenging a number of philosophical and methodological

characteristics of the discipline, identifying areas of repeated problems
and suggesting alternatives.

During the development of the discipline and these issues, controversy and debate have been rife, and not always productive; further, some
of this type of accompanying controversy has seemed somewhat beside

point though very characteristic of the period.

the

Several authors (Burgess,

1972; Watson, 1974; Stierlin, 1977) have used the conceptual schema

originated and developed by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1970b) to understand change and progress in science.
ever,

How-

there are problems in using Kuhn's work for psychology - these

will be discussed at length in the ensuing chapters.

It is important to

note here, however, that Kuhn's ideas have often been used uncritically
xiii

:
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and without taking into account his subsequent
important revisions;
nor has his framework been critically reviewed and
adapted for use in

psychology.

Consequently, his schema has occasionally been used as
a

weapon in just the sort of sterile controversy already
mentioned.
Burgess (1972, p. 193) documents just one such sequence;
referring
to the

publication and revision of Scientific Revolutions

Burgess

,

comments
In one sense, at least, this publication has united all kinds of
psychologists. Anti-behaviourists now believe they have the final
weapon with which they will eventually demolish that monolithic
anti-Humanitarian monster Behaviourism (Jenkins, 1968; Koch,
1964).
Behaviourists now believe they have fired the last salvo
in their battle against "extinct" Psychoanalysts (e.g. Krasner,
1971), and so it progresses.
One wonders, however, whether these
theorists are not attacking straw men which they have erected themselves (a favourite armchair pasttime of psychologists who have
managed to identify with one or other "father-figure-school").
Of more importance though is whether psychologists generally have
read Kuhn correctly or are showing a familiar bandwagon effect
(as Koch, (1964) has shown for the early learning theorists in
their slavish imitation of the logical positivitists)
It seems
that Psychologists are especially susceptible to this sort of
thing, i.e. picking up a thread midway, being neither prepared
to return to the original ball of string or to see where eventually
their thread leads or to what it is attached.

—

.

Despite these problems regarding Kuhn's schema for psychology, his

work may potentially provide insight and a structure within which
interpret events.

to

Of particular interest for the present felt crisis in

psychology is Kuhn's emphasis on crisis, disagreement, and development
rather than accretion, in science.
In the following chapters,

I

will use a modified Kuhnian analysis

for one substantive area in which there occurred a felt crisis,

to see

if the "application" of the Kuhnian schema allows us to interpret or

XV

understand a crisis situation in psychology,
and especially if Kuhn
allows us to interpret events in a different
manner than previously,
or even to find sense in heretofore senseless
or random-seeing processes.

The "substantive area" of focus will be the
emergence of family
therapy, specifically the emergence of the
double bind hypothesis and

double bind (DB) family therapy.

I

have used the term "substantive area"

rather than "discipline" because, while family therapy
is a subdiscipline
in psychology, it is also a sub-discipline in
psychiatry, social work,

nursing, and education with some adherents and practitioners
are also

occasionally found in anthropology, sociology, and psychosomatic medicine,
The criteria for defining the area and the individual's inclusion
within
it,

is neither based upon credentials of training nor discipline, but

rather on adherence to the idea that within the family lie the processes
to which we can attribute the etiology, maintenance,

and potential for

amelioration of psychological (and some think, psychosomatic) disorder.
This set of ideas is a marked departure from intra-psychic formulations

based upon and within the individual.

It should be acknowledged that

family therapists have little trouble recognizing each other, though

agreeing with each other is more of a problem.

This larger complex

of family therapists occurs across disciplines,

in terms of their

own perceptions of the family field and who "belongs" in it, and also
because almost any substantive area in psychology cuts across formal

disciplinary lines and can be found in neighboring disciplines.
substantive area rather than the disciplinary name is the more

The

xvi

sensible boundary for the present analysis.
The emergence of DB family therapy was
chosen for a number of reaso,
)ns

With its recent differentiation from individual
psychotherapy during the
past quarter-century, family therapy has a
fairly accessible history; it
is relatively well-documented, with many,

though not all, of its

originators currently active in the field.
Family therapy in its entirety, however, was not chosen
as the
focus of analysis because it is constituted by a number
of groups, theories
and sets of practice, so that, as an area, it is also
subject to some

degree of disagreement and controversy.

It seems not surprising that

within only a quarter-century, there has already emerged debate and groups
in disagreement.

Also,

it is apparent that the term "family therapy" is

applicable to a wide range of practices, and that it is used in
rather vaguely defined manner (Freeman, 1964,

p.

55).

a broad,

For these reasons,

one of the family therapy frameworks, rather than the entire discordant
field, appeared preferable for a detailed analysis.

Double-bind family

therapy was one of the frameworks that developed during the 1950 's and
1960's, and an argument will be made that it constituted the first systems

approach and the first family framework to embody the full characteristics
of family therapy rather than merely transitional elements.

Double-bind

family therapy is commonly, and justifiably, regarded as constituting a

unit in itself, having internal consistency and generally recognized

characteristics.

Hence, it was chosen for analysis.

It could be pointed out that, unlike the physical sciences,

family

therapy is constituted not only by research and theory, but also by

xvii

clinical practice.
to use a schema

is,

There are questions as to whether it is
legitimate

designed from, and for, the physical sciences,
as Kuhn's

for a social science area that also includes
a clinical practice

component.

It would be possible to make an argument that
clinical

practice itself can constitute a legitimate form of research,
and some
(Raush, 1974; Sullivan, 1953) have done so.

As this particular point is

not the primary focus of this dissertation, however,

I

will remain with

the original issue about the use of Kuhn for areas which include
clinical

practice; specifically, will it "work" when

I

attempt a Kuhnian analysis

for family therapy, or will such an application strain the Kuhnian schema

such that it can be inferred the analysis is not appropriate.

This

appears to be a question best answered by attempting the application.
Procedurally, a modified Kuhnian analysis will be used to interpret
the events, processes, and controversies surrounding the emergence and

development of DB family therapy.

Hopefully, this analysis will shed

light, or meaning, on events which had previously appeared merely random.
If successful,

this will indirectly suggest where the Kuhnian framework

is appropriate for psychology and similar disciplines, and where the

schema needs revision in view of difficulties encountered in the process
of such an application.

in applying the Kuhnian

It is very probable that,

schema to family therapy, information about his schema will also emerge.
It is expected that use of the framework will highlight its strengths and

weaknesses as well as providing information about

a

sub-discipline par-

tially within psychology; that is, the process of examining a framework

.

xviii

in psychology will in turn reveal information
about the conceptual tools

originally used for the analysis, and these secondary
findings will also
be discussed.

This method, in which the process of examining the
primary subject
area, in turn reveals information about the conceptual
tools, is a variant

of what Radnitzky (1973) refers to as "tacking." (Radnitzky
discusses

dialectical theory as proceeding in "turns" first emphasizing the empirical human sciences and then emphasizing critical social theory, alternating or "tacking" back and forth, so that they shed light on each other)

Some of this tacking back and forth has already taken place; for
instance, the attempt to apply Kuhn's work to the informational sciences

resulted in Masterman's (1970) revision of Kuhn's work on a multiple-

paradigm issue. (See Chapter II).

This differs from the situation in

which Masterman explicitly addresses the paradigm concept to critique it.
Though "tacking" entails

a

certain amount of methodological complexity,

the information reflected back upon the conceptual tools should not be

left by the wayside but should instead be considered a secondary or sub-

sidiary focus.

Schematically, in Chapter
explicated.

I

the felt crisis in psychology will be

In the second chapter, Kuhn's framework regarding scientific

developments will be reviewed, along with critiques and revisions from
the literature, and necessary modifications to allow legitimate appli-

cation of the scheme to the social sciences.
chapters,

In the third and fourth

the focus will shift to examine the developments in psycho-

xix

analysis leading up to the introduction of the
DB framework.
Chapters V and VI will explicate the inception of
DB family therapy
as a Kuhnian revolutionary paradigm,

then trace the development of the

DB developers as a research and clinical group.

In the seventh chapter,

the analysis carried out thus far will be
examined as to its strengths

and weaknesses, and used to interpret several controversies
in which
the DB group members had engaged.

Finally, in the eighth chapter, proposals for further
modifications
in the Kuhnian schema will be forwarded, as well as
suggestions for further analyses regarding psychology's felt crisis.

CHAPTER

I

FELT CRISIS IN PSYCHOLOGY AS A DISCIPLINE
It will become evident during the course of
this chapter that there
is currently a felt crisis in psychology
(Becker, 1968; Farberow, 1973;

Warren, 1971)

.

Psychologists cannot agree on past achievements and con-

tinue to debate about fundamentals (Burgess,
1972, p. 198).

Taking a

reviewer's perspective. Buss (1975, p. 977) states that.

While reading current issues of psychological journals ...
which promote discussion of general topics, trends, and
controversies within the discipline (e.g., the American
Psychologist ) we cannot help but conclude that there are
a significant number of professional psychologists concerned with where we are, how we got there, and where we
are going from here.
,

Lest we think these considerations are rather complacent or of
recent origin, Hudson (1972, p. 73) points out that the criticisms and

concerns have become,

increasingly vociferous. Fifteen years ago, the vast majority
of those working in psychological departments here and in the
United States shared the belief that their discipline was robust,
that their efforts embodied the onward march of Science. However, in the early 1960 's a number of the informed and eminent,
Sigmund Koch, for instance, were making sounds of misgiving,
suggesting that for reasons of scientific insecurity, psychology
was in retreat from its historically constituted subject-matter.
It would appear,

further, that the perception of crisis spans the sub-

disciplines of psychology, and is one of the few non-parochial elements
of the discipline; it should be further noted, though, that within these

sub-disciplines, it is primarily those who are investigating human actions (or cognition, relationships, etc.) rather than animal behavior
\

1

..

or neuropsychology, for example,
that are most concerned about this

crisis
Naturally, different authors address
themselves to different aspects
of the crisis (or perceive different
crises?) in psychology's develop-

ment as a discipline; while this undoubtedly
reflects psychology's

history of factionalism, it also suggests the
depth and extent of the
crisis

Lack of long-term pro gress and episodic patterns

.

Several perceive a

crisis because of a lack of long-term progress in the
discipline.

"Some thirty years ago, research in psychology became
dedicated
to the quest for nomothetic theory ... model building
and hypothesis testing became the ruling ideal, and research
problems
were increasingly chosen to fit that mode. Taking stock today,
I think most of us judge theoretical progress to
have been disappointing (Cronbach, 1975, p. 116)."

Vitelis (1972, p. 601) is of the opinion that during the past 50-75 years
what psychologists have learned with any confidence about human behavior,
is considerably more limited than might be anticipated from the number

of publications in psychology.

Singer, in a lesson in brevity, states, "Some thirty years have passe
and we do not as yet have a developed, self-conscious discipline of a

science of science (1971, p. 1010)."

A partial solution to this state

of affairs has been proposed by Elms (1975, p. 974) whereby, temporarily,

"educative" articles examining the discipline's scientific and philosophical foundations would replace the usual empirical research reports in

journals.

Limitation of empirical research reports to coherent series

s

3

of studies, or to pre-planned
strategic replications could free
the

space necessary for the non-empirical
articles.
(1972)

He feels Moscovici's

suggestion that data collection temporarily
halt might be extreme,

The authors concerned about lack of
long-term progress have voiced

their disquietude and occasionally their
recommendations, from essen-

tially a sympathetic position.

There have been others, sharing their

concern, who have been more sharply critical
and distanced: C. Rogers
for example (1973, p. 379),

Psychology, for all its thousands of experiments,
its
multitudes of white rats, its vast enterprises involving
laboratories, computers, electronic equipment, highly
sophisticated statistical measures, and the like, is in
my estimation slipping backward as a significant
science.
We have failed dismally to heed Robert Oppenheimer
warning, addressed to the APA in 1956, when he pointed
out that the worst thing psychology might do would be
"to model itself after a physics which is not there any
more, which has been outdated [p. 134]."
'

Trenchant comment is also found within the experimental psychology
tradition.

Hudson (1972, p. 168) points out that as early as 1956, O.L.

Zangwill believed that "Experimental psychology has produced many facts,
a few generalizations, and even an occasional

'law.'

But it has so far

failed to produce anything resembling a coherent and generally accepted

body of scientific theory."

Similarly, Hilgard and Bower (1966, p. 424)

in one of their textbooks on learning

statement

—

—

an unusual place for such a

assert:

—

The argument has been made that more complex behaviors
thinking
and problem solving
could be more easily understood once
simple behaviors under especially simplified conditions were
better understood
After some thirty or forty years without

—

.

.

striking advances in our understanding of the capabilities
this argument has begun to have a hollow

of the human mind,
ring.-L

There are a small number, as yet, who are calling attention
to a
specific pattern in this lack of long-term progress.

Raush (personal

communication, 1976) has pointed to a peculiar episodic quality
to

research and theory in psychology, specifically, to a pattern
whereby
theories or research lines are not necessarily invalidated and put
aside
for explicit reasons, but rather are "dropped" or are allowed to wither,
so that a decade later, one wonders a bit "Whatever happened to

?"

The point is that there results no closure on this line of investigation;
it is neither disconfirmed and then dropped, nor supported and consis-

tently followed as a fruitful line of research.

In a very clear example

At this juncture, it should be mentioned that not only psychology
but all of the social sciences have been faulted for the lack of progress
in the face of so much productivity:

Measured against the needs of the times, there is nothing
remotely resembling a science of man [sic]; there are only
mountains of disciplinary journals, and hordes of busy
specialists; what is the effectiveness in relation to the
momentous problems of survival and human dignity in our time?
To ask the question is already to answer it; taken separately,
most of the disciplinary activity in the social sciences
represent trivial work. True, it is hard-working, certainly
well-intentioned, at times deeply hopeful and anxious
but
(Becker,
1968).
still, somehow very much besides the point ...

—

While I agree with Becker entirely, I will restrict my context to psychology, and my focus to a sub-discipline of psychology in the Interests
of clarity, manageability and commonsense.

^

5

of this sort of thing, Hilgard
and Bower^ in their 1966 revision,
ex-

plicitly note the elimination of a
theory from their text because
of
lack of Interest, and not because the
theory had been empirically discredited.

Similarly, Bonneau (1975, p. 799)
laments the "clusters of

specialized research problems that arch
gloriously through the higher

intellectual atmosphere of scientific meetings
and then like the Nehru
shirt fade away to remain only in the
memories of a few."

Hudson's

(1972, p. 55) Cult of the Fact returns to this
episodic pattern a

number of times, addressing several of its
aspects:

Psychology proceeds more by fits and starts; a
series of
lunges into the surrounding darkness... a subject,
or series
of
8, in which one research fashion succeeds another,
leaving little behind it as a residue of reusable
knowledge
(p. 55).. the impression is one of impermanence
There is
change certainly; one vogue follows another. But
the movement is less cumulative than cyclic; and more subject
than
in the other sciences to that 'Great Prime Mover
of all
intellectual acitivity the Zeitgeist, without whom no man
[sic] would think as he does, nor have his thoughts
make
sense (p. 156)
.

,

.

'

Crises of identity

.

Another group of authors has come to cite crisis,

not so much because of lack of substantial progress, as because they

perceive a crisis of identity, either in the discipline as

within their particular sub-disciplines.

a unit or

Engineering psychology is

Hilgard and Bower, 1966, pp. V, Vi and Vii.
3

Hudson quoting from E.G. Boring, Sensation and perception in the
history of experimental psychology New York; Appleton Century Crofts,
;

1949, p. XI.

.
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felt to be "in jeopardy" (Adams,
1972, p. 615); and while the problem
in personality is "pressing," it
is as urgent in cognitive
(Cronbach,

1975, p. 120)."^

Social psychologists appear to be
questioning fundamen-

tal commitments to research approaches
(Fried, et al

.

,

1973, p. 155),

and Elms (1975, p. 968) documents the
"widespread self-doubts with
goals, methods, and accomplishments" in
personality research, develop-

mental psychology, and clinical psychology,
as well as social psychology.
Among clinical psychologists, Albee (1970)
has questioned the viability
of the scientist-practitioner identity while
Farberow (1973, p. 391)

has offered a compromise in the practitioner-scientist
model, and has

advocated a significant change in APA structure because
of its size and
fragmentation.
The issue of the scientist-practitioner model and
practice has not

yet been resolved to some people's satisfaction, that is,
to the satis-

faction of those, usually, who have at least one foot in the
practitioner's
realm.

Tyler (1973) and Hudson (1972) bring up particularly interesting

points pertinent to the longevity of the dissatisfactions with this

model
It was recognized, of course, that there was such a thing
as applied psychology, and applied psychologists of the
clinical, counseling, industrial, school, and other varieties
were trained in universities. These specialized kinds of

4Cronbach cites Newell (1972) on the fragmentation in information
processing research alone, where the latter counted 59 different
"colonies" of investigators, each collecting data on their own narrowly
defined task.

—
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activity, however, were not accorded
the prestige that
went^with pure scientific work. Words like
"do-gooder"
and tender-minded" often served to
express and perpetuate
the disparagement felt for those
who were mainly interested in what psychology could do to
help people and improve
the human condition ... It is hardly
strange, under these
circumstances, that serious conflicts have
developed between "scientific" psychologists and
"professional",
especially clinical psychologists. (Tyler,
1973, p.'l021.)^

Hudson goes on to give a fascinating possible
reason behind this
"remarkable" insistence upon scientific status:

When a teaching department's projection of a
professional
identity is unusually insistent, one's impulse, whether
or not one has truck with Jungian ideas, is to look
for
sources of professional anxiety.
In the case of psychology
these are not hard to find. Psychologists have a marginal
position in the academic community, poised near the borderline between the humane and the scientific disciplines; we
have a farouche professional past, redolent of mesmerism,
even of witch-doctoring; and there still exist widespread
misgivings both in academic life and with society at large
with any attempt to examind the mind's contents. Our response,
professionally, has been to over-react; to observe all the
outward signs of scientific respectability, taking as our
model, incidentally, the Victorian conception of the physical

—

sciences, a model that physical scientists themselves have

For another view of the same pattern: "Among British scientists,
and with few exceptions, the pure look down on the applied, the physical, on the biological.
And all continue to look down on the social,
or "Mickey Mouse" scientists who are scarcely scientists at all...
Psychology stands low in this pecking order, and contains a pecking
order within it. Again, the pure look down on the applied, and the
clean on the messy. The experimental, usually physical or biological
in background, look down on the social, industrial, clinical, and educational.
The psychologist of high status works in a laboratory, and
studies either a sub-human species rat, pigeon, monkey or some
simple aspect of human skill.
The psychologist of low status works with
human beings in their natural habitat, and studies them in their full
complexity. The psychologist of high status works on problems that to
the untutored eye seem trivial; the one of low status, on problems that
laymen are more likely to understand. (Hudson, 1972, p. 53)

—

—
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one has the impression
I Irnft
of a
professional1 group plunging, in search
of an identity
from one extreme to another. A
sense of orderly growth is'
lacking; so too is any awareness
that urging propounded
theses usually carry their own
negation buried within them.
(p. 54)

This disparity between what the novice
wants to learn and what

he/she is told is good and right for
him/her to learn, remains and is
reflected in the disparity of prestige
between "scientists" and "practitioners"; it contributes to the sense of
crisis regarding identity.

After all what should clinical (or social,
developmental, cognitive, or
engineering) psychology be?
it study?

What should "it" study?

Is "study" science?,

etc.

How?

^^at could

Sometimes involved in this complex

of questions is a group questioning whether
psychology is, has ever

been, should be (could be) "pure" science, purity
being juxtaposed here

with either "applied science" or scholarship involving public
policy.
There are some who cite an identity crisis (Viteles,
1972,

p.

604)

because of what they term the "uncertainty" as to whether the
discipline
at this stage is to be primarily "science or action; fact or fiction;

cult or knowledge; a scholarly discipline or a medium for frequently

premature application of views and methods of highly doubtful validity.."

When Viteles states his position in certain

terras

("service or research;

community action or enhancement of knowledge; participation in movements
or firming up the foundations of academe; the advancement of science or
the construction of 'instant Utopia'") there is little doubt regarding

his views on the scientist-practitioner model.

Regarding his views as

to the conduct of science, he comes down squarely for what is often

9

considered a "value-free" objective,
Newtonian model as the way out of
the woods.

The tendency on the part of psychologists
to confound

speculation with scientific content, and to
inject value judgments.
in a manner that makes it increasingly
difficult, especially
for the student and the layman, to
determine when the psychologist is dealing with facts and principles
derived from
experiments, or when he is merely presenting
his own value
judgments.
It has, in other words, become exceedingly
difficult to know when the psychologist speaks with
the
authority of science, or when he is playing the role
of the
social reformer while clothed— or even disguised—in
the
garb of the scientist. (Viteles, 1972,
p. 605)

He is essentially espousing a return to psychology's
dominant model
and philosophy of research as a procedure for extricating
ourselves from
our collective identity crisis.

Hudson, on the other hand, (as might be)

expected by now), would disagree with Vitele's recommendations, as he
has

already stated that.
If we are to recover our pristine vigour, a major change
is in store; not at the periphery, nor in detail, but at
our corporate hub a change in our conception of what we
are about. And such a change must hinge on the emergence
of a new model with which we can epitomize ourselves; a

—

new root metaphor from which our more day-to-day activities
will flow (Hudson, 1972, p. 157).

Operations in research philosophy and method

.

The identity crisis issue

is related to divergences in research philosophy; what psychologists do

in the daily practice of their discipline, determines who and what their

identity as psychologists might be.

This last major concern appears to

be the most complicated and acrimonious.

Cronbach (1975,

p.

116) con-

fesses some pessimism regarding psychology's predominant norms and procedures, then mentions the questioning of others (e.g., Gergen, 1973;
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Glass, 1972; Israel and Tajfel, 1972; McGuire,
1973; Newell, 1972).

Methodological challenges.

The first set of concerns regarding

scientific method revolves about the appropriateness and
efficacy of
the current experimental model.

The rules of statistical analysis and

instrumentation have been challenged on methodological grounds.

Sig-

norelli (1974, p. 866) questions the position that psychology is
evolving as a science, because it is increasingly using statistical

analyses to evaluate its postulates.

His point here is well taken, as

it is usually those who are most enthusiastic in claiming progress be-

cause of statistical procedures, who also hearken to the physical sciences for their procedural models.

Signorelli points out that the use

of mathematical procedures in the development of the physical sciences

bears little resemblance to the current use of statistics in psychology;
moreover, instrumentation in the physical sciences is designed in

accordance with, and to test, physical concepts, whereas in psychology,
the situation is reversed, that is, instrumentation is heavily influenced

by statistical concepts.

For example.

The Skinner box is designed not to measure the presence of
such theoretical factors as intensity of drive or reinforcement; rather, it is designed primarily to measure the frequency
of the response.
Intelligence tests and personality and
diagnostic scales require the compilation of averages and
correlative statistics to produce classifications and to
demonstrate reliability and validity of the scale; the
factor under measure is inferred from the power of the
statistical results (Signorelli, 1974, p. 869).
In addition to statistically-based instrumentation and concepts,

theory construction, and validation or falsification also appear to be
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increasingly oriented to statistical
formulation.

Reliance on statis-

tical significance, for instance,
frequently obscures implications of

experimental results, leading to controversies
that are not resolvable
at the level in which they are conducted.

Signorelli (1974, pp. 867-

868) reports an interesting study trying to
decide between two formula-

tions about the precise nature of reinforcement

-

characteristics, the other on drive-reduction.

A series of experiments

one based on response

attempting to demonstrate the superiority of one
formulation over the
other was inconclusive - significant results
supported each formulation.

Signorelli suggests that if the obvious is accepted—
that the two formulations are complementary rather than mutually exclusive,
neither further

experimentation nor controversy would be necessary, while an
integrating

formulation is.
Statistics are also cited as increasingly becoming the basis around

which theory is constructed as well as tested; Signorelli (1974,

p.

866)

highlights Estes' learning theory, Feigenbaum and Simon's formulation of
the serial position curve and John's hypothesis regarding memory storage.
It should be noted that while Signorelli particularly takes issue with

experimental psychology, he absolves none of the sub-disciplines.
His points are reminiscent of those made by Koch that the develop-

ment of psychology as a science "was unique in the extent to which its

institutionalization preceded its content and its method preceded the
problem." (Quoted by Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,
(1975, p.

p.

795).

Gadlin and Ingle

795) state that they share Koch's contention that many of the
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current problems in the discipline are a consequence of "method pre-

ceding content" and

I

would agree.

Paucity of theory.

The second issue regarding scientific philo-

sophy relates to the paucity of theory in the discipline.
p.

Elms (1975,

970) laments that theories have not fared well under empirical test

and is of the opinion that any "would be" theorist today would find it

difficult to propose any level of integrative theory in social psychology,

with reasonable confidence in its longevity.

Similarly, others (e.g.,

Bonneau, 1975, p. 800) are articulating the need for "major frameworks,"
or schema, to tie together and relate the various bits of information

we have.

Besides worrying about the longevity of a proposed theory, it would
be appropriate to worry about its reception and treatment.

psychology are "critiqued" into oblivion.
combat is all too evident.

Theories in

At times, the glee of the

Why not, in fact, rather than refute, con-

struct tests whereby hypotheses, as well as being capable of refutation
or confirmation, can be confirmed only in such and such conditions

can be made exceptions, inclusions or subsumptions?

holds under these conditions, not under those.

In short

—

,

or

that X

This approach, which

would retain the confirmed material and integrate, if not "correct" the
other, would have the virtues of continuity (in time and across subject

matter) and less wasted time in re-discovery.

Some interesting insights

into why commonsense has, once again, not prevailed, are afforded by

Hudson.

It becomes apparent that the socialization process into psycholo

.
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fosters such an approach (1972,

p.

103).

The education I myself received undoubtedly had the
effect
[Marcuse] predicts: I was equipped neither with the
language,
nor the concepts, nor the self-confidence, to phrase
questions of a general kind. We were taught to dismantle,
but not to reconstruct; the doctrines of the philosophers
acting—as Bertrand Russell has said as a 'corrosive
solvent' of the great systems of the past, yet putting
nothing, beyond a mood of skeptical complacency, in their
stead

Another insight, this time into the perpetuation rather than origin
of such a pattern, is forwarded by Elms (1975, p. 973); "The
typical

procedure... of ten seems more effective in producing
professional pub-

lications than in locating and explaining important aspects
of human
social interaction."

Another exploration relates to psychology's uncertain scientific
status.

In the spirit of minority-group process, we can be more critical

of our own theories than anyone else, before they are.

Suffice it to say, there is growing disillusionment with the experi-

mental method as the dominant scientific procedure for the discipline.
As Pereboom has summarized (1971, p. 439):

The application of the experimental approach to a multidimensional discipline presupposes that it will work, that
control and analysis will generate explanations which will
lead to a unified theory for a restricted behavior domain,
and that there will be a fundamental basis for our concepts,
scales and methods which will justify the measurable
generalization of that theory. This has not yet happened.

Objectivity and subject-object split

.

Experimental procedures have

also been criticized on philosophical and ethical grounds as well as the

procedural and consequential previously reviewed.

Since they are con-
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slderably more complex, philosophical issues
will be just briefly re-

viewed in the present context.

A primary area of criticism has been the

traditional stance of objectivity and the resulting
subject-object split
in research.

Because of the nearly total dominance of the
experimental

method and its philosophical context a number of
consequences have

gradually evolved.

These include the assumption of independence between

subject-matter and method (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,

p.

793), such that

any variety of phenomena could be investigated by
the same method, essen-

tially without questions regarding the appropriateness of
said method.

Gadlin and Ingle (1975) have addressed themselves to several
of the
ramifications of such a meta-method.

This includes, due to the emphasis

on "objectivity", a split between experimenter and subject, such
that
the experimenter was purportedly "neutral" and the subject became object;

that is, the subject necessarily became objectified as a manipulable

entity, i.e., "thing."

This approach both denies the relational aspect of research (by

objectif ication) and mitigates against its recognition.

Gadlin and

Ingle (1975, p. 796) suggest that the attempt to deny the relational

aspect of research be abandoned and that it be actively attended to and
investigated, such that,
the relationship between investigator and subject is overtly
recognized as influencing the data. The relationship is seen
as e.stablishing a condition for the data to emerge, and
examination of the relationship between investigator and
subjects becomes part of the data analysis itself. (H.
Raush, personal communication, quoted by Gadlin and Ingle,
1975, p. 796).
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As such, the relational aspect of research
would be regarded as

necessity rather than unavoidable epiphenomenon
or artefact.

A proposed model includes a research relationship
in which "researchers and participants mutually explore
psychological phenomena." (p. 796).

Additionally reflexivity can be created
by acknowledging
that the study of human behavior
necessarily includes the
behavior of psychologists. This recognition
implies, of
course, that the psychologist is as prone
to psychological
processes as anyone else and should be
especially selfconscious of this fact when acting as a
scientist.
This
self-consciousness includes the psychologist's
awareness
ot his relationship to and with his
subject matter and the
awareness of his own role with respect to his
inquiry.
The
knowledge that derives from such reflexivity
is a tripartite
knowledge— about the subject, about the researcher,
and
about the knowledge itself. Little has been
written about
such matters in the psychological journals, but
there does
exist a small if obscure literature known as
critical social
science theory.
The works of Habermas, Ratner, and Horkheimer can provide an introduction for those
interested
(Gadlin and Ingle, 1975, p. 796).
Obviously, an existing model embodying reflexivity of "investigator"
and "subject" is found in psychotherapy as it is practiced by the
relational

therapists—for example, Rogerians, psychoanalytic therapists, and especially Sullivanians.

H.S. Sullivan's articulation of the relational

aspects of personality development, psychopathology and the therapist
and researcher as participant-observers, remain paradigmatic for relational

conceptualization and practice.
This is not to imply that all psychotherapies are necessarily relat ional or relationally-based

;

for instance,

the theory, if not always

the practice, of behavioral modifications, token economies, and rational-
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emotive therapy are not.

In fact, behavioral theory is
explicitly based

on the method and meta-method of the
dominant research framet^ork
which
is presently under criticism
for its denial of relational
aspects.
The

question of relational accountability
echoes throughout the discipline,
whether in research or therapy, and will
be seen, in ensuing chapters,
to be a focus of interest with regard
to the crisis in psychology and

attempts to use a Kuhnian classification
for a social science.
Related to the issue of subject-object
split are questions from a

variety of perspectives about the validity of
assuming that science is
value-free, in its problem choices, methods, and
the uses to which it
is put.

Buss (1975, p. 986) refers to a change from
"voices in the dark"

to "a growing army of psychologists who...
"can no longer subscribe to

the notion of a "pure" or "value-free" science.

Traditional view of scientific "producer" and "consumer"

.

The

traditional view of the relationship between scientific "producer"
and
"consumer" has also come under fire.

Garner (1972, p. 942) describes,

albeit facetiously, this relationship and terms it a fable.
There is a fable, carefully nurtured over the centuries
by the basic scientists, particularly those who see basic
as pure, about the relation between the scientist who acquires
information and the problem solver who applies that information.
The fable is that scientists acquire the knowledge,
that this knowledge goes into the public domain, and that when
a problem solver needs some knowledge to solve his problem,
he extracts it from the public domain, uttering words of
gratitude as he does so, and solves his problem. The actuality
that the scientist has provided knowledge needed by the
problem solver occurs in some mysterious fashion. Mysterious
though the process is, it is so effective that no tampering
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must be allowed, and in fact, the
less contact the
scientist has with the problems of the
problem solver
the more apt he will be to fill the
public domain with
knowledge of ultimately greatest import
to the problem
solver.
This is the fable, but... It does not
work that
way at all (Garner, 1972, p. 942).
Raush (1974) has addressed this line of
concern in some depth,

challenging the conventional wisdom that
research is produced by scientists, the information from which filters
"down" to practitioners, who

used it and at times may tentatively make
observations which serve as

hypotheses to the scientific community.

Raush (1974,

p.

678) contends,

rather, that "The consumers for formal, statistical
psychological re-

search and for the laboratory experiment are other
researchers

view suggests that research clearly influences research.

..

.

An over-

So far as one

can see, again with the possible exception of behavior
modification

approaches,^ research has not influenced practice",

[emphasis added]

Related to this issue is why there has been so little substantive

knowledge and contribution from these well established traditional research lines.

Raush (1974,

p.

679), however, makes the interesting point

that such substantive contributions have come from non-psychologists or

from those psychologists

"

and here

I

include not only Erikson and

Rogers, but others like Fromm, Maslow, and May

—

who have dissociated

At another point, Raush notes that even among some of those well
disposed to behavioral modification, questions have been raised as to
the nature of the relation between operant research and behavior modification (1974, p. 678).

\
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themselves from formal psychological research methods
.. .Does formal
research, as reported in our journals, offer little
for application?"
This self-dissociation would appear to be a contributor
to the

failure of integration between practice and traditional
psychological

research methods.

Another contributor would seem to be the status

differential which invests the practitioner with lower prestige
than the
academic, scientific psychologist.

Raush's (1974, p. 679) suggestion is that,
it is not research that is being rejected, but one kind
of research.
The practitioner, whether as producer or

consumer, rejects the traditional model of statistical
research because it is of no value to him. The academic
psychologist deplores this rejection and misinterprets
it as a rejection of science itself.
It is as though the
rejection of a particular political platform meant that
people did not want government.

The continuing rejection by practitioners of the traditional psychological

research method is due to "fundamental inadequacies of those research

methods for tackling issues open to the practitioner."

(p.

681).

Essentially, Raush advocates a pluralism in officially legitimized
research.

While he would not eliminate traditional approaches, he is

urging the legitimizing (through acrediting agencies and such institutions as journals and training programs) of alternate research approaches,

designed specifically for the contingencies of psychological practice
(p.

679).

That is, models of research appropriate to the investigation

of human and inter-human processes must be developed and legitimized as

important in their own right,

(and not as bastard children to "real
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science" fit only for the service of broaching hypotheses,
but not in

succession with legitimate status in the scientific
establishment)

.

One

such conceptualization of a different role for the
psychologist in such
a research process would be as a participant-conceptualizer

scientist-practitioner

.

(a

,

rather than

conceptualization suggested in 1965 at the

Swampscott Conference [Raush, p. 680] and probably based upon
H.S,

Sullivan's concept of participant-observer.'^

Interestingly, Sullivan

was one of those who stood outside the traditional
research approach,
and as a practitioner, made significant clinical
and scientific contri-

butions, integrating the two and arguing explicitly for
this view of

science receiving full legitimacy.).

External validity.

Questions regarding the limits of experimentally

derived knowledge have also arisen, particularly with regard to whether
people behave in markedly different ways in experimental situations
than
"outside" during their usual living (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,

p.

791). A

related concern is whether experimental situations investigate, and of
course measure, what is purportedly the subject of investigation.
Similarly, the choice of subject matters has spiraled inward, under the

necessity of meeting experimental conditions and controls, until the
subject matter is largely trivial, or irrelevant.

Hudson faults psychology

Dr. Harold Jarman has pointed out that participant-observant
approaches have multiple roots, including a substantial tradition in
cultural anthropology and in 19th and early 20th century society.
Sullivan's work, mentioned here, was a probable root in clinical psychiatry.
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for the practice wherein we "lift people from the context in
which they

live and set them down in our departments and laboratories

are at ease and they are not.

—

where we

Or we avoid the human race altogether,

and settle for the monkey or the rat ..." (Hudson, 1972,
pp. 152-153).

He feels that, to a degree that is "astounding," academic psychologists

have shunned not only actual contact with people, but the ideas about

people that would evolve from such contact, preferring simple abstractions,
in what he regards as the flight "from our historically constituted

subject-matter." (pp. 151-152).

Repudiation of method seen as repudiation of science

.

With such a

variety of criticisms, some of them fundamental to the research process,
it is perhaps an object of wonder that the experimental method has not

been abandoned, or at least transmutated

.

One such reason (among many

fully as significant) is that abandoning the experimental model means a
good deal more than abandoning merely a method (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,
p.

793);

it would be essentially abandoning science itself as it is

currently practiced and construed.

The experiment is virtually synono-

mous with good scientific practice and has been the overwhelmingly
dominant, and successful, form of science to date.

8

To challenge it as

^Gadlin and Ingle (1975, p. 793) have stated that: "Abandoning the
experiment would be much more than the abandonment of a prevailing
method; it would be desertion of a paradigm." From their import, they
apparently refer to an orientation toward practice as well as that practice itself. While the present author would agree with their contention,
and obviously has, it is well to point out that their use of "paradigm"
here is no longer appropriate, as will be made clear in the next
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a method carries the direct implication of challenge
to the dominant prac-

tice in science, and practically, to science itself.

The significance of

the situation is compounded by the fact that, since
this method is con-

strued as science itself, there is no way in terras of
methodology, to
stand outside the practice to critique and change it; and with
its

dominant philosophy of science eschewing such critique and
historically

addressing questions of method, while assuming precisely the present
areas
of criticism (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975) the crisis is very real,
and per-

haps fundamental.

A number of people have dealt with their concern on just such a
fundamental level.

Tyler (1973, p. 1024) contends that we require both

new guidelines for research and "some new models for research, not just
adapted from physics or biology, but created especially for the sciences
in which scientist, subject, and consumer all belong to the same species."

The disillusionment with the traditional framework is thoroughgoing (see
Hud son, 1972, pp. 11 and 75), as is the repudiation of a philosophy of

science that has engendered a form of science termed futile (Signorelli,
1974, p. 869).

The intensive exploration of alternate methodologies

has been recommended (Raush, 1974; Gadlin and Ingle, 1975), rather than
the "simple" abandonment of the experimental method, which would indeed

be tantamount to "scientific suicide" (as it is essentially synonymous

chapter regarding the schema proposed by Thomas Kuhn about the development of science.
It will also be apparent that most people using the
paradigm term have fallen prey to this problem, helped along in no small
measure by Kuhn's acknowledged inconsistencies with regard to the term.

22

with science).

Some feel that psychology is in an era of
Kuhnian revolu-

tion (Palermo, 1971, p. 136) and others^are
calling for a new Kuhnian

paradigm

~

in this sense, a new framework for scientific
theory and

practice (Elms, 1975; Gadlin and Ingle, 1975).
It is apparent that the crisis in psychology
has emerged from a

number of contexts and is by now challenging the
fundamentals of scientific conceptualization and practice.

The criticisms have been of essen-

tially two types, the first by psychologists (and others in
allied fields)

who are making methodological criticisms from within the same
framework
as the research they are addressing.
a more serious crisis;

The second type of critique poses

this critique is by individuals who have stood,

or are beginning to stand, outside the framework of the experimental

method.

They are critiquing not only the method, but the assumptions,

premises, goals, and philosophy of the dominant scientific framework.
It is probable that at present with the depth and extent of the present

crisis,

the differences between competing frameworks will begin to be

articulated on a disciplinary level, and the controversy (regarding
both method and framework) will increase.
As a discipline, psychology has not been averse to fervent and often

chronic controversy; this history of acrimonious and usually fruitless

controversy bears a direct relationship to the lack of general recognition that psychologists do not always share the same framework, and
not want the same things.
At Oxford, we were initiated into the joke about the
introspective psychologists who, in the early years of
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the century, fell into furious debate over whether green
was in truth a yellowish blue, or a blueish yellow. The
example is trivial, but the epistomological difficulties
such a story parodies are real enough, because the science
in which no two scientists can agree on the evidence is
no science at all (Hudson, 1972, p. 144).

Not only can psychologists not agree on the evidence, we usually

cannot agree on the questions.

Presence of sterile controversy

.

While psychology as a discipline has

had a history of active controversy, by no means have all of these con-

troversies proved productive.

In fact, many of them have been charac-

terized as evangelical rather than scientific in that people regard
their arguments as directed towards ways of life rather than methods of

doing science (Sutherland, 1973).

Still other controversies appear no

closer to resolution than they were when introduced scientific generations
ago, and in fact, though continuing in one variant or another, no longer

shed new light on the issues and may be termed "sterile."

If the contro-

versants were not so intensely committed to their views, the debates

would by now sound quite stale.

As it is, with some controversies, it

is quite difficult to ascertain what their role can be in the develop-

ment of psychology.
In view of this history of active controversy, and in the context
of a felt crisis where authors differ about preferable solutions to this

crisis, it may help to see if there are consistent characteristics which

distinguish successful from unsuccessful controversies in research and
practice.

What are the characteristics of those controversies that
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have been resolved or
appear

be progressing to
resolution.

What are

the Characteristics of
controversies that,

though not being resolved
seem at least to shed light
on the areas of debate'
aeoace.'
r,r,
=
Can some
characteris
tics of the perpetual,
unresolved, i.e., "sterile"
debates be identifiedT
Are any particular types
of controversy especially
facilitating or

Impeding in the development
of psychology?

CHAPTER

II

KUHNIAN CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA, REVISIONS AND
COMMENTS
Early Formulations and Reception

Kuhn's early formulation of paradigm, revolution,
and normal science
met an interesting disparity of reactions: on the
one hand enthusiasm
and application by scientists (Grinker, 1967; Stierlin,
1977; von

Bertalanffy, 1968), and on the other, extensive criticism by
philosophers
(see Shapere, 1964; and especially Lakatos and Musgrave,
1970).

One of

these philosophers, Masterman (1970, p. 59-60), draws attention to
this
and offers a possible origin for this disparity.
It is being widely read, and increasingly appreciated, by
actual research workers in the sciences, so that it must be
(to a certain extent) scientifically perspicuous.
On the
other hand, it is being given widely diverse interpretations
by philosophers, which give some reason to think that it is
philosophically obscure. The reason for this double reaction,
in my view, derives from the fact that Kuhn looked at actual
science, several fields, instead of confining his field or
reading to that of the history and philosophy of science, i.e.
to one field.
Insofar, therefore, as his material is recognizable and familiar to actual scientists, they find his
thinking about it easy to understand. Insofar as the same
material is strange and unfamiliar to philosophers of science,
they find any thinking that is based on it opaque.

Kuhn's (1970a, p. 271) responses to most of the philosophical critique

indicate that he was convinced his position had been largely misunderstood and/or distorted.

For instance.

It is now four years since Professor Watkins and I exchanged
rereading our contributions
mutually impenetrable views
together with those that have accreted to them, I am tempted
to posit the existence of two Thomas Kuhns, Kuhn-]^ is the
.
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author of this essay and of
an earlier piece in this
volume. He also published in
1962 a book called T^e
l^iucpe of Scientific Revolutions, the one whicPte
and Mxss Masterman discuss
above. Kuhn, is the author
of another book with the same
title.
It is the one
here cxted repeatedly by Sir
Karl Popper as well as by
That both books bear the same
title cannot be altogether
accidental, for the views they
present often overlap
and are, xn any case, expressed
in the same words. But
their central concerns are, I
conclude, usually very
different. As reported by his critics
(his original has
unfortunately been unavailable to me)
Kuhn, seems on
occasion to make points that subvert
essential aspects
of the position outlined by his
namesake.
,

Kuhn attributes this mutual impenetrability
to the kind of "Gestaltswitch- he discusses in scientific
revolutions and regards the misunder-

standings as "an extended example of what
[he has] elsewhere called
partial or incomplete communication

—

the talking-through-each-other

that regularly characterizes discourse between
participants in incommen-

surable points of view" (pp. 231-232).
Kuhn's position was that, since most of his critics
had not understood his schema, their critiques were largely
irrelevant.

Masterman'

s

critique was the exception.

that Kuhn uses Masterman'

s

It is significant, I think,

criticism so thoroughly.

He at no point

accuses Masterman of distorting his material, acquieses with most
of the

criticisms

a'nd

goes on to base his revisions on them.

this seemed to be his perception that Masterman'

s

His reason for

critique was the only

one that understood his schema, making that Gestalt-switch he emphasizes

He pointed out (1970a, p. 234) that they approached the problem (that is
the necessary revision of the paradigm concept),

in the same spirit.
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though, "my present position differs
from hers in many details."

Masterman does indeed take the position
of sympathetic critic which
is perhaps attributable to the
stand she explicitly takes as a
"workir
Lng
scientist" rather than philosopher.

It was Masterman,

in fact, who first

pointed out the very different receptions
accorded Kuhn's work by scientists and philosophers.

Masterman has no trouble understanding Kuhn's

concept of normal science, regards his
paradigm idea as scientifically
useful, and perceives its current use by
scientists.

She also manages

to take a swipe at two of Kuhn's more
notable detractors.

As Masterman

states (1970, p. 60-61),

—

That there is normal science
and that is exactly as Kuhn
says it is
is the outstanding, the crashingly obvious
fact which confronts and hits any philosophers of
science
who set out, in a practical or technological manner, to
do
any scientific research.
It is because Kuhn
at last
has noticed the central fact about all real science ..
mainly
that it is a normally habit-governed, puzzle-solving
activity,
not a fundamentally upheaving or falsifying activity (not,
in'
other words, a philosophical activity), but actual scientists
are now, increasingly reading Kuhn instead of Popper; to such
an extent indeed that, in the new scientific field particularly,
'paradigm' and not 'hypothesis' is now the 'okay word.'
It
is thus scientifically urgent, as well as philosophically
important, to try to find out what a Kuhnian paradigm is.
Since my overall viewpoint is scientific, this paper also
measures that science as it is actually done, i.e., science
roughly as Kuhn describes it
is also science as it ought
to be done
For the one thing working scientists are not
going to do is change their ways of thinking, in doing science,
_ex more philosophico
because they have Popper and Feyerabend
pontificating at them like eighteenth-century divines; particularly as both Popper and Feyerabend normally pontificate
at even more than eighteenth-century length...

—

—

—

—

.

.

,

This preface is, I fear, a shade aggressive; compression of
material and indignation with what I shall call in the paper
'philosophy-of-science-aetherialism' have caused this. In
any case, in view especially of some of the more interesting
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phrases used by Watkins, a little pro-Kuhn
aggressiveness
injected into the symposium will not do any
harm.

Lest we begin to think Masterman an uncritical
sympathizer

,

it

should be noted that she explicitly agrees with
Kuhn in one major area,
that of paradigm concept, but disagrees with
him in another major area,
i.e., verification (1970, p. 61) and twice takes
him to task for lack

of clarity: first, for confusion about multiple-paradigm
science and

disregard of the role of technology in science, and secondly,
for his
posing two incompatible solutions for his inability to find
the rules
for puzzle-solving.

Masterman's Critique

Masterman begins her critique by raising a most interesting point
"... it is curious,

~

that, up to now, no attempt has been made to eluci-

date this notion of paradigm, which is central to Kuhn's whole view of

science" (1970, p. 59).

When she examines his 1962 usage of the term,

she found that Kuhn used 'paradigm' "in not less than twenty-one different
senses ... possibly more, not less" (1970, p. 61).

Textual analysis

concerned with possible commonalities, with anything definite or general
about the paradigm idea, indicated that Kuhn's twenty-one usages of

paradigm fall into three large groups.

And this is the heart of para-

digm revision (1970, p. 61).
For when he equates "paradigm" with a set of beliefs (p. 4)
with a myth (p. 2), with a successful metaphysical speculation
(p. 15), with a standard (p. 102), with a new way of seeing
(pp. 117-121), with an organizing principle governing perception itself (p. 120), with a map (p. 108), and with something
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which determines a large area of reality
(p. 128)
it
is clearly a metaphysical notion
or entity, rather than
a scientific one, which he has in
his mind.
I shall
therefore call paradigms of this philosophical
sort
metaphysical paradigms or metaparadigms
and these are
the only kind of paradigm which,
to my knowledge, Kuhn's
philosophical critics have referred. Kuhn's
second main
sense of "paradigm" however, which is given
by another
group of uses, is a sociological sense. Thus
he defines
paradigm as a universally recognized scientific
achievement (p. X) as a concrete scientific achievement
(pp. 1011) as like a set of political institutions
(p. 91), and
as like also to an accepted judicial decision
I
(p. 23).
shall call paradigms of this sociological sort
sociological
paradigms.
Finally, Kuhn uses the "paradigm" in a more
concrete way still, as an actual textbook for classical
work (p. 10), as supplying tools, (pp. 37 and
76), as
actual instrumentation (pp. 58-60); more linguistically,
as a grammatical paradigm (p. 23), illustratively, as
an
analogy (p.g. on p. 14); and more psychologically, as a
Gestalt-f igure and as an anomalous pack of cards
(pp. 63
and 85)
I shall call paradigms of this last sort
artefact
paradigms or construct paradigms
,

:

.

.

Of these three major types, Masterman chooses the third,

the arte-

fact or construct paradigm, as the fundamental sense of the concept,

what she calls the "initial practical trick-which-works-suf f icientlyfor-the-choice-of-it-to-embody-a-potential-insight" (1970,
is the concrete problem solution,

p.

70).

It

the new way of seeing the problem

which allows it to be solved and which can then be extended to other
similar phenomena.

The construct or artefact paradigm is a concrete

picture that is then used analogically.

The paradigm then has two func-

tions: one which solves the original problem and the other "that being
a picture of one thing

...

is used

to

represent another

a geometric model made of wire and beads,

—

for example,

though it is primarily a glori-

fication of a well known kind of child's toy, is used in science to
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represent a protein molecule"
(1970, pp. 76-77).

The construct or arte-

fact paradigm antedates the
research program and theory, it
is the way
of seeing something, the flash
of insight, that cracks the
problem.
Often, this paradigm is supplied
by what Masterman refers to as
"some
rank outsiders with a quite different
viewpoint and rudimentary tech-

niques [who] succeed." (1970,
p. 84), in large part because of their

different perspectives and the crudeness
of their technique.

Masterman

considers most paradigms to be relatively
crude, to have a basic quality
of concreteness (1970, p. 67).

usable, and rather primitive.

The paradigms are nothing if not practical,

They are unelaborated

,

unrefined, but

rather inspired insights.

Paradigm Revised

Kuhn's revision of the paradigm concept relies heavily
on Masterman's

analysis and recommendation though he used a somewhat
different structure.

Masterman assigned the 21 paradigm senses

to

three categories,

struct or artefact, the sociological and metaphysical paradigm.

the con-

She then

identified the artefact paradigm as the meaning she thought was fundamental to Kuhn's schema."^

1^
It seems to me that Masterman is correct but for reasons other than
those she forwarded. She makes a case for the artefact sense being fundamental because: if a paradigm must come before normal science, if normal science is a fundamentally "puzzle-solving" activity, and if artefacts
solve puzzles, then the paradigms needed to solve the puzzle are the artefact paradigms. Her argument can be damanged by terming normal science a
"problem-solving" venture, although I do prefer "puzzle-solving" for its
connotations. But it does seem to me that this argument of Masterman's
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Kuhn splits his original broad usage of
paradigm into two interrelated concepts: a construct or artefact
paradigm and a disciplinary

matrix (DM).^

He thus retained Masterman's artefact paradigm
as his

primary conceptualization of the term and assigned
all the previous

meanings of the paradigm to the DM category.

"All of the objects of

commitment described in my Scientific Revolution as
paradigms, parts
of paradigms, or paradigmatic would find a place in
the disciplinary

matrix, but they would not be lumped together as paradigms,
individually
or collectively (1970a, p. 271).

The DM defines a community and provides

those constructs and methods that "enable [adherents] to solve
puzzles
and that accounted for their relative unarainlty in problem choice and
in
the evaluation of problem solutions" (1970a, p. 271).
out,

As Kuhn points

the DM is essentially Masterman's social paradigm.
To explicate the revised paradigm concept first; retaining Master-

man's artefact or construct paradigm, Kuhn re-defined his paradigm as
"exemplar" (1970a, p. 271): "a universally recognized scientific achieve-

ment that for a time provides model problems and solutions to a community

is not nearly so solid as her points regarding the three categories, the
priority of paradigm to theory (66) and to the sociological paradigm
(69-70), and the artefact paradigms used as a way of seeing (73), analogically (77), from the original picture solution to the operational
reinterpretation, while she seems to like the play on words
about puzzle,
I am more impressed by other of her arguments.

"Disciplinary because it is common to the practitioners of a specific discipline, and 'matrix' because it consists of ordered elements
which
require individual specification." (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 271).

.
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of practitioners" (1970b: viii)

.

Paradigms are concrete problem

solutions and at least some of the very early technical
problems
solutions (1970b, p. 18).

As Masterman points out, Kuhn assigns the

central place "in real science, to a concrete achievement"
rather than
to "an abstract theory"

(1970a, p. 66).

Kuhn and Masterman point out

here and there that these achievements must have three more
characteristics to function as paradigms, as opposed to problem solutions only.

They must be "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an
enduring group of

adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity" and they
must
be sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the
re-

defined group of practitioners to solve.

Without these two requirements,

the paradigm could not exist, as a paradigm must point the way while

attracting followers, otherwise there would be no identifiable group with

which it is associated, nor, any subsequent line of investigation which
articulates it as a paradigm.
Finally, to function as a paradigm, a concrete problem solution must
be usable as an analogue; it must provide a Gestalt with which to "see"

new problems as subjects for the application of similar techniques.

3

This enables adherents to see some problems as "like each other" and

therefore apply an interpretation of the model solution.

It would appear

3

This dual aspect of paradigm, as simultaneously solution and exemplar, occasionally causes trouble.
For instance, ". .Pavlovian conditioning is limited as a paradigm-spawning exemplar for two reasons."
(Lipsey, 1974, p. 408).
Examplars do not "spawn" paradigms, they are
.

paradigms
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that this process simultaneously: 1) solves
the new problem,

2)

extends

the range of the paradigm's applicability;
and 3) demonstrates the

efficacy of that paradigm.

Kuhn provides a very nice example of this

dual function of solution and analogy, in
Galileo's solution of the ball

rolling down an inclined plane and the subsequent
use of this solution
as an analogue.

Galileo found that a ball rolling down an incline
acquires
just enough velocity to return it to the same vertical
height
on a second incline of any slope, and he learned
to see that
experimental situation as like the pendulum with a point-mass
for a bob.
Huyghens then solved the problem of the center of
oscillation of a physical pendulum by imagining that the extended body of the latter was composed of Galilean pointpendula, the bobs between which could be released at any
point in the swing. After the bobs were released, the
individual point-pendula would swing freely, but their
collective center of gravity when each was at its highest
point, would be only at the height from which the center of
gravity of the extended pendulum had begun to fall. Finally,
Daniel Bernoulli, still with no aid from Newton's Laws, dis-'
covered how to make the flow of water from an orifice in a
storage tank resemble Huyghens' pendulum, determined the
descent of the center of gravity of the water and tank and
jet during an infinitesimal period of time. Next imagine that
each particle of water afterwards moves separately upward to
the maximum height obtainable with the velocity it possessed
at the end of the interval of descent.
The ascent of the
center of gravity of the separate particles must then equal
the descent of the center of gravity of the water in tank and
jet.
From that view of the problem the long sought speed of
efflux followed at once. These examples display what Miss
Masterman has in mind when she speaks of a paradigm as fundamentally an artefact which transforms problems to puzzles
and enables them to be solved even in the absence of an adequate body of theory.
Is it clear that we are back to language and its attachments
to nature?
Only one law was used in all of the proceeding
examples; known as the Principle of vis viva , it was generally
(1970a,
stated as 'Actual descent equals potential ascent.
'

pp.

273-274).
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Besides demonstrating the solution-analogue
functions of a paradigm,

Kuhn's example also speaks to the
function of a paradigm in the absence
of theory, a point which causes
difficulty for some of his readers.

Kuhn remarks that physicists share few
rules by which they make
that transition from the Gestalt to
the specific form of it demanded by
the individual problem, and. instead,
exposure to a series of exemplary

problem-solutions teaches them to "see" different
physical situations
as like each other.

way,

Once a number of problem situations are seen
this

the individual "can write down ad lib " the
interpretation of the

Gestalt required by the characteristics of the
particular new problem.

Participating in this way of seeing teaches the individual
what the
words mean and how they "... attach to nature; equally,
it is part of
learning how the world behaves.
p.

The two cannot be separated..." (1970a,

The acquisition of a new paradigm as insight and method
seems

274).

also to be the acquisition of a way of seeing "how the world
is."

Thus,

"facts" about some phenomenon in one paradigm would be different than
the "facts" about that phenomenon as construed by another paradigm.

The Disciplinary Matrix

Differentiation from paradigm

.

Kuhn's 1962 Structure of Scientific

Revolutions obviously combined the paradigm and DM concepts.

Thus, Kuhn

cites as paradigmatic, several works which served for a time to implicitly

define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners.

Almagest

,

He includes Aristotle's Physica

Newton's Principia and Opticks

,

Franklin's Electricity

,

,

Ptolemy'

,
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Lavoisier's Chemistry and Lyell's Geography (1970b,

10).

p.

They were able to do so because they were both
sufficiently un-

precedented to attract adherents and sufficiently open-ended
to leave
problems for solution.

But then Kuhn continues:

—

[These] accepted examples of actual scientific practice
examples which include law, theory, application, and
instrumentation together
provide models from which
spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.
These are the traditions which the historian describes
under
such rubrics as 'Ptoleraic astronomy' (or Copernican'
)
'Aristotelian dynamics' (or 'Newtonian'), 'corpuscular'
optics' (or 'wave optics'), and so on (Kuhn, 1970b,
p. 10).

—

'

The "coherent research traditions" should not be seen as identical
to the technical problems solutions.

The latter are the paradigms (e.g.

the Almagest , or the Principia ) which precede

and from which are derived

,

s erve

as exemplars for,

the coherent traditions.

These traditions

,

are what Kuhn later termed disciplinary matrices (DMs) with characteristics, origins and functions all their own.

This 1962 presentation in

quotations indicates the point at which the 1970 revision separates the

disciplinary matrix concept from the paradigm.
In separating the DM concept from the paradigm concept, Kuhn (1970a,
p.

271) asked:

"what its members shared that enabled them to solve

puzzles and that accounted for their relative unanimity in problem choic
and in the evaluation of problem-solutions?"

Here he is essentially con

ceptualizing the DM as a constellation of group commitments (1970b,
It is a strong network of such commitments "conceptual,

methodological" (Kuhn, 1970b,
1970b, p. 177).

p.

p.

1

theoretical, and

42), which defines a community (Kuhn,

This is the perspective within which Kuhn feels the DM
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is what makes it possible for the members
of a coherent tradition of

research to have relative fullness in their
professional communication

with each other, and relative unanimity in their
professional judgments
(1970b, p. 182).

It is important to recognize that a DM governs
the

practitioners and not the subject matter (Kuhn, 1970b,

p.

180).

Seen

sociologically, the DM is "a set of scientific
habits ... [which] may be
intellectual, verbal, behavioral, mechanical, technological"
(Masterman,
1970, p. 66).

Internal structure

.

When addressing the disciplinary matrix "from the

outside," trying to see what it does, what functions it serves,
Kuhn
seems more successful than when he tries to articulate a DM's internal

structure.

Here, when talking about internal structure, he pares the DM

down to four constituents: paradigm or exemplar, shared symbolic generalizations, shared models whether heuristic or metaphysical, and shared

values.

A DM is much broader than, and derives from, a paradigm.

Kuhn is

quite clear that the concrete scientific achievement must not be identified with, but must be seen as "prior to the various concepts, laws,

theories, the points of view that may be extracted from it" (Kuhn, 1970b,
p.

11).

The paradigm is the concrete problem-solution used as analogue

whereas the disciplinary matrix is the line of investigation founded
upon that paradigm or paradigm-set which bind the practitioners.
Symbolic generalizations, another DM component, are those expressions

deployed without question or dissent by group members, which can be
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readily cast into logical form
(1970b, p. 182).
expressed in symbolic form, as in:
^acceleration).

f

Sometimes these can be

= ma (force is equal
to mass X

.

Other symbolic generalizations are
more easily expressed

with words such as "action equals
reaction."

These symbolic generali-

zations allow group members to attach
their logical and mathematical

manipulations to consensual sign posts, as
well as functioning as laws
and definitions for the symbols used.

The symbolic generalizations are

developed as the paradigm is articulated
and are consensually validated

within the DM.
The third major component of any DM
is the shared belief in particular

models "whether metaphysical, like
atomism, or heuristic like the hydrodynamic model of the electric circuit"
(Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 271-272).

The

heuristic model for molecules of gas regards
them as behaving like tiny
elastic billiard balls in random motion.

The metaphysical models portray

phenomena in such a way as to indicate what types
of approaches are permissible.

For example, with regard to metaphysical
models as is pointed

out in Marx and Hillix (1963, p. 180).

...there are two extreme views of the physical world and
the
role of systems in it. One view is that the world
is composed
of independent additive parts whose total
constitutes reality.
The other view is that everything is related to everything
else, and there are no independent systems.
The Gestaltists
held neither of these extreme views, although they leaned
toward the latter.

The metaphysical paradigms as presented by Kuhn address both
episteraolo-

gical and ontological concerns.

Finally the last component Kuhn discusses at any length (and that is

—
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not much) are values.

Kuhn feels that values are more
widely shared

among different communities than
either symbolic generalizations
or
models, and that they do much toward
providing a sense of community to
natural scientists as a whole.
Probably the most deeply held rules
concern predictions:
they should be accurate, quantitative
measures are

preferable to qualitative, etc.

There are also values to be used in

judging whole theories, e.g., theories
should permit puzzle formulation
and solution, it should be as simple
as possible, self-consistent, and

plausible (Kuhn, 1970b,

p.

185).

The issue of value seems to me poorly

articulated; for instance, if values are
more widely shared amon^ different

communities than the other DM constituents,
and if they do more toward

providing a sense of community to natural
scientists as

a whole,

it seems

as though in some ways values function
outside the DM as well as inside

the DM.

How else could they provide a sense of community
across DM's if

these values did not, in some sense, also operate
outside DMs?

an area which deserves more scrutiny.

This is

It is also obvious that when Kuhn

refers to values, he is using the term in the narrow
sense, in relation
to theory choice and construction.

After listing and discussing rather briefly the four components
of
the DM, Kuhn states, "...and other elements of the sort" (Kuhn, 1970a,
p.

272).

These "...other elements of the sort" while most certainly

not elucidated by Kuhn here in his second approach (the internal structure
of the DM), are included in the first approach (the function of the DM)

that is what it seems to do "for" practitioners.

These mentioned, but

'
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not developed, other components then,
must include "scientific habits"
in theory, method, and instrumentation/
technology

.

All of which above

have been mentioned as part and parcel
of the DM by Kuhn and Masterman
as they Initially approached the DM
concept.

They then presumably in-

cluded these concerns only under "other
elements of the sort."
It is obvious, however,

that they are necessary and should
be

articulated as to function and relationship
with components of the DM.
Kuhn places both paradigm and some
aspects of disciplinary matrix prior
to theory.

For instance (Kuhn, 1970a,
p. 271)

When I speak of knowledge embedded in terms and
phrases
learned by some non-linguistic process like
ostension,
I am making the same point that
my book aimed to make
by repeated reference to the role of paradigms
as concrete problem solutions, the exemplary objects of
an
ostension. When I speak of that knowledge as consequential for science and for theory-construction, I am
identifying what Miss Masterman underscores about paradigms by saying that they 'can function when the theory
is not there.

His points regarding paradigm solutions as exemplary objects
of ostension,
and as operating prior to theory are nicely spelled out in
the previously

presented quotation regarding Galileo, Huyghens, et al

.

,

using the para-

digm in the absence of Newtonian theory, but with the picture-insight
to guide them.

Masterman (1970,

p.

66) makes the further point that,

by

assigning the central place in actual science to concrete achievements,
that is, the paradigm rather than the theory, "Kuhn, alone among philo-

sophers of science, puts himself in a position to dispel the worry which
so besets the working scientist confronted for the first time with pro-

fessional philosophy of science,

'How can

I

be using a theory which isn't
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there'"?

Relation Between Paradigm and DM
It is also clear that paradigms
must initially precede DMs,

since

the paradigm provides the initial
insight, and the normal science which

articulates that paradigm must clearly exist
subsequent to, and not
prior to, the paradigm.

But what does the scientist use in terms
of

method or perspective to develop

a

paradigm?

Given the emphasis Kuhn

places on technical problem solutions, the
individual scientist might

well be "importing" a technique or approach from
a different DM.

The

insights or techniques of the normal science of a
different DM are

adapted and brought to bear on the problem at hand.

In fact, Masterman

alludes to this process when she talks about a paradigm
being constructed
by "rank outsiders" in a different field who come up with
a crude, but
useful, paradigm.

(As we will see,

this is precisely what occurred in

the construction of the double bind paradigm.)

If the technique,

or

"trick," is successful, the individual has a problem solution, and if
that problem solution meets the criteria of unprecedented success, open-

endedness, and possibility of analogic use as Gestalt or exemplar, s/he
also has a new paradigm; at this point, the "imported" technique, or

"trick," if it remains useful, becomes the starting point and part of
the new DM, and will become translated and modified through time to meet

the requirements of the problems encountered.

Those techniques or tricks

not an aid in constructing the paradigm, or subsequently articulating it.
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are obviously not part of the new DM.

During the early elaboration and articulation
of the paradigm by

DM adherents, the sequence is linear;
that is. the paradigm exists,
and being elaborated, forms a DM
through normal science activity and the

flow of "events- is from paradigms to
DM.

(Actually, this is necessarily

the case, as the paradigm precedes the
DM in time and function).

As both

components become developed, however, the
linear quality changes; DM
components reflect "back" onto the original
paradigm, necessitating modifications.

For instance, some refinement of
instrumentation may require

a change of paradigm quantification
values

(if the paradigm has been ex-

pressed in numbers), or, the elaboration of a
theory might highlight

necessary reformulation of a basic process in the
paradigm.

It is

supposed that if paradigms are constructed in such
a manner that makes

modification impossible, the DM must eventually wither;
whether this has
actually occurred seems an interesting, and important point,
though one

which is tangential to present purposes.
Kuhn does not address himself to this loss of linearity, and
thereby unrealistically limits his schema.

The concept of "ref lexivity" as

developed by the ethonomethodologists (Mehan and Wood, 1975) appears to

describe the actual relationship of the paradigm and DM, after the
initial development of the DM.

That is, both the paradigm and DM become

defined by the adherents with respect to each other and as each becomes
defined, the definition serves a defensive or confirming purpose for the
other.

In such a way the adherents maintain some "purity" of definition
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and some overall coheslveness
In the DM.

Similarly. U>a use o£ new
Instrumentation a, well as old
techniques
and methods may also allow
new problems and solutions
to emerge, e.g..
as Kuhn points out. use of
the cathode ray made the
discovery of x-rays
possible. The cathode ray and
Its use were Instrumentation
and methodology respectively but the
solution to the problem remains
the insight,
that is the paradigm, not
the instrument.
At times, the two have been
confused; for Instance the concept
of "instrumental paradigms"
such as
the shuttle box and rotary
pursuit apparatus have been
forwarded
(Welmer and Palermo, 1973.
p. 242. their footnote M,
While Welmer and
Palermo indicate that these
devices function within the
paradigm and
meet exemplar requirements
It seems that they confuse
the issue somewhat.
These Instruments may well
be a part of a problem-solution
that
also serves as an analogue,
and thus In part constitute
a paradigm, but
.

.

it appears unnecessary and
potentially confusing to refer to
them as

"instrumental paradigms."
In a similar point. Lipaey
(1974.

pp.

407-408) takes them to task

for arguing that behaviorlstlc
methods and techniques were exemplars,

Lipsey's point is that they are not the
same as

a

concrete problem-

solution "resulting from the use of a
particular method or technique."
This point seems equivocal to me.

For instance, if

a

familiar technique

solves a problem, this seems to me to be
normal science and therefore
not the creation of a paradigm.

If,

on the other hand, a familiar method

or technique is adapted to solve a new
problem such that the solution

A3

meets paradigm requirements, that
adapted method-and-solution
combination
appear to be the relevant unit, and
then, the method does indeed
partially constitute the paradigm.

Functions of DMs

Gatekeeping

.

Kuhn considered some of the other important
functions

(beyond guidance functions previously
discussed) of the DM.
of these, essentially a gatekeeping
function,

The first

involves the achievement

of unanimity regarding the problem-choice
and solution.

...One of the things a scientific community
acquires with
a paradigm is a criterion for choosing
problems that

while the paradigm is taken for granted, it can
be assumed
to have solutions.
To a great extent these are the only
problems that the community will admit as scientific
or
encourage its members to undertake. Other problems,
including many that had previously been standard, are'
rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another
discipline, as sometimes just too problematic to be
worth
the time (Kuhn, 1962, p. 37, cited by Masterman,
1970,
pp. 82-83, footnote).
Weimer and Palermo (1973, pp. 223-224) give an exposition of

a DM

development, particularly with respect to its gatekeeping functions
and

institutionalization.
In sum, the paradigmatic and normal science nature of structural
psychology is evident from a number of its distinctive
characteristics.
It specified a rigorous subject matter
(consciousness and its contents) and a rigorous method
(selbstbeobachtung) such that anyone studying another
subject or employing another method was automatically not
doing 'experimental psychology.' Laboratories were
founded for the experimental study of the subject matter,
while universities offered courses in the 'New Psychology',
and departments gradually appeared as separate entities
from physiology and philosophy. Professional initiates were
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trained
these departments and laboratories.
Professional
journals, such as the Philosophische
Studien (founded in
1881), appeared for the dissemination of
research findings
Likewise, psychological professional
societies developed^
tor the purpose of fostering
communication within the
group
A certain amount of 'brass instrument'
equipment
specific to the psychological laboratory,
was developed
Despite the many conceptual and theoretical
issues taken
for granted (e.g., the utility and
validity of studying°
the contents of the adult mind), there
were numerous
within the ring' (to use Titchener's turn
of phrase) controversies concerning specific issues of
fundamental
theoretical if not paradigmatic import
(such as whether the
Ausfragemethode was a legitimate form of
introspection)
Throughout all of this, some basic metaphysical
directives
such as 'Associationism is the mechanism of
the mind', were
endorsed unquestioningly (Weimer and Palermo,
1973, pp. 223'

'

.

224).

Communication and consensus.

Kuhn also considers the communicational

function of a disciplinary matrix; this appears to be

a

major function

with respect to conducting normal science activities, to
the maintenance
of research communities, and to the perception
and conceptualization

of phenomena and decisions about how they should be
researched.

One of the things upon which the practive of normal science
depends is a learned ability to group objects and situations
into similarity classes which are primitive in the sense that
the grouping is done without the answer to the question,
'similar with respect to what?'
One aspect of every revolution
is then that some of these similarity relations change.
Objects
which were grouped in the same set before were grouped in
different sets afterwards and visa versa
Think of the sun,
moon, Mars, and Earth before and after Copernicus; of free
fall, pendular, and planetary motion before and after Galileo,
or of salts, alloys, and a sulpher-iron filing mix before
and after Bolton.
Since most objects within even the altered
sets continue to be grouped together, the names of the sets
are generally preserved. Nevertheless the transfer of a
subset can critically affect the network of interrelations
among the sets
Transferring the metals from the set of
compounds to the set of elements was part of a new theory of
combustion, of acidity, and of the difference between physical
.

,

.
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and chemical combination.
In short ordpr
^hoo
u
had spread through all of
cUejtstry
^h a' ^df^
trrbution of objects a.ong
slmilarLy sets occurs ito
men whose discourse had proceeded
for some time"ur

Zn

responding to the same stimulus
with Incompatible descriptions or generalizations.
Just because neither can
then say "I use the word element
(or mixture, or pLne?
tne source of the breakdown
?heTur:r:f":he'b"':H*

xy/ua, pp. Z75-276)

In their communication may

[emphasis added]

Without insisting that there is
no recourse in such situations,

Kuhn does emphasize that these
differences are very deep, not merely
about definition, names or theory,
but "equally and inseparably about
nature.

We cannot say with any assurance
that the two men even see the

same thing, possess the same data,
but identify or interpret it differently" (Kuhn,

1970a, p. 276).

Kuhn's work here, it seems to me, is
quite important with regard
to

controversy in psychology and so

I

will continue at some length.

The source of communication breakdowns now
being considered
are likely evidence that the men involved are
processing
certain stimuli differently, receiving different
data from
them, seeing different things or the same
things differently
Nevertheless, there must be recourse. Though they
have no
direct access to it, the stimuli to which the
participants
in a communication breakdown respond are, under
pain of
solipsism, the same. So is their general neutral apparatus,
however different the program. Furthermore, except in small,
if all-important areas of experience, programming must
be
the same, for the men involved share a history (except
the
immediate past), a language, and an everyday world, and most
of a scientific one.
Given what they share, they can find
out much about how they differ. At least they can do so if
they have sufficient will, patience, and tolerance of
threatening ambiguity, characteristics which, in matters of
this sort, cannot be taken for granted.
Indeed, the sorts of
therapeutic efforts to which I now turn are rarely carried
far by scientists.
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'^^'^ experiencing communication
breakdown
cln discover
l^Trn
can
by experiment-sometimes by
thought-experiment
arm-chaxr science-the area in which
it occurs.
O^en
the linguistic center of the
difficulty will involve a set
of terms, like element and compound,
which both men deploy
unproblematically but which it can now be
seen they attach
I£ Iiature in different ways. For each, these are teT^^Ti^ a
basic vocabulary, at least in the sense
that their normal
mtra-group use elicits no discussion request
for explication
or disagreement. Having discovered,
however, thIF for intra^roup discussion, these words are the locus
o^ special
difficulties our men may resort to their
shared everyday
vocabularies in a further attempt to elucidate
their troubles.
Each may, that is, try to discover what
the other would see
and say when presented with a stimulus to
which his visual
and verbal responses would be different.
With time and skill
they may become very good predictors of each
others' behavior, something that the historian regularly
learns to do
(or should) when dealing with older scientific
theories
(Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 276-277; emphasis added)
'

,

,

It is important to emphasize here Kuhn's
points regarding differen-

ces in perception as well as meaning.

Within one DM, this sort of

communicational breakdown is necessarily impossible since the
adherents
share paradigms (ways of seeing the problem of interest which
help to

constitute the DM), symbolic generalizations (i.e., shared language
and
codes, where the same symbol or word means the same thing and is
related
to

the same phenomenon for both people) and shared values,

that is

shared ideas about what is important; there may be degrees of differences but they are within the same framework.
of controversy within DMs;

This does not imply lack

there can be vehement debates regarding

theoretical issues, methods, interpretations of results, etc., but since
the framework is shared,

these controversies resolve.

But communication

between two such frameworks is very difficult though not impossible.
since the same words might mean different things or refer to different
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phenomena, or refer to the same phenomena in
different ways.

There is

not necessarily any agreement about
what is important and the indivi-

duals do not share important Gestalts
through which they see the world.
(For, after all,

if they did,

they would share a DM).

Clearly, defi-

nitional fights can be resolved within a DM,
but are almost irresol-

vable between two DMs as there is not the
shared language, values or
phenomena, nor is the interrelationship of language
and phenomena the
same.

With this sort of elaboration, it becomes clear
that the differences between the two different DMs are more than
a matter of differing

paradigms, though that in itself can be rather confusing.

Differing

paradigms means that the same name may be used for different
phenomena.
Further, just to make matters more complicated, two different
paradigms
in all probability stand in different relation to their
DMs,

that is,

no two paradigms are articulated in the same manner by their
DMs. Keeping

this difference in mind can help us to avoid certain mistakes
which appear

repeatedly in controversies.
For instance, in an attempt to present some of the difficulties in

deciding among the various theoretical formulations of learning theory,

Weimer and Palermo (1973,

p.

230) state that,

...all these theorists utilized the 'empirical fact' of reinforcement in their behavioral equation, regardless of whether
it was 'theoretically necessary' or not.
As is by now common
knowledge, the difficulty in deciding between the various theoretical formulations of 'learning theory' was that, despite
their different appearances, all these theories 'predicted'
(or, more often, postdicted) the same behavioral results,
[their emphasis].
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It might well be that the theories
predicted the same results and

that complicated the choice.

But surely, when competing lines
of re-

search talk about the "empirical fact"
of reinforcement, it is obvious
that they are not necessarily talking
about the same thing.

Weimer and Palermo (1973,

p.

Thus, as

229) note:

As is well known, Hull related reinforcement
directly to
drive reduction and deemed it necessary
for learning.
Guthrie, by contrast, said that reinforcement
was not
necessary for learning (that learning was
nothing but
association by contiguity), and that it had an
effect
upon momentary performance only.
Skinner was a strict
reinforcement theorist (for operant behaviour)
but considered it to be an experimental operation only,
shunning
all attempts to identify the nature of
reinforcement with
physiological (or other) variables. Tolman acknowledged
the necessity of reinforcement for certain
types of learning
situations, but denied its relevance to others.
Spence,
remained noncommital throughout the controversy
.

Though all of the above learning theorists used the term
"reinforcement" and referred to its presence as an empirical
fact, it is
clear they had different conceptualizations for the term,
and actually,
the identical term referred to different phenomena.

However, in those

DMs where reinforcement was regarded as essential to learning
itself
(rather than merely for performance)

,

the reinforcement concept would

be more important and would very probably be articulated and supported
in a different manner than when reinforcement was regarded as useful only

in eliciting the performance of the already learned response.

A related point is, that "further research" does not suffice to
resolve controversies across DMs and in fact, cannot
p.

.

Burgess (1972,

197) has also recognized this; he is speaking with reference to the

49

long-standing controversy between cognitive
psychology versus Skinnerian
psychology.
^h^n they note that research
will be the final arbiter between
these two approaches
this surely constitutes a
misinterpretation of Kuhn
nothing could be further from the
truth.
Research does
not determine a paradigm change
it is a Gestalt switch
and since few Skinnerians or
cognitists discuss their
mutual problems this Gestalt switch
seems far off.

-

Take for example, a controversy
cited where a transposition experi-

ment with two discriminable stimuli
was agreed upon by both factions
as
an adequate instrument with which
to test the alternative approaches.
"The neobehaviouristic orthodoxy won
this conflict by the simple, yet

beautifully effective, expedient of

'

operationalizing

'

the controversy

in terms of their own experimental design,"
(Weimer and Palermo, 1973,
pp.

230-231).

By allowing the controversy to be couched
in neobehaviouris-

tic terms and methods,

the cognitive proponents could not possibly
"win."

They had allowed the others to define the
problem, conditions, methods
of testing and acceptable solution,

i.e.,

to be put into the neobehaviouristic DM,

the fight before the fight.

they had allowed the problem
and, as such, had capitulated

It is a bit like those expositions of the

Socratic method wherein the "learner" answers questions so phrased
that
only one answer is possible, only to be drawn inevitably to the foregone
conclusion.

Allowing a debate to be entered only within one DM or another

pre-empts the testing factor altogether.
In addition,

the differences in values, meaning and language as well

as choice of heuristic or metaphysical model, makes settling of terms
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between two people who do not share a DM, exceedingly
troublesome and
improbable.

This is not to say that communication and
resolution is

impossible; for example, areas of disagreement
can be identified and

discussed (although agreement is unlikely);
however, discussion about
the content of any of the intra-DM constituents
by

not share a DM is doubly difficult.

work of problems and meanings.

tt^o

people who do

First, they lack a shared frame-

Secondly, each constituent of a DM is

not independent but rather is inter-dependent
on the others; thus, the

other constituents are often brought in to clarify
a point about the con-

stituent in question, but if they are, the entire DM
and not merely one
component, will be debated and that is fruitless.

Here

I

think is one

of the reasons Kuhn talks about conversion
experiences.

In summary, the consensual aspects of the DM are of
fundamental

importance in facilitating normal science activities and ease of
communication within a DM.

Across DMs, however, this consensual aspect is

lacking (by definition), and this deficit facilitates mis-understanding
in a number of areas.

First, semantic difficulties may arise because

identical words have different meanings in different DMs.

Secondly,

different DMs may look at what appears to be the same phenomenon, but

perceive very different problems and conceptualize different approaches;
if these differences in perception are not recognized, mis-understandings

are likely.

Thirdly, the difficulty in understanding and communication

is exacerbated by the fact that paradigms are not necessarily developed

and elaborated in the same way by their respective DMs; thus, what one
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DM may regard as the obvious next step
and definitive trial may seem
irrelevant, or even misguided to the other
DM.

Because of this, argu-

ments about such activities as verification
or disconf irmation, across
DMs, are usually fruitless.

Fourth, the inter-dependence of DM con-

stituents often means that it is very difficult
to fully discuss any
one constituent without bringing in some
others.

Thus, it may be

impractical to attempt to explain a DM's paradigm
without also mentioning
those values or models which help to articulate
it; similarly, it would
be very difficult to debate one's models without
using the DM's symbolic

generalization.

Unfortunately, the debate then involves large regions

of the respective DMs rather than isolated segments.

Finally, mis-

understandings across DM lines is fostered by the belief that
these
debates are resolvable by "further research".

This belief is based on

the premise that method and research are independent of DMs.

clearly not the case.

This is

Perception and conceptualization of the phenomenon,

language, models, instrumentation and methodology are DM-related.

As

such, further research rather than resolving the debate between two DMs,

perpetuates and elaborates two parallel lines of research in disagreement.

Communication and consensual understanding are DM functions for

the adherents of each specific DM; this consensuality breaks down across

DM boundaries, that is, consensuality is not a perogative of those who
do not share a framework.
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Normal Science, Anomaly, Crisis,
and Revo1nf.-nn

Normal science_.

Conceptualizing scientific activity
and progress. Kuhn

distinguishes between his own and Karl
Popper's.
243) argues that Popper's idea of

Kuhn Cl970a, pp. 242-

'revolutions in permanence':

...does not, anymore than
'square-circle', describe a
phenomenon that could exist.
Frameworks ^ust be lived
with and explored before they
can be broken.
But Hat
does not imply that scientists
ought not aim at the

unobtainable that
"rpv
^^^°l"tion
permanence' could name an important
fnf.-H
and
Ideological imperative.
If Sir Karl and I disagree
at all about normal science,
it is over this point.
He
and his group argue that the
scientist should try at all
times to be a critic and a
proliferator of alternate
theories.
I urge the desirability of
alternate strategy
which reserves such behavior for
special occasions.

^oaf

m

Specifically. Kuhn conceptualizes
scientific activity in terms of

alternations between periods in which normal
science is the dominant mode
of activity, interspersed with
revolutionary periods emerging when normal

science has uncovered problems which are
unsolvable in the usual concep-

tual-procedural structure.

That is, normal science and revolutionary

science alternate, but neither is dispensible
in scientific activity.

Normal science consists of those research
activities which articulate,

elaborate and extend the paradigm or paradigm set.
by engaging in puzzlesolving behavior.

The paradigm is used in its various functions, is re-

fined and clarified, and the limits of its applicability
began to be
sensed.

Essentially, lines of research originate from the paradigms and

develop into DMs.

Normal science activities investigate phenomena both

deemed important by the value system of the developing DM and seen as
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solvable by practitioners using the particular
paradigm (and subsequent

methodology and concepts built up by the DM
thus far.)

The paradigm

is used in its Gestalt function and
becomes progressively more "power-

ful" as a scientific tool.

During these periods of normal science, practitioners
can take the
current theory for granted, exploiting it rather
than criticizing it;

practitioners in the mature sciences are free to investigate
their
phenomena to "an esoteric depth and detail otherwise
unimaginable"
(Kuhn, 1970a, p.

247).

It is at these times,

that theories are inves-

tigated and extended, adding information to the body of knowledge
al-

ready acquired; the journal article is the primary source
of information,

primary vehicle of information processing, and the mode of programs
is
cumulative, that is data build up and add to what has been previously

articulated.

Kuhn points out that there is an aspect of normal science that is

fundamentally conservative, in which normal science "seems an attempt
to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible boxes
that

the paradigm provided" (1970b, p. 24).

During normal science phases,

there is really no sort of activity which is directed to eliciting new
sorts of phenomena; new information about recognized phenomena, yes, but
that is altogether different than revealing and having to deal with new

phenomena.

In fact, those phenomena that

not fit into the paradigm-

DM complex are either not seen at all (Kuhn, 1970b,
gated" to other DMs, or to metaphysics.

p.

24), or are "rele-

Despite this conservative aspect.

.
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which makes possible investigation without
constant glancing over one's
shoulder, change does occur. At times in
all substantive areas revolutionary science develops because of a
rather specific developmental
pattern.

It is probably important to emphasize
here that these revolu-

tionary phases emerged from certain developments
in normal science, that

revolutionary science establishes the paradigms
which are later articulated and which make normal science necessary
and possible; suffice it to

say that both forms of scientific activity are
indispensible

Anomaly.

During the articulation and extension of the paradigms,
that

is during normal science activity,

there sometimes occur obdurate dis-

crepancies between paradigm-based prediction and actual empirical
findings, i.e., anomalies.
sist,

With replications, if these disparities pre-

they result in a felt crisis, with resulting changes in the

activities and goals of science, and the eventual establishment of a
new paradigm or set of related paradigms, which initiates another period
of normal science activity.

Kuhn (1970a, pp. 256-257) gives a rather nice example of this disparity between paradigm-induced expectation and empirical finding, in
his summary of the origin of the Bohr atom.
...the background was an entirely normal puzzle.
Bohr set
out to improve the physical approximations .. .of the energy
lost by charged particles passing through matter.
In the
process he made what was to him the surprising discovery that
the Rutherford atom. .was mechanically unstable and that a
Planck-like ad hoc device for stabilizing it proved a promising
explanation of the periodicities in Mendeleev's table, something else for which he had not been looking
At that point
model
no
excited
nor
was
his
still had
states,
Bohr yet con.

.
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cerned to apply it to atomic spectra;
those steps followed
however as he attempted to reconcile
his model with the
apparently incompatible one developed
by J.W. Nicholson
and in the process, encountered
Balmer s formula. Like
much of the research that produces
revolution, Bohr's
biggest achievement in 1913 are products,
therefore, of a
research program directed to goals very
different from those
^^'^^^"^^ ••• ^"'^ illustrates with
particular clariTTThrT^olutionary efficacy of normal research puzzles,
(emphasis added)
'

'

Kuhn's explication aptly illustrates the
manner in which anomalies crop
up during the course of normal science
activity, directed elsewhere, and

how efficient or productive normal research
puzzles prove to be for just
this sort of thing.

stance,

"...

He makes this latter point several times, for
in-

in developing sciences ... it is technical
puzzles that

provide the usual occasions and often the concrete
material for revolution.

Their availability together with the information and
signals they

provide account in large part for the special nature of scientific
progress." (1970a, p. 247)
Since an anomaly is a discrepancy between paradigm-induced expect-

ation and actual observation (Kuhn, 1970a, p. 52), it is important
realize, as Masterman points out,

(1970, pp. 82-83)

that:

[Kuhn's] essential point is that an anomaly is an untruth, or
a should-be-soluable-but-is-insoluable problem, or a germane
but unwelcome result, or a contradiction, or an absurdity,
which is thrown up by the paradigm itself being pushed too

far not just an incidental counter-argument to the theory,
or an awkward fact, which Kuhn correctly characterizes is
merely an 'irritant'. Neither is it an extra-paradigmatic
novelty nor a problem which used to exist in the field at an
earlier stage, but which the developers of the paradigm have
now suppressed and rendered invisible, because it is incompatible with the paradigms "basic commitment." The anomaly,
to be a true anomaly, has got to be introduced from within
;

to
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the paradigm. 4 [her emphasis]

Efforts are made to "correct" the situation,
at times by adjusting
the analogy function of the paradigm,
or alternatively, to produce var-

iants of the theories which can accomodate
the anomaly, or if worse comes
to worse to "dig out the theory's
fundamental assumptions,

make the analogy fit again" (Masterman, 1970,

p.

to try to

83).

Obviously, anomalies will have different impact
depending upon how

important a point in a DM they challenge.

An anomaly of theory for in-

stance, may necessitate changes in a theory, without
challenging the

paradigm or other primary DM components.

If the paradigm is challenged

by the anomalies, however, then clearly they are
very significant and

will probably induce

Crisis.

a

relatively greater sense of difficulty.

If the anomalies continue,

if for instance there are several of

them and they make the inadequacies of the present framework clear, or
if the anomalies,

though not numerous, are embarrassing because they

counter critical parts of the DM, a period of crisis emerges.

As Master-

man develops the important point (1970, pp. 83-84)
...it is not only the case that a fully extended paradigm
or theory, reaches the point where further extensions of
it produce diminishing returns.
The situation is worse.

4

tum

See Kuhn's example of obdurate anomalies in early twentieth cenphysics, 1970, p. 257.
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complexity and conf^sJon
n
does, if pressed
P"^""
"^like the way in which
I Llrl
P"^^ mathematics does, when it
°^
yieLs un!T
decx abi
ormuli or contradictions, or
fails to^^ld
^^^^^^^^^
ac iTthf
?oo faf Lr^J/!^

1

--^^ -alogy

V

No philosopher of science
before Kuhn had described
this
deterioration. All had blamed
the gradual coUapse of
various scientific theories
on the Let ?hat thov ""^"^
eventually falsified in
experience
^^""-^^"^^ by
sav the
t^P emergence
°y» say,
of new farf<?- i o
^

''^^"'^
'"^'^^^ commitments, and
,?nr» ^^
since
the °L
effect of these paradigms Is
drastlcaUy

f

by their own make up...

'

This process, of emerging anomalies
which increasingly demonstrate
the inadequacies of the all
important (to scientific activity)
framework,

where the paradigm "gets pushed too
far" and collapses from within,
have
some of the tragicomic quality of the
well-known cartoon character
looking down and realizing he has run
off the cliff and didn't know it.
There's a ring of some of the same surprise,
betrayal, incipient outrage,
and dawning awful conviction that there's
going to be hell to pay.

This sense of outraged and chagrined
shock seems to me an earmark of
that transition from normal science
to revolutionary science.

Awareness

of the problem is necessary, for
there is no crisis in Kuhn's framework

without awareness.

Crisis is induced by this awareness among
adherents

that anomalies exist and despite persistent
efforts, will not conform
to paradigmatic expectations

(Kuhn, 1970b, pp.

67-68).

Without such

.
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awareness, there can be no crisis,
though there ™ay be anomalous

findings

Kuhn discusses some historical
situations in which solutions to
problems have been ignored for a time
because no one knew they were
needed; thus there was no crisis,
but no new solution either, until

awareness of anomaly induced crisis
and the idea was dusted off to see
if it would fit.

The most famous of these situations
is probably the

anticipation of Copernicus by Aristarchus
in the third century B.C.
His work on the heliocentric solar
system was ignored, as no one really

needed it.

It explained nothing then that the
geocentric system did not,

and there existed no felt crisis.

Only after repeated failures of the

Ptolemaic system did it become clear that an
alternative was needed
(summarized from Kuhn, 1970b, pp. 75-76).

A bit closer to home, Weimer and Palermo (1973,
similar situation.

They regard

K.

p.

232) present a

Lashley's 1951 Hixton Symposium

paper on serial order as
a coup de grace from which no behaviourism worthy
of the
name will ever recover ... [but J it is only recently
(nearly
twenty years after the fact) that Lashley's monumental
paper is receiving recognition. With behaviourism in sway,
it was initially ignored even at Harvard (Lashley's

own
institution) which was subsequently the birthplace of the
new psycholinguistics during the early 1960 's.

(Lashley's paper was directly relevant to the psycholinguistic position).

Besides awareness, there are a number of other earmarks to the crisis
phase,

that is,

science.

the transition from normal science to revolutionary

These include, "the proliferation of competing articulations,

the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent.

.
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the recourse to philosophy and
to debate over fundamentals

1962, p.

90,

quoted by Masterman, 1970,
p. 83, in a footnote).

(Kuhn,

The pro-

liferation of theories is an attempt
to include the anomalies in
the DM
framework, with many of them more
than a little plausible.
Further
characteristics of crisis are investigation
of phenomena formerly considered beyond the confines of
legitimacy, with a concomittant loosening
of the rules of research, and debate
about these rules of normal science.
.

Kuhn points out that it is not
coincidental that the emergence of

Newtonian physics in the 17th century, and
relativity and quantum
mechanics in the 20th, were preceded and
accompanied by fundamental and
philosophical investigations of the respective
contemporary research
traditions.

It would seem that such periods of
crisis must be interes-

ting times in which to be a philosopher,
and difficult times for most

scientists

Revolution.

Crisis remains until someone formulates a paradigm
that

uses the anomalies as the base for his/her paradigm.

formulated, as Masterman points out (1970,

p.

Paradigms are often

83) by "outsiders" who

have a different viewpoint and a different set of techniques
which they

bring to bear on the anomalous phenomena and in the process of doing
so,
also create a paradigm and a new line of research.

This does not mean

that someone comes in, from another field, and incorporates the anomalies

into his/her own original field; this is clearly not a revolution nor is
the problem solution necessarily a paradigm; it may be just a problem

solution.

To be revolutionary,

the new solution must serve as a paradigm
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and begin a new line of research through
normal science.

A new paradigm or paradigm set in revolutionary
science demands
that the conceptual and procedural
commitments of the group fundamental
to the practice of the relevant
specialty be jettisoned and replaced

(Kuhn, 1970a, p.

250);

this often necessitates a redefinition of
the

relevant science (1970b, p. 102).

Because the paradigm and subsequent

DM are more than theory or model, some fundamental
ways of seeing the
world, and structuring phenomena, have
changed.

Each revolution has consequences with
ramifications for the past
as well as the future.

The extraordinary episodes in which that shift
in professional commitment occurs are. .. scientific revolutions.
They are the tradition-shattering complements
to the
tradition-bound activity of normal science...

Each scientific revolution necessitated the community's
rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor
of another incompatible with it.
Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific
scrutiny and of the standards by which the profession
determined what should count as an admissible problem
or as a legitimate problem solution.
Each transformed
the scientific imagination in ways that we will ultimately
need to describe as transformation of the world within
which scientific work was done. Such changes, together
with the controversies that almost always accompanied
them, are the defining characteristics of scientific
revolution (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 6).
It is necessary to emphasize that revolutions are part of a developmen-

tal sequence, a part that is non-cumulative, in which the older, estab-

lished paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new
one (Kuhn, 1970b,

p.

91).

Some questions need to be raised at this junction.

For instance,
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what is revolutionary and
what is Just an extension
of nor.al science.
One aspect of this question
was addressed above; if
anomalies are absorbed by so.e other DM, a
proble. solution is not
revolutionary.
If
the anomalies provide the
base for a paradig. on
their own, then revolutionary science is occurring.
Kuhn approaches this question
from a

different angle (1970a,

p.

251),

articulations and extensions of
sharld belief from "^r'
shared
changes which involve reconstruction^
The answer in extreme cases is
obviously yes
Copernican
revolutionary but'the caloric JhLry
Of adiabatic compression
was not.
These examples are, however, too extreme to be fully
informative; there are ^oo
many differences between the people
contrasted, and the
revolutionary changes affected too many
people.
Fortunately
however, we are not restricted to
them: .. .Lavoisier s dL
oxygen... was revolutionary, for it
was inseparable
friria new theory of combustion and
from
acidity.
The discovery
of neon, however, was not, for
helium had supplied both the
notion of an inert gas and the needed
column of the periodic
table.
.

.

.

oT:~tll

'

Another relevant question might be:
Kuhn (1970a,

p.

Revolutionary for whom?

Again,

242),

Sometimes the answer is easy: Copernical
astronomy was a
revolution for everyone; oxygen was a revolution
for chemists
but not for, say, mathematical astronomers ...
For the latter
group, oxygen was simply another gas, and its
discovery was
merely an increment to their knowledge; nothing
essential to
them as astronomers had to be changed in the
discovery's
assimilation.
It is not, however, usually possible to
identify groups who share cognitive commitments simply
by
naming a scientific subject matter— astronomy chemistry,
mathematics, or the like.
Some scientific subjects, for
example, the study of heat have belonged to several different
scientific communities at different times, sometimes to
several at once without becoming the special province of
,

any.
It should be noted here that "crisis" does not always refer to the
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discipline as a whole.

This
inxs DarM-^n,,
j
partially depends
upon the significance of
the ano.alies-the greater
their significance, the
greater the probability
that a large group of
scientists is affected.
It is important to recognize that the relevant group
here is that group of
practitioners constituting and working in the DM
that the anomalies are
challenging.
If
a discipline is comprised
of several DMs, one or
perhaps more may be

experiencing crisis, but not
necessarily all of them.
Similarly, as Kuhn alluded above,
it is necessary to know
the nature
and structure of group commitments
before being able to signify
those to

whom a paradigm is a revolution.

It would seem that those who
responded

vociferously to the paradigm, either
positively or negatively, would be
the scientists most involved in
the fate and consequences of
the issue,
(though unfortunately, this criteria
would fail to pick up those prac-

titioners who, maintaining a stoney
silence, hope the offending party

will go away if ignored long enough).

At times there is an easily iden-

tified community, while for other
phenomena, interested scientists are

dispersed over a variety of disciplines,
and meet primarily at specialized conferences.

Kuhn very clearly feels that the "unit of
analysis" with regard to

revolutions are DMs, that is,
...the practitioners of a given specialty, men [sicj
bound
together by common elements in their education and
apprenticeship, aware of each other's work, and characterized
by the
relative fullness their professional communication and
relative unanimity of their professional judgment.
In the
mature sciences the members of such communities would
ordinarily see themselves and be seen by others as the
men exclusively responsible for a given subject matter

63

and a gxven set of goals.
Including the training of their
successors
Research would, however, disclose
the exis^^P^^^^
co^nities't
leTsl In
scientific scene, may consist
of a hund^^H
hundred members, sometimes
significantly fewer.
Individuals, particularly the ablest,
may belong to
several such groups, either
simultaneously or in
succession and they will change or at
least adjust their
thinking caps as they go from one
to another.

X

Groups like these should, I suggest,
be regarded as the
units which produce scientific
knowledge...
This is also the body which decides
the fate of the new paradigm, and

articulates it into a line of research if
it is accepted.
Changing paradigms also directly implies
changing from an established DM to a developing DM. with all
this involves in changes of perception, meaning, and relevant phenomena.

In changing DMs, a scientist,

while usually doing so on intellectual grounds,
is also by implication
deciding between systems which heavily influence
his/her perception and
experience, as well as theory-building.

It is not surprising that new

DMs are often resisted; depending upon the
scientist's present DM, new

DMs must seem more or less congenial.

The congeniality of developing

DMs would vary widely, depending upon how closely the
scientist's present

DM approached the various emerging DMs in their influence on perception
and experience of the world, as well as for purely logical considerations
in theory-building and such.

Discussing these problems regarding paradigm choice, Kuhn describes
the issues as:

...about techniques of persuasion or about the argument or
counter-argument in a situation in which. .neither proof
nor error is at issue.
The transfer of allegiance from
.
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paradigm to paradigm is a conversion
experience that
cannot be forced. Life-long resistance
... is not a
violation of scientific standards but an
index to the
nature of scientific research itself
.. .Though the historian can always find men— Priestley
for instance—
who were unreasonable to resist for
as long as they did,
he will not find a point at which
resistance becomes
Illogical or unscientific (1970a,
p. 260).
,

Precisely because allegiance is in part
illogical, the continued resistance to change is not, in an illogical
context, an illogical process.

Continued resistance to change, or decision
to make the change, cannot
be judged, nor decided, using purely logical
criteria because, commitment to a DM means scientific research
itself is not always logical to
a DM.

Kuhn points out that in the debate about DM choice,
...neither party has access to an argument vrhich resembles
a proof in logic or formal mathematics.
In the latter,
both premises and rules of inference are stipulated
in'
advance.
If there is disagreement about conclusions,
the
parties to the debate can retrace their steps one by one,

checking each against prior stipulation. At the end of
that process, one or the other must concede that at an
isolable point in the argument he has made a mistake,
violated or misapplied a previously accepted rule. After
that concession he has no recourse, and his opponents'
proof is then compelling. Only if the two discover that
they differ about the meaning or applicability of a
stipulated rule, that their prior agreement does not provide
a sufficient basis for proof, does the ensuing debate
resemble what inevitably occurs in science (1970a, pp.
260-261).
This state of affairs is directly attributable to two factors: the fact
that decision and commitment to paradigm and DM involve other processes

than the purely logical, and secondly, that these not-logical processes

are more fundamental than the ejq)licitly articulated theory.

Since the

,
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level of debate is equally restricted to
this latter theoretical level,
the non-logical material continues
its influence and the debate con-

tinues, without resolution and at the
wrong level.

However, people do in fact make paradigm
decisions, based in part

on these not-logical processes.

Kuhn feels these choices are based on

reasons which include "accuracy, scope,
simplicity,
the like- (1970b, pp. 261-262).

f ruitfulness,

and

He goes on to emphasize the importance

of scientists being taught to value
these characteristics and
being pro-

vided with examples that illustrate
them in actual use; if scientists
did not hold such values for guidance
obviously their disciplines, and

scientific activity, would develop very
differently.

So Kuhn is saying

that values constitute the differential
criteria for paradigm choice.
I am. .insisting that such reasons
constitute values to
be used in making choices rather than rules
of choice
Scientists who share them may nevertheless make
different
choices in the same concrete situations. Two
factors
are deeply involved.
First, in many concrete situations,
different values, though all constituitive of good
reasons,
dxctate different conclusions, different choices. In such
cases of value-conflict (e.g., one theory is simpler
but
the other is more accurate) the relative weight placed
on
different values by different individuals can play a
decisive role in individual choice. More important,
though scientists share these values and must continue
to do so if science is to survive, they do not all apply
them in the same way.
Simplicity, scope, f ruitfulness
and even accuracy can be judged quite differently (which
is not to say that they may be judged arbitrarily) by
different people. Again, they may differ in their conclusions without violating any accepted rule (1970a,
p. 262; emphasis added)
.

.

Kuhn further specifies that once a DM is in existence, it is the prerogative and the responsibility of that community of scientists to formu-
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late scientific values for their DM and
then to both apply and accept

responsibility for those value applications.

Problems with Using the Kuhniam Sch ema

Textual difficulties.

Kuhn's 1970 revision is primarily directed toward

differentiation of his original paradigm notion into
paradigm and DM.
Unfortunately, he presented this revision in a
postscript to his 1970

edition of The Structure of Sc ientific Revolutions

,

where it was often

overlooked, and where he allowed it to exist in isolation from the rest
of the volume;

that is, Kuhn did not revise his schema in light of the

paradigm-DM differentiation.

His 1970 edition is essentially his 1962

schema, and a postscript containing the DM revision, with no reworking
of the text of the book.

This has had an unfortunate effect, in that most who used Kuhn's

schema either did not or could not integrate the revision into their

work and thus have perpetuated and elaborated the ambiguities, e.g.,
the comments by Burgess (1972, p. 193) regarding polemic in psychology

(already cited), or Palermo (1971, pp. 136

& 138).

Brewster Smith (1973a, p. 464) in Elms (1975,

p.

Similarly, see M.

967), "Our best scien-

tists are floundering in the search for a visible paradigm."

These,

among others, have encountered difficulties because Kuhn, for whatever
reason, did not adequately revise his 1970 publication.

It is clear,

however, that enough confusion and ambiguity has been engendered in

psychology for Lipsey (1974,
template.

p.

406) to decry the use of Kuhn as a
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Even careful authors have run into
difficulties which appear to
originate not because the revision
was unknown to them, but rather
becaus
its ramifications were in no way
articulated
by Kuhn.

Warren (1971,

p.

For instance.

407) and Palermo (1971) both use
earlier versions of

the schema, while it appears they
knew of the revision.

Palermo (1973, p. 273, footnote

B)

,

Weimer and

divide the Masterman-Kuhn paradigm

usages into "exemplar" and "sociological,"
the latter of which can be

divided into "theoretical" and "metaphysical",

it is difficult to under-

stand where they arrived at these "exemplar"
and "sociological" categories, as both Masterman and Kuhn clearly
use "artefact" (roughly

analogous to exemplar) "sociological" and
"metaphysical".

Warren (1974,

409) mentions "sub-paradigms."

p.

Similarly

What are they?

Watson

notices the ambiguities in the paradigm concept
(1974, p. 52), but

ambiguities in his presentation remain because of the
paradigm-DM split
not being articulated.

And it should be emphasized, the above-named

authors have been among the careful and their problems
with Kuhn are

relatively minor.

With others, the problems are considerable.

Palermo

(1971, p. 138) argues that psychology has had two paradigms (he
apparent-

ly means DMs).

Lipsey (1974, p. 407) argues that psychology is mis-

paradigmatic, rather than pre- or post-paradigmatic; though he, again,
is semantically inaccurate, his point will receive corroboration in

later chapters.

Conceptual difficulties

.

Power of paradigm concept

.

A number of conceptual difficulties
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remain.

D.

Shapere raises a series of criticisms
about Kuhn's DM

revision, some of which are relevant.

Shapere examines the implications

of Kuhn's 1970 revisions for
the latter's original framework.^

First,

he finds the paradigm-DM differentiation
of little help for those who

originally found Kuhn's paradigm concept
obscure, as neither version
clarified how the remaining factors
covered by the paradigm term were
related to or embodied in the historical
examples in such a way that the

whole outlook of the tradition could be
conveyed.

In other words, what

were the routes and processes by which
concrete paradigms were linked to
scientific traditions?

It would seem that Shapere 's
criticism is ans-

wered in part by the DM concept itself, in
which paradigm is articulated
into a more encompassing and complicated
network of method, commitment

and theory.

Shapere contends that Kuhn has not yet clarified
the ways in which
the physical science's -general" or "over-arching"
paradigm determines
the course of scientific research and judgment.

Shapere perceived Kuhn's

paradigm concept to be
a single overarching Weltanschauung, a disciplinary
Zeitgeist,
that determined the way scientists of a given tradition
viewed

and dealt with the world, that would determine what
they would
consider to be a legitimate problem, a piece of evidence, a
good reason, an acceptable solution and so on." (1972,
707).
p.

Shapere (1972, p. 706) makes several other charges, most notably
about paradigm's ambiguity and relativism. Masterman had more than
adequately dealt with the first and Shapere 's charges regarding relativism lose a good deal of their efficacy because he refuses to regard
the role of values in science.
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Shapere notes (1972, p. 707) that it was "precisely the
unity, and the

controlling status of paradigms that constituted the appeal
and the
challenge of Kuhn's original view".

It is Shapere 's opinion that,

if

Kuhn abandons the controlling status of the paradigm, he will have
abandoned what was one of the most provocative and influential aspects
of
his earlier view.

Shapere has raised an interesting point.

Kuhn's original concept of

paradigm did indeed have the type of controlling status to which Shapere
refers.
tions,

By revision to a concrete problem solution with analogue func-

the paradigm concept has been removed from the more general, implicit,

and thus influential role, leaving a conceptual vacuum for precisely this

over-arching concept already described.

In examining the family work

area, interestingly enough, there are indications of the need for such a

concept at this broader, general level.

Such a concept would label

several processes and characteristics of what appear to be two major
groups of family therapists that differ in their commitments to exactly

something like a Weltanschauung.

(These two groups and identification of

their points of difference, as well as some implications for Kuhn's
schema, will be reviewed at length in Chapter VIII).

Another of Shapere 's criticisms, which seems to me related, concerns
Kuhn's short treatment of the DM.

He in fact spends a good deal of that

cursory treatment distinguishing among the four DM components he identifies, without discussing any unity underlying them (1972, p. 707).
I

While

would take issue with Shapere and point out that the paradigm set con-
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stitutes a fir. source of unity,
it is also clear that
Shapere's point
is well taken.
Kuhn's DM concept is neither
set into context, described
in terms of unifying themes
or processes, nor related
very well to such
things as theory or instrumentation
(though some attempt to start
the

latter was attempted here in
Chapter II).

Consideration of these issues

will most likely benefit Kuhn's
schema.

^^i^^^iHslv^^eri^^

conceptual difficulties
relates to what can be termed the
"inclusive perimeter" of a DM. How
"bi,
is a DM;

that is, what is the size of a
DM and what are the criteria that

determine this?

Is the -size" determined by
number of adherents or

breadth of the paradigm application?
regard.

Kuhn is quite ambiguous in this

He states that communities of
practitioners

...exist, of course at numerous levels.
The most global is
the community of all natural
scientists.
At an only slightly
lower level, the main scientific
professional groups are
communities: physicists, chemists,
astronomers, zoologists,
and the like.
For these major groupings community
membership
IS readily established except at
the f ringes ... Similar techniques will also isolate subgroups: organic
chemists, and
perhaps protein chemists among them, solid
state and high
energy physicists, radio astronomers, and
so on.
It is only
at the next lower level that empirical
problems emerge. How
to take a contemporary example, would
one have isolated the
phase group, prior to its public acclaims?
For their purpose
one must have recourse to attendance at
special conferences,
to the distribution of draft manuscripts
or galley proofs
prior to publication, and above all, to formal
and informal
communication networks including those discovered in
correspondence and the linkages among citations .. .Typically
it may
yield communities of perhaps one hundred members,
occasionally
significantly fewer (Kuhn, 1970b, pp. 177-178).
,

The first difficulty is in trying to identify the extent of
what
will be called the "inclusive perimeter."

Which of these communities
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is co-extensive with the term DM?

If the DM governs a group of
prac-

titioners and not the subject matter, what level
of group, then, does
it govern?

Does Kuhn's DM concept include the system of
all-natural

scientists-and-their-network-of commitments, or is it rather
at the
levels of all-biologists-with-their-commitments, or
all vertebrate biologists, etc.?

Are all of these DMs and is the term DM infinitely
ex-

tensible to all levels and if so, what are the consequences?

Should

the use of the term "DM" be reserved, rather, for some
relatively

specific level of community and a new term be found for something
like

all-natural-scientists?
There are several considerations in support of this latter
suggestion.

If the paradigm is the concrete problem solution,

then its arti-

culation in the form of a DM would also be fairly specific.

For example,

from earlier in the chapter, Galileo's solution of the ball rolling
down
the inclined plane helped him to solve the pendulum problem (by con-

sidering the bob as a point-mass); Huyghens then used Galileo's solution
on the problem of the center of oscillation and Bernoulli in turn used

Huyghen's solution for the flow of water from an orifice.

The paradig-

matic use of the original solution remains very specific, grounded in
concrete problems.

It is usually possible to name the practitioners who

are active in lines of research, and it appears that it is usually a

relatively small group of practitioners who share paradigms and other DM
constituents.

Henceforth, the inclusive perimeter of DMs as referred to

here, will be the standard in later chapters during discussions of the

.
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family therapy DMs.

Conclusions can be made later whether
such usag.

was helpful or not.

Use with the social sciences

.

Of greater significance is the proble
Lem

that the Kuhnian framework was developed for
the natural sciences, not
the social sciences.

In fact it was Kuhn's observation that in
contrast

to natural scientists the controversies
among social scientists regarding

fundamentals led him to develop the paradigm concept
(Kuhn, 1970b,

p.

viii)

And actually, when one looks at what subject
matter he addresses himself
to, Kuhn has remained within the mature
physical sciences

—

astronomy,

physics, chemistry, electricity, and though only occasionally,
geology
(he mentions Lyell)

Others have also noticed Kuhn's focus on the established sciences.

Palermo (1971,

p.

138) notes that in fact Kuhn appears unsure of the

status of the social sciences in general, at times implying that they

have not yet reached the maturity of paradigmatic-status.
p.

Warren (1971,

408) concurs with Palermo and points out that it was the contrast

"between the social processes of the physical and the behavioral sciences"
that provided the impetus to Kuhn's theorizing.

This proved to be an important point, as it is becoming painfully

obvious that the social sciences in general, and psychology specifically,
does not have the same basic consensus that the mattyre physical sciences
do regarding fundamentals of value, problem choice, and appropriate

approach.

The extensively documented felt crisis and the issues con-

tained therein testify to that, as do certain authors who, in relation
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to a Kuhnian analysis,
have directed attention to
this. Watson (1974,
P.

52) puts it in terns of psychology
lacking "this universal
agreement

about the nature of our
contentual paradig. [sicj."

He points out that

there regains debate over
fundamentals and in research,
"findings stir
little argument but the overall
framework is still very much
contested."
Burgess (1972, p. 196) is of
the same opinion.

Fortunately, in taking Kuhn to
task for his confused view of
preparadigm science, Masterman addresses
the issue of what she terms
"multipleparadigm" science.
She states that he fails to
distinguish three states:

•Wparadigm
science.

science, multiple-paradigm science,
and dual-paradigm

Non-paradigm science is the state of
affairs right at the be-

ginning of the process of thinking
about any aspect of the world..."
(1970, p.

73).

Masterman (1970,

p.

that when "normal science

75)

simplifies the position, by saying squarely

sets in," anywhere there you have science,
and

where it does not set in, there you have
philosophy, or something else,
not science and that it is always some
construct using, puzzle-solving

trick which starts off normal science" [her
emphasis].

She considers

the mature physical sciences as having one
"vast paradigm" and to have

created through the convergence of a number of
paradigm-guided research
lines, i.e., DMs, which mutually threw light on
one another (1970, p. 75).

This can be seen in juxtapositon
•••_"lth multiple-paradigm science with that state of
affairs
which, far from there being no paradigm, there are on
the
contrary, too many.
(This is the present overall situation in
the psychological, social, and information sciences.)
Here,
within the subfield defined by each paradigmatic technique,'
,

'
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technology can sometimes be quite advanced, and
normal
research puzzle-solving can progress. But each
sub-field
as defined by its technique is so obviously
more trivial
and narrow than the field as defined by
intuition, and
also the various operational definitions given
by the
techniques are so grossly discordant with one another,
that discussion on fundamentals remains, and long
run
progress (as opposed to local progress) fails to occur.
This state of affairs is brought to an end when someone
invents a deeper, though cruder (p. 23) paradigm, which
gives a more central insight into the nature of the field
making research into it more rigid, esoteric, and precise
(p. 18 and 37).
This (p. 16) either by causing rival,
more shallow paradigms to collapse, or alternatively, by
attaching them somehow or other to itself, triumphs over
the rest, so advanced scientific work can set in, with
only one total paradigm.
Thus, multiple-paradigm science
is full science, on Kuhn's own criteria; with the proviso
that these criteria have to be applied by treating each
sub-field as a separate field (p. 74).

Masterman is of the opinion that multiple-paradigm science is full
science and may be treated to a Kuhnian analysis by treating each subfield as a separate field.

Burgess (1972, p. 196) concurs with Master-

man that psychology is multiple-paradigmatic; for instance.
What paradigms (in the sense of multiple-paradigms noted
above) exist in psychology? Litchenstein; adopting a
Kuhnian model mentions a number (1971): Fechner's psychophysics; Tichener's structuralism; Pavlov's conditioned
response; Hull's hypothetico-deductive model; Kohler's
isomorphism and finally Skinner's operant (1971, p. 6). Krasner
(1971) has a different view, he believes behaviour therapy
constitutes a paradigm. Katahn and Koplin (1968) believe
that the clash between Breger and McGaugh (1965) on the one
hand and Weist (1967) on the other represents a paradigm
clash, while Keehn (1969) believes the Skinner's 3-term
contingency (S^-R-S^) constitutes a paradigm. Clearly,
there are differences here.
The models used by Lichtenstein,
Katahn and Koplin are far more general than that used by
Krasner. What can we say of the choice made? Clearly, it
was not Hull's hypothetico-deductive model that was attacked,
it was his drive-reduction hypothesis as well as his strong
interpretation of or reliance on reinforcement. His clashes
with Tolman and his followers (why does Tolman's interpretation not qualify as a paradigm?) did not centre around
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Hull s use of the
hypothetico-deductive method, they
centred around the role of
reinforcement (henc; TlT
the studies on latent learning)
and on drive-reduction
(on drxye induction and
explanatory behavior'etc.,
etc
etc etc.
vide Bolles (1967).

Burgess believes that Masterman's
"analysis of paradlg™ has essentially
saved this concept for psychology
especially her three-fold historical

-

division of scientific development"
(1972,
Burgess' opinions.

Warren
dLren (1971
u^/i,

n
p.

An
411,

p.

196);

I

„ould concur with

f^^*_ n
footnote)
apparently agrees,

and uses the revision appropriately.
The analysis regarding normal
science and multiple-paradigm disci-

plines is quite appropriate for
psychology and theoretically at least
allows for a Kuhnian analysis, as long
as the focus is on a sub-field.
This is obviously another reason to
have limited the focus of Kuhnian

analysis to one of the family therapy
"schools", as the analysis continues,
it will become more clear that the
particular "school" constitutes a

Kuhnian DM, with its own paradigm, DM
components and developments.

CHAPTER

III

ANOMALIES AND THE ATIE>ffI
AT ACCOMODATION IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS
The purpose of

.Ms section

Is to demonstrate
that the emergence

and development of the
D-B fe.U, therapy
"school., can be productively
analysed In Kuhnlan, terms
Emergence of the BB DM was
a response to
anomalies which developed
as traditional
psychoanalytic theory and
.

practice and were extended
to new clinical phenomena.

For these

reasons, the Inception of
the clinical psychoanalytic
DM will be
Sketched to provide a conceptual
starting point and a contrast
against

which the emergence of these
psychoanalytic anomalies can be
seen.
Though psychoanalysis was
the dominant and virtually
undisputed, clinical approach for a half-century
(a situation, many would
argue, which

continues into the present), only
the early elaborations of
the classical psychoanalytic paradigm,
and then the relevant anomalies
will be
addressed; the task of tracing
the comprehensive psychoanalytic
elaboration has not been the Intention
of this author, and is beyond
the scope
of the present work.^
a Kuhnlan analysis of the entire psychoanalytic

necessary to be circumspect in speaking
of "the psychoanalytic m""!""
analvtJc
DM as at present. It appears that there
is none, or rather
that there are several.
For the purpose of this dissertation,
I wlli
be using the very early Freudian
paradigm (henceforth referred to as
the classical or interpretatlonlst
paradigm, and DM) which Freud
developed^ regarded as bounded In time, and
summarized, by Freud's 1914
paper on Recollection, Repetition, and
Working Through'.; after this
phase, both technique and conceptualization
changed. The anomalies
relevant to the emergence of family therapy,
however, occurred with
respect to Freud's classical paradigm and DM,
so I will review only its
inception and early development. It should be noted
here that the'

V
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framework will nnt hc^
be ac focus here, In
part because It Is not
strictly
relevant, and in part to
avoid the Infinite
regression of "DB fro„
psychoanalytic ano^alies^
psychoanalysis fro. neurolosy's
ano^lies,
neurology from.
^

Freud

^^^^i-^lJiy--ia.

''s

Revolutions r-^, Paradigm

The psychoanalytic DM
developed around the prob-

lem of hysteria.

During the middle and late
19th century, hysteria was
the province of neurology,
spurred on by its resounding
success in having
found a biological etiology
for general paresis.
Neurology was con-

centrating its efforts on biological
explanations and the attacks of
hysteria with very little success.
By the late 19th century,
hysteria
as a disorder constituted
an important medical problem.
it also constituted an anomaly
for neurology.

In Kuhnian terms,

Also in Kuhnian terms,

the problem Freud faced was
the treatment or "cure" of
hysteria.

At

the relevant point in Freud's
life, when he was a practicing
clinician
(in neurology) doing private work,

the problem to which he was primarily

original classical paradigm continued to
be elaborated by one group
the mterpretationists, yet was
also modified by other groups into a
number of other DMs which developed in
parallel to the classicaror
interpretationists position. Thus the work of
the ego analysts constitutes a separate DM as does the work of
Melanie Klein
These
two DMs were clearly developments in
psychoananalysts thought and practice, but they differed sufficiently from
the classical DM with respect
to paradigms, symbolic generalizations,
models and values, to constitute
separate DMs in their own right. As the anomalies
relevant to family
therapy s emergence are not directly relevant to
these later parallel
psychoanalytic DMs, these DMs will be acknowledged, but
not explicated.
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addressing hi.self was the
cure of hysteria, and
explanation or technical innovation were l^ the
service o£ such a cure. This
cure would
constitute the solution to the
problem, and If used analogically
(which
it was for other neuroses),
the paradigm.
At that ttoe, a "cure" for
hysteria was quite Mportant for
Freud.
Upon his return In 1886 from
studying with Charcot in Paris,
Freud
specialized In nervous diseases,
with hysteria providing the
clinical
picture In a large proportion of
his patients.
Initially he relied
upon the current methods of
treatment, including,
^"^^
"eir-Mltchell
rest
reft-curf'^'R,
cure.
Butt'^h'^Z^""""^
when these proved unsatisfactory
his thoughts
turned elsewhere. 'During the last
few weeks,' he writes ?o
his friend FUess on December
28, 1887, 'I have taken up

(s?rTi;:y:i95rp'ii)"

^-^^^ "-^-^^^"^

Apparently, from his own subsequent account,
Freud began to use

hypnosis to achieve recollection and later
also catharsis in the patient
rather than for its standard use as a
suggestion technique (Strachey,
1955, p. XI).

2

Freud first began to use the new method
sometime between

1886 and 1893 (Strachey, 1955, p. XII).

First technical innovation: role of recollection

.

Freud's first tech-

nical innovation, by approximately 1887, was the use
of hypnosis for

Although there are a number of definitions and conceptualizations
of "catharsis", there is agreement that catharsis is a process
i^herein
an individual emotionally experiences or re-experiences something, and
to some extent releases or purges pent-up affect or emotion.

:
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recollecclon or recall, which
„as conceptualized as
the operative process Of change. While
hypnotised, the patient would
be induced to
recollect repressed material
and with that recollection,
the repressed
was remembered and symptoms
were no longer "needed"
to express the
material. Freud's later account
of this appears quite
matter-of-fact
considering the reception it
gained him from colleagues.
Now In those days of hypnotic
treatment 'recollection' took
a very simple form.
The patient put himself
backing an
"''""^
'° confou^d Si^h
^""'^^
the present,
pr'es^it"'"™'
gave an account of the mental
processes be'°
'^^^
and "pended
r?iif 'h
"""'^ f-^™ "^"'"8 conscLus
wha had before been unconscious.
what
(S. Freud, 19Ua,

"

p.

367).

Breuer and Freud later supplied
the rationale for the mechanism
of change.

In 1892,

in their "...Theory of hysterical
attacks," they

Stated
The memory which forms the content
of the hysterical attack
IS an unconscious, one, or, more
correctly, it is part of the
second state of conscious which is
present in more or less
highly organized shape in every hysteria.
Accordingly that
memory is either wholly absent from the
patient's recollection
when he is in his normal state, or is
present only in a
summary way. If we can succeed in bringing
such a memory
entirely into normal consciousness, it ceases
to be capable
of producing attacks ... the psychical events
during his attack
remain hidden from him. They can, however, be
awakened at
any time by hypnosis. (Breuer and Freud,
1892, Vol. V, p. 29).
The operative process was recollection, which allowed the
isolated

memory to be associated with other cognitive material, in

a sort of

"network" and gradually lose its power and isolation through repeated

references and associative ties.

Emphasis was directed toward those

events which excited symptom-formulation.

"Reproduction of the mental
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processes" evoked in the
particular situation „ere
thought to "htlns
about a release of the„
through conscious operations."
(.teud, 19Ua.
p.

368)

^"""'^^-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-t^^
of affect had become .ore
clear,

^3,3_

m

^^^^

their "Preliminary
Co„unicatlon",

Breuer and Freud noted:

'''''''
"'^^
P^^-^^ had de'r^bed'
th^t e'v^rin'th'
^^^^il
had put the
afLct in^o
'T'""'
^^-Hection without affect almost
invarxailv produces
invariably
n"°.
no result. (1893, Vol. II,
p.

6)

The operative process of cure,
or mechanism of change of
catharsis
was now added to the original
recollection formulation.
It brings to an end the operative
force of the idea which
was not abreacted in the first
instance, by allowing its
strangulated affect to find a way out
through speech; and
It subjects It to associative
correction by introducing
It into normal consciousness
(under light hypnosis) or by
removing it through the physician's
suggestion, as is done
in somnabulism accompanied by
amnesia. (Breuer and Freud,

1893, Vol.

II,

p.

17)

Freud's later, stable defintion of abreaction
held that "quantities
of affect pent up by repression ...
(1914a, p. 376) are released, identified

and articulated.

Third technical inn ovation;

free association and repetition

.

Though

hypnosis allowed him all this, Freud realized that he was not
particularly

successful at its induction, and gradually gave it up, contenting
him-

.
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-If

With packing patients
Into a state of
concentration", using
occasionally a gentle pressure
on the forehead. (This
was the

case

by approximately
1395 as he mentions this
in Stndie, o,

(pp.

107-108) with an engaging
mixture of chagrim and
pride)

With the virtual abandonment
of hypnosis and the
development of
free association. Freud's
technical innovations reached
the third
phase;

the continuation of
technical innovation and
exploratory con-

cepts provided him with a
stable and effective method
for curing^^
hysteria.
It was Strachey's (1955.
Vol.

II.

p. XVII) opinion that this

shift from hypnosis to free
association revealed the presence
of
"resistance" and this essentially
constituted a cricical choice point
for Freud

How was this unwillingness to be
dealt with? Was it to be
shouted down or suggested away?
Or was it, like other
mental phenoraana, simply to be
investigated? Freud's
choice of this second path led him
directly into the uncharted world which he was to spend his
whole life

exploring.

Having made his decision to explore
rather than subdue resistance,
Freud concentrated on two phenomena which
promised to be helpful: dreams
and the resistances themselves (as phenomena
rather than obstacles)?

Dream analysis provided both a method with
which

3

to investigate primary

Also, the death of his father prompted Freud to
begin analyzing
his own dreams; a good deal of this work went into
Freud's 1897
Interpretation of Dreams.
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process, ana also .He
,„n.e„ee o. p.l^.,
.^..^s on conscious .Ho..,,
(-e., .Ha connecions be.ween
pn„a., an. seconda.. process,.
s.^acHey
C"35. vol. „. p. xvill) Has
poin.ed ou. .Ha. .His
In
pu. P.eud
in possession of a new
.ecHnlcal device In.erpre.a.lon." (The
subsequent importance of ^hp f,„.o^the function ofr
interpretation will be reviewed)
Drea. analysis allowed
Preud to carr. out his
own analysis, to formulate
the Oedipus complex
and infantile sexuality,
and to recognize, albeit
dimly, the obstacles and
therapeutic potentials of
"transference".
(Strachey, 1955, Vol. n,
p. XVIII)

-

•

.

The emergence of the
importance of interpretation
as a technique
and transference as a
phenomenon, were underscored
by their similar
centrality when Freud attempted
to investigate resistances
as phenomena.
Because of the importance of
resistances and relatively little
control
over the patient's locutions
during free association, Freud
was forced
to deal with the patient's
compulsion to repeat; he eventually
set out
to induce repetitions as
a method of dealing with
the resistances.

Freud describes the compulsion
to repeat as a process
wherein, rather
than remembering what has been
repressed, the patient
it not in his memory
but in his behavior; he repeats
bS^'irhi.'b
it, without of course
Knowing that he is repeating it.

For instance, the patient does not say
that he remembers how
defiant and critical he used to be in regard
to the authority
of his parents, but he behaves in
that way toward the physician. (Freud, 1914a, p. 369).
By inducing these repetitions,

the hitherto unconscious conflict became
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-nifest

to the analyst and also
beca.e

therefore accessible to
intervention.

-p.esenf in actual life, and
The repetitions were
induced

by heightening the transference
of the patient; for
example, by re-

maining relatively silent, or
giving very little personal
reality based
inforrnation, and by not allowing
the patient to see facial
expression.
In contrast to hypnosis,
the repetition compulsion
was viewed as
a "piece of real life"
(1914a, p. 371) and therefore not
always an
indifferent or trivial phenomena.
At times,

this could result in an

exacerbation of symptoms during
treatment (1914a, p. 371); this
point
became particularly cogent and
important later for patients characterized as latent schizophrenic or
borderline (one class of later

anomalies), where exacerbation often
provoked frank psychoses.

Also,

it became clear that the repetitions
were evident not only in the trans-

ference, but also in all other aspects
of the person's life (1914a,
p. 37

We must be prepared to find, therefore,
that the patient
[repeats] also in all other matters occupying
and interesting him at the time, for instance,
when he falls in
love or sets about any project during
treatment. (Freud
1914a, p. 370).

This was the reason for invoking the
psychoanalytic injunction against

major life changes during analysis.

Since the resistances were even-

tually regarded as determining the succession of
repetitions (p. 371)
and also, since the greater the resistance,

the more extensively the

repetition compulsion replaced the capacity or willingness to insight
(or recollection),

(p.

370), resistances became the focus of attention;

once elicited, the analyst used interpretation

to

reveal the relation
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between .e=...„ees du^.n,

allowin, .He paUen. .o

a.soc.aUon, a„a unconsc.ous
.«e..al
.h.oush- .He resistances.

I„ .His .Hira

phase,
the analyst abandons
concentration

nr.

nxzmg .He resistances wHich
coL up
-terxal and .aWng tHe patient

awaje

o

n regard

c£"tS

to
hjr°'"
(l1l4t P.

It would appear that
recollection is once again the
ai. of analysis
but Freud is emphatically
clear that this is not the
case. He stresses

that the repetition
compulsion and its shielding
resistance as expressed
in the transference .ust
be "worked through."
The first step in overcoming the resistance is

made... by the analyst's
discovering the resistance x.hich
^^^^^^^^
acquainting
with It
witrir
Now It seems that beginners in
analytic practice
are inclined to look upon this
as the end of ^he wo"
naming the resistance could not
result in its immedSt;
suspension.
One must allow the patient time
to get
know this resistance of which he
is ignorant, to 'work
it, by continuing the work
according
\ '° rule in defiance
In
to Zt
the analytic
of it. Only when it has
come to Its height can one, with
the patient's cooperation,
discover the repressed instinctual
trends which are feeding
"
the resistance; and only by living
them through in this
way will the patient be convinced of
their existence and
their power. (1914a, p. 375).

L

'

The working through of the resistances as they
arise in the trans-

ference was regarded by Freud as the process
that affected the greatest changes in the patient and that could be
correlated theoretically,

with the change function of abreaction in the earliest
formulation.
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(1914a. p. 376).

'Vo.Un, through" involved
emotional element., and

recollections once the resi^tanrf.c
resistances u^a
had t,
been overcome

(p. 375).
in all
his formulations of cure,
Freud included a recollection
lecoxiection .0
component, and
an emotional "reliving"
of so.e sort.
In thl. third phase, the
role
Of interpretation assumes
technical importance because
of its function
with regard to the shielding
resistances; interpretation became
the
technique which induced the
working through of resistances,
by which
the therapeutic emotional
and insightful aspects were
elicited.

The paradigm and its revol „tn„n...

development of

free association and the change
mechanism of working through, Freud

re-conceptualized hysteria and his problem
solution constituted a revoU
tionary paradigm.
It should be emphasized that the
series of technical innovations

(hypnosis for recollection, then for
recollection with catharsis, then
free association and interpretation)
preceded any re-conceptualization
of a change mechanism or of the disorder
of hysteria.

It is these tech-

nical innovations and supporting conceptualizations
which constitute
the classical Freudian or psychoanalytic
paradigm.

The technical innovations are supported by their
respective

mechanisms of change, and then by the re-conceptualization
of hysteria
as a psychological rather than biological disorder.

Strictly speaking,

the third-phase innovations constitute the paradigm;

the techniques

and change processes of the first two phases were successful in a

limited way in comparison to the innovations of free association and

.

.
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interpretations.

Also, either of the first two
phases would have

difficulty as a theory-practice system
if used as an analogue and
extended to other neuroses. First,
theoretically because they were
too circumscribed and secondly,
empirically, because hypnosis is

rarely successful with obsessional or
paranoid individuals.

Finally,

for Freud to develop this series so
rapidly, despite the successes of

the first two phases, one can infer
that he felt, or recognized, some

inadequacies in the earlier phases that induced

-

allowed him to

develop the third, then stay with it.
The technical innovations of free association
which elicits the

"raw data" of psychoanalysis, and of interpretation,
which supplies
the tool to deal with such data, constitute
the relevant paradigm

techniques.

Freud's postulation that the mechanism of change was

repeatedly working through both the cognitive and emotional
aspects
in the transference provided the conceptualization of
cure which

accompanied the new techniques.

Similarly, both the techniques and

change mechanisms were useful in the amelioration or cure of other type
of neuroses, i.e., obsessional and phobic.

Thus, Freud's problem-

solution admirably filled its paradigmatic "analogue" function for new

phenomena
Finally, the innovations induced a re-conceptualization of the

hysteria, in stages.

First, Freud and Brewer wrote in 1893 that the

symptoms of hysteria were meaningful and not random as hitherto

conceptualized
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Let us keep firmly in
mind the fact that it
^h
dxstressing antithetic ideas
(inhibited
't^jtjccea
by normal consciouqnpcc^ ttK-j u
^
^^e
moment of emergence
™^8^"ce of Ihf.
the disposition to
hysteria
^.n^ ^-

L^ec^d

/

precisely well-brought-up and~^f
who
suffer from hysterical attacks
in
^° ^^^^^ ^^^^ of^owdi Ls,
Ive'ry
every kind of
^
o'f wild escapade
and bad conduct.
It is
the suppressed- the
laboriously suppressed-groups
of Ideas that are brought
into action in these cases
°' '
°' counter-will, when h^'
sub,ectTarf''?i
^^^^^11^^ ^ ^i^tim to hysterical exhaustion,
vlriZ
connection may be a more intima e
one ?o; ihf h V'''
condition may perhaps be produced
by the
thf laborious suppression;
but in the present '^I^
the psychological features
of that
that"'
h"'
condition.
Here I am merely concerned with
explaining why
assuming the presence of the disthe symptoms take the particular
^or^T''
u°
form
which
we
fact observe them. (1893,
p. 53).

Shf^i
behaved boys

S

Lboriouf

—

m

m

-

The contention that hysteria
was of psychological etiology came
only

later in 1895 (Strachey, 1955,
p. XXIV).

In 1893, Freud was still

writing of "the agency of somatic
innervations" (p. 40) and "physical

modification corresponding to [inhibited
intentions]"

(p.

that time, neurology had regarded the
disorder as organic.

44).

Up

to

With Freud's

removal of hysteria from this organic realm,
the problem-solution was

revolutionary in its formulation.

Hysteria can be regarded as a persistent anomaly
which refused
to

respond to neurological treatment, and for which the
new germ-
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theory class of formulation
was unsuccessful.

Neurology's eagerly

anticipated breakthrough,
in „hich hysteria would
be demonstrated

to occur.

Freud moved to a radically
different solution from his
early acceptance of
biological etiology, one which
was based on his
technical therapeutic
innovations, drew from a
different framework than
neurology, which in turn
created its own framework.*
Freud came to regard hysteria
as a disorder of the
cognitive/emotional
sphere, with symptoms as
meaningful as the symbolic
expression of Ideas
and emotions forgotten"
and operating at a not-conscious
level, which
were related to forbidden
material from early in life.
This formulation
needed obviously, the ideas
of the unconscious, of
repression, of psychical trauma and the genetic
principle to provide continuity
from the
past to the onset of symptoms,
which Freud later developed. With
this

set of concepts accompanying the
original Insight that hysteria was

psychological. Freud's solution had
reached full revolutionary status,
with all that implies regarding the
usual reception of revolutionary

formulations in Kuhn's schema.

Strachey reported (1955, V. II,
p. XV) that Studies on Hj^sterla

was unfavorably

received in German medical circles; it was, for
In-

stance, very critically reviewed by Adolf von
Strumpell, the well-known

4

For an interesting argument as to where Freud
perspective
°j^^|i"3ted, see D. Bakan's Freud and the Jewish Mystical
Tradition

s
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neurologist."

This makes a good deal of
sense, particularly
that latter
point that an eminent
neurologist Should
In Kuhn's schema it
is precisely the group
for whom the paradigm
is revolutionary,
that is
.est threatened and
resistant, with some of its
members never adopting
the new paradigm.
P.eud's resignation from
professional associations
was requested, his puhlic
presentations were poorly
received and his
colleagues were confounded
and alienated.

Wit.

^'^^'^^^^^^^^-^^^^
The

technique of interpretation
gained enormous importance
in psychoanalysis.
As previously mentioned,
the classical paradigm was
undisputed and
relatively unchanged until
approximately 1914. After this
point, Freud,
and others, made some major
changes in the DM with two results.
First,
some of these changes made by
others induced the development
of differentiable DMs within the psychoanalytic
rubric (e.g., Kleinians)
secondly,
there remained a group of analysts
committed to the original, classical
;

paradigm.

Thus, for instance,

they eschewed work with other than
neuro-

tics, and they regarded interpretation
as the analyst's ultimate (and

for some of the more dedicated- the
only legitimate)

tool.

While in-

terpretation was important to all the analysts,
it was the lodestone
for these classical or interpretational
analysts.

Freud (1937)^ differentiated between interpretation
proper, such

^ Freud (1937) Constructions in analysis;
Collected Papers, Vol. V
Cited by Loewenstein, 1958, p. 209.
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as those Of a drea. or a
parapraxis. and a "genetic"
interpretation
or reconstruction of a
remote and repressed event
or fantasy, or an
impulse or reaction which
remained repressed but active.
Loewenstein

continued the differentiation
among types of interpretation
which he
regarded as the "specific tool
of the psychoanalyst.
."(p. 205),

m

.

1958 (two years after the inception
of the double-bind paradigm)

,

Two

years before the double-bind.
Stone (1954) was identifying
interpretation as one of the "technical
instrumentalities .. .which is ultimately
relied on for the distinctively
psycho-analytic effect."

We would while acknowledging that
other psychotherapeutic
agents play an important role in the
psychoanalytic process
assign to interpretation the unique
and distinctive place
in Its ultimate therapeutic effect.
We would, I think require that the interpretations achieve
this effect through
the communication of awareness of
facts about himself to
the patient, with the sense of emotional
reality that comes
only with technically correct preparation,
rather than through
certain other possible effects in the transference
countertransference system which occur so frequently
in other psychotherapies. (Certainly, they occur also in
psychoanalysis,
but^they are^regarded as miscarriage s of effort).
(Stone,'
'

Comparing Loewenstein or Stone's views with other
analysis reveals that they are actually rather flexible in
their orientation. For
instance, Loewenstein (1958, p. 208) includes confrontation
and clari-

fication as important, "preliminary to interpretation."

In other

words, they are willing to give a role to other verbal
techniques.

Other analysts of that same period, however, are considerably more
inflexible.

Eissler (1953) regarded the ideal case as one in which in-

terpretations alone are used and prove sufficient; any other activities

.
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tKe

pa„

.He anal... a.e

.e™e.

stand a. occasionaXl,
nnavoidaMe.

„

^.a^e...

an.

,„,Uca.cn

'

.nfo^.na... „o.„ieat.ons

technique

Analysts of .Kls period,
whether flexible or
Inflexible
regard to Interpretation
elearl. helonged to the
^lnstrea„

„Uh
of psycho-

analytical development and
represented the do^nant
forms of conceptual framework and clinical
practice.
They worked almost
exclusively
with neurotics and based
their formulations In
direct evolution from
Freud's early classical
paradigm
and DM.

^!^^-££HM™^L-£clsslsm.
relatively early

m

Narcissism constituted a
problem

psychoanalysis for a number of
reasons directly

related to the paradigm and the
role of transference and
Interpretations and working through.
Part of the almost exclusive
occupation
with neurotics by this dominant
group was related to the fact
that
Freud's formulations had been
based on hysteria, then extended
to
phobic and obsessional neuroses^all of which were regarded as
transference neuroses and thus all
amenable to the same type of dynamic

Freud and Bre-uer's formulations
of hysteria were in 1892 and 1895
culminating in 1895 's Studies on Hj^s^eria;
Freud however had an
article published in 189A (The
Defc^teuro-Psyihoses in'NeuroU.lsches'
^°
"hlch he connects with "hy steria "m^ny
k"k
"^sessions " in fact signifying that
"observLio":f the e
?nhob1c''
[phobic and obsessional] patients had
resulted in a contribution Co the
theory of hysteria (1955, Vol.
1, pp. 59-75).
Henceforth, these were
regarded as tr ansference phenomena.
,
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f-e„ce, l„terp.e.a.io„.
and „o.,i„,

Pracueal and theoretical
rea.on.
neuroses.

^^^^^

.e^in,„,

There were al.o .Keore.lcal
reasons

-eud.s .SU paper on narcissU..

^^^^^

-

„osr ..por.anrl.

B. .He .H.rd pHase o.
.He para^;,.

set,

.He strength of positive
transference was regarded
as crucial
When the positive transference
had developed to "a
sufficiently strong
attachment, the treatment
[„as, In a position to
prevent all the „ore
Of the patient's
repetition-actions and to .ake
use of his Intentions
alone..... (p. 373).
This point was highlighted
,y those patients who

were perceived, Hy Freud
and then others, of being
Incapable of forcing
this strong transference
reaction because of a
preponderance of narcissism; this was the case
with schizophrenics and
particularly borderline personalities.

A pressing motive for occupying
ourselves with the conception

narcissism arose when the attempt
was
knowledge of dementia praecox
(Kraeoelin^
or schizophrenia (Bleuler)
into line with
upon whxch the libido theory
is based.
Such patients
display two fundamental characteristics;
they suffer f^c^m
^'^'^ inLres"^frfm°the
external world (people and things).
iTrlTl^^^^^^^^^^^
In consequence of this
latter change
them, they are inaccessible
to the influence
endeavor^! (19Ub,

iLri'V^
made to bring our

,

m
Vol^T^rlT:

thrhySsL

~

Schizophrenic patients were perceived as
having withdrawn their

attachments to the external world, without
replacing them by phantasy
substitutes, and as such were incapable
of forming either the essential transference relationship, or
concomitantly the repetitions in
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cal cu.e as the .hange
agent would be e.clu.ea.
na.cissis™ „o„X, also
preclude an, eont.ol
..e anal.s. of .he
compulsion .o .epea.
ou.iae
situation.
The ecbination of the
historical precedence of
the transference
neuroses, then the
differentiation Between
transference and narcissism
xn oh.ect-choice, proved
crucial in the development
of the psychoanalytic
DM.
As has been mentioned,
most analysts remained
focused on transference neuroses, and emphasized
interpretation as the primary
therapeutic technique; this group
can be regarded as the
direct successors
to the early Freudian
paradigms.
Not all the analysts, however,
perpetuated the focus on the
paradigmatic phenomena.

^P^

Ano malies in the Traditior

R^Pil.£xtension of paradigm

to^^e^hen^

Pop .n.r.-^

Relatively early, clini-

cians began to apply psychoanalytic
insights and techniques to very
different phenomena. Freud himself
had made some extensions, notably

obsession and phobias, allowing insights
gained during the application to modify his hysteria formulations.
As all these disorders
to

are easily dealt with by a transference
formulation, Freud's extension
served to elaborate and refine the paradigm
and DM.

His 1914 article

on narcissism can be seen as an attempt
to demarcate those clinical

phenomena for which he felt psychoanalysis was
appropriate and could
be held accountable, and those for which it
could not, and therefore
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could no. lesUi.a.el,
.e faulted ,or

d„ae„Ules

1„ .he

appUeaUo„

With regard .0 .hi. point,
of course, he „as
entirely correct; there
no reason a fra.ewcrk
should be faulted when
It was applied by
Others to phenomena for
which
wnxcn It
it was
tt^. -not
r,^^
constructed. Yet this is
exactly the sort of extension
that too. place, one
which the Kuhnlan
essentially predicts
the extension of paradigm
or analogue to new phenomena:

-

fra„

-

°' psychoanalysis
;b;a"arbegaf
ufcigan to
to^Jelt'ln'^
treat manic-depressive
h""""^^

that

psychosis nq971
and not too long before Simmel
[1929] opened a i^v.i
'''"'
sanitorium where he treated very
severe neuroLr'^^
psychotic conditions, and
addiction"! A^o ear
; ca^e'^he'
•

i'

h
nimseit
1^1^53^
L1933

^^.^^.j^i^;^^
IT'V:by ^'r^'^'^
the distinguished contributions
follox.ed

of Jones and Abraham. However,
character analysis as a
special technical problem was
precipitated sharp" "to
°'
'"'^^^^^
^il^^l- Reich's
IrilllTnri =^^™^l^ting,
^r""'^ although
still
controversial
^n l [1947].
noJ.T With Anna Freud's
book
book on The Ego and Jhe
[1946], one Mght
ifr,—.^.ent
toward the broadening and
multiplication of the psychoanalytic spheres of interest in
the personality, and an
°f psychoanalytic technique,
found
general
IZlrllTna
and secure acceptance. (Stone,
1954, pp. 567-568).

^£^ML^£f

^

By 1919, what was referred to as
borderline neuroses and psychoses
had been addressed (Clark) as had
dementia praecox (Kempf
)

treated within a modified psychoanalytic
therapy.

;

both were

Aichhorn had adapted

the traditional technique to treat
delinquents and Anna Freud in the

twenties began formal analysis of children
(1928).

Federn's work

with psychosis implied further technical
modifications.

The extensions

proliferated to the point that Anna Freud began to
be concerned about
the distribution of effort (1954,
pp. 610-611).
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^

For years now, our most experienced and
finest analysts
have concentrated their efforts on opening
up new fields
tor the application of analysis by making
the psychotic
disorders, the severe depressions, the borderline
cases,
addictions, perversions, delinquency, etc.,
amenable to
treatment.
I have no wish to underestimate the
resulting
benefits to patients, nor the resulting considerable
gains to analysis as a therapy and science.
But I regret
sometimes that so much interest and effort has
been withdrawn from the hysteria, phobic and compulsive
disorders,
leaving their treatment to the beginners or the
less
knowledgeable and adventurous analytic practitioners.
If all the skill, knowledge and pioneering
effort which
was spent on widening the scope of application of
psychoanalysis had been employed instead on intensifying
and improving our technique in the original field,
I
cannot help but feel that, by now, we would find the
treatment of the common neuroses child's play, instead
of struggling with their technical problems as we have
continued to do. (A. Freud, 1954, pp. 610-611).

Interestingly, her recommendation appears to be, not a return to the
former spheres of application, but an increase in the number of psycho-

analysts.

"Let us hope that the future analysts, who occupy our Train-

ing Institutes now as candidates, will be numerous enough to spread

their energies over both fields."

(p.

611).

With the extension of the paradigm to new clinical phenomena, a
number of anomalies emerged and eventually challenged the integrity of
the Freudian paradigm.

Similarly, in the enormous literature and prac-

tice in the traditional clinical phenomena, anomalies also arose.

Those

anomalies that engendered the sense of crisis immediately prior to the
inception of the double-bind family therapy paradigm are relevant to
the present purposes and so will be reviewed here.

Unsolved problems of individual psychoanalyses

.

Anomalies in the
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traditional psychoanalytic population
emerged gradually and slowly, as
treatment of neuroses gained a history.
Contrary to expectation, it
was not the case that one group drew
attention to an anomaly, while

another group proposed a solution or
accomodation; rather, the same
individual or group, would point out an
anomaly and at the same time

propose a solution.
One of the most notable analysts in this
regard was Clarence Oberndorf.

His awareness of problems arose in two
areas (the second of which

will be reviewed later in the discussion of
anomalies).

He proposed,

that it become a custom endorsed as good
practice that a
case be reviewed in consultation if the
patient has been
under classical psychoanalytic-treatment 4-5
hours a week
for more than, let us say, three hundred
hours.
Such groups
[of 3 experienced analysts] might reach
an opinion as to
whether the case should continue with the same analyst,
be
discontinued as not well adapted to psychoanalysis and some
other method attempted, or be referred to a second
analyst
because of transference difficulties leading to therapeutic
stasis. (1950, p. 403).

Oberndorf was here addressing himself to the increasingly
obvious situation that psychoanalytic treatment results had not always
warrented the
time, money, and effort put into them.

He reviewed the two foremost

psychoanalytic journals (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis
and The Psychoanalytic Quarterly ) for the preceding decade and found
that "practically no articles have been devoted to the results of

psychoanalytic treatment and very few deal with therapy directly.

One

of the most recent books on technique also fails to mention results,

except in fragmentary cases and the question of unsatisfactory results
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is not considered."

(1950, p. 394).

The unsatisfactory results took
a number of forms.

One was the

presence of a "distressing recurrence
of illness in treated
patients"
(Gralnick. 1962. p. 517); this, of
course, should not have occurred

according to the psychoanalytic
formulation of therapy and change.
If both catharsis and
recollection had transpired, these
processes
would insure the neurosis (with
respect to the particular conflictual

material treated in the analysis)
would not recur.

And apparently, th

frequency of relapses was greater than
one could assume to be the case
if they were explained by incomplete
analyses.
Alternatively, the analysis may have been
technically successful,
but the person's social relations
remain as bad as before analysis.

Facetiously speaking, everything in the
patient is cured except his
human relations.

Or in the phrase of one analyst, "On
completion of

analysis, the patient is wiser, but sadder
and lonelier." (Ackerman,
1954, p. 362).

Or perhaps more painful yet, patient and
analyst may

vary in their opinion regarding success of
treatment, or the
results might be entirely unacceptable to relatives
and
associates close to the patient. Results in which all
are concerned (the patient, his environment, and
the
physician) are content with the outcome are frequent.
On the other hand, there are many instances when none of
these participants in an analysis is satisfied..."
(Oberndorf, 1950, p. 395).

These situations constitute anomalies because they counter either

psychoanalytic practice or theory.

For instance, though analysis cer-

tainly does not promise happiness, it does directly imply greater
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understanding of one's needs and motivations,
as well as greater control over one's behavior in relation
to significant others (by the

working through of the repetition compulsions
via the transference).
The above difficulties clearly counter
this direct implication.

Which

is not to indicate that all difficulties
which arise are anomalies;

for

instance, Stern (1938, p. 475) discussed a type
of intellectualizing

patient as a technical difficulty.
It is among these patients

[those convinced they are inferior
individuals] that one frequently finds (the bane of
the
analyst's existence) those who get a thorough
psychoanalytic
education through being analyzed and remain quite
sick people.
They have the intellectual equipment to accumulate
knowledge
and unless the analyst is on his guard, will use
this knowledge not to unravel sources of their feelings of
inferiority,
but neurotically to bolster up their ego, with pseudotherapeutic results.

This sort of difficulty is not anomalous as it can be accounted for,
easily, by psychoanalytic practice or theory.

For instance, it can be

said that such patients, though recollecting and free associating away,

have maintained the dissociation of intellect and affect, and as such,

have undergone little or no catharsis.

As such,

they cannot be said,

with the framework, to have been successfully analyzed.

The solution

lies in technique, that is, how to induce the patient, probably through

deprivation,

(of reality markers, of response to overtures,

etc.) to

couple recollection with appropriate affect.
Bona fide anomalies however, continued to emerge.

Such were the

situations in which the identified patients became healthier, and a
family member reciprocally, became "sicker."

This state of affairs
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was not always obvious since
analysts eschewed contact with
family
members, but It did occasionally
reach report (and was subsequently
documented as a frequent occurrence
by family therapists). For
Instance,
within the child-guidance context,
which used psychoanalytic theory
and
practice, such reports had begun
publicly by at least 1942. Burgum
reports that.

Occasional murmurs about the father
as a factor in child
guidance treatment echo through the
field.
The fact that
the niother is the person most
involved in responsibility
^"""^
difficulties, and also most accessible
±n\T.^
in
terms of, t
her own time and agency working
hours, tends to
focus attention on her both in
diagnostic and treatment
considerations
The father is not entirely neglected,
yet
the full significance of his role
in the treatment situation
is rarely adequately realized.
(Burgum, 1942, p. 4/4).
What makes the situation particularly
significant is that the treatment

was in the traditional individual model
(with mother seen as adjunct),
(p.

481), and the reciprocities in health followed a
general pattern

(implying the situation was not idiosyncratic).''

The pattern was one in which the presenting
problem was construed
as mother s difficulty in controlling a young
child, with accompanying
mutual antagonism and the child's possible destructive
behavior, poor
school adjustment or irritability.
Father
"on the other hand
either lurks in the background at
time of referral or comes forward as the child's
champion
[and] has taken on the role of child's protector.
If the
mother requests placement, the father asks that an attempt
be made to work out the problems in the home... He comforts
[the child] against the mother's abuse, becomes his last
refuge, and sometimes takes over, under strict matriarchal
surveillance, a large share of the maternal case." (p. 474).
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Neurotic comp ll.en rarities

.

Finally, a series of articles
regarding the

protraction of neuroses among marital
couples appeared.

Again, it was

Clarence Oberndorf who appears to
have initiated this set of concerns.
In 1934, he published an account
of his treatment of "a case"
of folie
,

a deux,

wherein he reformulated some of the
traditional ideas regarding

this "sharing" of psychoses.

The term "folie ^ deux" had traditionally

been used to refer to psychotic
manifestations shared by two people.
Generally, it is applied to the so-called
induction
(contagion, infection) of a second person
by a primary
mentally sick person living in close proximity.
The
xnductor suffers from paranoid ideas,
excitements or
depressions which are transmitted to the second
person.
Those who are induced, are usually blood
relations
(siblings, or parents and their children);
less frequently
the second member of a married couple.
This circumstance
IS interpreted by Bleuler to 'throw
light on the familial
disposition to the disease.' (Oberndorf,
1934, p. 14).
His reformulation is to the effect that:

first, the tendency for

folie a deux to appear in blood relations is
less due to "constitutional

predisposition" than to the "possibility for early and
intense identification of children with parents to each other" which
especially affects
"ideal formation and self-appraisal."

Secondly, Oberndorf highlights

the presence of two initially neurotic conditions, which
complement

each other, and develop "mutual symptomatology" only after marriage.
It is a matter of frequent observation that when the induced
person is removed from the inductor the symptoms in the
former disappear.
Exception to this result has been noted,
which again led Bleuler to comment that the second person
sometimes suffers from an independent disease in which only
certain manifestations, such as the content of the delusions,
are determined through induction. I believe this to be the
case far more frequently than it is possible to demonstrate
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xn advance folie a deux.
In the case of neurosis
a
deux whxch I present, the
pre-existent individual
neuroses could be thoroughly
established; the^utual
syrnptomatology developed only
after marriage!
(Oberndorf, 1934, p. 14).

^

It can be inferred that
this case

n.ay

have sparked Oberndorf

's

interest in complementary neurotic
processes in couples, as he
addressed
this pattern repeatedly and
some of his conclusions presage
his later
^
writings.^

^e.g
In the latter [folie a deux]
we have the psychological
interplay of a group of two. In nearly
all of the more
permanent and stubborn neurotic
compulsions one finds
that the condition is often nourished
by a lesser neurotic
tendency on the part of the individual
principally involved xn the patient's neurosis. At
times the attitude
of domination or indulgence of the
patient by the complementary person may be so patent that
the layman correctly
interprets the patient's father, mother,
etc., as the main
cause for the continuity of the neurosis.
(Oberndorf, 1934

p

.

15)

.

'

'

9

100?^^'""'^°''^'^

perceptiveness regarding family dynamics is

remarkable,
in 1934, at a time when essentially no
one was writing of current family
dynamics, Oberndorf had the prescience to
address them repeatedly. i-^i.
For

instance,

In pathological interlocking familial situations
often
the only reason why the one person comes for
treatment
and the other does not, rests in the circumstances
that
the sick person is consciously struggling to break the
abnormal situation which he unconsciously desires, whereas
the person who is considered well desires consciously to
maintain it, without necessarily appreciating its pathological aspect.
From the strictly technical interpretation
of induced psychopathology, the inductor in neurotic
familial situations is often the individual who considers
himself and is often considered the normal person. This
leads to the very frequent comment on the part of psychiatrists dealing with childhood psychiatric problems that
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Oberndorf then discussed his
analysis of each .ember of
nine
couples, both individuals of
which eventually entered
analysis with
him.
He reported on nine such
cases in twenty-five years
practice.
He stated that after varying
periods of time, the spouse
would enter
analysis, in several instances
because improvement in the first
member
(first in analysis) would convince
the second person that s/he
must
change for the marriage to continue.

'

His article is fascinating in
part because of his style of
presentation.

Published in 1938, when perhaps the
press for space in Journals

was not so great as it is today,
Oberndorf

's

account includes many pages

of case history and comparative
information which makes for a vivid

picture of the processes he was trying
to explain.

Also his initial

paragraphs are careful, methodical arguments,
paving the say to his

slightly heretical material; he began with
"The theory of the psychoanalytic school attributes the origin of neuroses
to a conflict between
conscious strivings and unconscious longings or
to a wholly unconscious

conflict of purpose." (p. 453), and proceeded
to Oedipal aspects of
development, occasional inability to relinquish parental
attachment,
and later difficulties in the psychic or sexual life of
the adult.

All

the parents need to be treated rather than the child.
(Oberndorf, 1934, p. 16).

The only other instance encountered during reviewing this literature,
of such perspicacity regarding family dynamics is Kempf's 1919 article
on psychoanalytic modification in the treatment of psychoses (cited
later with regard to anomalies in non- traditional psychoanalytic
populations)
.
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this was preamble to his
contentions that marital difficultieB
..par-

ticularly sexual problems and
infidelities, were often the

re^pf

the transposed incest prohibitions,
that is of the persistence

incest prohibitions after marriage
that have been "transferred'

parent to the spouses precluding
guiltless sexual contact between
espouses.

He believed that the degree

to'

|

which the Oedipus complex

had waned in both partners was the single
most important psychological

factor influencing the success, or failure,
of a marriage (1938, p. 464).
As determinedly psychoanalytic as his
1934 presentation was, there

are clear passages that presage his later
work on neurotic complementarities.

For instance, while discussing "conscious
feelings of in-

feriority in women... associated with the castration
complex (penis
envy)...", Oberndorf comments that

This type of woman with a psychological masculine
urge
may find herself powerless to refrain from attempting
to
assert leadership over her husband at critical moments
in connection with generally accepted masculine
prerogatives.
In consequence the man may feel himself humiliated and
react with a refusal to be subjected by his wife or to
acknowledge his own proclivity to feminine subordination.
If he is unable to defend his masculinity or to find
assuaging compensations for his latent femininity, he
may seek escape in divorce. He often rationalizes his
flights with such reasons and causes as incompatibility
of temperament, social inequality, or difference of religion. The above mechanism was operative in the wife
of one of the couples reported by the author (1934, p. 16).
Of course, marriages are well known where mutual inver sions
of minor degree have happily complemented each other. This
mechanism was operative in one of the couples reported as
"Folie a deux." (1934, p. 15).

He considered the technical problems "knotty" but not insurmountable.
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With regard to transference,
he wrote that these
patient's should he
treated as any other; with
regard to each patient
using the analyst
as a source of resistance,

the analyst should maintain
his position

of neutrality with utmost
inviolability.

Bela Mittelman, citing
Oberndorf

's

work with couples' neurotic

ccplexnentarities, began writing
in the 40's about what
he termed
"neurotic circular interpersonal
reactions." (1944, p. 480).

m

a

study of fifteen couples,
Mittelman reconstructed the
complementary
neurotic reactions by which
"partners followed an intrapsychic
vicious
circle of reactions which they
acted out in an external viscious
circle" (p. 483). (Interestingly
enough, Mittelman was discussing
here,
a couple in which "...as a
result of psychotherapy,

the patient's

behavior suddenly changed, the
partner felt that he was now really

being abandoned and punished for all
his past aggression.
by cutting his wrist..." (p. 483)

He reacted

(which can be seen as a variant to

reciprocity in health anomaly!).
It was his contention that because
of the continuous and intimate

nature of marriage, every neurosis in a
married patient was "strongly

anchored in the marriage relationship" and that
the presence of a
compleLmentary neurotic reaction in the partner
contributed to the pro-

tracted nature of the patient's neurosis and should
be addressed in
treatment.

An example,

for instance of such a complementarity is the

common pattern of an attempt at self-sufficiency through
emotional detachment on the part of one partner (usually
the man), and an intense, open demand for love on the part
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of the other (usually
the woman).

When the woman'.

^-^^^^^
-^-s
fe: r'heTr'
"""^^ detached while she
evaluates
ttll L. I
' ^^^il-^^-S rejection.
Her guilt
and fear o^";!'
Pace with the violence o
her demand
C°^'^°"^itantly, the man, who
is warding
?
off Khxs desxre
for dependency and submission,
becomes
afraid of being completely
dominated by thes; excessive
demands for affection and defends
himsllf brin'easJng
hxs detachment. At the same
time this detachment Js
an expression of his anger
toward her, aroused bj Ms
"-"^--^
criticism as a
frustratxo'n"?
trustratxon of hxs own need to be
loved.
The complementary reactions are further
overdetermined by the
partners project the guilt from
their
mutlnf
attitudes and blame each other for
thexr //J^'T^^^
diffxculties. (Mittelman, 1944,
p. 484).

T

.

luT

(Mlttelman provides several more
such patterns but one will
probably
suffice at this point.)

Mittelman stated that in treatment he
analyzed only one partner
of each couple,

though he interviewed each partner
at least twice and

occasionally gave "weekly psychotherapeutic
interviews", i.e., not
analysis.

The analysis of a partner, when
necessary, was invariably

conducted by another analyst

(p.

491),

though he cites Oberndorf's con-

current analysis and recognizes the advantages
to knowing in detail of
each partner's reactions.

Mittelman emphasized that "he must be care-

ful to limit his activity to analytic
interpretations and avoid taking

sides or rendering judgment on the qualities of
either mate" (p. 490),

demonstrating himself to be both wise, but orthodox with
regard to the
role of interpretations.

If the patient's analysis was successful,

the complementary reaction of the partner often subsided
without any

sort of direct treatment (p. 490); and if the complementarity was not
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of a serious nature, it was
often enough to explain to the
patient,
using daily material, how his/her
behavior affected the partner
(p. 489).
In a later (1948) report, he
considers the advantages of
problems
of concurrent analysis of twelve
couples.
Each partner received analysis
for four of the couples, and
for the remaining eight couples,
one partner was analyzed and their partners
received between two and twenty

sessions of intervals from one week
to several months; it should be

emphasized that treatment was concurrent,
not conjoint, that is, each
individual in the couple was seen, but the
couple was not seen together
as a couple.

Couples were adjured not to "mix" their
analyses

(p.

193).

He felt that the primary advantage in
this mode of treatment was
that both the realities and the neurotic
interactions of the partner's

behavior became clear.
Current reactions of dependency, guilt, hostility,
anxiety,
and superiority are revealed in a clearer light,
and at
times one of the mates gives information about
crucial
trends in the other mate.
These trends may be so underplayed by the other mate that they would not otherwise
be
adequately recognized by the analyst, although their
investigation is imperative for the success of the treatment .. .Simultaneous treatment of married couples was
successful in eleven of twelve instances, including two
which ended in divorces satisfactory to both parties.
In four of the twelve couple, both mates were analyzed,
in eight, one mate was analyzed, the other received
briefer psychotherapy. (Mittelman, 1948, pp. 196-197).
"The treatment" here, it should be understood, refers to the

analysis of the primary patient; the treatment might well be directed
to

the two partners, but only in the service of breaking the complemen-

tarity and allowing the primary patient to begin working in analysis.
\
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By this ti.e, mttel^an
was experienced enough
in concurrent analysis
to provide indications,
contraindications, and technical
pointers to
the reader.
It is also clear,
however, that he was
construing this
as an adjunct to treatment,
i.e., as a preliminary
and/or "e.tra"
treatment designed to rob the
complementarity o£ its effects
and allow
the patient to get on with
analysis
analysis.
All t-^.^
^
All
the formulations
were psychoanalytic, as was the treatment
format.
->

•

The efforts of Oberndorf and
Mittelman can be regarded as
those
of psychoanalytic adherents
who recognized problems arising
in the

treatment of neuroses by classical
analysis, problems which could
not
be accomodated by traditional
practice, which was based upon
the intimacy of individual analysis and
a careful putting aside of
reality
factors.
Ignoring reality issues was necessary,
technically
to

~

enhance the transference, and
theoretically

-

as neuroses were caused

in the past and could be cured only
by addressing the past, whether

through recall, abreaction, or working
through repetitions in the transference.

The presence of contemporaneous, reality
factors which

decidedly influenced neuroses, and which at
times were amenable
advice, constituted an embarrassment, and an
anomaly.

to

Classical theory

was unable to explain why simply direction and
reflection of behavior
and reaction could change the patient's behavior and
his or her spouse's

Contemporaneous events and relationships were exerting enormous
influence over the neuroses of patients in a way psychoanalytic
theory
could not account for, nor deal with in the traditional manner.
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As this became more obvious,
greater effort was directed
toward
the problem areas, and the rate
of publications addressing
them accelerated.

During the 30's Oberndorf was
virtually alone among analysts
In
dealing with neurotic complementarity
and, couples; Mlttelman had
than
extended Oberndorf

's

work In 1944, 1948, and 1952!°

In 1953, P. Martin and H.W. Bird
published "An approach to the

psychotherapy of married partners: the
stereoscopic techniques" In which
they advocated the close cooperation
between the analysts or therapists
who are each treating the individual
partners in a marriage. The expected regular and frequent contact
between the therapists was regarded
as leading to a more accurate perception
of the marital relationship.

This, of course, is an extension of
Mittelman's position, wherein he

saw both members of a couple to better
assess their neurotic reactions
to each other.

Though his focus remains essentially
intrapsychic (he

speaks of neurotic reactions rather than
relationships) his approach
does show clear relational elements.
is clearer still in Martin and Bird.

The shift to a relational focus
(It should be noted that they

emphasize the relationship between therapists
must be friendly and in-

formative for the stereoscopic technique to work) (cited in Grotjahn,
1960, pp. 39-40).

Significantly, in a laudatory and affectionate obituary written
at Oberndorf 's death in 1954, his work outside the mainstream of psychoanalytic theory and practice is not once mentioned, though his mainstream activities, of which there were many, were cited and discussed.
It can be inferred that the writer of the obituary and editors of the
Psychoanalytic Quarterly were uncomfortable enough with that material
to exclude it completely.
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Then in 1956 Alexander Thomas reported his work with
eight couples,
each partner of which was treated in one or two weekly
sessions to about
150 sessions per partner.

(At no time did both partners of any couple

meet simultaneously with Thomas.)

He points out that the therapist

should
Behave, as if he knew nothing about the other
individual...
No guarantee for a solution should be offered... It
must be
made clear that each partner will have to resolve his or
her neurotic functioning in the marriage in order to make
a go of it... [and] in simultaneous psychotherapy,
the

transference situation between patient and therapist
tends to become secondary and the emphasis to shift from
the therapeutic situation toward the marriage relationship. (Grotjahn, 1960, p. 44).

Martin Grotjahn's modification

.

Some of the work of Martin Grotjahn

may be said to culminate this trend toward tec^inical modifications in
classical clinical practice.

Grotjahn developed in greatest detail,

the techniques for using "marginal interviews", i.e., interview of the

patient's spouse, to further the analysis of the patient

.

He is quite

clear that these marginal interviews are an adjunct to "the therapy",
that is, the analysis of the individual patient, and information gleaned

from them is used in the service of the individual analysis (1960,
p.

172; p. 238) which is regarded as the basis of psychotherapy (p. 9).

There is no pretense of couples or family therapy.

His theory remains

strictly psychoanalytic, though his practice bends the clinical rules.
For instance, he discusses not reaction complementarities but"family

neuroses," and states that "there are cases in which seeing the marriage
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partner is strongly indicated for
sound analytic reasons..."
(I960,
p. 169).

He began seeing marital partners
when, doing the training analyses
of analytic candidates he found
that the

favorite defence of many physicians
... is isolation of
insight from emotional experience
... [whichj frequently"
renders their training analysis
therapeutically ineffective
They learn everything and change
nothing.
I found that
to involve a physician's
marriage partner, directly or
indirectly, and under favorable
circumstances, was an
effective way to combat this fateful
tendency .. .and I
decided that this technique might
also be applicable to
the treatment of other resistive
patients with similar
defenses. .. (I960, p. 162).

These and subsequent interviews were
planned to "reinforce, stimulate,
or to safeguard therapeutic progress"
in the patient's analysis.

Occa-

sionally marginal interviews led to
"collateral psychotherapeutictreatment with regular interviews"

concurrent analysis.

(p.

169), but, it appears, not to

If analysis of Grotjahn's partner
were indicated,

that partner would be referred to another
analyst (1960, p. 236); in
fact, Grotjahn would not accept in analysis,
the partner of a patient

even if treatment had been terminated, so
that if re-analysis were
required, he would be free to accept back the former
patient (1960,
p.

236).

It was made clear that he had never conducted "the simul-

taneous analysis of two married partners."

(p.

233)

At other times,

marital partners were referred to group psychotherapy (Klein, 1965,
p.

26).

"In certain emergencies"

a family conference may be called;

(p.

295) or "in rare cases"

(p.

179)

however, it is clearly an extra-

ordinary measure and one that is isolated and not part of

a series.
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Grotjahn was at pains to point out that his work was psychoanalytic,
and involved a "new direction in analytic technique"
theory.

(p.

279), but not

He pointed out that

the emphasis is on the analysis of the individual neurosis
as anchored in the complementary neuroses of the family...
This method employs the main analytic concepts of transference and resistance, of interpretation, lifting of
In my
repression, insight, and final interpretation.
its
although
therapy
opinion family therapy is analytic
analytic
formal
approach differs from the standardized
approach described in textbooks of psychoanalytic technique, (p. 275)

His formulations revolved around the ideas of complementary neuroses

which were anchored in the family collective unconscious and the family
neurosis

(p.

272).

The family collective unconscious was comprised of

the projective extensions of both the conscious and unconscious.

For

not chilinstance, the marriage neurosis (between marital partners and
their ages)
dren, depending upon presence or absence of children or

may be defined as the transfer and projection of unresolved,
unconscious conflicts from the parts of both partners into
into the
the present; that is, from children of families
unrealistic^
marriage situation. As long as the neurotic
prognosis
aspects of this transfer remain unconscious, the
old
In a neurotic marriage, the bond repeats
is gloomy.
an
see
infantile patterns. The female may unconsciously
deeper
On
image of her father or brother in her husband.
a
sister,
or
mother
her
him
in
see
levels she may also
man
A
circumstance which complicates matters endlessly.
it
father
may easily realize he represents his wife's
been
understand he has
is a different matter for him to
mother-in-law.
(pp. 92-93).
own
cast in the role of his

~

to formulation and change
While clearly psychoanalytic with regard

instance, with interrupting repetiprocesses (he explicitly deals, for
in marriages)
tions and beginning new learning

(p.

213), Grotjahn's
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work in practice was clinically far enough beyond the pale by

a summary

work in 1960, to draw criticism from dominant psychoanalytic circles.
"Psychoanalysts like Edward Glover, Karl Menninger, and Leon Saul more
or less warned against [analysis of the family neurosis] as dangerous
or detrimental to a pure transference neurosis." (p. 281)

Kubie is

cited (pp. 68-69) as thinking it unwise for the same analyst to conduct
the analyses of both marital partners simultaneously because that one
or another of the partners will lose confidence in the analyst's impart-

iality.

A third set of criticisms from the more traditional psychoanalysts
concerned the perceived destruction of the one-to-one relationship of
classical treatment.

This was regarded as the basis of analysis and

its disruption was ascribed to attempts to correct countertransf erence

difficulties in the analyst him- or herself.
Finally, the analyst's "unresolved" countertransf erence difficulties

may be criticized more personally.
It may be hinted darkly that he has an unresolved interest
in watching the primal scene. He may be accused of having
a "papa complex," or of attempting to become the pater
familiae, who God-like guides his flock of sheep. He may

Grotjahn dealt quite nicely with another obvious problem here,
separate analysts
the emergence of paranoid ideation, by requiring either
family
"joint
a
planning
or
at the first sign of paranoid reaction,
techthis
that
felt
He
interview" of patient, partner and analyst.
"malignant,
less
misinterpretations
nique made paranoid distortions and
It safealthough it cannot prevent argument and misinterpretation.
some
him
giving
guards the sanity of the sane family member by
orientation in the reality of the treatment." (p. 273)

,
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be accused of a great unconscious need to play the
omnipotent, omniscient, all-powerful, God-like-fathermother. Because of the dependency phobia of our time,
he may even be suspected of trying to enslave whole
families.
The perfect psychoanalyst will thus be contrasted with the image of the imperfect, depreciated,
and deplorable psychotherapist whom we meet in the funny
papers and mystery shows. There is no doubt that such
therapists do exist; but this cannot be avoided in a
time of transition, when well-organized training is
limited, and above all, slow. (Grotjahn, 1960, pp.
276-277)

Grotjahn 's rejoiner was that by dealing exclusively in counter-

transference consideration critics were ignoring the presence and role
of the complementary family neurosis, which had its own structure and

dynamics, and required analytic conceptualizations and treatment.

Psychoanalytic family treatment was regarded as stimulating the process
of working through, especially in those cases that tended to isolate

analytic insight from affect,

(p.

274)

What is quite obvious is that a sufficient number of analysts had

bolted from the mainstream, so that they, in some sense, constituted a
threat.

These criticisms can be regarded as attempts to discredit the

increasingly influential techniques on theoretical and personal grounds,
or to redefine the techniques as "not psychoanalysis" and thereby main-

tain the purity of the DM-"purity" here, not being meant perjoratively
but rather in the sense of "uncontaminated" or "wrong-to-the-spirit"
of the framework.

(The double-bind DM will be observed to attempt the

same type of probably necessary maneuver and Freud's 1914 paper may be

seen similarly).

This would seem to be an almost inevitable development

—
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as members of a DM, with all that implies in perception and self-

identity attempt to keep the set of commitments in which they have invested, stable and consonant with their total framework of commitments.
It is an attempt to correct what are seen as faulty thinking, as well

as an attempt to keep the ground from shifting out from under one's feet.

The process is an attempt to stave off a sort of betrayal from a DM
that is beginning to deteriorate from within.

Grotjahn's work with the family neurosis represents the most develop
response within psychoanalytic conceptualization, to the anomalies emerging from within the traditional clinical populations of psychoanalyses
the transference neuroses.

He addressed the resistant cases (resistance

with regard to isolation of affect, to lack of change in treatment, to
relapse) and bent the techniques without breaking fundamental rules.
It was a highly developed, and usually successful

(and therefore threat-

ening) accomodation of the psychoanalytic framework.

Ackerman's work,

though psychoanalytic in origin, steps firmly and unambiguously outside
the classical psychoanalytic framework, both in technique and concep-

tualization.

While Grotjahn regarded the individual as the patient,

based formulations and change in psychoanalysis, Ackerman's work treated
the whole family, with its dynamics, and redefined the change process

into family terms.

Two further points regarding implicit aspects of Grotjahn's work
that presaged the best of family systems therapy should be mentioned.

First, he was exquisitely aware of family homeostatic aspects, and
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particularly the reciprocity of health previously mentioned.

For in-

stance, while discussing the possible uses, including
diagnostic, of

marginal interviews, he states, "As the patient progresses,
this family
neurosis will also change, and this change will involve and perhaps
endanger the mental health of his mate and the future of the marriage."
(p.

156)

Similarly, in the previously mentioned issue of paranoid

ideation in the spouse, his technique served delicate homeostasis functions.

The second such point relates to Grotjahn's recognition that con-

temporary family processes served maintenance functions with respect to
pathology.

Oberndorf and Mittelman had, of course, dealt with this in

some measure because of their interest in how neurotic complementarities
served to protract neurosis in the analytic patient.

However, their

emphasis was on unconscious constellations that fit in a complementary

manner in the initial stages of relationships (and often influenced object choice) having set up marital neuroses, allowed/induced them to
continue; also, both wrote about the presence of individual neuroses in
the partners, antedating the relationships.

Grotjahn's work emphasizes

this aspect also, but had frequent undertones addressing the processes

whereby pathology was actively maintained in family behaviors and words;

12

Also see pp. 171-172 for extended discussion of spouse's difficulty in integrating 'relationship' to spouse in view of spouse's
changes and meeting the therapist.
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this connoted a shift in etiology from intra-psychic
dynamic processes
to interactive,

communicationally- induced pathology.

For instance.

Analytic psychotherapy of the family neurosis is
based
on an important insight: a person's neurosis may
be
anchored to a large extent in a complementary neurosis
involving his marriage or his family. The unconscious
communication or interaction between people can cause
and maintain a neurosis, as another kind of communication
can help to cure it. The family may thus both help and
hinder growth and maturation. (Grotjahn, 1960,
p. 282)
and,

The therapist of the neurotic family must understand that
a neurotic reaction in one person may complement neurotic
behavior in another; that a neurosis (or psychosis) may be
the only possible adjustment of a child to a neurotic
(or psychotic) family; that the way in which symptoms
develop in one person may be the result of unconscious
clues and orders given by another member of the family.
In these situations, psychoanalysis of the individual
patient may remain incomplete and may fail unless the
analyst treats the family neuroses, in addition to the
neuroses of the individual. (Grotjahn, 1960, p. 289)
If put to the test and asked whether neuroses are "caused" by inter-

action between people in the family of marriage (not origin) or by
psycho-dynamic processes from family of origin, it is obvious that

Grotjahn would take a modified psychoanalytic position.

Nevertheless,

the direction of his flexibility is prescient.

The influence of contemporaneous relationships on neuroses and on
the course of treatment constituted an anomaly primarily of technique,

and also had some implications for the paradigm.

These difficulties

were anomalous because psychoanalytic technique and theory of change
demanded treatment in isolation from the world (as mentioned previously,
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particularly with respect to enhancing transference)

.

By ignoring

reality factors and remaining a blank screen, the analyst fostered
the

necessary frustration, regression, and development of transference,
through which the neurotic repetitions could be worked through.

To

take into account reality factors, particularly with regard to relation-

ships

,

would drastically interfere with the development and use of that

therapeutically essential "relationship," the transference.

Thus, with

regard to practice, with patients involved in neurotic complementarities,
the analyst was caught between the devil and the deep, blue sea.

To

take into account the reality relationships hampered the transference

development and thus the therapy; to not take them into account hampered
the therapy because little or no change came about.

The anomalous aspects with regard to paradigm concerned the thera-

peutic processes of change, and not etiology of neurosis.

Psychoanalytic

theory could rather easily deal with even neurotic complementarities;
for instance, it could point to neurotic involvement in object choice

or indicate that both partners had been neurotic prior to their relationship.

The existence of contemporaneous influence over neuroses did not

contradict the etiological notions of origin in the past.
The unsolved problems of individual psychoanalysis, then, did not

constitute anomalies with respect to theory of

etiology

anomalous for both technique and theory of change
had paradigmatic status in the framework.

,

,

but were

both of which had

CHAPTER

IV

ANOMALIES ARISING WITH THE EXTENSION OF THE PARADIGM
TO NEW CLINICAL POPULATIONS

The success of the psychoanalytic DM with the transference
neuroses

impelled practitioners to attempt applying it to clinical phenomana
oth(
than the transference phenomena.

Psychoanalysis was applied to dementi;

praecox/ schizophrenia, to psychotic depressions, latent schizophrenia

borderline personalities, and to the psychopathology of children.

o]

Upon

application, it became quite clear that major reformulations would be

required as neither technique nor theory could accomodate aspects of
these psychologically different clinical syndromes.
This set of anomalies proves particularly important for two reasons.

First, the extension of a successful paradigm-DM to phenomena

for which it was not constructed, is another confirmation that Kuhnian

analysis is appropriate, with respect to the sequence of developments

preceding the inception of family therapy.

Second, the anomalies that

arose from this extension were more marked than those that arose from

traditional clinical populations; the discrepancy between DM-expected,
and encountered processes, proved just that much more noticeable.

Several authors had drawn attention to the fact that the framework
was largely unsuccessful when extended too far beyond itself.
stance, Oberndorf

,

For in-

only six years before the publication of the D-B

theory, stated that.
It is my impression that the proportion of unsatisfactory
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results may have increased with the extension of
the
psychoanalytic method to include cases with marked
schizoid personalities or schizophrenia, as well as
those with extremely weak or uncertain superegos
('psychopathic personalities'), and with the use of
the method of physicians whose natural talents are
unsure or training is incomplete. (Oberndorf, 1950
p.

396)

Similarly, attention has been drawn specifically to extension
to

clinical phenomena outside the originally intended realm of consideration,

"...instances where the psychoanalytic method has yielded unsatis

factory results [include]

...

intractable psychiatric conditions for whic

the psychoanalytic method was not originally intended but is now fre-

quently used." (Oberndorf, 1950,

p.

396)

Interestingly enough, Don Jackson, one of the double-bind originators and himself psychoanalytically trained, made note of this process.

Another influence toward family studies, which has indirectly stemmed from the psychoanalytic movement, has
to do with the disappointment in the results of this
expensive and time-consuming technique and the possible
relation of results to a change in the type of clinical
material with which psychoanalysts deal. The shift in
emphasis from symptom neuroses to character, marital,
and child guidance problems has resulted in a broadening
of analytic techniques with an emphasis on parameters
and on psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. (Jackson,
1961, p.

33)

Perhaps the finest example of awareness regarding both the results
of extension and the response of analysts comes, again, from Oberndorf
(1950, p„ 397).

Psychoanalytic treatment of the more complicated schizoid,
paranoid depressive, or extremely narcissistic personalities
may have continued three to five or even more years by the
same or successive analysts. The unsatisfactory results in

'
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this group are discouraging and arouse doubts in the
mind of_ the analysts as to whether the inadequacv"
Ties
in limitations of the method or in his own skill
in
applying it
.

These cases particularly suggest research to determine
more accurately the efficacy and scope of psychoanalytic
therapy; also to judge earlier the type of personality
likely to respond favorably, the suitability of the
analyst to the patient, and to assess promptly the
patient's difficulties. The latter fall into the realm
of transference, empathy, their derivatives and corollaries,
which are of paramount importance. This is always true
whether the therapy aims to make the deeply repressed
unconscious conscious, adapt the individual to cold,
cruel reality, integrate the id with the ego and the
superego, or also, I presume, in the procedure seeking
the goal of 'orgastic release.
For this reason the attention of most investigators dissatisf ied with their own results has centered about the question
of_ technique with the hope that improvements in technique
especially the analysis of the transference would bring
about better results
(emphasis added)
,

,

.

Anomalies that Arose from the Treatment of Children

The extension of psychoanalytic treatment to children occurred quite
early.

Anna Freud was presenting publicly in the 20' s (1926) and citing

Aichhorn's work (with delinquents) during the second decade of the century (1954, p. 607).

It is Parloff's opinion that it was in the area

of child analysis that the first serious questioning of the basic assump-

tions of psychoanalysis occurred.

Grotjahn apparently agrees, stating

that for many years, Oberndorf's work relating to family neurotic patterns

remained unnoticed.
Then, slowly, some analysts started to report techniques
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which differed from those their colleagues
had reported in
Glover s-^ questionnaire. These were the child
analysts
In their efforts to analyze children, they
constantly had
to deal with problems caused by the help
or hindrance of
the parents. (1960, pp. 28-29)

Parents of young patients.

The issue of dealing with the effects of

parents in treatment and with the parents themselves
was quite difficult,
and actually, could not be accomodated within the
psychoanalytic frame-

work.

The injunction against seeing relatives forbade it
technically,

and theoretically; meeting with parents contaminated the
emergence of
the transference relationship.

Moreover, particularly with children of

latency age, meeting with parents was regarded as potentially disrupting
any trust the patient might invest in the analyst.
On a theoretical level, mechanisms of psychoanalytic treatment

were involved.

The progress of therapy depended upon the elicitation

and working through of the transference neurosis and repetition compulsions.

The analyst, to facilitate such a transference, attempted to be

a "blank screen" and introduced few reality constraints into the situa-

tion; this included providing only minimal personal information about

him/herself and also not meeting with the patient's relatives, either
to give,

or receive information.

Success in treatment depended upon

elicitation and working through of transference.

Introduction of dis-

ruptions, such as meeting one or more family members could impede either

Glover, E. Techniques of psychoanalysis New York: International
Universities Press, 1955.
:

.

.
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of these processes (Parloff, 1961),

At the time of writing, Parloff

stated that it was still common practice for analysts to refuse inter-

views of family members on the assumption this would interfere with
treatment
In spite of these knotty theoretical points, it became increasingly

clear that parents had to be included in the analysis of children

— they

were wreaking havoc on the treatment and their effect had to be mitigated.

Melitta Sperling (1949) devoted an article to dealing with parental, but
'especially maternal, anxieties, restrictions, and subversions of analysis
of children with psychosomatic problems.

Similarly, Parloff (1961, p. 41)

drew attention to
the mounting clinical evidence .. that parents .were.
The patient's mother appeared
so bumbingly diabolical.
to have the remarkable knack of being able single-handedly
to produce neuroses, psychosomatic syndromes, psychoses,
and even juvenile delinquency with equal facility and on
either side of her ambivalence.
.

Such remarks strongly suggest that theories of

etiology were failing,

and that mounting frustration on the part of clinicians was encouraging
a scapegoating of parents, and particularly the mothers of disturbed

children.

Reasons for including parents, even peripherally, into the child's
treatment began to be noticed.
Child analysis failed to fulfil its initial promises as
analysts discovered that even five one-hour sessions a
week could not keep up, in most cases, with the influence of the remaining 163 hours at home. The number
of child analysts who have stuck to their last is surprisingly small, and this fact must have had some
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influence in giving tacit approval for others to seek
new techniques in treating children. (Jackson and
Satir, 1961, pp. 33-34)

Moreover, since the child was perceived as the victim of
the parent's

conscious or unconscious "malevolence," the treatment of the child
could
be enhanced by also treating the parents (Parloff, 1961,
p. 41).

Also,

the child guidance clinics (which almost without exception
operated

within the psychoanalytic framework) were finding that in

a

significant

percentage of cases, children were referred with problems which were
directly, and often dynamically linked to marital problems, and that

treating the child alone was fruitless, and similar in structure to
treating one individual in a neurotic complementarity.

(This sort of

finding is, it would seem, partially responsible for the transformation
of some child-guidance clinics to family-therapy clinics).

Work such as Burgum's (1942, previously cited) regarding the father
in relation to child and mother's treatment, indicated that treatment
of child and mother were not enough.

Cognitive structure of children

.

The necessity of working with parents

was damaging enough to the integrity of the application.

Quite as

damaging was the suggestion that, not only was psychoanalysis not very
effective with children, but that child analysis and its formulations,

were not always appropriate to the children themselves as a change process

Dr. Alvin Winder has noted that apparently Fritz Redl found the
psychoanalytic change processes compatible with those children he treated,

and was able to use the framework successfully.
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Auerswald (1972, pp. 87-88) relates his discovery
of this shortly after
having finished training as an analyst.
Armed with the paraphenalia of a "child therapist"—
family dolls, dart guns, etc.— I found myself
in
various rooms with various black ghetto children
doing
'play therapy.'
I' discovered at that time
that I
had a problem. Nothing I did changed much of
anything.
The kids I was trying to "treat" were delighted
to
shoot mother "symbolically" ad infinitum
They were
supposed to respond to my interpretations by entering
into a process.
They didn't. They just shot mother.
Furthermore, they shot father, brother, sister and
Jesus Christ with the same glee, depending upon which
stimulus I placed before them. Frequently, they shot
me... I began to understand that the reason I could not
treat "delinquent" ghetto kids with play therapy was
to be found in their general cognitive organization
vis- a- vis my own and the frame of reference I was using,
and not in the structure of psychodynamic defense systems
which, in that particular group of kids, existed at
best in only rudimentary ways.-^
.

Carl Whitaker (1972, pp. 98-99) too, became frustrated and dis-

couraged when no change developed.

Carolyn Attneave (1972, pp. 122-123)

within the context of delivering comprehensive care to children (not

within the psychoanalytic framework, though her experience is similar
to the others in the problems she was responding to)

started doing family
'

therapy "because nothing else made sense, although we'd not heard of it
as a separate field."

In case we should consider the case of delinquent children too extreme an extension to adequately judge psychoanalysis s efficacy, we
should recall that the first extension of the framework to children was
by Aichhorn, to the same population, that is, delinquent ghetto children.
'
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Anna Freud's work, as early as her 1926 report also took into
account
the differences in the cognitive structure, and existential
situation
of the child.

She stressed that adults came to treatment, whereas children

were brought for treatment; it was necessary, therefore, to form an understanding or to reach a consensus with each child patient about the reason
for treatment.

This agreed-upon reason was always in terms the child

could understand and was usually, it appears, initially formulated by the
child.

Though she did not elaborate explicitly to any great degree, it

is obvious from her reports that Freud took pains to establish a working

relationship with each child; she was explicit about the need to establish a working relationship that is different from that with an adult
patient.

What she was less than explicit about was that the pains she

took to establish these relationships were directed toward a type of

relationship that depended as much upon its affective component as any
interpretations to effect change.

The differences between adult and child

in cognitive structuring were taken into account primarily in her tech-

nique rather than in her theory.

Initial efforts to see the young patient's parents

.

Eventually, social

agencies dealing with children, and to a far lesser degree, child analysts,

began to see family members, though "only as the backdrop against which
to view the individual"

(Sherman, 1961, p. 14).

There developed a definite

rift such that some therapists were advocating seeing family members,
as a family and not in concurrent but separate analyses, whereas others

.

—
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advocated a more orthodox psychoanalytic approach.

For instance, Berta

Bornstein in 1948 contended that contact with parents should
not go
beyond mild and supportive adjunct psychotherapy and the analyst
should
not use dynamic or genetic interpretations with
the parents.'^

We can assume that the rift became recognized in
part because there

were enough advocates of both positions to mount an
explicit campaign.
By the early 1950 's, caseworkers had had enough experience
in seeing

relatives of patients that they were able to identify points of
difficulty in their new endeavor.
The trouble has been, as I have already mentioned, that
the theory underlying casework practice with individuals
has not been supplemented with the methodological equipment necessary for the understanding and treatment of the
family constellation
It is an interesting phenomenon
supplying grist for the sociologist's mill— that studies
and experimentation of the family as a group and on family
pairs, conducted by psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, caseworkers, and anthropologists, have been reported in the
literature only recently. Caseworkers have begun to seek
new operational hypotheses on the basis of their own
experience and have also extrapolated related concepts
from the findings reported by other professions.
(Mitchell, 1961, p. 72)
.

By 1954, Nathan Ackerman's work had enabled him to elucidate these

gaps more fully,

(though it would be another four years before publi-

cation of his theoretical solutions)
In child guidance practice, the problems of treating the
parents of disturbed children have not been solved. There

^Cited by Grotjahn (1960,

p.

30).
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have been many failures. We have not yet succeeded in
formulating adequate criteria for the psychotherapy of
parental role.
In examining the causes of failure of
treatment of mothers of disturbed children, several factors loom large: the complexity of the definition
of
mothering; the difficulty of relating the dynamics of
individual personality to the mothering role; incomplete
or incorrect diagnosis; vague and changing
orientation
to goals with resulting confusion of the
therapeutic
course; failure to properly integrate the treatment
of child and mother; failure to understand the
parental
conflict and the fundamental interdependence of maternal
and paternal functioning; and finally, the failure to
relate the therapy of child and mother to a total psychosocial evaluation of the family as a unit. (Ackerman,
1954, p. 362)

Anomalies in child analysis

.

If we recall Masterman's point,

that anom-

alies arise because the paradigms have been pushed too far, and Kuhn's
point, that anomalies are obdurate discrepancies between DM predictions/

expectations and what actually occurs, then two situations here can

legitimately be termed anomalies.

First, the failure rate in child

treatment if parents were excluded signalled the first anomaly.

For,

if change depended directly upon the transference relationship, and if

contact with family members hindered development of transference, the

analyst was caught in a bind.

S/he could either see, or not see, the

family members; if s/he did, transference development was hindered and

change jeopardized, yet if s/he did not, then experience had shown
change was hampered in the child.

Secondly, the differences between

adults and children in cognitive capabilities dictated the necessity
of changes, both clinical formulations and practice to de-emphasize

transference, interpretation, and many verbal techniques; thus Anna
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Freud set about establishing an emotional working relationship with
the
child patients, and Melanie Klein and her group split off from
classical

analyses in part because of using play^rather than talk with young
patients.

Thus, the techniques were definitely different than in Freud's

paradigm; the mechanism of change, working through the repetitions, continues to apply, except that transference itself is no longer involved.

Ackerman's response to psychoanalytic-child anomalies

.

Nathan Ackerman's

work with families constituted the first psychoanalytic family treatment
publicly reported; that is, his focus was not on the individual but on
the family itself as the unit of conceptualization and focus for change.

He had served for several years as a consultant to a social agency pri-

marily oriented to the treatment of children, which eventually dissolved
to form a Family Mental Health Clinic

(Ackerman, 1961a, p. 228).

Ackerraan

was concerned about the treatment of children in the light of anomalies

mentioned here.

In 1950, he and Sobel challenged the traditional psy-

chiatric diagnostic categories for children and set out to define the

children's personalities as a function of the "sociopsychological con-

figuration of the family unit."

(p.

744)

Because their unit of defini-

tion was the child in his/her interaction with significant others, they

Dr. Al Winder has brought attention to this important split from
the classical psychoanalytic framework.

.
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decided that the treatment of the young child should begin
with the
treatment of the family group.

They observed, however, that no one was

doing family treatment, and the conceptual framework for it
did not

exist—in fact, they stated that, "We

do not know whether it is in fact

possible to treat families as groups.

Perhaps it is not possible."

(p.

745). They then proposed a methodology for the study of the pre-school

child with the context of the family

(p.

745).

By 1954, concern primarily for the child had shifted to the inte-

gration of the family unit with the child.

Ackerman pointed out many

of the difficulties in adjunct treatment, where child "and someone"

would be seen (pp. 361,366).

He also began to elaborate what would be

his primary interest for the remainder of his work

finding a better way of conceptualizing the interrelations
of illness in one person with psycho-social processes of
the family entity.
This immediately involves a consideration
of three interrelated phenomenological levels: what goes on
inside one person; the make-up of that person as it is
expressed in adaptation to specific family roles; and the
structure and function of the family as a group entity.
(Ackerman, 1961b, p. 256)
In 1954, he again pointed out that an appropriate frame of reference had

not yet been devised to integrate the therapy of an individual with the

therapy of a family group (pp. 367-368).
His Psychodynamics of Family Life

:

Diagnosis and Treatment (1958)

constituted his initial paradigmatic statement where he provided that

framework for the integration of individual and family he had talked
about
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In this book he offered a comprehensive
theoretical
approach in which the emerging personality of the
individual is related to the family configuration.
He presented a systematic scheme for organizing
and
correlating data on the family group with data on
individual family members. This scheme encompassed
bio-psycho-social factors, patterns of communication,
control of conflict, mechanisms for restitution,
extrafamilial social roles, pathogenic conflicts,
stricings and values, capacity to accomodate to
new experiences, reality testing, learning and
growth. (Mitchell, 1961, p. 73)

The object of the diagnostic family process was to pinpoint the

central conflicts of the family group, and their corresponding role

disturbances.

However, both diagnosis and treatment focused on the

family as a whole, rather than the concommitent treatment of several

members in separate analyses.
...if we are to understand the individual, we must also
understand the structure, function, and vital processes
of the group as a discrete system.
It is for this reason
that, in this past decade, "family diagnosis" has been
coming to the fore as a focus of interest, replacing an
interest in "family -oriented " diagnosis.
It represents
a shift to viewing the distress of the individual as
less the problem than a symptom of the problem of
pathology in the whole family. Family diagnosis is
oriented to "the client ±n the family" and their reciprocal interplay; it replaces the separatism expressed
in the phrase "the client and his family." One cannot
overemphasize the basic difference in orientation produced by the substitution of the word "in" for the word
"and." The "in" orientation is holistic; and "and"
orientation atomistic. These differing orientations
reflect differences not only in personality theory but
also in practical family analysis. (Sherman, p. 18, in
Ackerraan, 1961) [his emphasis].

Ackerman also responded to a number of the anomalies that had
arisen with respect to child analysis, and re-interpreted them accordi
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to his dual-focus individual-family system.

From a clinical point of view, several considerations
ought to be stressed. First, mental illness is contagious.
It is passed from person to person.
If we
test this idea, we find some interesting things, some
that ought to have been obvious. Families are rare
in which only one member is psychiatrically disturbed.
Where one is disturbed, one inevitably finds other
members of the same group also suffering a psychiatric
disorder. These illnesses liiay differ but it is hard
to know whether the first person that comes to our
attention is the most sick or the least sick. There
is, too, a very important ongoing interaction between
the psychiatric sickness of one member and the psychiatric sickness of another, where the two are intimately bound in their day-by-day family experience.
In other words, there are complementary relations between the illnesses of respective family members who
share the problems of daily living. The one individual
who happens to get to us first, the so-called primary
patient, ought to be viewed as one link in the distress
and disablement; but we must also examine the ways in
which his disturbance represents a symptomatic or
functional expression of the emotional warp of the
family as a whole.
Often when one looks into these
matters does one find that one part of the family maintains a tolerable emotional balance at the expense of
another. That is, if one person is to keep his head
above water, to maintain at least a tolerable functioning
without breaking down, it can sometimes only be done
when another member of the family is made sick or kept
In
sick, as is the case with some forms of depression.
a tacit, covert way, other family members behave in a
manner that induces the depressed person to stay depressed.
If we intervene and relieve that depression, we upset the
pre-existing emotional balance in the family relations,
and someone else cracks up. Now, this is generally what
one finds in family groups where there is some degree of
cohesiveness, some partial complementarity among the
members, so that the family functions are carried on.
Despite this apparent unity, on a deeper level, the
family is emotionally divided into competing factions.
In some families there may be open warfare between one
part of the family and another. The fate of such internal
war influences the susceptibility to breakdown and the
outcropping of psychiatric illness. (Ackerman, 1961a ,pp.
233-234)

s
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Ackerinan's work

clearly the most sophisticated form of response

to the child anomalies arising from within the psychoanalytic
frame-

work.

Many family therapists of a certain ilk credit Ackerman with

having "started" family therapy— others discount his contributions as

adaptations/extensions of psychoanalysis and refuse

ceptualization and methodology as family therapy.

to regard his con-

It is unclear at

present if his work was revolutionary or evolutionary in Kuhnian terms;
in any case,

the influence of his work remains powerful among many

groups of family therapists, who it should be noted, can be regarded as

antithetical in practice and theory to the D-B adherents.

D-B adherents

claiming priority of revolution, however, cite the incontrovertible fact
that the D-B paradigm reached public report two years before Ackerman'

paradigmatic work.

Anomalies that Arose from the Treatment of
Borderline Personalities or Latent Schizophrenia

The development and awareness of a "pseudo-neurotic" masked psychotic

syndrome

.

A surprising amount of attention was paid to borderline per-

sonalities or latent schizophrenia (also known as pseudoneurotic schizo-

phrenia or borderline psychosis) beginning, with any frequency, during
the 1930's.

"Surprising" because, the syndrome is not exactly one that

seems likely to attract the attention of analysts.

For example, it

seems to make sense that schizophrenia should attract their attention,

both in terms of treatment and research; if psychoanalysis was largely
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successful for neurosis and nothing seemed particularly successful

with schizophrenia, the obvious next step is to bring the theory and
practice of psychoanalysis to bear on schizophrenia— to cure or ameliorate, and to gain information about the disorder(s).

However, even the

existence of a borderline syndrome was not known until the practice of

psychoanalysis led to its discovery/ formulation as a clinical entity.

While schizophrenia was

a

manifest psychopathology

phrenia was exactly this: latent.

,

latent schizo-

It became a recognized syndrome, not

through nosological observation or because of theoretical predictions;
but rather, was uncovered, then highlighted, by a psychotherapeutic
process.

The reason for analysts' attention to borderline syndromes

rests, not in the intractability or inverted prestige of schizophrenia,
but in the contingencies of everyday private practice.

analysts grew, and concommitantly

,

As the number of

the number of cases treated,

there

began to appear an alarming number of patients who appeared neurotic
(of one form or other) when accepted into treatment,

then, during the

exigencies of analysis, decompensated into frank psychosis.

Even

allowing for the inevitable percentage of mis-diagnoses in early treatment, poor treatment leading to exacerbation of clinical picture, and

"hidden" psychoses, the number of analytically precipitated psychoses
in neurotic-appearing patients began to concern the profession.

This

was particularly problematic as most analysts dealt (and still do) with

out-patients; precipitation of psychosis in one's out-patient is

anxiety-provoking, to say the least, with its subsequent need for
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hospitalization and dimming of prognosis.

A literature search reveals

a larger body of writings on
these borderline personalities in the
1930';

and 1940 than on the treatment of
schizophrenia, though both contributed

their own anomalies to the rising sense
of crisis.

Though the 1930's heralded the intense work
on borderline issues,
Clark addressed himself to what he termed the
"borderland neuroses and
psychoses," as early as 1919, commenting that,
I think very few physicians have
seriously used psychoanalytic methods in treating the essential neuroses
without sooner or later making an attempt to employ
the
same method in the borderland neuroses and psychoses,
with varying results. (Clark, 1919, p. 306)

Briefly, he reported his work (beginning as early as 1912)
with

several sets of syndromes "not ordinarily classed as belonging to
the

analytic type of psychoneuroses
praecox.

.

"

(p.

306)

These included dementia

6

While Clark would use psychoanalytic interpretations in what appear
to be efforts to understand the patient's difficulties, he felt that

...under no circumstances should we really attempt to
require the patient himself to get that insight or
attempt to act upon it as such. In other words, dementia
praecox should not be analyzed, but by a method of
conscious suggestive therapeutics and rationalization

With the dementia praecox cases (most of which were advanced by time
of referral to him)
he was of the opinion that any attempt at traditional
psychoanalysis "invariably does harm," as it takes away the "crutches
of formulations these patients have made by which they can get on with
the realities of their existence.
They are then reduced to actual
impotence."
(p. 307)
,
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the praecox individual may be helped to
an adolescent
sublimation of work and recreation short of the
adult
demands of emotional maturity. (Clark,
308)^
p.

It is obvious that Clark had used the term
"borderland" to denote

ambiguity in clinical picture; later use of the term
refers to a specific syndrome which should be regarded as a fairly
stable personality

integration, which has specific characteristics, one of which
is the

potential for temporary psychotic decompensations.

The term does not

refer to a process of transiency nor does it connote anything
like
"almost psychotic" or "nearly psychotic;" the majority of individuals
or borderline personality type at no time experience psychosis.

Greenacre (1941), in a series devoted to the predisposition toward
anxiety, emphasized increasing the reality hold of the patients and

strengthening the ego through "education" of the patients' narcissism;
she emphasized minimizing acting out and concessions to the patient's

demand for activity.

g

Stern in 1938 drew attention to the reason for regarding borderlines
as a group by themselves, as differentiated from both the psychoneuroses

and the psychoses (p. 488), though he takes pains to point out that his

presentation is unavoidably vague, as the syndrome is neither a variety

^In some respects, Clark's formulations bear resemblance to Harry
Stack Sullivan's a decade later,
g

reviewed by Stone, 1954.
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of neurosis or psychosis (and hence he is elucidating a syndrome with-

out the familiar psychoanalytic processes and characteristic clinical

patterns his readers were accustomed to) and because his efforts were
early in the process, and more time and investigation were required
(pp. 487-488).

In part. Stern's difficulty was attributable to the

presence of processes not accounted for within the psychoanalytic

framework making the borderline syndrome both anomalous and important.
His efforts were particularly directed toward diagnosis as, it should be
recalled, diagnosis of borderlines was heretofore difficult and crucial
to the profession so that they would not be involved as patients in

psychoanalytic treatment.

9

His initial set of statements give a good

indication of the perplexity with which this phenomenon was viewed,
and also the sense of failure, crisis and need for revision.
It is well known that a large group of patients fit frankly
neither into the psychotic nor into the psychoneurotic group,
and that this border line group of patients is extemely
difficult to handle effectively by any psychotherapeutic

Q

Stern (1938, p. 468) listed clinical symptoms to help the practitioner recognize a borderline personality early in treatment, in time
to terminate and avoid the significant potential of a psychosis, or to
make technical modifications in the treatment. Stern's list includes:
i.e., psychic collapse at trauma
1. Narcissism; 2. Psychic bleeding
hypersensitivity i.e., easily
Inordinate
3.
resilience;
rather than
and body rigidity— 'The rigid
Psychic
4.
wounded;
deeply insulted or
i.e., depression or
reactions
therapeutic
personality'; 5. Negative
rooted feelings
constitutionally
like
looks
suicidal attempts; 6. What
patient;
the
of
personality
the
in
of inferiority, deeply imbedded
organic indeep
of
state
a
as
described
7. Masochism; 8. What can be
10.
and
mechanisms;
projection
security or anxiety; 9. The use of
relationships,
personal
in
particularly
Difficulties in reality testing,

—

—

—

.
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method. What forced itself on my attention some three
or four years ago was the increasing number of these
patients who came for treatment. My custom was not to
treat them analytically, except when they were suffering
acutely from neurotic symptoms (i.e., anxiety, depression,
etc.) and required immediate therapy.
With these I
tried the usual analytic therapy but in the large majority
of the patients, after a more or less lengthy course of
treatment, I had to stop treatment leaving them not much
benefited. In the case of the 'neurotic character,' which
makes up a very large proportion of this border line group,
much more often than not I attempted no treatment at all,
for the simple reason that I had learned from experience
that our knowledge of analytic therapy as employed with
the psychoneurotic patients was insufficient to achieve
good results with this group, especially when their
suffering was not acute enough to justify immediate therapy.
(Stern, 1938, p. 467, emphasis added)

His perception of the failure of classical psychoanalysis for these

patients is reiterated throughout his article (pp. 468,469,488).
cally,

Specifi-

though he induced and allowed the thorough working through of the

object libidinal

material "they nevertheless remained sick", unlike

usual neurotics (p. 468).

The mechanism of change in classical analysis,

working through the repetitions within the transference, took place,
but were not effective for this group of patients.

This clearly runs

counter to paradigm-induced expectations and, as such, constitutes an

anomaly
Stern was to eventually decide that though the disturbed psychosexual impulses were operative and must be included in treatment, the

presence of disturbed narcissism, and not psychosexual difficulties,
were the cause of borderline states (pp. 488-489).

These patients

showed the presence of narcissism to a degree not present in transfer
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neurotics and "it is on the basis of narcissism that the entire clinical
picture is built."

(p.

469)

This clearly, is a significant departure

from the Freudian paradigm with respect to formulation of the disorders.

Stern is positing a new root cause for this disorder, then goes on to
further differentiate the borderline group from the psychoneurotic.

With borderline patients, there is an immaturity and insecurity in the
transference not seen in neurotics (p. 478); it is a transference of

"extreme dependence" (p. 480).

This is related to another point of

differentiation; that is, the anxiety of borderlines (which is quite
intense and from which the symptoms arise as defense) arises from the

early infantile period, and as such, at an earlier developmental stage
than neurotics (p. 487).

Finally, a significantly greater proportion

of the ego functioning is involved in the disturbance, which of course

contributes to the increased difficulty in treatment and the "more grave"
prognosis (p. 489).
Now,

this is all rather interesting as,

it might be recalled,

the

reason for psychoanalyst's not treating psychotic manifestations involves
the inability of these patients to form transferences.

This was dis-

cussed at some length by Freud in his 1914 paper on narcissism.

In that

paper, he deduced from his paradigm and DM that the presence of signifi-

cant narcissism precludes the development of transference and hence,
rather importthe change processes of working through. Contrary to this

borderlines, though
ant point, Stern and others, began to note that
form
characterized by inordinate amounts of narcissism, did in fact

.
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transferences.

Moreover, these transferences were
particularly intense,

primitive, dependent, and vivid.

Because of the intensity and dependency
of these transferences.
Stern (1938, p. 479, footnote) recommended
two technical modifications:
a greater degree of supportiveness
by the analyst and "a rather constant

occupation" with diminishing the intensity of the
transference.

These

modifications are in direct contradiction to the
psychoanalytic practice
of fostering the transference.

The presence of transference among

patients with marked narcissism clearly constitutes a
discrepancy between paradigm and DM induced expectations and empirical
findings; as
such,

transference among narcissistic patients constitutes a
theoretical

anomaly with respect to the libido theory.

The technical modifications

required to deal with borderline transferences constituted a technical

anomaly with respect to the classical paradigm.
His final conclusions were that narcissism was indeed amenable to
not only psychoanalytic investigation, but also treatment (p. 488),
though it was emphasized that the technical modifications required were

substantial
Zilboorg (1941) addressed the behavioral picture of what he termed

"ambulatory schizophrenics" (another term at times used for the borderline types) which captured the quality of their lives rather well, and

which mentioned many of the elements later discussed by Otto Kernberg
(1975)

.

This includes the "outstanding feature" of the inner life of

these persons.
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...they are literally suffused with hatred.
They are
hardly ever free from its pressure, during their
waking
hours or in their sleep. This hatred they may
not express, but it appears under two guises.
As a rule the
combination of both usually presents itself in one
person: first, they are usually tense, almost
to the point
of being constantly aware of physical tension,
of "being
tied up in knots"; and second, anxiety, of
which they
may on occasion be aware, makes its appearance,
but even
when these persons realize that they are anxious, they
perceive it not as fear, nor as anxiety only, but as
an inner, violent, helpless anger, even rage.
(1941, p. 149)

Zilbourg documents the paucity of friendships, dissociation
of

affection from sexual life, propensity for suicide,
assaultiveness, and
homicide of those (ambivalently) close to them, and their
impulsivity.
His report, he felt, needed more time to be less sparse, as not many

ambulatory schizophrenics had entered treatment, or remained.
Federn published a three-part series on the psychoanalysis of psychoses, where he addressed himself to diagnosis, treatment and dynamic

processes in psychosis;

(most of that work will be reviewed with the

schizophrenic anomalies, except for some material on latent schizo-

phrenia more appropriate here)

.

It was his feeling that in cases of

latent psychoses, one wanted to make the diagnosis as soon as possible,
to avoid beginning or continuing analysis, and that this is what Freud

had in mind when he avocated trial-analyses (1943, p. 15).

Four years

later, Federn reiterated this concern, in the interests of preventing
a latent

schizophrenia from becoming manifest; though not always possibl

it was to be attempted as the prognosis of schizophrenia is graver than

that for latent schizophrenia and always unpredictable.

He also "sharply separated" early childhood schizophrenia from
latent schizophrenia, a necessary point, in view of the occasional confusion between the two (1947, p. 132).
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He addressed himself in 1943 to exactly the phenomenon of
concern

among analysts— how to diagnose the latent schizophrenia early
enough
to terminate analysis and hopefully avoid an
analytically-precipitated

psychosis.

As such, he focused on latent schizophrenic indications

that occurred during analysis, particularly:

the patient's intuitive

acceptance without resistance, of interpretations regarding symbols
and primary processes, and quick or even sudden disappearance of severe

neurotic symp tons
Unfortunately, the presence of these two features led analysts to
think the analysand was an excellent analytic candidate; hence, the

relatively large number of precipitated psychoses.

In doubtful cases,

Federn strongly advised trial-analysis with immediate interruption if
the indications were present (pp. 41-42).

at that late date, 1947,

He apparently felt that even

the unwitting precipitation of psychoses was

continuing and not being recognized (1947, pp. 138-139):
No latent schizophrenic should be " cured " of his neurosis
and he definitely should not be treated by the standard
form of psychoanalysis
For thirty years cases have come
to me for treatment or for consultation after having been
naively, and apparently well, psychoanalyzed. Their (correct)
,

.

Other warning indicators included: a history with different levels
of neuroses such as neurasthenia, hypochondria, early conversion hysteria, obsessions, anxiety hysteria and severe depersonalizations (hence
psychotic periods with true
the term "pseudo-neurotic schizophrenia)
delusions and loss of reality testing in early childhood; lasting
deterioration at work and isolation in social contacts after puberty
or after leaving home or school (as neurotics tend to temporarily
improve with change in circumstances); prevalence of a narcissistic
reaction pattern over that of object libido choices; and typical
physiognomic signs in posture, look, and gesture (which Federn does
not, however, specify), (pp. 15-16)
;

s
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diagnosis was neurosis. During all that time the latent
schizophrenic state was not recognized. Seldom did the
psychoanalyst either anticipate the outbreak or acknowledge, after it had occurred, that it was his interference
that precipitated the manifest psychosis. He would invariably think the case was too difficult for psychoanalytical treatment. This kind of error is not a personal one, but one made by "standardized" psychiatry,
[his emphasis]

Awareness of crisis in the late 1940 's and early 1950'

.

By 1950,

'

the realization of difficulties with borderline personalities had be-

come more acute.

Bychowski (1950, p. 407) referred to the "growing

interest in the problem of therapeutic failures" and addressed the

borderline group, who he characterized as superficially appearing to
have made a "rather good adjustment, with only occasional behavioral

deviations and mood swings until this facade collapses 'either due to
a dramatic event in their life, or to the removal of their Ego defenses

as in a training analysis...'" (1950, p. 409).

His paper focused on

the concept of ego weakness, i.e., an ego that could not be relied upon

when stressed

to

continue to differentiate "self" from "other", and

reality from fantasy.

Bychowski also considered and required technical

modifications which emphasized active reduction of transference.

This

was accomplished by avoiding the "classical analytical reserve" (p. 413),
by stressing reality testing (p. 414) and the inclusion of the "total

reality" of the patient in the analysis

— that

is,

events from work,

relationships, behavior in the "outside world" and projective mechanisms
(p.

414).

Adherence to the classical position of enhancing transference
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and reducins the reality "markers" was perceived as dangerous in
its

simultaneous elicitation of disturbed tendencies (in the transference)

with decreased controls, (the control of acting-out tendencies, impulsivity and intensity of transference being very important in the treat-

ment of borderlines).

Bychowski's modifications in treatment can be

said to loosen with one hand and protect or restrain with the other,
the narcissistic libido and the ego,

in the service of rectifying the

narcissistic disturbances while strengthening the ego (1950,

p.

416).

This working through of primary narcissism will then form
an indispensable basis for productive sublimation of narcissistic libido, a process whose vital necessity cannot
be overestimated.
Since investment of the immature Ego
with an unusual quantum of primary narcissism seems to be
an important factor of its weakness, we cannot strengthen
the Ego without freeing it from this load.
On the other
hand, however, we know that a proper amount of narcissism
is an important prerequisite of the Ego strength (Nunberg,
Federn)
Moreover, redirection of primary narcissism
toward productive and realistic objectives, seems the best,
and perhaps the only preventive measure against future
relapses as a result of a clash between reality and unbound
narcissism, (p. 415)
.

This is clearly not classical psychoanalysis and posits different change

processes as well as different technical processes.

For instance, he

even advocated the temporary interruption of treatment on occasion to

allow the strengthening ego

to

consolidate certain of its gains

(p.

417).

In a later paper (1953), also on borderline phenomena, or latent

psychosis, Bychowski addressed diagnosis, dynamics and therapy.

(He

discussed psychological testing to aid diagnoses and the problem of

divergent opinion between psychologist and analyst, in either direction.
article
A year earlier, L. Zucker had devoted an entire and quite good

1A4

to diagnosis and dynamics of latent schizophrenia
based on Rorschach

studies (1952)

.

Zucker also addressed the advisability of diagnosis

to avert psychosis.

Briefly, he emphasized its existence as a clinical

entity (p. 484), but one which was usually masked by
character-neurotic

difficulties, deviant behavior (delinquency, perversion, addiction),
or
psychopathy, which upon provocation "may burst into psychosis"; he paid

particular attention to those psychoses provoked by psychoanalysis
whether therapeutic or didactic (pp.

48.5,

499, 500).

Bychowski also posited a formulation of the dynamic structure of
latent psychosis that departed firmly from Freudian formulations and

appears related to the ego psychoanalysts (a large and important group in

psychoanalysis but one which is tangential to present purposes)

.

Bychow-

ski states that in the course of early development, a discontinuity occurs
so that early ego states remain untouched under the cover
of later ego formations.
Accordingly, archaic constellations remain fixated and preserved, as it were, for future
reference.
They form then the psychotic germs which, under
the impact of various dynamic and environmental factors, can
cause the psychotic breakdown of ego defenses and sever whatever reality contact and testing have been built up in the
course of later development. (1953, p. 491)

This formulation takes into account the periods of time with non-psychotic
functioning, the relatively rapid decompensation (as he's not suggesting

an accretionary process, but a break-through), the presence of characterol
gical and neurotic signs (serving to keep the psychotic materials in
check)

,

as well as the peculiar rigid and brittle quality of individuals

subject to these processes.

This formulation provided the basis, and
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rationale, for further modifications in
technique; Bychowski reiterated
his 1950 modifications and added
several elements.

He became more

emphatic about the need to introduce
modifications to strengthen and
protect the prepsychotic ego
(pp. 500 and 502).

^^^^^^^ testing

grew in importance as the ego became
more exposed to "the bombardment
of the repressed id derivatives"
(p. 502).

The frequency of sessions

and position of patient (recumbent or
seated, facing or not facing the

analyst) were factors used to control reality
testing also.

interpretations needed to be spaced, and careful.

Similarly,

"Too deep and too

rapid interpretations, especially when not
accompanied by certain re-

assuring explanations, may expose the ego to the onrush
of id impulses
well as to the implacable sadism of the superego",

(p.

500); some resis

tances were left uninterpreted and free association minimized
as it en-

couraged both regression and looseness of thinking.
The primitive transference relationship could show either infantil
leaning and oral dependence with derivative primitive identification or, negatively, in defensive hostility culminating
in destructive rage...

12

His point regarding the importance of the weak ego for psychoanalysis appears well taken. Over twenty years later, (1974), Strupp's
report on the Menninger Foundation study of psychotherapeutic success
includes two (of five) concluding statements about ego strength:
1.

A high level of Initial Ego Strength represents a good
prognosis for all forms of psychoanalytic psychotherapy,
but especially psychoanalysis.

2.

Patients with ego weakness (especially "borderline" cases)
frequently fail to benefit from psychoanalysis or supportive psychotherapy... (p. 273)

.
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The dissociation between these various attitudes of the
ego toward the analyst as a temporary love-hate object
may be so blatant as to make for a true split in the object
relationship.
In this way, in the transference, the ego
repeats the cleavage by the archaic ego which in its deep
ambivalence had split parental images into bad and good
objects. It is of great therapeutic value to work through
this peculiar situation and to demonstrate it to the patient
with absolute clarity, (p. 501)

The focus of treatment was also shifted from analysis of libido
conflicts to the analysis of primary narcissism and its defensive
"archaic megalomania" (p. 502)

All of the preceding modifications of formulation, technique and
focus resulted in a sophisticated and effective form of treatment for the

borderline personality type, but clearly by 1953, its most sophisticated

proponent was well beyond the psychoanalytic pale.
to abandon the paradigmatic

Bychowski had had

technique of free association, the change

processes of abreaction, and alter the working through of transference,

eschew interpretation as the primary technical tool, change the emphasis
of treatment from verbal technique toward a verbal-relational model,

13

and even abandoned the traditional recumbent position of the patient.

Though Bychowski clearly regarded this sort of treatment as within a

psychoanalytic context, the psychoanalytic community was not undivided
in its appreciation of such work (as will be seen later)

instance, when discussing the patient's mounting anxiety,
firm
Bychowski states that interpretation must "be combined with
to the
clear
it
make
should
reassurance and... active kindliness [which]
any
under
analyst
his
patient beyond any doubt that he can count on
"'"^For

circumstances

.

"

(p.

501)

147

Jacobson in 1954 discussed the "indistinct but convenient"
term of
borderline, which epitomized common features in patients
that displayed,
ego distortions and superego defects, disturbances
in their
object relations, and a pathology of affects beyond what
we
find in common neurotics.
For this reason they usually need
many years of analysis with slow, patient, consistent work
in the area of ego and superego, with great attention
to their
particular methods of defense and to their affective responses
in which these defenses find special expression.
This work
is so difficult because such patients call into play auxiliary
defense and restitution mechanisms which impair their reality
testing to a greater or lesser extent, engaging at the same
time the outside world, and in particular the significant
objects for the purpose of their pathological conflict
solutions. For these reasons they may require modifications
of our usual technique, which neurotic patients do not
need. (pp. 596-597)

Finally, Stone in 1954, while discussing the widening scope of indi-

cations for pyschoanalysis, discussed the importance of early diagnoses
(p.

589) and considered them to be increasingly in evidence and in fact

added, "It is a long time since

I

have treated an actively psychotic

patient; borderline cases and severe character disorders have been numerous." (p. 581, footnote).

He reviewed this experience of the trans-

ference of borderline patients and identified clinical signs and dynamics.
By 1954,

the care and treatment of latent schizophrenia, in the border-

line personality, had departed from psychoanalysis in formulation, focus,

technique and paradigm, and had drawn both adherents, and critics ad-

juring a return to the fold.

A full examination of these anomalous

qualities will be explicated with the anomalies of schizophrenia (in
the next section) as they appear virtually identical, except that the

aim of therapy with psychotics is to return the individual to a secondary
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process state and with a borderline, not to lose that secondary
process
state in the first place.

Anomalies that Arose from the Treatment of Schizophrenia

It is interesting to have brought to one's attention the feeling
by

some family therapists, that most of the pioneers in family therapy,

came from the field of intensive individual psychotherapy
with schizophrenic patients; they found, while treating
these severe ego disturbances, that they were treating
the patients in a vacuum.
Treatment progressed only up to
the point where insight had to be translated into lasting
behavioral changes, then the whole endeavor would collapse,
primarily because of regressive unconscious collusion between the family and the patient. These invisible but
powerful outside influences, it was reasoned, could only
become palpable and manageable if they were integrated into
the treatment program. (Framo and Boszormenyi-Nagy 1965,
,

pp. XV-XVI)

Carl Whitaker, an early family therapist, spoke more autobiographically
of this process:

That boy from Harvard that I agonized with for three years
didn't get better. He just got quieter. The boy from
Menninger's got much better in the three years I worked
with him, but he was thrown back into a full-blown psychosis when his parents lured him back home by that new
red Chevy convertible. He did keep on calling every six
months to tell us how well he was and how things were
going so nicely with Mother and Dad, except that between
times he would be in that distant hospital again. (1972,
pp. 98-99)

The history of the treatment of schizophrenia has been replete with

failure; that was one of the reasons, we can infer, that psychoanalysis

eventually addressed itself to the disorder (s).

As the most successful

form of clinical treatment available, it would only have made sense
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for the framework to be used, Freud's 1914 paper on narcissism
and

psychoses notwithstanding.

In fact, Freud's 1914 interdiction can be

seen as an attempt to protect psychoanalysis from the vicissitudes of
therapy with patients of insufficiently stable ego
the framework that had already occurred!

— an

extension of

Federn (1943, p.

3)

mentions

that "Bleuler himself was the first to state that Burgholzli could dis-

charge three times more cases since all physicians had begun

to deal

with them on the more profound basis of Freudian understanding."
While sympathetic to the future treatment of psychoses, Freud
used the term, "some other plan better suited for that purpose" suggesting how closely tied psychoanalytic treatment and a realiable ego were
in Freud's thinking (Stone, 1954, p. 567).

Stone points out that though

Freud was flexible with regard to revision of formulation, he was

basically uninterested in experimenting with extensions
groups or devising new techniques,

(p.

to

new clinical

567)

Another related problem was the difficulty in communication when
dealing with schizophrenia.

Verbal production was often unintelligible.

Fromm-Reichmann in 1948, addressed this (as well as Freud's 1914 concerns
about narcissism), with the implication, it appears, that psychoanalysis
was not helpful in this matter.

There seemed to be no medium in which the disturbed
schizophrenic and the psychiatrist could communicate
with one another. The thought processes, feelings,
communications, and other manifestations of the disturbed schizophrenic seemed nonsensical and without
meaning as to origin, dynamics, and actual controls,
(p.

263)
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The use of terms such as "word salad" for the speech of schizophrenia,
and the reliance on symbolism may be taken as indications of people's

difficulty in communicating with schizophrenic patients.

This diffi-

culty could not have made the prospects for a basically verbal form of

treatment any brighter.

Nevertheless, the framework was extended.

By 1919, Kempf publically addressed himself to the treatment of

schizophrenia using modified psychoanalytic methods, with "hygienic
measures, vigorous, playful exercises, and .. .handicrafts"

valuable adjuncts.

(p.

58)

as

It was his experience that the treatment was success-

ful, given certain conditions.

The psychoanalytic treatment of repressed, perniciously
regressive, dissociated personalities produces astonishingly
reconstructive results when an altruistic transference can
be maintained and the wish for insight is spontaneous that
This requires upon the part of
is, comes from the patient.
the physician, sincerity, insight, technical skill, self
control and the capacity to win confidence and control the
transfer. (Kempf, 1919, p. 58; his emphasis)
,

Particularly interesting is Kempf

's

translation of vivid family dy-

namics into psychoanalytic formulations; he appears to have been fully

appreciative of the role of what he referred to as "this family disaster'
in the patient's decompensation citing the unconscious

fluence of the individual's intimate associates"

(p.

"

repressive in-

58; his emphasis)

or neurosis.'
as causing the "maladaptation of every functional psychosis

patient's predicament.
At another point, he draws a vivid picture of one
way
The two families conflicted right and left about the
inexperienced
timid,
the
and
to raise their only grandchild,
young mother was swept off her feet. Her husband's mother
and her own
insisted upon plenty of fresh air for the infant
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mother protested that they were freezing it. When her
husband happened to be in a nearby city his mother insisted that she neglected him because she did not visit
him, and her mother objected to the visit because she
would be neglecting the baby. (1919, p. 31)
away from the home
Taken in the context of a husband who was necessarily
af ter"careful study" that
for large amounts of time and Kempf 's finding

an encouraging sympathy
the patient had not one single adult who felt
is a classic double-bind,
for her efforts, the situation he described

the D-B group elucidated
with all the necessary formal characteristics,

in 1956!

been successful, and
He went on to say that the treatment had

hospital with psychosis in remission,
in fact, she was able to leave the
and restrictions undermined his
except that subsequent family pressures

efforts somewhat.
psychoanalysis, however, really
The treatment of schizophrenia by

began during the 1930'

s,

1940 's (Jackson
and accelerated during the

and Satlr, 1961, p. 34).

that schizoZilbourg (1931, p. 508) contended

responone definite pathogenic factor
phrenia had no "specitlc event, no

had
also, until just previous to 1931,
sible," and that psychoanalysis
pathogenesis of
aetiology or agent In the
been looking for the special
"gradual
that schizophrenias were
schizophrenia. He argued rather,
which at first are not entirely
outgrowths of a series of reactions
a succession
can almost invariably find
schizophrenic in nature... one
in nature, until
500-501), usually neurotic
of mental reactions" (PP.

overwhelmed or abandoned.
rather
modifications, but they are
Zilboorg mentions technical

.
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slight, amounting to increased caution in his choice of words and in-

creased emphasis on reality testing; the technique of free association

predominated, however, as did the classical analytic change processes
once the patient began to resemble a neurotic dynamically (after approxi-

mately one year of preliminary work)
The first period of her analysis (about a year) was devoted
That is to say, the patient's
to the testing of reality.
associations, dreams, memories, or any other statements were
carefully analyzed from the standpoint of what was actual or
The analyst was quite passive; at no time during the
not.
whole analysis was any technical language used and at no time
It must
was the analytical theory explained to the patient
the
or
be borne in mind that the use of technical language,
imparting of any theoretical premises to a schizophrenic
It is
patient is rather dangerous and absolutely useless
useless because the schizophrenic is a master of cold abstract
thinking and the more theory you impart to a schizophrenic,
the more abstract material you furnish him for his unreal
system of thought. (1931, p. 502) [his emphasis]
.

.

Moderate technical modifications due to un-repressed material

.

In 1934,

Federn devoted a three-part series (now regarded as a classic) to the
psychoanalysis of psychoses in which he introduced some problems relating
to families of patients and some technical modifications.

He dated his

analytic case,
interest in latent and manifest psychoses from his first
served as consultant;
which Freud had referred to him and for which he

unfortunately, the patient developed a psychosis under the rigors of

classical analysis.

In three such unsuccessful cases, Federn states

that "psychoanalysis of the neuroses was the leading cause.

cases which

I

later treated with good results,

I

In all

followed the rules

the psychoses, and not those
dictated by the libidinous condition of
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dictated by the claim for analytical thoroughness." Cl943a, pp, 16-17)
He admitted that in some "milder" cases, it had proved possible to
treat the neurosis without precipitating a psychosis, but that was a

"pseudopsychoanalysis which has abandoned the strict Freudian rules.,,"
(1943a, p. 7) which he referred to as a scientifically bad method that

achieved good results; his goal was to base good results on a foundation
of sound theory.

He theorized that the metapsychology of psychoses was

based upon,

abnormal narcissistic cathexis, dimifllshed object cathexis;
ego regression through which (3) onto-and biologically repressed mental elements and aggregates have become conscious;
and (4) through which, because of change and diminuition in
ego-cathexis the reality test becomes insufficient. (Federn,
(1)

(2)

,

1943, p. 3)

This formulation necessitated a number of technical modifications,

primarily with respect to case management and transference.

Federn in-

cluded the family of the psychotic patient as the largest factor in case

management, stating that
It is not at all astonishing that most psychotics relapse
at home or elsewhere when left without the continuous
support of transference. Every psychosis is consciously
or unconsciously focusing on conflicts or frustrations in
family life. Unless these conditions are changed, the cure
of psychotics turns out to have been Sisyphean labor which
ends in hospitalization or foster-family life. (Federn, 1943,
p. 5) [emphasis added]

He noted that because the course of schizophrenia was interrupted by
relapses, he refrained from recognizing successes and publishing accounts
of his cases until five years after termination of treatment (p.

9).

often treated patients while they remained in the home and took care
"not to arouse fear and violence between the patient and the family"

He

154

(1943b, p. 248) and felt that no patient could be cured unless the family

wished it and that prognosis was particularly poor in the face of a
family's hatred, whether conscious or unconscious (1943a,

p.

17).

Federn characterized the transference of psychotic patients in the
same terms as Bychowski, adding that the ambivalence is more extreme
(1943a, p. 252) and if not contained by reality- invoking procedures, could

lead to either deification of, or aggression against, the analyst (1943b,
p.

247).

To this end, Federn eschewed both the couch and the recumbent

stance (1943b, p. 247), allowed phone calls and extra appointments (1943b,
p.

254), and curtailed free association (1943b, p. 246).

Because of the

power of the negative transference, the maintenance of the positive

transference was important, as were the relational elements of the treatment.

Though Federn did not explicitly deal in relational dynamics, his

approach to the patient did (1943b,

p.

251).

One wins the normal transference of the psychotic by sincerity,
It is a great error to believe
kindness, and understanding.
that whenever a psychotic feels that you understand him he is
Frequently he offers opposition at first, but often
yours.
by the next day the explanation has been accepted. One must
avoid blame and severe admonition, any smiling superiority,
and especially any lie. There are no white lies allowed with
To lie to a psychotic is contrary to the injuncpsychotics.
way
tion in the Bible that one must not place a stone in the
cheeks,
way
on
friendly
a
in
slapped
To be
of the blind.
shoulder or buttocks, is to be treated like a silly child,
is an indignity.

(Federn, 1943b, p. 251)

discussed was
The final requisite to successful treatment Federn
a radical change in traditional case

management-he used

helper" outside of the analytic hours.

a

"motherly
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While every neurotic patient easily transfers from his
mother to the psychoanalyst, the psychotic does not do
so to a male analyst.
This demonstrates how the psychotic
depends more on reality than the neurotic, i.e., when he
is forced to transfer his mother-relationship to a man,
he confuses homo- and heterosexual feelings and becomes
more perturbed.
The writer's contention that there should be women helpers
for psychotic persons is therefore well founded, although
the conclusion was reached as a result of simple experience.
In all cases in which the writer was successful, he had
such motherly aid; in some cases, the real mother was
willing to help, because many women, although lacking in
sublimated instinctual motherhood, have a great sense of
duty toward a poor psychotic child. But the real mother
is usually less helpful than a sister or a nurse who becomes
a sister.
The relation of a psychotic becomes too possessive
and regresses easily to incest, when nursed by his own
mother. Yet the loving cooperation of the mother is very
helpful, when obtainable. (Federn, 1943, p. 254)

He felt that no psychoanalysis of psychotics could be accomplished

without this assistance.

The helper would generally be called into the

final minutes of each analytic session while the analyst, with the

patient's assistance, repeated the problems and solutions dealt with in
the session (1943c, p. 480).

The helper was invaluable if positive

transference were lost, as treatment could continue through her (1943b,
p.

256); also the patient received assistance and protection between

the analytic hours (1943a, p. 5).

He gives an account where apparently

his own wife and family were used in this manner (1943a, p. 8).

This clearly constitutes a radical departure from psychoanalytic
less
technique and his case management involving the family, though

startling, is similarly a departure.

The emphasis on increasing the

influence of the
resistances to psychotic processes and increasing the
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ego processes stood traditional psychoanalytic
processes on their head.

And the implicit emphasis on relational aspects of
treatment directly

counter both the technical and theoretical aspects of classical
psycho-

analytic treatment.
He added, in a summary- type statement:
The technical innovation does not contradict Freud's
teaching, for he developed his method for the treatment
of neurosis and not of psychosis.
Freud repeatedly said
that psychotics were not suitable for psychoanalytic
therapy.
Today his thesis still holds true when one wants
to use the standard method; however, it is no longer true
when one wants to know how to modify it. One should not
assume that the modified method is easier and less strict.
As Freud said, "one cannot make a reliable contract with
the psychotic ego." Therefore, it is only with the greatest
precaution that we use a method which brings more psychotic
material to the surface. (Federn, 1947, p. 139)

This sort of statement leaves Federn in a bit of difficulty.

He

essentially has put himself in a position of saying that Freud was
correct regarding the unsuitability of psychotics for analysis, but only
for the classical method.

A modified method is appropriate, but no long

classical psychoanalysis; however, the modified method involves

diction if both were called psychoanalysis.

a

contra

One uses a method intended

to bring unconscious material to the surface to get just the opposite

effect, that is, to return conscious unconscious material to a repressed
state.

Psychoanalysis was designed explicitly to make the unconscious

conscious, for use with latent schizophrenics and psychotics; however,

psychoanalysis was modified explicitly to make the conscious unconscious
The position is not an enviable one.
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Family h omeostatlc anomalies with schizophrenia

.

During, and immediately

subsequent to, the re-formulation in theory and technique that allowed
a significantly different "psychoanalysis" success with psychotics,

analysts were also drawing the discipline's attention to a rather odd
set of unexpected and unpredicted phenomena related to schizophrenic

patients.

It gradually became apparent that family processes contempor-

aneous with the course of schizophrenia could improve or worsen the

patient's condition, and concommitantly that changes in the schizophrenic'

condition at times affected the condition of family members.

Kasanin and Knight (1934,

p.

262) pointed out compensatory behavior

on a father's part to a mother's over-protection of a child, who in turn,
looked for and encouraged this degree of protection.

In another case,

despite obvious wishes on the part of parents for the recovery of the
schizophrenic adult child, Kasanin and Knight stated that.
It is curious to note that the patients with over-protective
parents remain in the hospital for only short periods of time
because the parents invariably make every attempt to remove
them from the hospital, irrespective of their mental condition, and make every effort to bring the patients back to
their old environment even though they do not fit there.

(1934, p. 257)

For the parents to remove the schizophrenic family member from hospitali-

zation with this degree of regularity, more than coincidence or idiosyncratic faaily patterns are operative; one can infer that it is in some

way important for the schizophrenic member to be brought home.
schizoCohen and Lipton (1950) reported on three cases of acute

maternal
phrenic psychoses that underwent remission shortly after a
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death.

They stated that while this was a familiar phenomenon to clini-

cal observers, their literature search failed to reveal any reports on
the subject.

Actually, that is not very surprising, as most schizo-

phrenic patients were treated in a hospital setting and, through a

combination of factors, within a psychoanalytic model, which avoided by
and large contact with family members.

The occurrence of these spon-

taneous remissions was probably often overlooked.

Also, psychoanalytic

theory could not easily account for this type of contemporaneous occurrence, and those remissions recognized as such were probably shrugged

away as coincidental, or not reported as they fit into no recognized

framework and did not fit into the pre-eminent psychoanalytic approach.
It is a safe bet that most of the people in a position to write such

reports were the least likely to "see" the remission, either practically
or through the framework filter.

Cohen and Lipton's study was initiated
by the coincidental occurrence of the phenomenon in two
male patients within a period of a few months on the
insulin service of Brooklyn (New York) State Hospital.
Both patients showed striking remissions of psychotic
behavior within a short time after they were informed
A third case reported
of the deaths of their mothers.
here was observed more than a year before this study
was started, but is included because it illustrates the
same phenomenon in a female patient. (1950, p. 716)

Apparently, the multiple occurrences within a short time period increased
the salience and validity of the phenomenon.

They reported similarities

of
in the three patients: all three were young adults with recent onset

in
first psychosis; in all three cases, mothers were actively involved
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the delusional and/or hallucinatory material and all
reacted to the

deaths with some degree of guilt

(p.

723).

In 1954, Ackerman explicated some of these homeostatic shifts:
It is by no means rare in the treatment of a family pair
that as one member of the pair gets better, the other gets
worse.
In child guidance work, as the child improves, not
infrequently the mother paradoxically worsens. Or, as the
child responds to psychotherapy, the parental conflict becomes drastically intensified.
Similarly, in the treatment of marital problems, it is often the case that as one
marital partner matures and becomes sexually more adequate,
the other regresses; or one may respond to analytic therapy
with an increased capacity for closeness, and the other may
react with depression, (p. 362)

Moreover, Ackerman 's experiences led him to report the presence of

paradoxical shifts in interpersonal relationships that defied individual
formulation.

For example,

...a wife campaigns for her husband to enter psychotherapy
for sexual impotence, threatening to leave him unless he
is cured.
The husband yields, is treated, and the symptom
of impotence is quickly alleviated.
The husband's therapist, pleased with his success, is shocked to discover
that directly after the husband's potency was restored,
his wife deserted him. This is paradoxical behavior,
to be sure, but it can and does occur.
Individual psychotherapy may help the individual, but under certain
conditions it may fail to ameliorate the psychology of
a family relationship.
The tension of interpersonal
conflict may remain largely unabated even though intrapsychic disturbance is measurably relieved.

Similarly, in 1958,

14

Fisher and Mendell reported that significant

changes in the identified patient were accompanied by clear cut changes

study was published in 1958, two years after the initial
double-bind publication but is included here as an indication of the
pattern of the times. Fisher and Mendell cite none of the double-bind
"^This

.
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in other members of their families; this occurred in all ten of the

families they investigated

(p.

134).

The issue of shifting interpersonal patterns and reciprocities
in families with a schizophrenic member became so important, and fre-

quently substianted that by 1964, an article had appeared which ex-

plicitly asked, "Can a family which has a schizophrenic adolescent

member have other offspring who are emotionally well-adjusted?" (Friedman, 1964, p. 47)

Not unexpectedly, the author's answer was "no."

Development of the Relational Aspect of
Treatment for Schizophrenia

Parallel to the elaboration of psychoanalysis and the emergence of
the psychoanalytic anomalies, a psychiatrist, Harry Stack Sullivan,

developed a treatment approach for schizophrenia based upon different
paradigms and assumptions.

This alternative DM, unlike psychoanalysis,

was developed specifically with respect to schizophrenia and related
syndromes, i.e., certain types of obsessionalism and paranoia.
late 1930

's

and early 1940

's

By the

the Sullivanian, or interpersonal, approach

had gained a moderate, but influential, number of adherents among

psychoanalysts

.

Though not an analyst himself, and despite the fact

literature nor any of its antecedents and appear to be reporting from
within a psychoanalytic framework as they mention similarities in fantasies and defenses, as well as in the therapeutic effects. Also, if
this was the second such study they had conducted, and this one reported
on ten families, one can assume the project had been some time in the
making

s

.
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that Sullivan's approach was not at all
psychoanalytic/^ a relatively

large number of analysts working with
schizophrenics

,

found it helpful.

A degree of controversy arose in the late
19A0's and 1950's regarding
the advisability of treating the psychoses,
particularly schizophrenia,

and the differences in technique and conceptualization
between the

classical or interpretationist psychoanalysts and the
interpersonal or

relational psychoanalysts.

Because these events will be seen to be

Important in the inception of the DB paradigm and in understanding
the
felt crisis of that time, Sullivan's DM will be very briefly
explicated,
then two representative articles from relational psychoanalysts will
be

used for illustration and as examples of the relational approach of that
time

Harry Stack Sullivan's interpersonal psychiatry

.

After obtaining his

medical degree at the Chicago College of Medicine and Surgery in 1917
and his discharge from military service after World War

I,

Sullivan was

sent in 1922 to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. as the

Veteran's Bureau liaison officer for a year (Mullahy, 1970,

p.

2).

There

he met Dr. William Alanson White, whose flexible approach

Mullahy (1970, p. 7) remarks that early in his career, Sullivan
found Freud's work helpful, but as time passed and as Sullivan increasingly concentrated on schizophrenia, he used Freud less frequently until by
the middle 1930 's, Sullivan had fairly well developed his interpersonal
practice and theory. Though Sullivan's first two articles (1924-25;
own
1925) were formulated with the classical Freudian DM, Sullivan'
DM is not psychoanalytic in paradigm, theory, or practice.

,
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became an Important influence on Sullivan's clinical practice.

Sullivan

then went, in 1923, to the Shepard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Balti-

more where, two years later he became Director of Clinical Research,
It was during his five years at Shepard and Enoch Pratt that Sullivan

became convinced of the great importance of social (in the sense of interpersonal) factors for the etiology and treatment of psychopathology

particularly schizophrenia.

During this five years, Sullivan's papers

became progressively more outspoken in approach.

During approximately

his last year at Shepard and Enoch Pratt, Sullivan established a unique

receiving unit to treat schizophrenic men (Mullahy, 1970,

1

p.

C.

2)

This

.

unit was set up according to Sullivan's conception of a social-psycholog
unit (what is now commonly referred to as a psychotherapeutic milieu);

treatment included the effects of such a social-psychological setting,

including contact with attendants trained by Sullivan, as well as the
traditional hour-long sessions with the therapist (Mullahy, 1970,
This unit,

p.

(during about 1928), was an expression of his formulations

regarding the interpersonal etiology and treatment of schizophrenia.

What can be considered Sullivan's schematic, but well-developed
paradigmatic work appeared in 1931.

16

In this work, Sullivan outlined

Sullivan eventually treated only men; his position was that
schizophrenics were difficult enough to understand, he was not going
to attempt to add to this the vicissitudes of understanding another
gender, with what the gender differences implied with respect to
schizophrenia.

4).

—

.

.

163

his method of treatment in the unit he had established, and his

formulation regarding etiology and mechanisms of change for schizoid
phrenia
•

17

As will be seen, both etiology and treatment of schizophrenia

are conceptualized as interpersonal rather than intra-psychic

The procedure of treatment began with removing the
patient from the situation in which he is developing
difficulty, to a situation in which he is encouraged
to renew efforts of adjustment, with others... The
noil: professional personnel with whom the patient is
in contact must be aware of the principal difficulty
viz the extreme sensitivity underlying whatever
camouflage the patient may use. They must be activated
by a well-integrated purpose of helping in t he redevelopment or development d^ novu of self-esteem as
an individual attractive to others. They must possess
sufficient insight into their own personality organization to be able to avoid masked or unconscious
sadism, jealousies, and morbid expectation of results...
,

Given the therapeutic environment the first stage of
therapy ... takes the form of providing an orienting
experience. After the initial fairly searching interview, the patient is introduced to the new situation
in a matter-of-fact fashion, with emphasis on the
personal elements .. .He is made to feel that he is
now one of a group composed partly of sick persons the other patients - and partly of well folks - the
physician and all the others concerned. Emphasis is
laid on the fact that something is wrong with the

The modified psychoanalytic treatment of schizoSullivan, H.S.
phrenia. Am. J. of Psychia t., 1931, 11, 519-536. Sullivan's paradigmatic statement underwent revision, of course, but the timing of these
revisions is difficult to ascertain. Sullivan apparently had a horror
of being misunderstood, and so preferred to lecture where he could
correct misunderstandings. Most of his later work was in seminar format at Chestnut Lodge which was tape recorded and published posthumously by his adherents and .colleagues (Mullahy, 1970, p. 6). While
lines of development in Sullivan's thinking are discernible, their
This 1931 article, being a relatively early
timing is usually not.
work, was published soon after formulation and therefore is relatively

fixed in time.
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with the patient and... that regardless of the
patient's
occasional or habitual surmise to the contrary,
everyone who
is well enough to be a help will... be occupied
in giving
him a chance to get well. From the start he is treated
as a 2erson among persons (Sullivan, 1931; reprinted
in Mullahy, 1970, p. 273; Sullivan's emphases)
Early efforts were directed toward establishing precipitating
factors for the psychosis, and reconstructing a chronology that
included
events, experience, and the behavior of people close to the
patient.

Efforts were made to point out that however mysterious the psychotic

manifestation that had befallen the patient, they were related

to his

everyday living among a relatively small number of people important to
the patient (Mullahy,

1970, p. 28).

To these ends, Sullivan eschewed free association and interpre-

tation (1970, p. 28), preferring a form of guided dialogue, with the
therapist in the role of a participant-observer (1970, p. 41).

The

psychotic communication of the patient was regarded as informational,

particularly with respect to maintaining some distance from people and
also in maintaining some degree of "personal security" (the condition

when anxiety was relatively low)

.

Schizophrenic speech was neither

regarded as "word salad" (i.e., meaningless and random), now was it

interpreted symbolically as in psychoanalysis.

Procedurally this was

expressed as a relative devaluation of verbal production and an emphasis on the reality relationship between therapist and patient develop

during treatment.

The mechanisms of change occurred during the develop-

ment of the reality relationship, which was conceptualized as both

3
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conceptual and curative

.

Through the relationship with the therapist,

the patient emotionally corrected problems in his
injured or faulty

narcissism.
The emotional re-learning or re-working of the narcissistic
defi-

cits obviously has some relationship to Freud's paradigmatic working

through the repetitions in the transference relationship.

The differen-

ces are that in the relational approach the locus of difficulty is re-

garded as concerning self-esteem rather than conflict; the relationship
is a reality relationship rather than transf erential

moreover, the

;

technique of dialogue rather than free association and interpretation
is directed toward the integration of psychotic events and precipi-

tating factors of significant others rather than the integration of

conscious and unconscious elements.
Concommitantly, schizophrenia as conceptualized by Sullivan, was
not so much the welling-up of id forces, but was rather attributable
to

processes wherein the individual had never been able to build up

sufficient self-esteem; when increased stress occurred,

(usually

developmental), the already impaired self-esteem crumbled altogether.
The person was conceptualized as having been subjected very early in

life to anxiety-provoking experiences which undermined his sense of

fundamental personal security (Mullahy, 1970, p. 10).

18

1

"Cultural

In Sullivan's more mature formulations, anxiety grew in importance and was characterized as a "felt threat to, or actual loss of,
self-esteem owing to the actual anticipated, or imaginary disapproval
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distortions" learned in the home were of prime importance in
later

developing schizophrenia; these were regarded as erroneous attitudes
and unfortunate occurrences in the family.

The early experiences with

anxiety combined with the

various other unfortunate experiences, maldevelopments,
and distortions that the individual suffers m^y all
combine to render him abnormally vulnerable to the
demands and stresses of the acknowledged stage in
Western society ... (Mullahy, 1970, p. 484)

Sullivan felt that

though the complex etiology of schizophrenia

culminated in a situation in which the sexual adequacy of the individual (according to that individual's learned standards) was found

"acutely unsatisfactory," the cultural distortions learned very early
in the home were of primary etiological importance (Mullahy, 1970, p. 19)
As such, Sullivan rejected the idea that unsuccessful resolution
of the Oedipus complex was of etiological significance and in fact re-

garded the complex, not as a universal, nor biologically based occurrence,
but rather, the result of "multiple vicious features of our domestic

culture." (Sullivan, 1926; cited in Mullahy, 1970, p. 14)

Moreover,

not only was etiology based on early family experiences, recovery in

large depended upon the social milieu to which the patient returned
(Mullahy, 1970, p. 18)

of significant other people, or of disapproval of one's self, owing to
the values and ideals one has acquired or developed." (Mullahy, 1970,
This anxiety is transmitted by the mothering one to the inp. 484).
fant and may be derived from some action of the infant of which the
mothering one disapproves, or from some concommitant anxiety induced
in the mothering one from elsewhere.
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^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^^sjS^^

By
Lne later 1940
IQAn' s and
.
y the
early 1950's

there were those
analysts who retained
the
Lne classical
Classical mterpretatlonlst
t
approach and maintained
that the
rh^ psychoses
u
were not the province
of
psychoanalysis, those wHo
allowed that technical
modifications had allowed
psychoanalysis to he s.ceessfnl
with these disorders,
and yet another
set Who proceeded
alons Oulte different
lines, adoptln, the
SulU.anlan
interpersonal paradigm and
BM for their wor. with
schisophrenics. This
latter group continued
to refer to themselves
as psychoanalysts,
and
they had. In fact,
received psychoanalytic
training, yet they used
a
Sullivanian rather than
Freudian DM.
•

Fron.-Reich.ann's writings
during the 1940's illustrate
this latter
group.
She constitutes an example
of an analyst who .oved
fro. traditional psychoanalytic
formulations to the changes
in what she ter.ed
"the doctor-patient-relationship
and the approach to the
contents of
psychotic con^unication"
(1948, p. 265).
She indicated that the results

of psychoanalytic therapy
with schizophrenics had been,
thus far, "not
too discouraging," but
that cures had not been to
psychoanalysts'

satisfaction with respect to frequency,
or durability (1948,

p.

272).

In Fromm-Reichmann's terms,
the changes in approach included
a

relative devaluation of the verbal
productions of schizophrenic
patients and an emphasis on the reality
relationship developed between

patient and therapist during treatment.

In technique,

the emphasis on

symbolism in schizophrenic speech was suspended,
and the "overemphasis
of contents was discarded."
(p. 269)
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Technically, .He patient's
confusing speech patterns
„e.e no longe.
interpreter s^hollcall,;
rather therapeutic attention
„as focused on
the genesis and dynamics
which determined the
contents of what was
-Id. partlculary as they
applied to the schizophrenic
episode.
As a way of accomplishing
this, close attention
Is oald
^"^""satlon done about the lollow ta^f
pr;se:t timing
present
t?m?nf and circumstances, the
original serM^!

gratitied by the disappearance
of psychotic manifestations subsequent
to their consistent

repetitive generic, and dynamic
scrutiny ... this procedure leads automatically
toward the inves igation and
understanding of neighboring
symptomatology whicThas
been linked up with the
manifestations orJginaUy
S-Luaxiy under
scrutiny. (1948, p. 269)
This was not tantamount to free
association, which was regarded as
a mistake with schizophrenics
in that it loosened up thinking
that was
already quite disorganized
(p. 270); the form of the interaction
was

Sullivanian, emphasizing dialogue,
precipitants

,

and experience, in

relation to the psychotic episode.
Technically, this collaboration was possible
only after patient
and analyst had formed a workable
doctor-patient relationship that had

established a consensus about the need for treatment
and its reasons
(p.

267).

Significantly, in two other extensions of psychoanalysis

to new clinical populations,

the therapists explicitly set about es-

tablishing a working relationship, i.e., consensus between
patient and
therapist regarding the need and reasons for treatment.

Anna Freud

.
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devoted chapters of The

Ps^choanal^

Stud^ of the Child to
the need
for establishing the
working relationship
with the child patient
and
the importance o£ the
needs and reasons for
treatment (which is particularly important with
children as it may he their
parents, and not
themselves, who are suffering
from some of the child
symptoms).
Similarly. Jacobson (1954)
in a discussion about
treating psychotic
depressions, stated that the
,uality in the analyst's
responses were

more important than the quantity
of sessions
sessions,
y yjL

(d
(p.

ftm^ and
a emphasized
603)

the genuineness of the
analyst's response and demeanor
toward the

patient (p. 604)
In any case what those
patients need is not so much
frequency and length of sessions
as a sufficient amount
of spontaneity and flexible
adjustment to the" mood
level, of warm understanding
and especially of unwavering
respect; attitudes which must not
be confused with over-'
kindness, sympathy, reassurance,
etc.
In periods of
threatening narcissistic withdrawal,
we may have to show
a very active interest and
participation in their daily
activities and especially their
sublimations.
I have
observed that analysts who are rather
detached by nature
seem to have difficulties in the
treatment of depressives.
Beyond this warm, flexible emotional
atmosphere, without
which these patients cannot work,
supportive counterattitudes and interventions may occasionally
be necessary
but they are only a lesser evil for
which we have to
pay. (Jacobson, 1954, p. 604)

Fromm-Reichmann's work, based as it was on Sullivan's,
explicitly
emphasized the importance of the relational element in
which the therapist was the participant-observer in the interaction
between him/her

and patient.

The existence of this reality relationship of course,

did not preclude the development of transference, but
Fromm-Reichmann
took issue with Abraham and Federn that the analyst should refrain
in

.
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and

di..o«io„. were co„s„ued
as essen.Ul

to the

.he.ape.Uc

process; besides the
distortion. However, the
existence of a ..„al
'
positive interrelatedness"
between the patient and
therapist was
recognized, and was included
in discussion
(p. 267).

An important ramification
of sucn
such an ,n„^„=„K
,
approach relates
to the
counter-transf
erenro
nf
t-u^
sterence of the therapist
and the elements of the
reality
relationship that are initiated
h. the therapist.
Reactions of rejection
or postures of grandeur
were clearly problems in
this sort of enterprise
and the personality of the
therapist came to he regarded
as more i.por..t.

tant,

Similarly, in 1952, Powder^ker
reported on observations fro.
treating schizophrenic patients
using the work of Sullivan and
Fron.Reichn^ann as a guide; Powdermaker
regarded their central thesis
about

treatment to have been an emphasis
on the relationship between
patient
and therapist, through which
the patient (and often the
therapist) was

brought to an understanding and
acceptance of the realities of that

situation and eventually other situations
(1952,

p.

62,

footnote

//3)

In her treatment of schizophrenics,
Powdermaker emphasized the reality

relational components and downplayed the
classical analytic techniques.

During therapy, it did not seem advisable
to have the
patient use the couch since this encourages
reverie and
retreat from reality. And as far as
possible I tried
to think about the patient's
communications without being
influenced by preconceived ideas of interpretation.
So
it seemed indicated to have these
schizophrenic patients
see and relate to me as a real person, a
procedure unlike
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the conventional analytic
treatment of neurotics
encouraged. The mani^^:^
tent rf'd"/'"
"'""''^ '^^''^^^ interpreted by
the patifnt
patient; hhe was not necessarily
encouraged
to

though he

often'^'

^"^^ preceding the breakdown were
!
cnTJT
considered together
with the conflicting attitudes
and feelings involved in
them... This procedure of
course often could not be
carried out in this order
°' ^'^^^^^ "^^^^ ' ^-^^ to k^ep
mTnd (V
mmd.
(Powdermaker 1952, pp. 62-63)

T

m

,

From Powdermaker's description
of the treatment plan, it
is obvious she
followed the Sullivanian and
Froimn-Reichmann pattern closely.

What is particulary interesting
is the timing of her report,
only
four years before the D-B report,
and the many ways in which her
observa
tions addressed interpersonal
elements later explicated and formulated

by the D-B hypothesis and theory.
For instance, Powdermaker considered
the "dilemma" of the schizo-

phrenic to lie between the need

to

communicate, and the fear of doing so

The dilemma of the schizophrenic presented
itself in my
observations at the hospital in a thousand ways
but
always it was the same dilemma. It is as if
the schizophrenic were saying: 'I want to communicate.
I'll do it
but I'm^afraid to, so I'll say it so you can't
understand
It or I'll pretend not to know you are there.'
The schizophrenic calls attention to himself by negativism, flirting,
stereotyped gestures, all of which dare you to communicate'
with him, to accept and understand him; and then he retreats...
His need to relate seems to be second only to his fear of
it.

(1952, p. 61)19

The D-B people would add a third disqualifier perhaps ,".. .or
I'll pretent it's not me saying this and such." The point is, Powdermaker had noted the ambivalence and disqualification as central to
schizophrenic complexity of speech, rather than having emphasized its
symbolic content.
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Si.iXarl., She was awa.e
of .He scM.ophrenic
response, as though nothing
made sense.

's

perplex^,, an.

that has made life
^^"^^^^^-dable
s^dUficult foT^h" patients
in the
first place. I^en thp
.
.
'° '^'"^
his
own ideas' the patient
tnountable
The'need of thr^^'""
^^^^^""^
^^o will
try to understand
I u
endeavoring to communicate
is made
uidue cJeafbv
cxear by thP
J' of a Datipni-- "Tf
the remark
don't agree, it means you're
wrong-.^t J^k.
strength to be a minority
of oil' (p' 63)

""

The D-B people later
demonstrated that indeed, nothing
much did make
sense in the families of the
schizophrenics they were observing.

What is perceived by the
schizophrenic patient is the battle
maintain a self and the need to

to

relate to others at the expense
of

liance.

co^^

In persons who have experienced
some acceptance of the self

and have therefore been able to
develop some degree of self-esteem,
there can develop some degree of
corresponding ability to sustain nonconformity with those around one
(1952, p. 70); however, experience had
led these patients to believe that
if they expressed their perceptions

and reactions,

they would not be accepted
(p. 67).

This in fact was

shown to be the case, and the perceived
battle between maintenance of
a self at the cost of maintenance of
relatedness appears to have been

also accurate.

The active ignoring by mothering ones of the
feelings

and perceptions of young schizophrenic adults
was noted, as well as
the

(not surprising)

and perceptions.

tendency of the patients to hide their feelings

This set of observations went far in explaining one

.
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Of t.e ,.e,.en. and
..see.in.x, pa.a.o.ical
s.a.e^en.s „a,e aBout
ehe
scH.opH.e„,e: .Ha. ,e
^^^^^^
and ,et he is s.e^ingl,
unable to .ake in and
.eac. to ,he realUy
around him'." VP
(p. 67)
n r r.,.
i
The D-B
0/;
people
provided the rest of the
explanation for this Odd
immohilit, in the face
of perceptiveness
Finally, Powderma.er
concluded that schizophrenics
used fundamentally different defenses
than neurotics
urutics, tor
for wh.twhat appeared to be some
of the same problems,
and that the schizophrenic
defenses were "related
to a way of dealing
with relationships involving
perceptions, and the
feelings and ideas about them;..."
(p. ui-;
69)
VF.
As will
AS
wlii be seen, that perception about perception would
be borne out.

.

»

^^2Eii£^tion^_for_g^^
Non- traditional" Anoma1iP<.

This

latter set of anomalies proved
discrepant to expectations with
regard
to both technique and theory
in a number of respects.
Freud had ad-

jured against the psychoanalytic
treatment of psychoses on the grounds
that the prevailing narcissistic
clinical picture prevented the develop-

ment of transference which would
necessarily preclude the treatment

mechanisms of change and thus, cure.
Psychoanalytic treatment of psychoses did proceed, however, often by default
with the latent schizo-

phrenias, and subsequent developments proved
Freud wrong in relation
to

the issue of transference.

Psychotics did, in fact, develop trans-
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The occurence of
..ansfe.ence

„Uh

.hese paUen.s,
..,a..less of

posUion. Because of .He
in.es.^en. of

""le

UM.o

i„

Us

„a„issisac concerns

c. „o libido

^^^^^
^^^^
ferences; .,a. .Hese
transferences „ere so intense
.erel, co.po.„aea the
degree of discrepancy between
paradigm-induced expectation
(and actual
prediction In this case) and
empirical findings.

Freud's prediction was correct,
however, regarding the
difficulties
in curing narcissistic
disorders with psychoanalytic
treatment, though
not necessarily for some of
the reasons he advanced,
it was found that
thoroughly working through the
repetitions In the transferences
with all
the object libido implications,
did not result In cure; In
fact, such a
process ™ore than occasionally
exacerbated the psychoses. This
was a
crucial anomaly, as It struck at
the heart of the psychoanalytic
paradigm, at Freud's final formulation
of the change process In psycho-

therapy.

According

to

that final formulation, which had
proved un-

precedently successful with neuroses,
the affectively laden workingthrough of repetition compulsions within
the context of transference

constituted the effective change process; decades
of success In analysis of neurotics had demonstrated Its efficacy.

psychoses, it proved ineffectual.

Yet in work with the

This was particularly damaging as

It proved anomalous to the paradigm itself, and not
merely to a theory

or DM elaboration.
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This turn Of even, led
so.e analysts to
.e,ln focusing on the
narcssuttc core of tHe
.Ist^.anoes. THe. .e,an to
p.pose a new
explanatory complex-that
the cause of psychoses
po^^uiiubes, had
nad to ddo, not with
external ^ujcL.L
obiect lihirir.
r.^
-LiDido, as xn neuroses
i-oses, hutbut, r.^t-u
with narcissistic libido
processes and that this
necessitated a shift In the
focus and processes
of therapy fro™ object
Uhldo concerns to narcissism,
which could he
treated. Thus two .ore
theoretical points were changed
to suit
empirical circumstances. The
consequences for treatment
reflected
directly upon Freud's paradigm
regarding change. Therapy
of the narcissistic core consisted of
re-lntegratlon of the split In
ego formulation through a re-educatlve
emotional process that was not
achieved
through the release of object
Ubldo; the ego split, moreover,
was not
between pleasure (id processes)
and reality (ego functions),
but between
an archaic unmodified, and
primitive narcissistic core, and
Its overlay
of learning and development.
The focus of change was on
Integrating
the unmodified narcissistic
core with Its development overlay
rather

than on the compromise of pleasure
and civilization.

With neuroses,

releasing the libido processes made
them available for work; with the
psychoses, they were already released
from this undeveloped core, and
the other, later developments of the ego
were awash In these libido

processes; the operative change process consisted
In minimizing their
presence and working with the Injured, but
meglomaniacal

,

narcissism.

The shift to narcissism as cause and focus of change
efforts had

variety of technical consequences.

The defense of psychoses were

a
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obviously seen as quite
different from those
Lnose of
ot the
th. neuroses.
The
analyst's demeanor and
behavior towards patients
fdciencs with narcissistic
disturbances of necessity
ty, had to be
l,„
different than towards
neurotic
patients. Xf the depriving
frustrating processes
were instituted
the transference
reactions would be
over„hel.in,-.i„ part,
because of
the difficulty Of these
patients in controliin,
affective intensity
especially rage, but
particularly because this
for™ of frustration
complemented and elicited
icited the
thp affective
^ff^ ^•
structure that constituted
the
disorder: ambivalence, rage
age, de^rf^^^.^
nr.. almost
depressions
anaclitic in depth, and
avoidance of personal contact.
•

•

i

,

For these reasons,
intentionally frustrating
elements of therapy

were eliminated or diminished
as far as possible within
reality constraints of a therapeutic
situation. Similarly, the
elicitation of
primary process material was
stopped; therefore,

technically, free

association was dropped with these
patients and a dialogic quality
emerged. Concomitantly, the
role and functions of
interpretation became
markedly less important-there
grew to be less opportunity for
it in
dialogue than in free association,
and the ralson d'etre of interpretation (to make the unconscious
conscious) was not wanted for these
patients.
is,

Similarly, "reality markers" were no
longer eliminated; that

those elements of psychoanalysis that

had been designed to diminish

reality testing and increase development
of transference were definitely not wanted.

Therefore,

transference was not allowed to develop

too far without reality correction,
analysts eschewed the use of the

.
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couch and also allowed
patients to face the. (or so.e
version thereof;
Sullivan preferred, for Instance,
to have hi.self and
the patient face
the sa.e point through
sitting 90° fro. each other
so their paths of

vision cut across each ocner
other

'q
s.

T>^=.^ ,n
That
allowedj uhim to see the patient's

non-verbal reactions without
having
•dviug CO
to stare
starP p^
at the person for an hour
at a time, or have the person
F^tbon scare
stare at him
h-in,
an important considera-

—

tion for Sullivan)

With the decrease in importance
of transference, free association
and interpretation, there developed
a greater appreciation of
the real!
ty aspects of the patienttherapist relationship, and an emphasis
on

the realit;^ relationship as both
contextual and curative

the change

.

As such,

process in psychotherapy shifted from
verbal to relational;

that is, from interpretation of linking
conscious statement to uncon-

scious content, to relational re-education
of fundamental narcissistic

concerns.

It is for this reason, one can infer,

that Sullivan and his

adherents concern themselves repeatedly with the
necessity of the
therapist's respect for the patient and the necessity
of not appearing
the incomparable paragon of health and holiness.

The self-esteem of

the psychotic was already at issue; to appear
disrespectful on any

level, or perfect, would serve to push the patient further
down into
the already injured lack of self-esteem.

In fact, Sullivan and ad-

herents differed from psychoanalysis in attributing psychosis, not to
the welling up of libidinal forces through a weak ego, but rather to

processes wherein the individual was never able to build up sufficient
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self-estee..

At .his point, it is
clear that the analysts
adhering

to

relational concepts and treating
psychoses (both ^nifest and
latent) and the analysts
adhering to verbal concepts
and treating

.

neuroses, diverged sufficiently
to be different DMs
with different
paradigms and paradigmatic
elaborations.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The response to the anom-

alies and technical modifications
was heated controversy, with
each
group further elaborating its
respective framework. The ensuing
developments (during the late 1940's
through the middle 1950's at least)
can be
seen as centering around two major
controversies. First, these new

debates about whether family members
could be seen as a legitimatic

aspect of psychoanalytic work; for
instance, would seeing the family

preclude transference and therefore change?

Also, if the family were

seen, could this psychotherapy continue
to be called psychoanalyses?

Secondly, there were debates about the technical
modifications, par-

ticularly between those analysts who had adopted
a Sullivanian relational

approach and those who insisted upon a return to the
fundamentals of
classical practice, i.e., interpretation of transference.
As has just been reviewed, this interpretationist
versus relationist split occurred with regard to the treatment of psychosis.

occurred with respect to child analysis.
analytic Study of

_the

It also

In Anna Freud's 1946 Psycho-

Child (which includes her 1926 Introduction to

the Technique of the Psycho-Analysis of Children (p. XI), she
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as an "In.e^ediate step"
between neurosis and
health, and differentiated treatment of the
child fro™ that of the
adult in this respect.

of^r^i^f"'

^''P^"^^"*

lleTSrf—f - i!H

l^he

Third Lecture, on The Role
of Children havrf
ufisf

Anal^

"ho maintain that-fteln^ur
thefr 2reati^^;"
=how profuse signs of transference which
^"
as in
the analysis oJ ^h"?!'
^""^
^^reed
that th
e
:
and

d^S^TWer

r

'TnTV

variegated^^r^^sl^rred'^e^ctSirorthr^hiu'Sf

rt ror-L:i -;o:i: i^i-n-ra^^i:
-j^^
place xn the patient's emotional
life.
It is only a struc'^^^^^^^
,""'
^^-^ °^ transfer:^:
neurosis.
TeZlls
"''t
So far as
the author's experience goes,
the
latter occurs solely in cases of
adult neurotics ;ho are
treated wxth the classical technique
applicable only to
patients who have reached maturity.
(A. Freud
19A6 d
xii; emphasis added)
'

The necessity of special techniques
for children was insisted upon,
and attributed to the fact that children,
unlike most adults, are "im-

mature and not self-respondent."

(1946, p. 4)

Specifically, the child

patient lacked "insight into the malady,
voluntary decision, and the
will towards cure" (1946, p. 5), as the child
was often not the
sufferer in his/her disorder.

For these reasons,

there had to be a

prelininary phase of treatment in which the
small patient [is made] 'analysable' in the sense of the
adult, that is to say inducing an insight into the trouble,
imparting confidence in the analyst, and turning the
decision for analysis from one taken by others into its
own.
Children's analysis requires for this task a preparatory period which does not occur with adults. I must
\

.
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emphasize that everything
which we undertake in th-fc
period has nothing to do
with the real InaJytical
work, that is to say there
is as yet no ques Jon
of
making unconscious processes
conscious or oranalvtic.l
xnfluence on the patient.
It is si.ply a

Lt"?

of

-

o~^afl'thr'^"'^^'^^^'^"^^^^^^^^
disposal of an
aduit
1''''
^^^^
'
'''^
°^ Preparationcne ••dre'sa'e-'fo^
?he
dressage for analysis one
might properly call it
wxll last the longer, the
further ?he original con
dition of the child is from
that of the Jdeaf adult
patient Which has already been
descrihed^'u! f.fX
All of the efforts to ready
the child for psychoanalysis
were
directed toward establishing "a
very definite emotional
relationship
with it. The harder the work
to be done, the higher
must be the

strain-capacity of this attachement

.

"

(1946, p.

38).

Freud regarded

this attachement as independent
of analytical theory and technique
(p.

38), most definitely as the precursor to
treatment, and not treat-

ment itself, and characterized this
preparatory work as only a more

formal and explicit form of the accomodations
most analysts made in
the initial period of analyses with
any patient (p. 16)

Nevertheless,

she insisted upon its importance as the
context for treatment clearly

enough that she drew fire for several years
from Melanie Klein and
her group (1946, p. 5); the Kleinian group
disagreed strongly with the

necessity of establishing this emotional relationship
preparatory to
.

T
analysis

20^

20

As mentioned previously, the Kleinians had also abandoned verbal techniques for play therapy.
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In 1954, Freud addressed
the relational issue once
again, with
respect to adult neurotic and
psychotic patients, challenged
the

general conception of transference
versus reality relationship,
while
acknowledging the unpopularity of
any form of challenge to the
classical ascriptions of transference
(1954, pp. 618-619)

T""
\

'\-^^--on

that the patient's trans^^^^
treatment, and
""'^^^^
har?o
gradually through interpretation
until at
Ir the very end of treatment,
until,
a real relationship
^^^^ "^^y
psychotic
^^"^
.
.nd borderline
t
and
cases; for the common neurotic
case the
reverse order seems to me to be the
rule. We see the patient enter into analysis with a reality
attitude to the
analyst; then the transference gains
momentum until it
reaches its peak in the full-blown
transference neurosis
which has to be worked off analytically
until the figure
of the analyst emerges again, reduced
to its true status
But—and this seems important to me— so far as
the patient
has a healthy part of his personality,
his real relationship to the analyst is never wholly submerged.
With due
respect for the necessary strictest handling
and interpretation of the transference, I feel still that
we should
leave room somewhere for the realization that
analyst and
patient are also two real people, of equal adult status,
in a real personal relationship to each other.
I wonder
whether our— at times complete— neglect of this side
of the
matter is not responsible for some of the hostile
reactions
which we get from our patients and which we are apt to
ascribe to "true transference" only. But these are technically subversive thoughts and ought to be "handled with
care." (A. Freud, 1954, pp. 618-619)

ferLcr'"^'?:

Oberndorf

,

not known as one of the relational analysts though

clearly awake to relational elements, also maintained an emphasis on

recalling and working through unconscious material through interpretation of transference and resistances, but added, "I might add also
those subtle, unobservable and indefinable phenomena which occur in
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the relationship between
physician and patient."
(1950, p. 39.)
this trend toward recognition
of relational elements

That

across the disorders has continued is
obvious; in 1974, Appel
stated "...the difficulties inherent in the
classical approach to
psychotherapy are
apparent... Whatever the
orientation, an Increasing
consensus of technical throreticlans appears
to be moving in the
direction of a therapeutic role that is reconstructive
primarily via relationship
rather
than interpretation."
(pp. 103-104)

The relationists during this
period, however, were most
definitely
not in the majority, and the
responses of interpretationists
varied,
though none encountered during
review, approved of the relational
shift.

Eissler (1953) in particular, advocated

a

return to strict interpre-

tationist lines, and accorded a
"special place
tative technique." (p. 126)

"exclusive tool of therapy"

to a

purely interpre-

Eissler regards interpretation as
the
(p.

109), differentiating it from trans-

ference, which though "therapeutically
effective," was considered a

source of energy which properly used led

to

recovery, but not a tool

of therapy (pp. 108-109). Similarly,

There are other therapeutically effective
factors which
may look like tools, such as the denial of wish
fulfillment, to which the patient must submit through the
treatment or, more generally, the psychoanalytic therapeutic
attitude.
I believe that these factors are secondary;
that is to say, they are the necessary consequences when
interpretation is the only tool of the analyst. Similarly,
working through is a specific technique for using interpretation. (Eissler, 1953, p. 109)
The only other tool Eissler acknowledged was the question, but its
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role was essentially
different f.o. that of
Interptetation (p. 109)
He acknowledged that
thete were tl.es when
unavoidable departures
from the ideal were necessary,
out set nn
up four conditions which
y, but
must
be ™et for the "parameters"
to he valid Introductions
to the technique
though parameters were to
be eschewed as much
as possible as each Increased the possibility
i^icy ot
of falsification
f^l q-t f-f ^o^-.of^ therapy by substituting
obedience for structural change
ciuge ^p.
(n
126^
tHo
f
i/b;.
xhe four
criteria for allowable parameters were:
.

,

"""^^
introduced only when it is proved
that the basic model technique
does not suffice; (2) the
parameter must never transgress
the unavoidable minimum'

"

fi-lly lead;
that is to say, the final phase
of the treatment must always
proceed with a parameter of
zero. (Eissler, 1953,
p. HQ)
'°
to
iolts'Z^T?Its self-elimmation;

The fourth condition, that the
parameter must not give the
transference a lasting direction, will
be difficult to fulfill during the acute phases of
the disease.
If it has
happened that a parameter has influenced
the transference
in a way which cannot be undone
by interpretation, a change
or analyst may become necessary,
(p. 114 footnote)

A parameter was to be introduced only
if, after its usefulness it
,

could be dispensed with and the treatment
could proceed with the basic

model

(p.

110), and must never have been such that its effects
on trans

ference could not be abolished by interpretation

(p.

113).

The command

by the analyst to face the feared object or
situation for a phobic

patient would constitute an allowed parameter.

However, he decried

any and all of the modifications made to treat schizophrenics.
It is impossible to demonstrate here the consequences which

'
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thae, despite the cLJ?;-;^:',
„
S^^^
analysts, I am convinced
that it has not Lt I
proved that schizophrenic
Patients eve^rLch a
"^''^
accordance
""^ "-'--1
llTrl"'
with
the basic model technique.
=
This i,

f

m

commonly say neuroses can
be cured
'°
construed as a denlarof
Pff r'^'
°' psychoanalysis in the treatment
Tf\ri
J"""""' patients.
of schizophrenic
(Eissler, 1953,

tIT.\1\

p.

114)

He was particularly critical
of those who used, then
avocated the
modifications because the clinician
"has noticed subsequent disapp.
3ear-

ance of symptoms" (p. II3 footnote);
or "it is a grave mistake
to conelude that [a] measure has
general validity because it has
proved its
usefulness under special conditions"
(p. 105)
While Eissler, beyond
equivocation, had a point, he stretched
it too far, and appears to
have

preferred theoretical parsimony over
clinical efficacy in the treatment
of schizophrenics.
The full weight of his wrath was
reserved for Fromm-Reichmann
though, as he criticized both her
theoretical and technical modifications,

particularly her switch to the "face-to-face
situation."

(p.

106)

Though not so rigid as Eissler, Stone in 1954 also
came down
squarely for an interpretationists position.

He stated that any psycho-

therapeutic treatment which did not attempt to provide
to the maximum compatible with the situation the
conditions
necessary for a full-blown undistorted transference neurosis
and therefore does not mobilize one, or which does not
dissolve this neurosis or reduce it to the greatest extent
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which the patient's structure
and the therapist's skill
''""^''^ i-erpretatloL. sho^L
iiu L De called analvsiq
nlTll^lnlTT''^
p^ron
t-u^

t
necessary formal
;
asDect.! nf
1
aspects
of the analytic
situation are reproduced
For
"-"-"."^e
p^of'^^d
;eorg
m"aU:rof
<^

'

•

J

j-j.-Liies3t)
.

-.

is,

m

a sensp

an in—

Though Stone believed that one
should not be rigid about
details, he
felt that any tangible deviation
fro. neutrality should be
handled within the general lines elucidated
by Eissler (p. 574),

with regard to criterion number
prior to the end of analysis).

4,

(differing only

that any parameter must terminate

Stone (p. 576) pointed out that
this

latter criterion automatically excluded
the time limitation parameters

which Freud had used with the Wolf Man.

By 1958, certain of the inter-

pretationists were differentiating among
modifications, variations, or
derivations of the basic interpretational
model. (Greenson, 1958,
Loewenstein, 1958, p. 202)

p.

200;

'^'^

Similarly, with respect to the second major
controversy of the late

1940's and early 1950's, the dominant group within
psychoanalysis, des-

pite anomalies in child work and neurotic complementarities,
refused to
see family members.

In 1954 Greenacre, with corroborations only slightly

modified by Menninger (1958) strongly advised against seeing
family

As will be seen in Chapter VII, this dispute was couched in terms
of technique, the relationalists and the interpretationists obviously
differed, with respect to paradigms, which served as the root of the
disagreement, the methodological niceties being the logical extensions
of each paradigm.
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members and even physicians,
as well as not giving or
receiving information as this endangered trust
and confidence in the analyst,
Jeopardized
the analyst's integrity as
s/he .ight be "prejudiced"
by informat:ion
other than the patient's free
associations, and cast aspersions

uipon

the motivation and training
analysis of the analyst (cited
by Grotjahn.
I960, pp. 25-26)
Similarly Glover's 1955 The
Techniques of Psycho.

anal^

(using information from questionnaires
to analysts one year

prior to World War II) reported
that "all persons questioned see
members of the family most unwillingly,
and at the patient's request"
(Glover, p. 322).

Moreover, there was a

clear majority against analyzing members
of the same
family, at any rate at the same time.
A minority would
analyze them at different times, although
some of these
say definitely "not husband and wife".
Three, however
replxed unequivocally yes, and one of these
stated that
she had found it practicable to analyze a
husband and
wife. Another who tried this says it has some
advantages,
but the disadvantages are infinitely greater.
And in 1959, L.J. Saul, in an exercise in diplomacy
stated that there

existed advantages in meeting relatives, especially if they
paid the
bills or "in the rare cases which are obscure to the point of
opaque-

ness."

Saul was clearly not a rabid supporter of family inclusion.

With the official stance and dominant practice in psychoanalysis
unsympathetic to seeing family members, it is little wonder that those
analysts who did see family, did so with little self-proclamation.
Galdstone,.

an analyst who did see family members, discussed the reasons

he did so, and some of the reasons why it was a difficult modification
for analysts to make,

(in Ackerman,

1961, pp. 130-131).

Gralnick

187

(1962, p. 516) stated that
until recentlv
recently, seeing, never
mind treating,
•

family members was
regarded as '^fr-.^
strange, xf not heretical"
and ascribed
the reluctance to
Freud's teachings and
his difficulties
^xj.i^uxLxes with countertransference in dealing
img with family
fa,T,-;i
members, as well as the
legitimate
difficulties in the early
years, ..n the treatment
of the single individual." (p. 518) Pramo
and Bos.ormeny-Nagy
(1965, p. XVI) sum.ari.e
the difficulties, and
consequences.

tabool.

.Although\i:i::iro?%.\"

understanding of the intrapsychic ^Ll To^lTT""''
wo.i'foftL individual
°' involvement of family members '
^he tllllZTr'
P^"'^^^^ °f individuals and his
view of the
! ? as a
individual
closed system established
the prIctLe of
exclusion of the family in most
forms of psychotherapy
It IS understandable then,
that, certain ea^ly fa^Sf*

'

riences to the professional
community and that their
'^"-'''^^
was disclosed
T'^'
^oszormeny.
N:gy:'l965r;^;?)''^^^

~t?Uo^

Finally, Weakland (1972,
pp. 132-133) pointed out that during
the

1950 's "there was very little
family treatment anywhere and
what there
was seldom was mentioned publicly."
In view of the disapproval of the

main body of psychoanalytic practice,
with its successes and prestige,
there is little wonder the first steps
within the framework were tentative. As might be ejected,

the revolutionary paradigm received
its

major impetus outside the framework.

Status o f the situation in Kuhnian terms
early 1950

's,

.

By the late 1940'

s

and

psychoanalysis could be regarded as being in the midst of
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Of a Kuhnian crisi..

The original paradig.
se. had been developed
and

revised by Freud until
approxl^tely

19U

and it provided the

^st

clinically successful and
theoretically powerful syste.
available for
the transference neuroses;
there is little doubt that
because of certain
modifications, that remains the
case.
Then, precisely because of
its
successes and its position as
virtually the
successful clinical
framework for several decades,
psychoanalysis began to be extended
to
phenomena other than those for
which it had been designed.
As predicted
by the Kuhnian analysis,
anomalies began to emerge (Stone
talked of
this extension of the psychoanalytic
framework as having reached an
"extreme development" by 1954).^^

This pattern emerged during the
1930's and 1940's in the traditional

clinical populations that had the
additional characteristic of complementarity with the neurotic features of
another family member, particularly
a spouse.

Intentional or default extension of the techniques
and formula-

tions of psychoanalysis to the disorders of
children, latent schizo-

phrenia and schizophrenia resulted in anomalies
during the 1940'

s

and

early 1950' s, which struck at the paradigm as
well as the theory and

technique of the framework with regard to change
process, primary tech-

nique of therapy and etiological formulation.
22

Kuhn's schema allows some

The timing of the "extreme development" is interesting. This
extremity occurred at about 1954 and the revolutionary DB family
therapy paradigm was published just two years later in 1956.
Is this
sequence, so closely spaced in time, coincidental or will it be seen
to be characteristic in Kuhnian analysis of other DMs and revolutionary
paradigms?
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of the difficulties of the psychoanalytic
framework to be seen as

structurally similar, and as resulting, not
from the disconf irmation
of the original theory as some had thought,
but from its extension to

areas it had not been designed for and which
had been explicitly eschewed
by Freud.

The Kuhnian analysis also makes clear the
method of exten-

sion—the technique becomes applied first

to a

new clinical area, then

theory is impotted to support findings, or to be
necessarily modified
in light of difficulties.

The priority of technical rather than theore-

tical application has not received the attention that it
requires, and
in fact, has not been noticed at times.

In 1954, discussing the exten-

sion of psychoanalysis to those other clinical phenomena, Anna Freud,

mistakenly it appears, credits theory with priority.
.by no means all the variations of technique, which we
find in the analytic field today, own their origin to
special conditions in the cases under treatment. An equal,
if not larger, number of them are occasioned, not by a
change in the type of disorder treated, but by a change in
the analyst 's outlook and theoretical evaluation of familiar
phenomena
The intimate interrelation between theory and
practice in psychoanalysis is responsible for the fact that
every development in theory results inevitably in a change
of technique.
To the measure in which classical psychoanalysis splits up into different schools of thought, the
orthodox technique undergoes variations the value of which
cannot be assessed except on the basis of the value of the
theoretical innovations which have caused them. (A. Freud,
p. 608; emphasis added)
.

.

.

In view of a Kuhnian analysis, it appears that one must disagree
and regard the theoretical modifications as arising from the contin-

gencies of attempted clinical application.
1890' s,

As with Freud in the early

the applications of technique were directed towards the

\
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alleviation of disorder-the
cure was the goal-and
goax and the
thP explanations
regarding etiology and
explanatory concepts of
treatment were
i

1„ the

service of the cure.
By the 1940-s sufficient

t»e

had elapsed between the
attempted

application of psychoanalytic
technique and the emergence
of patterns
Of difficulty for public
reports to accumulate regarding
difficulties, necessity for modification
of technique, and finally
for a new
DM, based upon the Sullivanian
interpersonal paradigm, to form.
It

appears that at approximately
this point, awareness of
crisis appeared.
Awareness of the difficulties
arising from extensions had
existed among
those concerned with such extensions,
but the sense of crisis emerged
only during the latter 19W and
s
early 1950's. The emergence of
problems, presence of controversy and
the examination of fundamentals

(interpretatlonist position) characterized
a period of crisis.
tually, awareness of the crisis became
explicit.

Even-

In fact, in a para-

graph encapsulating several of these
elements in retrospect, Loewen-

Stein stated,
In recent years, problems connected with
variations of
technique have aroused a great deal of
interest among
analysts. This may partly be due to the
appearance of
interesting modifications of psycho-analytic
technique
that have created considerable controversy
and thus led
xn turn, to renewed study of _the base
of classical techni£ue. ..Moreover, this revival of
interest is influi^
by the widening scope of the application
of psychoanalysis,
as well as by the increasing use of
analytically oriented
psychotherapy. Thus the need for a scrutiny of the
rationale of all such techniques has become more
acute.
(Loewenstein, 1958, p. 202; emphasis added)
'
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It is unclear, however,
whether the strength of
the interpersonal DM

contributed
it.

to

the sense of crisis or
was responsible in so.e
way for

That is, did the sense of
crisis arise because of
the number and

depth Of the ano^lies, or
because of a combination of
anomalies and
powerful diverging framework
addressing the anomalies? With
an alternative or rival framework, do
people of the established
framework sense
threat, or is the presence of
anomalies sufficient? These
questions,
it seems cannot be answered
in the present analysis.
Briskman (1972)
points out this sort of difficulty
in the abstract.

Kuhn's theory, at its simplest
and most elegant, portrays
mature sciences as evolving through
a serLs ^f paradlLnormal scxence-crisis-and new
paradigms. A fundamental
Feyerabend, is the
fanu?e%n'
failure to recognize that very often
important arguments
against the old paradigm may only come
to light with the
emergence of competing alternatives and
that therefore
the best way to provoke a 'crisis'
may often be to offer
an alternative in advance of any
serious paradigmatic
breakdown. Kuhn's chronology consistently
runs from crisis
to the emergence of alternatives;
my point is that very
often this process must be reversed.
It is precisely for
this reason that 'critical' (or, if one
likes, 'crisisoriented ) epistemologies such as Popper's
(1963) and
Feyerabend 's (1968) stress the important role of
alternative theories in the growth of scientific
knowledge,
^
(pp.

89-90)

It appears that this is an important unresolved
element in Kuhn's for-

mulation.
In 1956, a paradigm was proposed that answered the anomalies
and

satisfied the Kuhnian criteria for a revolutionary paradigm.

It

responded to the general sense of crisis in psychoanalysis and specifi-

cally to the reciprocation of health and disorder found in schizophrenic
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fa.Uies and

„U

-a..Uo„al ..eat„e„.

co„ple™e„.a.U.es,
an.

,o™.,a.on

..„,euU.e3 e.pe.,ence.

,n

.

ano„.Ues

o. seH..ep..en.a,

.He

pa„.c.Un.

.H„,

sense o. seK..p..en.
speecH
and the persistent
lack of success in
Its treatment.

\

CHAPTER

V

INCEPTION OF THE DOUBLE-BIND
PARADIGM
To constitute a revolutionary
paradigm in the Kuhnian sense, an
ideal/ technique would have to meet
the following criteria: it
would hav
to be a

(1)

problem solution which is

(2)

a new way of seeing things

and which simultaneously serves
(3) an analogue function; that is,
it

would serve as a Gestalt with which
people could "see" new problems
as subjects for the application of
similar thinking and techniques as
the paradigmatic idea.

This problem-solution must be
(4) sufficiently

unprecedented to attract an enduring group of
adherents away from competing models of scientific activity, yet also

(5)

sufficiently open-

ended to leave problems for the new, re-defined
group to address; that
is,

a

paradigm would have to form a DM and leave it problems to
address

and in fact, would (6) for a time provide model problems
and acceptable

solutions that pointed out a direction of development.
These are all necessary criteria that Kuhn has at one time or

another emphasized.

At other times, he has added supplementary points,

some of which were proposed by Masterman originally,

that have not

appeared necessary, but that elaborate the paradigm concept and as such
are useful.

These supplementary characteristics specify that: the

problem-solution (A) resolves those problems that constituted the
anomalies (or at least some of them?), that it can be reached
deductively, during the coarse of
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(C)

(B)

normal science activity directed

.
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toward other Interests
and goals, by (B) '.ran.
outsiders," that is
by individuals or a
group outside the OM
in „hicH the ano„.lles
hal
arisen; a consec,uence of
the last three criteria
Is that the problemsolution is (E) cruder, and
probably „ore concrete
(than theorizing
or techniques in the DM
of anomalies)
It is unclear whether
these supplementary
characteristics apply
to

an

paradigms to some extent, or.
whether their presence means
a partlcular paradigm Is revolutionary;
this might be especially
relevant to
supplementary characteristic
"(A)", i.e.. that the
problem-solution
specifically addresses the anomalies;
are there problem-solutions
that
do not address anomalies,
but merely address problems?
Or would they.
by definition, be normal
science
-Lcuce effortqerrorts,

normal science in this case.

ttm^h think they would
would
be

T
i

•

i

^.

In another case, however,
what of those

alternative theories that are said

to

induce crisis by their own exis-

tence without anomalies, of which
both Feyerabend (1968) and Popper
(1963)

seem so enamored?

anomalies.

These would not necessarily be addressing

This particular point-whether
paradigms are necessarily

revolutionary, is apparently still at issue.
To present this argument most clearly,

the original DB formal

statement will be explicated, then some of
the subsequent modifications
will be reviewed (in a manner similar to the
review of Freud's formal

paradigm statement).

Then,

the early work involved in formulating

the DB paradigm will be examined, and an argument
will then be made

that the DB work constituted a revolutionary paradigm.

development of its DM, both sociologically as

a

The subsequent

research group, and
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Intenactually,

win

be reviewed in Chapter
VI.

Initial Paradigmatic- <;fai-»„^„>.
a Theory of Sc hli^^T;^;,..

toward

The first formal
paradigmatic statement tooU
place in 1956 in an
article titled "Toward a
theory of schizophrenia.,
hy Gregory Bateson,
Don .ackson, day Haley,
and John Weakland; the
article was published
in Behavioral Science
rather than a family- therapy
Journal as there were
no family journals in
1956.
The authors construed the
article as "a report on a
research project Which has been formulating
and testing a broad systematic
view of
the nature, etiology, and
therapy of schizophrenia/'
(1956, p. 251) by
focusing on the "basic family
situation, and the overtly
communicational

characteristics of schizophrenia."

^-^±J:ILCo^mu^^

(p.

262)

Their article began with an
explanation

of the theory on which the DB
formulation was based:

Their formulation

was based on that
"part of communications theory which
Russell has called
the Theory of Logical Types" (Whitehead
and Russell, 1910)
The central thesis of this theory is
that there is a
discontinuity between a class and its members.
The class
cannot be a member of itself nor can one
of the members be

in fact, the first family journal, Family
Process, was a direct
product of the DB group and issued its first copy
for January 1962 with
Jay Haley as editor.
There had been "child" journals, but none to
that time devoted to the clinical concerns of the family
as a unit.

.
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Although in formal
logic there is an at^P,.n^
'^'^ discontinuity
between a class and J tf' k
"^^^^ers, we argue that
in the
psychology
f^y^n>jj.u^y or
ir^eaW
real communicatinnQ
i-^-i
adiscontinuity
between a class and i>c n,o k
inevitably .r.l^^
251-2?^^"^"^
'

.^l.TlT.

Examples of co^nunlcaUon
that Involve multiple
Logical Types include "Play" for instance
(among humans and at least
the lowet mammals)
There are exchanges of
signals that identify certain
behavior as "play"
and thus change meaning
and consequences of the
behavior. These signals (about the behavior)

they classify. Among human
beings, this framing and
labeling of messages ... reaches
considerable complexity
with the peculiarity that our
vocabulary for such discrimination is still very poorly
developed and we rely
preponderantly upon nonverbal media of
posture, gesture
facial expression, intonation,
and the context of the
communication of these highly abstract,
but vitally important labels. (1956, p. 252)
'

Similarly, fantasy, humor, sacrament,
and metaphor employ multiple

Logical Types.

Hunor, for instance, was regarded
as a method of ex-

ploring implicit themes in thought or
relationship, with "the explosive

moment" in humor occurring when the labeling
undergoes "a dissolution
and resynthesis," (p. 252), such that the
punch-line compels a re-

examination of the earlier labels that ascribed the
statements

to a

certain mode (e.g., fantasy or literalness)
The falsification of such "mode-identifying" signals
(e.g., "this
is real",

"this is only pretend") can also occur;

they mentioned the

artificial laugh, the confidence trick, the manipulative simulation of

.

197

friendliness.

At times,

these
"-"^se falcnf.taisifxcations were percpivf^rl
perceived as occurring
unconsciously and at times
within the self,
self such
.
u that
the person may
conceal
,,./He. seH, H.s
.e., HcsUU.. .„.e.
.W.pHonc
Sulse o. pu....
(p. ,3.)
po.„. U.e. .ecc.es
<,.Ue ,.po..an. „u.
regard to schizophrenia)
'

m

Learning to lea„. or
learning sees („Ha.
Bateson's sys.e„ refers
to as Deutero Learning),
involved „.lUple Logical
T.pes and were also
relevant to schizophrenia.

^^^^^^^^^^^^-i^^^^^^^^^^^^

in 1,34,

Baeeson's group Beca.e
interested in schizophrenia
because of its long acknowledged
co^unicational oddities Its
jh
^^Q "T7r.v-^
^
t
word salad" quality and
particularly the inappropriate metaphoric and literal
qualities.

—

,

With regard to the communicational
aspect of the paradigm, if
their formal summary of
symptomatology were correct, and if
schizophrenia were essentially a result
of family interactions,
2, then it
should have been possible "to arrive
a priori at a formal description
of these sequences of events which
would induce such a symptomatology."
(1956, p. 253)

Based on their perspectives in learning
theory, par-

ticularly with respect to deutero-learning
or learning sets, they
^Jackson's contribution to the paradigm was
less communicational
than interpersonal, and will be reviewed
later during the analysis of
paradigm development. For what appear largely
historical reasons,
during the explication of the DB paradigm and
revisions, Jackson's
component of the paradigm was more implicit than
explicit.
The
reasons for this will be reviewed in Chapter VT
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deduced that thesp
ucnese nic»r>f-oi
mental uhabits
were the result of
u
of characteristic
sequential patterns" Cn
(p. 253) in the Immediate
environment, i.e.,
family.
They eliminated "specific
traumatic experience"
253)'
(p.
during infantile development
as an etiological
agent, preferring to
ascertain „hat contingencies
would produce the
co^unicational patterns
they were seeing.
Comhlning the emphasis on
learning with the fact
that the context of
behavior is used as the
"mode indicator," they
deduced that characteristic
patterns in the family "taught"
the patient
the mental habits U.e.,
(i.e
leprn-inf,
u
learning set) characteristic
of schizophrenia.
That is, the patient "must
live in a universe where
the sequences
of events are such that
his unconventional
communicational habits will
be in some sense appropriate",
(p. 253)
They hypothesized that these

characteristic sequences of events
in the external experiences
of the
individual were responsible for
what they perceived as an inner
confusion in Logical Types.

"For such unresolvable sequences
of experien-

ces, we use the term 'double bind.'"
(p. 253)

Initial paradigmatic _statemei^

The "necessary ingredients" of a
double

bind situation, as presented in their
first paradigmatic statement, were
1.

''Tv^ or

more £ersons

,

"

one of which was designated the "victim."

"We do not assume that the double bind is
inflicted by the mother

alone, but that it may be done either by mother
alone or by some

combination of mother, father, and/or siblings."
2.

"Re peated experience

,

"

such that the double bind is a "recurring

theme in the experience of the victim.

Our hypothesis does not

"
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invoke a .ingle „3u.atic
expedience, but such
repeated experiences that the double bind
structure co„es to be an
habitual expectation." or in Bateson's
ter.s, the victim's
deutero-learning,
or learning set, was of
double bind structure.

ini^^

•A £rlHary_nesative
"(a)

'Do not do so and so,

not do so and so,

I

or

I

„,i,,

^^^^^^

will punish you.' or (b)

will punish you.'"

^^^^^^

„ you

do

The context of learning
was

based on avoidance of
punishment rather than reward
seeking and
they indicated that there
was perhaps no formal reason
in terms of
Logical Types, for this selection.
(During the explication of the

process developing the communlcatlonal
part of the paradigm, the
possible origin of this choice will
be shown to lie in the personal correspondence between Gregory
Bateson and Norbert Weiner.)

The group assumed that punishment
could be either the withdrawal
of love or the expression of hate
or anger, or worst, "the kind

of abandonment that results from
the parent's expression of extreme helplesness

.

"A secondary injunction conflicting
with the first at a more abstract

level
,

and

Ihrea^

Uke

_the first

survival.''

enforced

punishments or signals which

This secondary injunction is more difficult

to explain than the first for what they
state to be two reasons.

The first is that it is commonly conveyed to the
child by non-

verbal means.

"Posture, gesture,

tone of voice, meaningful action

and the implications concealed in verbal communication may all be
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used to convey this more abstract
message."

Secondly, this secon-

dary injunction may impinge on an^
element of the primary message
and may therefore take a wide variety
of forms and directions.
For example, "'Do not see this as
punishment';
the punishing agent';

'Do not see me as

'Do not submit to my prohibitions';

not think of what you must not do';

'Do not

'Do

question my love of

which the primary prohibition is (or is not)
an example'; and so
on."

The discernment of these secondary
injunctions is made more

difficult at times when the double bind is
inflicted by not one
person, but two, wherein, for example, one
parent may negate at
a more abstract level,

the injunctions of the other.

A further difficulty not mentioned by the four authors
might
be mentioned. Since the secondary injunction is at a
more abstract
level, and serves a meta-comraunicational function, it is
by defini-

tion and function more abstract and "once removed" from the
osten-

sible content of messages.

As such, its presence and role would

of course be more difficult to discern.

"A tertiary negative injunction prohibiting the victim from escaping
the field.

In a formal sense it is perhaps unnecessary to list this

injunction as a separate item since the reinforcement at the other
two levels involves a threat to survival, and if the double binds

are imposed during infancy, escape is naturally impossible."

They

further allude that, in some cases, escape from the fields is pre-

cluded by processes which are not "purely negative, e.g., capricious
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promises of love, and the like."
6.

"Finally, the .o.plete set
of Ingredients Is no
longer necessary

When the victim has learned
to perceive his universe
In double
bind patterns. Almost any
part of a double bind may
then be
sufficient to precipitate panic
or rage.

The pattern of conflicting

injunctions may even be taken
over hv
uver
by hoii
hallucinatory voices...
[quoted and paraphrased
from Bateson. Jackson,
Haley, and Weakland,
1956, pp. 253-254; emphases
theirs]
•

Probably the best known
illustration (and analysis) of
a double bind
comes from this 1956
paradigmatic paper. Bateson,
et al. provide a
clinical illustration which
at least one of them
apparently saw (Though
their analysis is rather long,
it will be presented in
toto, as the
double bind formulation is not
particularly easy to recognize in
behavior
unless one has had a good deal
of experience at it, as an
aid to understanding the power of the situation
and its implications for the
patient
and to explicate clearly at
least one double bind analysis
to make clear
the formulation what all subsequent
fuss was about; without a clear

understanding of its unresolvable quality
in combination with the impossibility of "doing nothing," the
etiological significance of the double
bind will remain pallid.

An analysis of an incident occurring
between a schizophrenic patient and his mother illustrates
the "double
bind" situation. A young man who had
fairly well recovered from an acute schizophrenic episode
was visited
in the hospital by his mother.
He was glad to see her
and impulsively put his arm around her shoulders, whereupon she stiffened. He withdrew his arm and she asked,
"Don't you love me any more?" Then then blushed, and she

'

202

said, "Dear, you must
not be so

assa^U.-

pj^q-ti,,

^^^^^ ^

u

^t^^^

Clearly, Che intensity of
his upset could have
been averted if he
had been able to
meta-communicate: "Mother
iiotner, it is
lc „k
<
obvious
chat you became uncomfortable when
I put my arm
around you, and that you
have
difficulty accepting a gesture
of affection from me'".
This, however,
is exactly the point-the
person cannot meta-communicate
due to 1) training and the resulting
learning set and 2) intense
dependency which is
fostered by the double bind
patterns.
He could not meta-communicate
but
was forced to deal with the
co^unication of the mother, and listen
to
her comments about his
communication and behavior. The
logical vicissitudes of the sequence are bewildering
to the observer (and will be re-

viewed); to one of the participants,
the sequence was obviously patho-

genic

.

The logical complications for the patient
in that perhaps thirty
second interchange include:
1.

2.

The mother's reaction of not accepting
her son's affectionate
gesture is masterfully covered up by her
condemnation of
him for withdrawing, and the patient denies
his perception
of the situation by accepting her
condemnation.
The statement. Don't you love me any more?
in this context
seems to imply:
(a) 'I am lovable.
(b) 'You should love me and if you don't
you are bad or
at fault.'
(c) 'Whereas you did love me previously you don't
any
longer', and thus focus is shifted from his expressing affection to his inability to be affectionate.
Since the patient has also hated her, she is on

'
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3.

good grounds here, and he responds
appropriately
with guilt, which she then attacks,
(d) 'What you just expressed
was not affection,' and
in order to accept this statement
the patient
must deny what she and the culture
have taught
him about how one expresses affection.
He must
also question the times with her,
and with others
when he thought he was experiencing
affection and'
when they seemed to treat the situation
as if he
had.
He experiences here loss-of-support
phenomena and is put in doubt about the
reliability of
past experience.
The statement, 'You must not be so easily
embarrassed and
afraid of your feelings,' seems to imply:
(a) 'You are not like me and are
different from other
nice or normal people because we express our
feelings
(b) 'The feelings you express are all
right, it's only
that you can't accept them.'
However, if the
stiffening on her part has indicated 'these are
unacceptable feelings,' then the boy is told that
he should not be embarrased by unacceptable
feelings.
Since he has had a long training in
what is and is not acceptable to both her and
society, he again comes into a conflict with the
past.
If he is unafraid of his own feelings [which
mother implies is good], he should be unafraid of
his affection and would then notice it was she who
was afraid, but he must not notice that because her
whole approach is aimed at covering up this shortcoming in herself.
.

The impossible dilemma thus becomes: 'If I am to keep my
tie to mother I must not show her that I love her, but if
I do not show her that I love her, then I will lose her.'
(1956, p. 259)

Their example is particularly vivid for me, as, soon after first

reading the 1956 report,
outcome.

I

saw a very similar interchange, with similar

A hospitalized man in his early 30 's, with

a diagnosis of

catatonic schizophrenia, was visited by his father, a man whose occu-

pation had self-conscious "he-man" characteristics.

Father came on
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son „a<ie placaUns
Sest..es, .u. could„..
spea. as heM .een
e„ectival,
»ute fo. th.ee .ears. .athe.
s.a.e. approximate.,
ten „,„u.es. sta„..„s
in the hall taUlng.
then began sa.lns his
goodhyes. Son hugged and

or something?"

Son stood there, not
answering and father questioned,
"Welir-, forgetting that his
son had been .ute since
father had burned
his son's journals and a
manuscript returned by an editor,
saying that
It was undignified for
his son to be "emoting all
over the place."
Thus, the son could not do
right
txgnc, coulH
couid nnh
not do
nothing, and could
not meta-coHMunicate (on one
level because that was emoting
and therefore devalued and on another
level, because he was mute
and "could not."
Of course, when he had not
been mute, when he'd written
those Journals
and manuscript, he had been
rendered mute by their destruction).
Upon
his father's departure, he became
assaultive, and self-destructive, and
was placed in temporary Isolation,
emerging the next day as if nothing

had happened.

The Induction of double bind

'

.

The mothers of schizophrenics^ were

3

Despite disclaimers to the effect that they held
no one in particular responsible for inception of double
binds and hence, schizophrenia, the 1956 article repeatedly lays the
blame at mother's doorstep,
formulations anl illustrations; they correct the
imbalance
somewhat in subsequent revisions, though because of the 1956
article+s
enormous audience, the mother-as-"binder "
child-as-"victim" father-

m

,

,
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hypothesized to be simultaneously
expressing at least two orders
of
messages, roughly characterized
as a) withdrawing or
hostile behavior
which is aroused whenever the
child approaches her, yet
b) simulated
loving or approaching behavior
which is aroused whenever the
child responds to her hostile or withdrawing
behavior, as a way of denying what
she is withdrawing.
The dynamic problem is the
mother's need to control
anxiety in the face of intimacy,
which she does by controlling the
distance (or closeness) between her
and the child.
It's also obvious that any child
exposed to this sort of mothering

with any regularity and with little
consistent mothering functions from
elsewhere (relative, housekeeper, neighbor),
would develop particularly
persistent, but schizoid, ways of attempting
to gain that affection,
regard, comfort—any of the guises under
which children receive the

steady love that is their necessity, and
right.

In the face of these

efforts, the mothers would, of course, escalate
the double binding, par-

as-"innocent bystander" Gestalt has unfortunately remained
powerful.
The 1956 preoccupation with mother as perpetrator
is being elucidated
in the interests of historical accuracy rather
than clinical veracity,
and as a baseline against which to gauge subsequent
paradigmatic revisions.
The shift from dyadic preoccupation in double bind
establishment, to three part, then family involvement, was
quite important in
the DM development.
This should not be construed to mean, however, that
the original paradigmatic statement was dyadic; it
was clearly dealing
in systems terms with family dynamics; for ease of
understanding, their
own as well as readers', the project's first statement
dealt with the
simplest version of the Interactive system, the two-person system.
As
Jackson's tenure in the group increased, the influence of homeostatic
processes in the family became more prominent in the formulation.
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ticularly with respect to
approach-avoidance.
The most important point the project
members wanted to bring out
was that in this oscillating process,
the mother's "loving behavior
is
then a comment on (since it is compensatory
for) her hostile behavior
and consequently it is of a different
order of message than the hostile

behavior— it

is a message about a sequence of
messages.

Yet by its

nature, it denies the existence of those
messages which it is about,
e.,

the hostile withdrawal." (1971,
p. 12)

i.

It was necessary to hypothe-

size, and they did, that hostility and
aggression could not be admitted
to by these mothers.

(Obviously psychoanalytic-thought had sufficiently

pervaded the general culture to be used, in part,
in almost any psychiatric formulation, particularly with respect to
psychological processes,

and defenses, e.g., denial, though not so much for
structure and content
of its formal theory.)

Because of her own difficulties, the mother uses the child's response to affirm that her behavior is loving, and since it, in fact,
is
only simulated lovingness, "the child is placed in a position where he

must not accurately interpret her communication if he is to maintain
his relationship with her." (1956, p. 257)

In fact, the child must

not discriminate among the orders of messages, here the difference be-

tween simulated feeling (one Logical Type) and real feelings (another

Logical Type).

In effect, the child comes to distort his perception

of the meta-communicative signals.

For instance,
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she „lght say. ..Go
°
to'l:,
v
"jJ^L""
you to get your sleep/'
^""^ ^
This overt
l
l<=vi.ng statement
Intended to deny a fLn„„
is
!
-'^-"-1
"Get out of my sigh
as
b cL's:
°^
child correctly dlscrlm?.^, \.
^e
Signals, he would have
face
"""^
doesn't want him and Is
decelvln^\
J
behavior.
He „ould b^" ^Lhed^
£c" J-earning to discrxminate orders; nf
would tend to
c
t
h IdL'tSar^^'r
recognize his mothL's
.'"''^^ ^^"^
deception
5hl.
deceive
about hir^L L'ernal
sta'^rin
^°
support mother i^Thi?
dile^o^T^S^survive with """^^^
her he
must falsely discrimin.^o J
internal messages as
well as falLlv
"^^^^^^^ °^
(1^36,
P. 257; f^ptlL'ad^dr^"

^

"

f

W

IT
"

™™"ative

llrZ'Tl

hWlf

-^-^

Such a process would help
one to understand the
sense of bewilderment or vague puzzlement
often encountered among
schizophrenic patients;
similarly, the tendency to
become alienated f rom one;^
self to maintain
a vital relationship is
given some etiological
formulation.
The just
quoted DB passage is reminiscent
of the schizophrenic
patient quoted by
Powdermaker (1952), who felt at
times that a quarrel meant
either the
giving up of self, or loss of
the relationship.
It is the inability to hold
their own with authority
figures who seem illogical or
otherwise ununderstandable
that has made life so difficult
for the patients in the
fxrst place... The need of the
patient for someone who will
try to understand what he is
endeavoring to communicate is
made clear by the remark of a patient:
'If the others don't
agree it means you're wrong - it takes
so much strength to
be a minority of one." (1952,
p. 67)

A DB formulation would emphasize the bind
between integrity of his
own perceptions and possible loss of
relationship, as well as the ob-

vious inability to metacommunicate regarding
whether disagreement
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necessarily Implied that the
patient were wrong.
The tendency toward Internal
deception to maintain the
relationship
is ahetted by the picture
ol benevolence; the
.other Is expressing overt
concern over the "fact" that
the child Is tired.
The easiest path for
the child is to accept
mother's simulated loving
behavior, and any Inclinations toward deciphering
or interpreting what is
going on, are
undermined.
"Yet the result is that the
mother Is withdrawing from him
and defining this withdrawal
as the way a loving
relationship should
be." (p. 257)
However, accepting mother's
simulated loving behavior as real
is
also no solution for this child
as, if he should approach
her (having
made the false discrimination)
she would of course, be induced
to withdraw; if he then withdrew, she
would interpret this as a reflection
on
her status of a loving mother, and
would either approach, or withdraw
to punish the child.
to distance.

If he then re-approached,

she would be compelled

"The child is punished for discriminating
accurately what

she is expressing and he is punished for
discriminating inaccurately-

he is caught in a double bind." (quoted
and paraphrased from 1956, p.
257)

To say that the child "should" simply desist in
his efforts is to

miss the point.

First, relationally , the child must make these efforts—

because he cannot give up what he has never had and continues to require,
and because he is responding to the needs of the mother and, her
active

signals are constructed such that he cannot not act.

.
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Attempts to deal with double-b
J,nl_sltuat^

A variety of means can

be used by the child to attempt to
escape from the situation.
to rely for the necessary
relational ties on someone

One is

else-the afore-

mentioned relatives, housekeepers, etc.,
or the father.

A pecularity

of schizophrenic families is the
insubstantiality of the fathers.

The "dominating mother" has become a
stereotype by now with regard to

schizophrenic families.

To turn it around, according to the
DB paradigm,

it is because families have one
parent

(here the mother) who double

binds and another parent who is insubstantial,
or weak, or passive, or

emotionally absent (here the father), that one
of the children is at
risk for schizophrenia.

If the child could gain relational
security

with that other parent, the pernicious effects
of the binding parent
would be greatly mitigated, particularly with
respect to their emotional

consequences
The fathers should not be regarded as totally oblivious
to the

child's problems in relation to mother.
position.

Father is also in a difficult

If father recognizes the difficulty and supports some of
the

child's efforts, particularly with respect to the mother's deceptions
he would then have to recognize the nature of his own relationship

with her, which he could not do and maintain that relationship

(p.

258)

To "help" the child would tilt the homeostatic balance in the triad

and tilt father out of his, at least, tolerable position.

The homeo-

static processes in the family preclude intervention or real avail-

ability by the father.
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As to the benign presence
of relatives, neighbors,
etc., another
peculiarity of schizophrenic
families Is their defensive
Isolation In
the world.
Any atte.pt by the child to
get Its relational needs
.et
outside the family would be
Interpreted by the binding parent
as a reflection on their "lovlngness"
and would produce anxiety,
thereby

setting Into play the various
homeostatic processes to "right"
the
situation and withdraw the child
fro™ the outside contact.
While this
is particularly true for
families with paranoid trends,

tic of nearly all schizophrenic
families.

it is characteris-

(See, for Instance.

F.D. Laing's
Sanity, Madness and the Famllj,.
1964. for several vivid pictures
of these
families' isolation).
Because of this isolation, it is
highly Improbable

that the child can gain that
consistent relational contact outside
the
family.

Meta-communication by the child (another avenue
of escape) is extremely difficult; for children until they
begin school, the family constitutes their reality."^ This is not
the only way the family functions
for the child.

Additionally, the family identifies objects
and processes,

and negates others as non-existent or
trivial; it establishes the nature
of reality, humans, and time in implicit
as well as explicit ways and

The forms of expression here, and some of the ideas,
were drawn
from Mehan and Wood (1975) who discuss "reality constituents."
This
section, regarding the child's reality, seems to owe a
great deal to
Mehan and Wood, though it is difficult to specify specifically
where.

.
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in fact. .He

WU.,e

a„a at.U.,es

cou.e. .aXU. s..™s
au,e.„e

.He.,

„e

o™

.He .os.

.

..„.c„U

.o

,,3,

Children, according to
Sullivan, constitute a
saving grace by giving
the™ relief and different
realities fro„ a .allgnant
,a„lly reality
system.
But It is asking too
.ucH of tHe pre-scHool
cHUd to stand outside tHe family reality and
cogent, of all tHlngs, on
Its parent; the
for. of perceptlveness
required at tl„es boggles
trained adult »lnds
(hence the „lde use of
video-taping to study double
binds).
It Is too
much to expect that a person
In the child's position
could so cogent.
But. what If by fluke, or
genius, or unmitigated bad
luck, the

child should somehow
meta-communlcate? "Bad" luck here,
because In this
set of processes, the mother
would regard His cogent as
an "accusation
that she is unloving and both
£unish him and insist that his
perception
Of the situation is distorted."
effect, the punishment is doublepunishment by Withdrawal and hostility,
and insistence upon alienation
of his perceptions.
In logical terms, the child
received only one

m

punishment for accuracy or Inaccuracy;
for meta-communlcatlon, he received two. a situation which one
assumes would reduce the frequency
of his meta-communications

Also, by preventing the child from using
the meta-communicational
mode,

the mother cuts off the child's access
to correction of percep-

tions of communicative behavior.

The ability to communicate about
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communication, and to t&^t
test no^^
perceptxons about
communication is essential
for successful social
intercourse
(p.
VP.

^oo;
258)

It is
i.

this meta-coramuni-

cational level it was felf
that schizophrenics
were perceived as unable
to use (for Instance,
the. confused the
literal and the ™etaphorlc
1„
their o™ speech,^ and
the douhle hind
relational ..tralnlns.. was
proposed as its source.

Psychosis was viewed then
by project members
as a final attempt to
deal With double binds.
However, by "adopting.,
or resorting to psychosis, the individual has
opted to deal with double
binds
the
double bind framework,
rather than by stepping
outside of it (as in

^

tneta-com^unication for example).

But, psychosis is a way
of avoiding

the worst of the emotional
consequences of being bound.
"'^^'"^ °^ ^ ^-^^^ bind to
'7
s^ift to'a^met/f
°-der
of message, but in an
^.^"'fP^^^^^^^l
impossible situation it is
better to shift and become
s mebody else
or shift and insist that
he is so:::here
^°"ble bind cannot work on the
victim
ttrt'
'^^"^^
'
different
^
placT' In o^h
-t-^ements which show that a
patient
paUeiit is
IS ci^
"T"/ can be interpreted
disoriented
as ways of defending himself; either he does
not know that his responses
are metaphorical or cannot say
so. (1956, p.

-

'

patient may wish to criticize his
therapist for beins late for
an appointment, but he may be unsure
what sort of a message that !ct
of being late was.
The patient cannot say, ..Why were you late?
Is it
because you don't want to see me today?".
This would be an accusation
and so he shifts to a metaphorical statement.
He may then say, .'I knew
a tellow once who missed a boat, his
name was Sam and the boat almost
sunk... etc..
Thus he develops a metaphorical story and the therapist may or may not discover in it a comment
on his being late.
(Bateson et al
1956, p. 256)
.

,
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The .ore f„<,ue„a,
encounte.ea and

easU, ai„e.en«ate. f.™^

Of SUCH a psychosis
(paranoid. Hebephrenic
ana catatonic, „ere
reinterpreted in DB terms
ern,s.
Vr^r.
For
instance, paranoid
schizophrenia is cast
into communicational
terms.
,•

means and an excessivf
."-""'"" """5'
concern ^ithth
example, assume that

hidden .eal ng
could not he

Lh!'^^'"^^"'

^^^^t, for

l.Till^ZZlT",

deceive:!-':s™;rLd°hf r:ii"L':

^^^^

"''^

s?:

SJle^rSe^jLd
stptiorrde^'i

Similarly, hebephrenia or
catatonia were re-case; the
particular stvles
adopted in psychosis were
portrayed as "like any
self-correcting system which has lost its
governor; it spirals into
never-ending but

always systematic, distortions."
(p. 256)^

Therapeutic DBs
,

This difficulty in communication,
in point of fact,

is one of the reasons verbal
therapies proved unsuccessful with
schizo-

phrenia, and why "therapeutic double
binds" were Initiated.
tic double binds essentially
fought fire with tire.

Therapeu-

The acknowledged

Ihis process of re-interpreting the
phenomenon of Interest is
characteristic of revolutionary paradigms; it
is a method of re-casting
the phenomenon into terms its Gestalt
can accomodate.
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difficulties of doing
ng traf^^^-;^
trac,xt.o„,li verbal
therapy with
schizophrenic
patients, the frequency
of relapses
apses, and the
fh
sense that the more
things
changed in these families,
the more they
'ey stayed the

same impelled the
DB project members
to fight fire
with firerire, if the family
f
procei.„„
Jsses
were so powerful and
bindina
ling tha^
,
that rational
approaches did not suffice
they would try an
Irrational approach,
approach I.e.,
i
.
.
.
to double-bind
the doublebinding families, in the
interest of the patient.

Though the psychoanalytic
paradigm had been developed
to cure hysteria. With etiological
explanations secondary and
in the service of
Change techniques, the
DB paradigm was
formulated to solve the
problem
Of the
schizophrenia as the Issue
had been raised by
anomalle
emerging In psychoanalytic
treatment.
Treatment using the DB concept
was a secondary concern,
although, gradually the
emphasis changed and
DB material is currently
used more for treatment
than investigation,
ironically, at points Freud
had pointed out that
psychoanalysis was a
better Investigative than
therapeutic process. An interesting
question
might be whether, in
n Clinical
clinir;?! DMs,
dmc
^
it is usual for
the primary emphasis
to shift in time; that
is, for a paradigm developed
to cure (a clinical
application), later to emphasize
investigation, and for these paradigms
established primarily for investigation,
to later emphasize clinical

^ti^

i

,

application.

This might be a common developmental
pattern for clini-

cal DMs, which necessarily have
the active dual foci of theory
and

application.

Can the operant conditioning paradigms
as elaborated by

various clinicians, for example, be said

to

change emphasis in time?
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The therapeutic use of
thp DB
dr t.^^,the
pattern was regarded in
1956 as having
only "therapeutic implicafi nr,o" ^ j
mplxcatxons and was the
last section covered
in the
article.
Interest centered, not
so much in doing
cnerapy, a.
6 therapv
as explaining
it
DB ter^s, as "a context
of .uUIlevel
"
1

m

co^unlca ticns

.

•

•

(1956

Double binds, with all
thai, formal characteristics.
„ere'
precelved as created h, and
within the psychotherapeutic
setting and In
hospital settings. Por
Instance, picking op on
the co^n concerns of
hospital settings and .others
of schizophrenics with
the Issue of benevolence, they assumed that
whenever a hospital (or unit,
syste. was
organized for hospital purposes,
and the patient was told
that certain
actions ware for his benefit,
then a double bind had been
perpetrated.
P. 263)

Also,

the project members felt
that the DB and the emphasis
on

communlcational analyses had potential
for Innovating therapeutic
techniques, and In particular In
making the Invocation of benign
or
therapeutic binds by the therapist,
a matter of Intention and skill,

rather than intuition and luck.

With elucidation of the DB 'ingredients"

it would be possible for DB's to
be formulated systematically, and

when needed, by therapists.
The difference between a therapeutic
DM, and a malignant one was

based on the fact that the therapist was
not involved in a "life and

death struggle himself..." and could therefore
set up binds

to

move

patients in positive directions, then assist
them in "emancipation
from them." (p. 264)
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I„ .Ha 1956 a.Ucle,

.Ke Ho.eos.a.ic aspect
.n

Which i.pncit fa.n.
processes maintained the
status .n.. „as much
less elaborated than the
cc„nnicational
„as not
to

WeaUand

u

until Jnst ptiot
and lacUson's 1,60
pape. on three-person
Interaction that
.

the ho.eostatic aspect
was explicitly elaborated.

But the ho.eostatic
material had been necessary
zo accQnn^
to
fov- ^-u
^
account for
the dependency
of the patient,

the passivity of the
non-binding parent,

the complementarity in

disorder, for the relapses
into psychosis and old,
unpleasant double
bind patterns.
The concept of homeostasis
provided the relational
context, as it was only within
relationships that double binds
could
carry their powerful emotional
impact.

Homeostatic processes, unless dealt
with, could sabotage, or prematurely terminate therapy, as was
often the case with schizophrenia.
In discussing the case of a
young woman schizophrenic, the DB
group

reported that two times during therapy,
the patient's mother showed

intense emotion: once when relating
her own (previously concealed)

hospitalization for a psychotic break and
during her last visit

when she accused the therapist of trying
to drive her
crazy by forcing her to choose between
her daughter
and her husband. Against medical advice,
she took her
daughter out of therapy, (p. 260)
Homeostatic elements would imply that daughter was
improving (as
daughter was improving, mother was worsening, i.e.,
mother was being
"driven cracy")

,

that the therapist had made moves towards getting

husband and wife closer ("forcing" mother

to choose)

and that therapy

.
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raac.

.e„ovi„, aausH.er
^^^^^^^

usual balance.

They further pointed

out:

The father was involveri in i-u^ u
.he intra-fa.iiy sit::tio„
a
t r:::^""
°f
example,
he stated that he had
to o,„-f IT
^"
Important attorneyln order to
an area where co^peSn?
p^LhLtric'h.r
Subsequently. actLg on
c'Ss
he p'Li:nt^i:"^""
'° ^ character'na^:d 4«?o;s

r^""

"

t™

Ned")"?hT^h'

"get out fro.
"^"^ '°
r " lo^^^er'the
However, the d'
'b^r was made
daughter
to feel that fha
the move was Initiated
for her. (1956,

And again, the theme of
ostensible benevolence emerges.
Adding other
family members multiplies the
variety of maneuvers the system
can employ to maintain its homeostatls
(this, ironically, makes the
work of
the family therapist easier
as [among other reasons],
the situation is
more fluid than the relatively
rigid homeostatls between two or
even
three people)

Another facet revealed by the
relational approach indicated that
particularly conflictual situations for
the patient were related to
areas
Important to mother's self-esteem

(p.

260)

These areas apparently

were most subject to double binding
and thus the emotionality connected to them by the patient was
greater than for most issues.
to

their formulation,

According

the communicational system functions to
protect

"mother's security..." and by inference, family
homeostasis.

This

being the case, when therapy helps the patient
be less vulnerable to
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a.e .a.e

.

.e.„s.a.

usual .o^eos.as.s.

was an adapCaUon .o

TH. p.^eHol.

eo^unicationaX s.s.e.. an.
aUowe. .He pa.ient
certain .eg.ees of f.eedc.
especUll. in
.He use of ^etapHor
and

disclaimer, al^st fn .He
manne. of

cou„

Jes.e.. Ps.cHosis is also
a
way Of side-stepping
some of tHe emotions
wHicH are engendered by
.He
double binding including
Helplesness, exasperation
and rage.

Early Revision.; and ModlfiVai-<nn.

WitHin a short time after
its 1956 publication the
DB paradigm received a great deal of attention.
Watzlawick (1963) cites almost

ninety
articles addressing, or taking
Into account, the DB ideas
between 19571961.
This number is indicative of
widespread Interest, particularly
as the article was not
published in a psychotherapy
Journal, and was

therefore not immediately apparent
to those people with an
Interest in
family work (of which there were
only a small number in 1956)
Since
.

then,

the DB paradigmatic statement
and its subsequent elaborations

have become one of the dominant
family therapy frameworks.

During the years Immediately following
the paradigmatic statement, several points of revision
were Introduced.

First the authors

attempted to clarify what they regarded as
misunderstandings of the
concept, and to bring Into their framework
whatever alternate explanations were being ascribed to the DB ideas.

Thus, certain points be-

came elaborated in the Interests of clarity /maintenance
of control
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ove. ..e..

,en„.Uo„s.

"blnder-.t„..e"

Second,. .He. .as an

a concept of

e.pUcU s.U.

.W.ual Mnding."

XMs .eflected a
=hif. .o increasing
emphasis on .,e .elaUonal
and Ho.eostatlc aspect
Of the paradigm (.athe.
than the co«unlcational)
This i„pUed the
process of three-party
interaction; when WeaUand
(I960) developed the
three-party idea more fully
^ly, It
it in turn
m,.-,,
.
strengthened
the homeostatic
aspect of the paradigm.
.

m

^^^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^

Early revisions attempted
to

elucidate obscure points and
defend the integrity of the
DB paradigm.
The DB's historical priority
was challenged (Devereux,
1959) as

a re-

discovery Of Devereaux's
Sociological Theory of Schizophrenia
(Watzlawick, 1963), and its central
concepts were at times,
mis-identified
as "equivalent to any kind
of contradictory communication,
or an approach
avoidance conflict, or difficulty in
discriminating messages, or any
number of other things" (Abeles,
1976, p. 115).
The concept of "paradox" and
"levels of communication" were the

ones most subject to misinterpretation.

For example, Watzlawick (1963)

cites several authors who regarded
the DB as equivalent to ambivalence.

As Watzlawick pointed out, ambivalence
was usually regarded as the

simultaneous presence of mutually contradictory
emotions, in particular,
love and hate; the concept was intrapsychic
rather than interactional.
By remembering that the DB addressed
multiple levels of communication,
it became clear that one emotion could
qualify the other,

from some

other level, usually by using the more abstract
level as qualifier.

220

3i.ilan,, pa.adox was
of.en .istaUen fo.
simple co„„a.ieUo„

an error the DB adherents
„ere at pains

to correct.

112

""^"^
other
:r™ni:ad^:tio:s"a^"\^
double bind is so of™:
'""^
^"terpr^fd^L""^
""eaning inconsistent
communication or contradlctnrv ™I
Unless such deflnitionTfur?
r" p^^JS: Sat'^L"'^
diction occurs between
contradifferent levM=
abstraction,
or different logical
types ^hf^
simple contradUion
°f
rISe?'than
different feature of"a^adox
*
Js
ts' "Ji
invalidation of its referf^s
by i self-ro'Z:"''''
remains conceptually
within the'^fraL'posed
rp:raZ.

^

«

"-"""-Iv

"":rro1'^;h:xtta:cT:f''i^"~"^^^ ^-^^^

In^ti--— r^J-e-o-o

F

win
he^r
iLlTATul^ ''T'^''

the unchosen

however!
the illusion of choice
e f'
this Sign.
tftis
Sign " Tn
in
In ^^
this Illusion

^^-^

^-sti-

°ther,

though
"'^^ P^^^^^'

'"^^^
^^^^^ "ignore
lies the difficulty since
''''
"''^
^^-S whatever'^ou do!
but that vo'"'''
-ally do anything at all. (Abeles,
;'
^976'
t^^^'^ "'^'"^^

The reflexive feature of a
paradox, "the invalidation of
its references by itself "provided the
logically inescapable quality for
the
individual.
For, if performing either
injunction necessarily disobeys
the other, the individual cannot
do something, yet neither can
he not
do something.
Thus, in a family, the demand to
"Be spontaneous" is a

paradox, as the person cannot not disobey.
to be spontaneous,

ing.

If he "obeys" and attempts

that is manifestly not spontaneity but
rule-follow-

There is essentially no way in which can
respond to this in-

junction, as it would involve a paradox, with
the fulfillment of one
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referent necessarily invalidating
the other.

If one follows orders
and "is spontaneous.., he
is not; if one does
not follow orders to he
spontaneous, again he is not.
With the addition of the
relational co.Ponent. such a paradox gains
its emotional intensity
for the "victim.'

Abeles (1965, p. 116), fo.
instance, has recognised this
aspect of DB
paradox and emphasized ''the
experiential effects of paradox
within an
intensely important relationship."
This emotional quality is
not present in the same manner with
simple contradiction-only
with paradox.
Haley (1959) addressed the
paradoxical rather than contradictor
)ry
quality of behavior by contending
that
age.

.'one

cannot not qualify

A person must speak a verbal message
in

a

mess-

a

particular tone of voice,

and if he says nothing, that, too,
is qualified by the posture
he presents and the context in which his
muteness appears..' (p. 323)

The

qualification of messages is literally inescapable
and is dependent
upon the miltiplicity in levels of
communication.

Bateson addressed yet another misconception
of paradox in 1926
the misinterpretation of paradox as failure
in discrimination.

In the well-known experiments in which an
animal subject
xs reduced to psychotic behavior by first training
the
subject to discriminate, e.g., between an ellipse and
a
circle and then making the discrimination impossible,
the "trauma" is not as is commonly stated, the
"breakdown of discrimination" but is the breakdown of that
pattern of complex contingencies which the experimenter
had previously taught to the animal. As I see it, what
happens at the climax of the experiment is that the animal
is penalized for following a deeply unconscious and abstract
pattern which the psychologist previously rewarded. It
is not that the animal cannot discriminate, it is that the
animal is put in error when he thinks that this is a context
for discrimination.

-
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^t^e

LLS-

plicit use of "binder" and
"victim."

were documenting the sh.ft
^ihifh
g
to be a victim,

^^
to a

.

1956 statement made ex-

By 1958,
ay
1958 w
^1
.
Weakland
and Jackson
.

positxon where, though
there appeared

both or all members of . ^
a family were
perpetrators and
•

also victims of DBs.

p"r:?'threUcio!f

a response to multiple

r

"^^'^^"^

Postni..ei that

°"

c:S:rr:t°L

,

r^i^^.^^^r"

''^^ scWz^^hre.lc

pa Unt^trbe'r"""''
escape fr' tL

°" '"^^ contradictLns or
Obviously, a double-bind
reJa?ion^M„ "".^"^^
""h" a special fa„,lly or
erouo^M
Jgroup
relationship,
since, for example, a child
could

'T

""^"^

°* handling such contradictory
offlrlnl support to the child. ="""8 an example and
offering
(1958, pp. 88-89)

intf

?

,

f

This revised short-form definition
emphasized both the relational

elements, and the necessity of the
homeostatic element ("if his father
were capable...").
It also implied
a later

revlslon-Heakland

's

three-

party formulation.

Weakland and Jackson perceived the "binder"
as being as much a

victim because s/he is as caught up in the
maneuvers and consequences
as the child.

With this revision, the DB was precluded from
being a

one-way relationship and was shifted

to an

interactional sequence

wherein all parties shared important similarities
of behavior (1958,
p.

111).

.
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Mutual binding „as a logically
inevitable revision; as
Abeles
(1976. p. 11,)

poi«3

out,

a„e„pting

to

tespon. to a patadox witbin

the ter^s set up by the
paradox itself "invites,
in Russell's language
Vicious Circle reasoning.'.
According to tbe authors,
any such response

would necessarily be as
paradoxical as the situation
wbich elicited it.
To illustrate, consider
the entire rl^c^Q
•

the X be independent.

•

:L"e.enJ\r:rorr^1irt;us

-'p^^^^
that independence cannot
be orderPd^
k
-j-ction implies
'°
alternatit;s which
alternatives
whLh' are nonexistent,
it implies by its
assertion that it is somehow possible
to
raro^de^r^^jri^''^'

respond with the
requested behavior. Any response
within tha? context Is
invalidated by being subject to
redefinition at anotLr
level.

(Abeles, 1976, p. 119)

Thus, any attempt to respond
(including, in this framework,
to not respond)

within the confines of

a paradox,

the attempt

becomes necessarily

paradoxical in turn and binds the previous
"binder." (This revision,
or shift in emphasis, led to the
concept of spirals of binding, which

will be reviewed shortly)
Haley, a year later (1959a)addressed the
mutual binding concept
in control, rather than logical or purely
relational, terms.

Working

on the assumption that, if a child learned
to relate to people in a

relationship with parents who constantly induced him/her
to

paradoxical messages, the child might well learn

terms, with parents and others.

to

to respond

relate in these

Haley then inferred that "the control

of the definition of relationships would be a central problem in the
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origin of schizophrenia."
(1959a. p. 323)^
Haley provided

n ^
illustration
of both mutual binding
and
the control issue
C1959a,pp. 330-331).
inSLI?"^

a behavior^,!
havioral

n-

^^Z^

.

schisophrenic patients
patient's

"ay of qualifying jL
statei:: mcongruently
is a
habitual response
As an lHus??a?ion
parents.
sinZf'^r'
child, "Co.e and sit on'l
lap " ^"PP°se also
that she
made this reguest ir, l\
I'
Indicated she
wished the cWld wJuld
'^^'l"
be faced with the
messa^r'"?"''
""^""^d
congruently by the message,
Lssa^; "cTr
Get away T'
"
from me
-^i-uiu
7J
Tha
Hit;,
ine child
could
not «;p^^of•,7 t-u^

"

IT
•

un^^fe^bie
bi^a^^^she had inSca?ed hv'h'
'
'"""^
^^^^
keep away.
if he kenf !w
uncomfortable
5^ T^'
because she
.
'^^^'"^
uncomfortable
because af?e? all Ih"'"'''
xnvxting him to her. The only
way
the child ^n ^H
''''' incongruent demands would
be to
respond in an
^^^^
near
^°
her
and cufl'v
qualify thirrr
that behavior with a statement
that he was not
^-^P^^'
towLd her and
h^ri'^'.-^^'
"^^^ ^
^"•^ton on your
"
drLs
In th1 "'"^ r"'"^'
°^
l^P'
he would
quaUfv tM.
" statement that he was only coming
to loll T.
h^i"8^
communicate
tlo levels
lltll of) message, the child ^""^'^
two
can come to his mother while
simultaneously denying that he is coming
to her-after all
it
was the button he came to be near.
•

—

iHn

—

lulTir

'

'

By saying,

"Come sit on my lap," in a tone of
voice which

^This is Haley's earliest major discussion
of the issue of control
i-^--st for him throughout the
"
luToTllTm'^"'
It is, after all, a possible
P^°J^\t:
interpretation
thf HR
of the
DB paradigm, which implies that the
world is composed of opposite
dichotomies
hierarchy. If at times, one can neither do,
nor not do,
a thing, the issue of control is
implied.

m
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---?
fu'

.pn?^rhe?-Lu:Lfrwu,;;^^^sjsthat,

she is making it
'^^^
impossible
fine his relationship
'°
'''''
wx'th her
nf^'
relationship as one of
^^^^^^ the
as one of distance
'^^^"^
if 'he L^o's'^^'/'k
demands
incongruent
^
He can only ^nJLst
himself and thereby IvTiT/, ^"^^o^gruent messages
relationship with
her. [emphasis added]

c^LT

IT"

.

Weakland's I960 paper
dafipv r^r,
on <-u
three-party Interaction
dealt even „ore
directly with mutual binding.
Weakland Hi-ct,enuea
presented a su„„
.
summary of. their
original statement, indicatina
ndxcatxng th^^
that xt emphasized
a pattern of messages
sent by a "bindp-r " t,,
•

^"1^

^h"- was an urgent

need to

emphasize this point
nt, to ^nQ^o^
insist, against a climate
of opinion focused
either on fantasy or physiology,
that real people were
giving ,eal
Observable messages that were
provocative of schizophrenic
responses."
(p.

375)

Weakland proceeded to modify
the earlier statement to
take into
greater account the duality and
paradoxical qualities of the
situation,
as responded to and perpetuated
by all its members.

He remarked that the

total sequence then must be
regarded to have the form of a
larger and
more encompassing double bind,
which progressively aggravates the

situation,

(p.

376)^

8

Thxs is not to imply to the topic of
mutual binding withered
Abeles states that it was later addressed,
after dissolution of
the formal project, by Watzlawick's
review in 1963, by Bateson, et al.
in their 1963 summary review, and by
Jackson in 1965

away

(1965, p.

116).

^
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Doub le bind .spxrals.
soirplc

TUr.
The

•

xssue of double bind
engendered double

bind in return, contributing
to the overall f.n,.-i
family communicational
pattern, was a n^^tural
corollary
cne smtt
shift to
^o mutual
y of the
binding
A
nu„.e. Of people .ecogni.ea
.he spi.aXln, ,.alU,
of .Hese sequences
WeaUand and JaCson addressed
InUUUy In 1,38, .efer.ins to
"reverberating cyclic sequences"
and 'Wtual uneasiness"
(p. 115)
as
well as e„phasi.ing that
in the context of the
OB. "a troubled
reLtionship begets further
troubled relationships."

...

U

(1958, p. 114)

Weakland extended the treatment
in his I960 "three-party"
paper.
Wnenever any such message of
concealment,
denial

or in-

o9paJL^-:Liom:-f?L" p^d-i:-

'^"^'^^^
s:^^-L^i
bind structure, on a wider
scale
scale.
For- example,
i
For
when
the
occurrence nf
I
t
of a pair of mcongruent
messages is followed hv
a further message denying
that there was Ly
contradiction
this combination comprises
another pair of Lcongrue^r
messages, or different levels,
whose incongruence is
•

repeat
repfa'tltse'if
itself, enlarging each time.

'™

^^^^
(p. 378)

He regarded this pattern as
progressive (p. 379) and cumulative,
and
responsible for the pervasive quality
of binding among the family
members.
Obviously, the number of individuals
implied in such a formulation goes beyond the dyad and
Weakland in 1960 elaborated the DB
for-

mulation for three-party party systems
and institutional relationships
(e.g., administrator-therapist-patient
or doctor-nurse-patient)

.

9

Weakland 's article also attempted to relate
observations from other
groups investigating schizophrenia to DB
formulations, an important DM
function.
Clearly, from the number of issues dealt with by
this 1960
article, it was one of the more important of
the early project publiC
cations,
•r

-J

\
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App lication to thp thyc^^
-^^-^il^-^hree^^

extension to a threeperson (or a three-party)
interaction was technicallv
Lecnnicaily important.
l.n
.
Although
clea.l, a systems approach
in

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

cybe.„euc .odel, .He OB
pa.a..s. ha. eh.

^

a.a.essea opl. .he .os.

Simple system— the dyad.
The most salient points
in the three-party
elaboration relate to
the greater potential
for douhle-hinding to
remain unnoticed as the
injunctions and qualifications
may
aistributed among several
y be distribntPH
people.
Remembering that the rhiiH
-f^
child IS more dependent
on both parents than
either
parent individually^

"

fi>^st-but

especially striking when
perjelief ?hlj°""
°b=--ng
factors that louM
seem Jnherenf x;
t"0-P«=on situation may easily have
par^n^?!
parallels or equivalents In
the three-person sltuaMon
•

TT-^^^.

^

^

separated.

It may be equally difficult

"^^'^^^^ are'^ Lch separatedstyle of ohraTTT;^
I^a
they still may differ in level:
"When the double bind
inflicted not by one individual
but by two
.one pare^
^"^^^
'
injunctions of'^the
o^her'-'a956)
B^^ of course these meta-level indications
of unity
unitv and these claims of
agreement and identity of
messages are independent of actual
similarity or difference
xn two messages-i.e., they may
be false.
Thus, the three!
person situation has possibilities
for a "victim" to be
faced with conflicting messages in
ways that the inconsistency
IS most difficult to observe and
conmient on that are quite
similar to the two-person case.
(1960, pp. 379-380)
oy person,
pe ron^'bby "Le^'^r^^-^^^
time, by different

L

,

L

.

.

f

Efforts to Plac e the DB in Certain Relationships
to Other Paradigms for Schizophrenia
The DB group appears to have realized the
importance of their

.

.
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formulation relatively early,
and efforts ensued to
place the DB In
certain relationships with
other formulations.
Thus, the OB

idea was

extended to new phenomena, and
the DB corpus was
differentiated fro.
other Clinical formulations
especially psychoanalysis.
Also, Increased
attention to the therapeutic uses
of the DB revealed that
the .echanl sms
Of change in DB family therapy
raaicaliy H-tff
yy were radic^^llv
different. rfrom those of

individual therapies (whether
interpretational or relational)
Extensi ons of the para di^n,_t^_new^^

Weakland's 1960

paper emerges as important in
paradigmatic and DM terms.

He explicitly

presented the objective of his paper
to be the placing of the DB
formulation in relation to rival
formulations for schizophrenia.

Ihis pape^. centers on applyin g the approach
and insights
thus developed to the analysis of thri^I^^
i^e raction
an^ to _the interrelating of observations
reported hv .r..i.„.
othe^ investigations of schizophrenia
.

.

vTh^^n^hiT^

to give further evidence for our
previous findings, to
clarify a basic schizophrenogenic pattern
common to a
variety of particular situations, and to
promote a communicational orientation that has been somewhat
foreign to
orthodox psychiatry but that we have found to be
most

illuminating. (Weakland, 1960, p. 37^;
emphasis added)

Weakland's extension to the three-party system produced
what can be
seen as a main-line extension or development of the DB paradigm
as it

elaborated aspects already implicit in the early paradigm in the same

direction as the 1956 presentation.

His subsequent extension to the

three-party institutional situation constituted a tangent, or parallel,
extension, as institutional dynamics were neither implied nor of a

central concern in the paradigm or DM.

Weakland concluded that his
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extension Had p.oved .elp,.X,
and su,,es.ed
,u...er extensions to
.o..Party s.ste.3 in scM.opH.enia/O
,3
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
and also for co^unication
in institutions. (I960,
p.

387)

The DB paradig. was
extended to a wide variety
of psychiatric
disorders other than its
original prohle., schizophrenia.
Wat.lawic.
(1963) documented that the DB
was also extended to
delinquency (Fereira, I960) and to delinquency
and addictions (Coodley,
1961), and to
different classes of phenomena
including: psychiatric
training (Appel,
et al., 1961; Coser, I960);
humor (Fry, 1963); creativity
(Bateson,
1956); and existentialism (Watts,
1958 and 1961).
Finally, its universal role in all psychopathologies
was critized (Abeles,
1976, p. 121).

All of the above may be
regarded as tangential, or side-line
extensions of the paradigm, which
produce parallel lines of work
which may
or may not remain part of the
DM.
Some parallel developments, e.g.,
Fry's work in humor, remained
within DB strictures, and as such,
remained
a DM side development.
To "split-off from a DM, a
parallel development

..1
role of a

sxbUng

be relevant to many unresolved
questions, such as the
in a schizophrenic's family, or the
natu;e of the xn!

""^^^^ potentially schizophrenic adolescent becomes
invo]vPr.-°'''"r'''^
involved
a love relationship outside the
family. "(p. 387)
It's
particularly interesting in paradigmatic terms,
that Weakland refers to
the DB as an analysis of communication
patterns," neglecting the
homeostatic element, when during his three-person
extension, the homeostatic element emerges so clearly.
This is an example of the assumption by DB people that the formulation was
preponderantly communicational; the relational elements appear to have
been acknowledged only
indirectly. Even Weakland, the most sensitive of the
three remaanino
members to Jackson's relational view, fell into this
pattern at times.

m

.
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wouX. Have

.

eXa.o.a.e.

.

....

arise and a new paradigm
^o^ula.ed.
dise,

in .He con.se o,

l.nes Of development,
If.

eUHo.aUon,

„UH

a

^^^^^
p.o.

view .hen, a para-

even.^aii, ,os.e. seve.ai

^in-li„,

^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
in .He con.se of
nonnal science ac.ivi.,
an. of .Hese iines
of

develop.en. „e.e eiaHo.a.ed
to .He pcin. wHe.e
ano,.lles e.e.,ed
wonid He possiHie fo. a
pa.adis^ to He developed
f^
p.,,,
l.ne Of development; then
this Une of development
„o„ld He a DM in
its own right.
This would airectiy
directlv imply
imnU. geometrical
progression
Of DMs .a.He. .Han linear.
Pe.Haps one way of Judging
a paradigm's
importance relates to tHe
nnmHer of

U

^

.ain-Une and side-Une DMs

it en-

genders
THe extension of .He
paradigm to .Herapy, especially
Haley's work,
constituted a maln-Une extension
as Haley developed ideas
important
in tHe paradigm s.a.emen.
and s.ayed direc.ly wi.Hln
DM concerns. (A
line of developmen. aHou.
humor, for ins.ance. appears
less cen.ral .o
DB concern, though it partakes
of DB paradigmatic formula.lon
regarding
levels of communica.ion). The
original paradigmatic statement
addressed
the "nature, etiology and therapy
of scHizopHrenia" hut inspection
of
the 1956 puHlica.ion Indicates
rela.ively lit.le treatment of therapy.
(In Chapter VI,

i. will become oHvlous that the
structural and etiolo-

gical features of schizophrenia were
the groups initial Interests;
therapy, though Included in the paradigm
statement was explicitly

developed only later.

231

—

Exte nsion to theranv

„
^^^^'--i£h^Jl-JE-h^^
ri-t

i-u

Within two years
of their paradigmatic
statement, the
ne groun
group had begun explicit
extension
of the DB to therapy.
in 1958 Weakland
Py
Wp^h ^ and^ Jackson
.
broached the idea
of the therapeuticc DB,
DB
anH
and HoI^.,,
Haley re-xnterpreted
psychoanalytic therapy
in communicational terms.
terms
rh^
f^n
The following
year, Haley addressed
the idea
of control in psychoanalytic
yLxc cnerapy
theranv and
anH Jackson
t.
the practice of conjoint family therapy with
regard to homeostasis.
,

i

During 1961, Haley extended
his interest in control
to brief therapy
(1961a) and to psychotherapy
with schizophrenics,

(1961b), while Jackson

Joined Satir (Jackson and Satir,
1961) for family diagnosis and
therapy,
and Weakland (Jackson and
Weakland, 1961) for the theory
and techniques
of conjoint family therapy.
Bateson (1961) considered research
into

psychotherapy.

Subsequently, Haley (1962) considered
the future of

family therapy, then with Jackson
(Haley and Jackson, 1963) reinterpreted transference in DB terms.
Haley, especially, has continued to
write about DB family therapy
(Haley and Hoffman, 1967; Haley,
1976).

Their extension resulted in a form of
therapy with different tech-

niques and mechanisms of change, i.e., DB
family therapy was revolutionary with regard to psychotherapy.

First,

there existed a con-

sensus that conjoint family therapy was discontinuous
with family-

oriented therapy, or collaborative individual therapies.
One way of narrowing the definition of "family therapy"
is to differentiate "family-oriented treatment" from
"family treatment"... "Family-oriented treatment" usually

'
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the

conslderatLn of otter fLnv°"::\
parents or spouse) bel^g
seconda^v
therapist
in the"?
three'or r;;;e of the ?a^-^
i^e
•conjoin?

"?

°'

''^"''P^''

infrequently by a different

i

of -thodologies,

yr.r-^3rth:r-i3r:r H:^'^^
TeS--— t^^--?"- -

It:

Jackson and Satir (1,61,
p. 29) regarded conjoint fa.ily
treatment as
therapy in which "all fa.ily
.e.bers are
seen together at the sa.e

time by the sa.e therapist."

Family inclusion is based upon
intimacy

and association as well as
biological kinship.
The inception of conjoint family
therapy rests with the DB group.

Grotjahn's work was obviously
"family-oriented treatment," and Ackerman's family work was developed
historically later, though independently
In fact,
dary;

for Grotjahn,

for Ackerman,

for the DB paradigm,

the individual was primary and the
family secon-

the family was primary with the
individual secondary
the family was primary and the
individual

ignored-

in theory and technique, the DB approach
was a purely systemic affair.

The individuals assumed importance only insofar
as they collectively

constituted the system, and not with respect

to

the integration of

individual and systems processes.
Also, conjoint family therapy had been differentiated from
group

therapy,

the latter of which was regarded by Haley (1971b,
pp. 1-2)

as an "artificial collection of strangers."

Family therapists worked

,
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with people who had shared
histories and usually shared
To change these sorts
of systems. It was necessary

uaUze therapy

(Haley,

1971b, p.

3),

fut,
:ures
to

reconcept-

decreasing the e.phasls on
per-

sonality, and appreciating
the Gestalt forced by the
families as a
system (Jackson, 1957a,
a, p
isn
vuru
p. lai).
With ^-uthis change of focus, a
different

mechanism of change developed.
'^^^^"^^"g <^l---er that
was a different concept of
change, rather
than merely an additional method
of treatment
be added
to individual and group therapy.
The focus of family
treatment was no longer on changing
an individual's
his behavior, but on changing
thrX''°^'
the structure of a family and
the sequences of behavior
among a group of intimates. With
this shift, it became
clearer that neither traditional
individual therapy nor
group therapy with artificial groups
was relevant to the
goals and techniques of family
therapists. The problem
was to change the living situation
of a person, not to
pluck him out of that situation and try
to change
him.
u.
s
^
(Haley, 1971b, p. 4)

?Ln'
family If
therapy

L

The mechanism

of change in DB therapy was clearly
discontinuous

from those of either the traditional
psychoanalytic therapies, or the
later relational ones.
The mystery of what causes change has been
only slightly
clarified. Many new therapists beginning to treat
families could abandon the idea that transference
interpretations or insight into unconscious processes cause
change. (Often they abandoned these concepts without
realizing that this could also mean abandoning the theory
of repression.)
But as former individual therapists began
treating families, they learned that some experienced
family therapists were even doubting that helping family
members understand how they deal with each other is related
to change.
It is beginning to be argued by many family
therapists that talking to family members about understanding
each other is necessary because something must be talked
about and families expect this form of discussion, but that
\
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iT.rfr.nll^'ZL^T

m

processes

T'''''

dlrecavely
particular w:yr
ff""^l^y.
: r;::Lr"l''
system and quite independently
of the awareness of th^
"^"^
behaving. (Ha";, 19nb/p 7)'''
The goals of changing the
family structure and sequences
of behavior demanded techniques
significantly different than had
been previously needed. Interpretations
or reality relationships
availed the
therapist nothing, except perhaps
inclusion in the schizophrenic
family
processes. Recalling that early
DB revisions addressed the
logical
unavoidabllity of mutual binding and
binding spirals, it is obvious
that rational, linear attempts
at intervention or explanation
would
compound rather than ameliorate double
binding.
In a schizophrenic
family,

anj-

communication no matter how straightforward,
is subject

an active binding process by the
receiver.

By implication, the only

therapeutic Intervention is a double bind
in kind.

communication is made double binding, and

to

if all

If non-paradoxical

straightforward efforts

are subject to inclusion In the family
schizophrenic pattern, only

a

perverse, non-rational, already binding
injunction can avoid corruption into binding.

The natural development in technique was the therapeutic
double
bind, broached by Weakland and Jackson in 1958
(p. 120)

We feel that the similarity of circumstances between
original significant events and their re-creation,
review, and reworking in therapy is crucial, and is not
confined to the session presented here. Especially, ...
we believe that something resembling the "double bind"
must often be instituted on the patient by the therapist
to obtain therapeutic change.
This "therapeutic bind,"

\
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however, must also diffpr

-fn

^

i

The fc^al structure
of therapeutic and
schisophrenic (or ^1evolent) double binds
are similar,
similar i,
but the pathogenicity
of the latter
are due to their role
1„ deutero-learnlns. or
learning sets. That is
.he individual learns
to respond only
„ltbln the paradoxical
and dls-'
organizing fra.ewor. of
the double bind, and
thus learns to trap
HI™/
herself, .s Abeles
(1,7,, p. ,,,,
^^^^^^
binds abound In Ufe;
response to the. beeo.es
pathological only „ben
the individual remains
trapped by futile attempts
to respond or unravel them from within
.

A second difference between
therapeutic and malevolent
double
binds is that
the former, at least one
person recognizes the situation, "indeed intentionally
(if intuitively), sets it
up in order that
the patient shall escape
If (Abeles, 1978, p. 122). With the
situation
recognized, at least one person
has benign control over the
spirals;
It is for this reason that
the group continually stressed
the Importance
of denial or concealment in
malevolent binds.

m

Translated into techniques, the
therapeutic double bind could take

"""" apparently consider the relational
^1
?
asnecf Haley
H.1
aspect,
explicitly
eschewed it. Bateson's position appears
to
"'^
"^^ ">°« ^= an intellectual,
T„.rTl
"l^V'Z
t^^
conceptual leader than as a therapist.
Almost none of his work
dealt with doin^ therapy.
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the form, for instance,
of prescribing
Dreqrri K-fr^r, the symptom.

(This is probably

the best known paradoxical
strategy.)

Paradigmatic of this approach
is the practice of "n.
the s^nnptom," i.e., telling
^^^^^SIl}}!^
the natienr^^
behavilJ^The already behavL with
f
to continue the
symptomatic ^ehav^o^' Thr

J

•

symptomatic behavior becomes,
paradoxically
implication under the patient's
control,

^he

"^"-"8

fuch a
such
TllTl'""'
peculiar prescription-in

Chosen

and bv

pa^^ew can

to coop^ra : „Uh
which case he does then

Interestingly enough, the technique
works, and often the patient exhibits a thwarted, "I know you're
doing something but I don't know
what
and it's foolish anyway."

Another set of techniques lies in exposing
covert conflicts that
are verbally covered-over by the double
bind patterns.

Typically, in

family sessions early in therapy, the
discussions revolve around the

identified schizophrenic patient; it is important
to deflect talk away
from the patient's condition and toward the
anxiety laden areas of
covert conflict.

In one family,

the father and mother insisted for some time
both that
they were in agreement on all important matters and
that
everything was all right in their family— except, of course,
the concern and worries caused by their son's schizophrenia.
At this time he was almost mute, except for mumbling, "I
dunno" when asked questions. During several months of weekly
family interviews, the therapist tried to get the parents to
speak up more openly about some matters that were obviously
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family problems, such as the
mother's heavy drinking
Both parents denied at some length
that thL was any
problem
At last the father reversed
himself and spoke
^° "^^^h every afternoon with friends
ttlt
i '^^Jf
that she
offered no companionship to him
in the evenings
She retaliated rather harshly,
accusing him both o^
dominating and of neglecting her,
but in the course of
this accusation she expressed
some of her own f eeJ ings
much more openly and also spoke out
on differences between them.
This session was reviewed and
discussed
with the participants the next week
(and a tape recording
of the argument was played back)
In the following
session, the son began to talk fairly
coherently and
at some length about his desires to
get out of the hospital
and get a job and thereafter he contined
to improve
markedly. (Weakland, I960, p. 383)
.

What is technically relevant here is that
"mere exposure of covert

parental conflicts, even before they are resolved,
is accompanied by
patient improvement" (Weakland, 1960,

p.

386;

emphasis added).

By

shifting the verbal processes, the homeostatic aspects
of the family
are jarred, the mother begins to appear more disturbed,
father more
absent, and son less crazy, as his pathology is no longer
"needed"

homeostatically to deal with mother's drinking and father elopement.
At no point are insights gleaned, or understanding shared, or
relational

elements recognized.

The DB theorists suggest that mother is exposed

as alcoholic and father as neglecting—rather harsh and seemingly

irrelevant to the patient's condition.

Yet, by shifting the focus from

the schizophrenic to the covert disagreement and engendering open con-

flict, the patient can systematically improve.

Thus,

the focus, and

mechanism of change, differed radically from previous therapies.

The

family as a unit was seen and the Gestalt of interaction became the
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focus.

Mechanisms of change revolved
around changing the structure
and
the sequential behavior
patterns of the family, with
the revolutionary
status of its clinical practice
as well as theoretical
formulations regarding the nature and etiology
of schizophrenia, the DB
paradigm began
the fourth major class of
psychotherapy, after Interpretatlonal
psychoanalysis, relational psychotherapy
and group therapy.
Different iation from Psychoanalysis

Relatively early in paradigm elaboration,
the DB group attempted
to define Its formulation's role
vls-a-vls other formulations, with

respect to both theory and practice.
First, the group explicitly eschewed
any organic or hereditary

formulation of schizophrenia, on the grounds
that such an approach had
produced little (Bateson, et al., 1956) and it
unnecessarily limited

available data (Weakland and Jackson. 1958).

Also, a position was taken

that double bind family therapy necessitated
a decided conceptual shift,

discontinuous with the clinical work prior in time
to it.
For instance, Haley (1971b, p. 9) stated that
recent visits to univer-

sity teaching hospitals (he discounted state hospitals
here) "illustrates how discontinuous the family, or ecological, view
is from the

psychiatric orientation still being perpetrated in the better universities."

Haley regarded the usual recommended course of treatment for

schizophrenia (long-term hospitalization and individual psychoanalytically
oriented therapy) as "absolutely contraindicated

.

"

Such an approach,
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he felt, was

The family view a"op?s
^= secondary,
,u e'tSI
'h%°PP°s"e vlew-the
[patient's] problem is
'"^ situation and his
internal dynamics are »
"'"""^^
'°
situation.
(Haley, 1971b? p To"
This was Clearly a
radical Inversion o.
traditional etiological
formulations, with special
reference to psychoanalytic
„or..
.ac.son and
Wea.land (19ai,
p.
made the same type of
differentiation.
In brief, ue are
much more ooncernpH ,.,,,-1,
c,
influence,
action, and interrelation k.,
Inter«dl"<=ly
servable In the present fh
°bu"^""'"'

"

1-ginary.

ilZTl'e

concepts and practices.

ma

e^s"'

^^^"^^^

•

1"''!""^^

^^^'^ ^'^her

'T"'''

therapeutic

The differentiation from
psychoanalytic work occurred in
specific
areas of theory, as well as
general orientation. For
instance, in 1957(a)
Jackson addressed the etiology
of schizophrenia, assigning
primary etiological significance to continuing
or repetitive events which
establish
a condition of life for a
patient- to-be rather than the
psychoanalytic
,

concept regarding the role of
trauma or psychological traumatic
assault
(see pp. 182 and 193).

Two years later Haley (1959a)
differentiated

the systems with regard to intra-psychic
vs interpersonal processes.

Despite all that is said about difficulties
in interpersonal relations, psychiatric literature
does not
offer a systematic way of describing the
interpersonal
behavior of the schizophrenic so as to
differentiate
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that behavior from the
normal
ti,„
schizophrenic's
Internal processes ar^ of^ i
of ego
weakness. prJmJuve L.lc
'r^^"^"
but his
if^^'^M' fresentei In
the for. of aLcdotes
'
?hls

v

inLp™i'\\^^;X
p

"r"wu^

"^"^^^^ '=^=^'1 O" a theoretical framework describing
all ^"^rpersonal
relationships.
(Haley, 1959, p. 321)
Haley later (1971b.

p.

2)

addressed differences with
respect to

therapeutic Isolation or
social Integration and
the Intra-psychlc vs
interpersonal element, as well
as mechanism of
change-clearly
per-

ceiving "Clinical change as
resulting from changed
relationship rather
than insight.""'-^

An essential part of the
medical model was the ideal
that
plucked out ofh s
soclll^.r^'"
socxal
situation and treated individually
in a private
would return
%^ transformed
to his
ll: social
ZATl milieu
because he had been "cleared"
of the intrapsychic problems
causing his difficultJes.
In
^"^^^^^
providing
^he
>a
patient
i^^t" with
;ith insight
u^'"^''
into his unconscious conflicts
thus
"^^^^
incapacJ^atL
°f the patient was considered
secondary
.in;.
perception of it, his affect,
his attuidL"
objects he had introjected, and the
conflicts
^^v,
i
within
him programmed by the past. While
a science of Suman
behavior was being conceptualized in
social terms under the
influence of systems theory, the people
who were trying to
change people were determinedly
disregarding the social
environment. (Haley, 1971a, p. 2)

""irrt

'

Jackson and Satir (1961.

p.

43) clearly differentiated family work

12

^^^^ in mind that for the DB project members, especially Haley, changes in relationships followed
structural and behavior sequence changes, not understanding
or insight.
•

.
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from psychoanalytic with respect
to differences in clinical
practice
and reception of their work.
We feel that just as events point
to increasing union
between psychiatry, the family, and
social science,
there will be no such union in the
main current of
psychoanalysis for some time to come.
Although there
is a small group of psychoanalysts
who are interested
in participating in family studies
and research, there
IS a much larger group who do
not consider this work
immediately relevant to their own interests,
and even a
rather hardbitten group who feel that
current family
approaches are superficial and tangential
and can in no
way be compared scientifically with the
depth analysis
of psychoanalytic therapy.
There is also a group of
well meaning psychoanalysts who are attempting
to correlate and collate family data with their own
observations
as individuals, but who unwittingly do the family
movement a disservice. This is because some of them feel
that
knowledge about family individuals is old stuff and is now
merely being refurbished. Their descriptions of family
work are largely couched in the monadic framework of
psychoanalytic terminology and are still essentially
individual.
They have not yet become convinced that the
parts are greater than the whole; their main tenet is that
the treatment of a family is theoretically impractical
because of the difficulty the therapist has in handling
more than one transference at the same time. This latter
observation is part of the reason why family diagnosis
and therapy needs a new terminology since the concept of
transference

There are a number of interesting points in their attempt to

differentiate themselves from other formulations, and especially psychoanalysis which they single out.

During this time, there were a number

of competing individual therapists, yet the double bind paradigm was

differentiated with respect to them once or twice and the matter was
settled.

This repeated concern with psychoanalysis could be interpreted as
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the result of Its pre-eminence,
and there are o£ course
such elements
present.
But if one recalls that to
be revolutionary, a paradigm
must
be revolutionary for a particular
sroup, it can be Inferred from these
efforts, that the DB paradigm was
revolutionary for the Interpretationist

psychoanalysts, and not tor the relational
or group psychotherapists.
Two historical trends support
this contention.
First, the major anomalies which the DB paradigm dealt
with arose from within the interpretationist efforts and extensions, and
not the relationists.

Secondly,

the DB paradigm "solved" the technical
problems of treating schizo-

phrenics and latent schizophrenics that
had plagued the interpretatlonists.
but not the relationists.

Thus, though the relational therapists
were

temporally closer to the DB period,
the DB was revolutionary for inter-

pretationist psychoanalysis.
The DB members attempted to maintain
control of their paradigm in
a number of

ways~by correcting misunderstandings

of definitional or

conceptual paradigmatic elements and by emphasizing
the impermeable

barrier between psychoanalysis and DB family work.

They also attempted

to .incorporate other formulations, by such
cognitive processes as re-

interpreting data or concepts from other theories into DB
terms.

Jackson (1957a, p. 183) used the work of other researchers to corroborate a point regarding codification of perception and identity, but
this is different than the reinterpretation mentioned,

Weakland's

important 1960 paper does the latter, at times explicitly.
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^^^^"i" suggested above are actually
encounteLd
schi^ophrenlc .e.ber and :
r'^' t
the schizophrenia.
For example, although
the
tflT,.
is oriented and
conceptual^L ^fite di^^erentirf"'"^
from our
own, many of his observat-,n„= Huice aitierently
^^"'"'"°"
in With our schema
°

HeLva" 1711^

mA

ZL:u

^Z:jatt.:
ag^LmL
terms of

,hrf

so^mr^aJLf j:LJL%^:j^-

r

of apparent parental

b:^

ZllTiilZlll:'''
co^unj't onrLst I^^L^r^^^^

"

Cd\:a\i-\\-rf- :-:i

Which resulted in perpi;x^nrd
^cr^
sxstent and contradictory
images.'

a^cL^.^id"":^"'

(SeaS^d,

J^oT

381)

^^^""^ ''^^^^ '^hese families
'
in Krn.^
broad !terms, Vbe seen
as being in line with our
schema. (Weakland, 1960,
pp. 380-381)

mieht
raxght,

Weakland went on to also incorporate
some of Bowen's (1959) work
with
respect to the formalized ways in
which families avoid open conflict
in the face of emotional distance
(p. 382) and Wynne et al.'s (1959)

work on "pseudomutuality" or the
concealment of conflicts

(p.

382)

The re-interpretation of data and
concepts can be seen as serving
a number of functions:

extending the boundaries of DB applicability;

subsuming other formulations under the DB with
the implication that
other formulations are special cases of the more
general DB; jockeying
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for a Place in .He sun

ada.esaing others „Hc Have
already achieved
so.e reputauon and
therefore „a.l„s oneself
Known „Uh respect to the„.
establishing the OB boundary
as applicable within
so^e other £or«lauon; testing the li.its
of the paradigm's
explanatory powers; estabUshing linus With other
frameworks to facilitate
exchange of information.
Probably each of these
functions has been exercised
at some point
in time.
The point, however
ever, IS
is that
thaf re-interpretation
,
of other formulations into DB terms was
a feature
nf nn
ateature of
DB paradigmatic
elaboration and,
may probably occur in the
development of other paradigm-DMs.
•

A variant of this process
also developed; terms
and concepts from
psychoanalysis were re-interpreted
in DB terms.

Por instance, .ac.son
and Weakland (l,ei,
evaluated the psychoanalytic
concept of transference
in DB terms.

Transference is a manifestation
related to the inactivitv

\^-^-^P^y^ho-alytic

treatmenr^hl"'
Iti^nt on th
<=he basis of minimal
cues, creates a framework
Ha
and Tl'
embroiders xt with past personal
references.
In con
''^^^
°f
activityreven
i? the
If
the'?h
therapist xs only acting^ as a
traffic cop.
If skiUfully managed the interaction
is largely among'famxly mem""-'"^ '""^ therapist.
Thus we would consider the
nroLr
"'^^ ^ ^^^^
^^^PP^-^ ^er husband to
rJbbon/ notrr\''°?;
rxbbons
to be "Look what you're doing
to the poor man "
but to ask hxm if she always shows
her attachment to him
^"^^
fascinated awaiting his reply
and wxll
wJllT*.
"'u^^^''^
be busy with
her rebuttal.

T

That is, with so much interaction among
the family members
and actxve therapeutic focus on this,
there is no emergence
ot standard transference phenomena.
What we do see can
better be labeled parataxic distortions
since the data consist of dxscrete examples of expectations
on the part of a
taraxly member that the therapist
does or does not fulfill.
It xs difficult to explain the
difference between these
,
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phenomena in individual and
family therapy unless
unxess one
on.
has observed or nari--;
j
r.^,*.
°f
therapy. Ts^atement
P^^^ho.

,

1

^

"""^
^ver
understood her is act to h!
^^P^^^^i°n
of dissatisfaction with her husband 1
'
should take! and b:?o;e
°'
thrtb"'
^^^^^ ^^is himself as father tranf?eren?p
T^'t'^T
have to be dealt wJti^
^ husband's reaction will
Wife's reac??:i^:t;
'°
(Jackson and Weakland,
.

T

1961, pp. 32!33)

'

Haley addressed
psychoanalysis more generally
(1938a), gave an interactional explanation of
trance induction in
hypnosis (1958b),and used
his development of the
idea of control in
interpersonal relationships
to analy.e control
in psychoanalytic
psychotherapy (1961a)
then with
regard to the psychotherapy
of schizophrenics
(1961b).

Finally, the DB group
differentiated itself from
psychoanalysis by
eschewing any phenomenological
or experiential
formulations or considerations, and insisting upon
the importance of observable
behavior and behavior patterns. For example,
Jackson and Weakland (1961,
pp. 16-17)

stated with regard to the DB
that the concepts are
.. .concerned with the
description and specification of interaction among actual persons, by
various means of communication, at a level of directly
observable behavior. This
focus implies further an emphasis on
what is real and on what
is current and continuing to occur.
Taken together, these
emphases define a broad "communicational"
and transactional
orientation to the study, understanding, and
treatment of
human behavior— including that special
class most interesting
to psychiatrists, symptomatic
behavior.
This orientation
while related to earlier work, especially
Sullivan's, and
currently increasing in acceptance, still
is considerably
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uiiuuijervaDie. tantasies or
mi<=DerrpnhTono
realxty; past mainly childhood,
experience '"d ^n""
psychic organization and content
fJack^on and
I
tt
i
Uackson
Weakland,
1961, pp. 16-16)
-I

.

J

i

^

DB Family Therapy

Family therapy based on the DB
differed drastically from psychotherapy as it had been done for
several decades, and differed
most
sharply from psychoanalysis.
In Haley's view (1971b,
p. 10), traditional
treatment was based on an ideology that
assumed that the patient's prob-

lem was internal and his social situation
secondary.

"The family view

adopts quite the opposite view-the [identified
patient's] problem is
his social situation and his internal dynamics
are a response to that

situation.

These two points of view represent a
discontinuous change

in thinking about human problems and how to
change them."

The resulting changes affected the unit that
received treatment,
the formulations, goals and techniques.

The families of schizophrenics

remained the primary focus of intervention efforts by the core group of
authors.

Such families were conceptualized as

enmeshed in a pathological but very strong homeostatic system
of family interaction.
That is, regardless of their past
history although that might be enlightening they are at
present interacting in ways that are unsatisfying and painful to all, provocative of gross symptomatology in at least
one, and yet powerfully self-reinforcing.
Their overt behavior may appear varied or even chaotic, but beneath this
a pervasive and persistent pattern can be discerned, and one
that is quite resistant even to outside therapeutic efforts

—
,

at change.

—
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In understanding the
1)"'' ""^ *"=lPf"l
occur^L^f
=<^hizophrenlc behavior,
are also helpfui in at?arW
f^n^a-ental proble^
level: why does
pa"h"o«ca?\eh'
behavior or organization
persist, even under
Weaklana, l961 pp! ^8-29)"

^

"

This resistance to change,
or alternatively,
persistence of pattern
was attributed to the
spiraling effects of mutual
binding within the
families; also, owing to the
complexity of con^unication,
it was possible
to avoid both agreement
and disagreement without
its being noticed by
•using" incongruent messages.
1„ particular, the group focused
on "dls-

qualiflers"-messages that negate what
another person has said, but
In
an indirect way. so that
statements are not really met.
(Jackson and
Weakland, 1961, p. 29)

Family members were perceived as
bound together in mutually destructive patterns, the primary symptom
of which was apparent only in
the
patient.

In therapy, there would commence
persistent efforts to pre-

serve a cohesive facade, usually by
focusing on the "fact" that everything was fine, except for the patient's
schizophrenia.

Once the facade

had cracked (due to any number of
techniques, some of which will be

discussed shortly), the covert disagreement,
or split, or conflict,
between two other family members became
apparent.

With its emergence,

"
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the patient usually
i„p„ved sy^pto^atlcally."
though naturally the
family renamed U.ely to
e^hat. on further double
hlnCs unless Inter-

vention continued (Jackson
and Weakland, 1961,

p.

19).

Obviously, because of these
processes exemplifying double
bind and
homeostasis, the unit of
focus was necessarily
the family rather than
the individual.
Ihis point was consistently
emphasised by the DB
workers, and acknowledged
as central to DB family
therapy by later adherents (Freeman, 1964,
p. 36; Klein, 1963, p.
26).
fact, treatment
of the family as a group
or system was necessary
to meet the form of the
concepts used (e.g., homeostasis),
and group or systems
processes constituted the conceptual frame
of reference.
Haley (1971a, p. 231, even
Insisted that the therapist
formed part
H ai. locmea
oart ot
of fh^
the system and was constituent
in the diagnosis of that
system.

m

Formal diagnoses were abandoned
as they were based on individual
psychology, could not be readily
translated into DB terms, and contributed almost nothing to the change
process
(1971a, pp. 232-233). Haley
in particular was adamant that
clinical results were the hallmark of
good clinical practice.

"Unless the diagnosis Indicates a
program for

bringing about change it is considered
Irrelevant by the more experienced
therapist.

13_
J^'^^^^^
Weakland later remark (p. 21)
th.r .^.^T''^''^^^
^''^ '^^'^ ^^"^^^^^^ "^"^lly ^-veals not only that
t^pL
!
'°"'fr have considerable
these parents
usually
interpersonal difficulties,

exniDics

m

his symptoms.

•
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The focus o£ the change
process, or the goal,
„as neither understanding nor abreactlon.
but changing of the
•self-relnforclng and
.utuall. destructive networks
of Interaction" In
families (.ac.son and
Weakland, X961. p. 26).
Through the seeding
disorganization or the
profusion of symptomatology,
the co^unlcatlonal
and hon,eostatlc patterns
held the families in frozen
positionsj.i.±ons, tnus
thus it
,> was processes
y
rather than
symptoms that became the target
of Intervention attempts.
therapist must experience
Jrthft'Ile
is that he will have to
deal with the same problem
ollr
and over again In different
forms and guises, as the
following example suggests.
father of a paranoid patient
complained to
Jhp'Jh^^'^'-'^^
the
therapist of his son's obesity
and requested a diet
for him.
He and his wife expressed
futility about "doL
anything with him." They
occasionally took action of an
interesting sort, considering their
son's suspicious nature
-^^^
one'morning to
tell the milkman that
'f'^'he was to ignore
any requests for
therapist held fast to his
recommendation
^h!^''^^'"*
that the patient would change
himself when he was Jeady
and several sessions later
the patient announced that
he
'^^"Pi^^
'^--^
to congratulate
him the
th. mother
"Tu
cut in to discuss her own
weight problem
^t°PPed her by recounting a rather
bizarr"'
\" he was found unconscious
eoisod: in which
episode
and taken to a
hospital
peril of his life.
'

eLX'

m

This sequence was characteristic for this
family.
The
patient's statements tended to be ignored
or rationalized
away, the mother usually sounded
a serious note about something, and the father topped it by
telling something on himself which, while dramatic, inevitably
made him out to be
slightly foolish. A kind of closure was
usually attained
at the end of these sequences by the
father, mother, and
son all chuckling slightly at the father's
expense.
This
sort of closed sequence, however, constitutes
the sort of
pathological family homeostasis that it is the
therapist's
business and duty to alter.
(Jackson and Weakland, 1961
pp.

25-26)
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In the attempt to induce change, DB
family therapy ignored intra-

psychic dynamics for more conscious levels
of family interaction (Klein,
1963. p. 26; Gralnick, 1962, p. 519), eschewed
content for communicational

and structural concerns (Jackson and Weakland,
1961, p. 26), and concen-

trated on what maintained the form of the current
structures rather than

historical concerns (Gralnick, 1962,

p.

519; Haley, 1971a, p.

230),

To make these sorts of changes, the therapist had
to be quite active
in the sessions-"-^ (Jackson and Weakland, 1961,
p. 25; Gralnick, 1962,
p.

519; Freeman, 1964, pp. 37-38; Haley, 1971a,
pp. 230-231), often

making interventions in the first session, before full information
was
gathered, so that change processes were started while
the family is

still in crisis and most amenable to change (Haley, 1971a,
pp. 230-231).
(This strategy is also very helpful in establishing some control
over

the situation for the therapist and in getting some form of change, which

14 „
"From

the discussion so far it must now be evident that active
intervention in and management of family interaction has an important
place in our initial work, and, indeed, this holds true of the further
course of family therapy also. This active orientation, however, grew
out of our experience and was not a predisposition except that experience
in treating individual schizophrenics presses one toward an active and
varied style of therapy. Nevertheless, in beginning our work with
families, we were concerned lest activity on the part of the therapist
would obscure family operations and dim the light of our research.
Actually, it has been so difficult to keep the sicker families involved,
to produce shifts and not mere repetitions of the standard patterns
characteristic of any one family, that we are no longer so concerned
about the therapist remaining a flyspeck by his own design and efforts,
and more concerned with his avoiding being put into such a useless
position by the family. (Jackson and Weakland, 1961, p. 25)

"

.
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o.

co.3e ...eases

.He

.He.p.s.s „e.,BUU.

'

an. ..e.e.o.e

chances of success)
TO do this.

HWHe.

tKe DB therapist
™igKt ..fta,.e the therapy"
as a

that is. set
.p. ..ten

i^pUciti. .ro. expectations,
t.ies an.

guidelines for the family
fam-ii^r r t
(Jackson and Weakland,
1961, pp. 22-23).
For
instance, s/he might
interrupt
the
tne parents
parent.' attempt to
y
focus solely on
the identified patient's
sy^pto^tology or history
(.ac.son and „ea.land, 1961.
p.
3/he
,
re-fra.e messages within
the fa.ily so
their .eanlng shifts (e.g.,
fro„ king's "had" to
"„ad" or vice-versa)
This experience demonstrated
that pointing out double
hinds or spirals
did little good; however,
the meaning, intent
or focus could he shifted
by such re-fra.l„g, and
with repetitions of such
shifts, the pattern
was said to lose some of
its "highly stereotyped
repetitlousness
i

.

(1961, p.

26).

Advice was sometimes given,
to accept the help
offered,

rather than to do the "right
thing."

At times, specific Instructions
were given, usually with
regard to
a minor matter, but one
which Involved a significant
pattern or interaction "and given an instruction
to do A, expecting that the
person,
from our knowledge of his
reactions, will

m

fact do B, which will

cause change C in a family
relationship." (Jackson and Weakland,
1961,
pp. 26-28)

Clearly, however, this form of
instruction was not the

straightforward matter usually envisaged
by the term.

It partook of

the "therapeutic DB," the benign
use of double binds by the therapist
to

gain change.

This technique was especially useful for
schizophrenic

'

.
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families as it matched
their own form
for-™ of
^
communicating, enabled
the
therapist to avoid
entrapment in cne
the tamily
familv'.s communicational
pattern
confused the usual
homeostatic processes,
and necessarily
anu
necessarilv induced
.
.
change
(as a therapeutic douhlp K-ir^^
bind IS as impossible
as a family double
bind
to Ignore, obey or
not obey)
'

,

•

In other words, these
for "plus ca change

ffltm-i-s^^ u

" ^^^"^^^^^^ -Ptitude
plus 0'^% ?"
/^"'^
increasingly clea? ^o ^s a^
^PP^^^^
''^"^ .''^^ ^°
effective'we mu^^'me t he^
Tn IZlrT''
°^ 2^°""^' though with
different orientation-toward
no^

defensive maintenance
ofTsIc ^
''T,H
Pist must himself employ
dual or mulM;i.
1^^^%"^^^^^^^- involving
such incongruences as wLl
serve
whole complexity of the
messa^L o? the family members
°5
he
must deal
cix with
wxcn...inat
Th^^ ^/^^^^J^^
IS, we have been concernprl vt-i t-v,
explicit statements that
''^/''^
convey concealed Snr
unexpected
implicit meanings as well
"'^'^^^^
joined With framing staL^en
s
wUh\r"''"'
r
whose carrying out^ill^^^.^^jr
rJhf
^mL^a^ge^'^^
have spoken of this elsewhere,
perhaps too narrowly ^s the
therapeutic double bind"; the
broad principle dl crJbed
"^"^^^P^^--^ °ften incongruent-messages
therapeutical?
recognition, and then further
"
xnvestiga ion ''m'
investigation.
I
(Jackson
and Weakland, 1961,
p. 30)
'

^

thrff

Collusion in factional struggles
was avoided, except as a temporary,
strategic, and explicit maneuver
(Haley, 1971a, pp. 234-235).

In^plicit

collusion, particularly if denied,
with some individual member was
usually an indication of poor prognosis.

Messages were interpreted and double
binds uncovered or exposed
(Klein, 1965, p. 26).

Feelings or attitudes, however, were most
decide-

ly not interpreted, and interpretation
as usually construed was regarded
as actively destructive in this form of
treatment.

The beginning family therapist tends to
feel that it is

^
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f.

destructive these
might be. He interprets
to
"""^^^^^
responding to each othe?
^
they are
through body .ove^eSt;
Ind o on'^oJt'
IS a way of giving
xneLing to tie fliT
1"'^' '^'^
more experienced
family therapist IT]^ "^embers. The
for the idea that
enthusiasm
interpretJnrf ^ '
brings about change.
attitudes
Tpa.tfcnr
it is helpful to
^^^1
'''.^^
confront ^r ?
they hate one another
^"^^
^ns^L'd' .^^ tends to
interpret
destructive behavior in
Pos^tl^e way, for example,
as a protective lcr
Uil
is not to makrexpUcit
P^^lem
resolve the diffLiux'es
to
in'^h''"^'°'''''^^
""'^^
causing the hostxL
'^''^^
y
^h'refo^e" he
experienced
therapist is sparser with
!
using them
^^'^
o PersLT^^^^^^^^^
'T'' to
^^"^""^^ members
behave d i f f^^i^^MTT-^A . ^
be 'o«arin:""faily\'/
:f '""""^ '"^^
unsavory feelings about
each "he^
Th^

T

f

T^'h

n^T"

ta^L

n:"":;hati:e°n"

^

™-

-

aUv" a^l" jrofff ^-l"^ '""^-"^
ourco"aLfrij^.o\"n;

n^™j"io"\'°V^-

Double Bind Paradigm as

Rp..nl

nary

To be a revolutionary
paradlg., a scientific development
must .eet

certain criteria; It ™ust be:

1)

a

problem solution that Is

way of seeing things (a
reconceptuallzatlon)
function,

(I.e.,

,

2)

a new

that 3) has an analogue

It serves as a Gestalt with
which to "see" new prob-

lems as subjects for the
application of similar forms of
conceptualization and techniques).

This solution/analogue must be
4) sufficiently

unprecedented to attract an enduring group
of adherents away from
competing modes of scientific activity
(I.e., establish Its "own" DB),
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open-e„ae. .o Xeave
p...,e.s

„e„. .e-<,e..„ea
,.o.p can aaa.ess and

provide the ne.us a.o.nd
which group co^nlt.ents
can be developed.
and thus, provide some
u
u
criteria k„
by which
to recognize adherents
to one's
"own" group and to other
competing" groups with their
own paradlg..
Moreover, a revolutionary
paradigm would bear certain
characteristics.
Such a paradigm would
he constituted A) from
identified anomalies
Which have developed Into B)
a spirit of crisis
(i.e., awareness of fundamental difficulties With
a framework), the
paradigm would be formulated C) deductively, in the
course of D) normal science
efforts directed
at other goals, by E) people
with very different perspectives
7)

•

ou^

the framework In crisis
(i.e., Master^an's "rank
outsiders'^)

sults In a solution set that
is fresh, but

F)

,

which re-

relatively crude.

Most of the criteria and
supplementary characteristics for a
revolutionary paradigm have been demonstrated
here to be relevant to the DB

formulations .'^
The DB paradigm directly addressed
a number of obdurate anomalies
in classical psychoanalysis.

In the traditional clinical
population,

comprised of adult transference neuroses,
the anomalies included:

^^Several such criteria and characteristics
have not yet been reviewed, including the deductive nature of
the paradigm, its relative
crudity, and its development by "outsiders"
during the course of normal
science activity in pursuit of other goals.
^
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the presence of necrotic
complementarities

m

uyaas
dyads and the persistently
poor social relation
In .an. "successfully
analysed Individual
patients
and paradoxical
reciprocities In Health and
disorder In the families
of
so.e patients wHose
clinical conditions „ere
Improvlns. These occurrences
hiShllshted the importance of
contemporaneous Interpersonal
factors. „KlcK
neither the classical change
process, nor theory, could
accomodate.
Anong the new clinical
populations to which
psychoanalysis was extended, the psychoanalysis
of children provoked
several anomalies with
respect to mechanisms of
change and technique,
isolation of the treatment from family members
was required to foster
the transference, without
which there could be no working
through and thus no change;
however, when
working with children, contact
with parents was necessary
If for no other
reason than to enlist their
cooperation, and precluded their
removing
the child from analysis.
Thus, technically, the analyst
was caught In a
bind; s/he could see the parents
and hamper transference, or
not see the
'

parents and endanger the treatment.

Moreover, the child apparently did

not form transferences of the
classical type anyway, and therefore
new
techniques and mechanisms of change
were required.

Finally, several anomalies emerged In
the psychoanalysis of schizo-

phrenics and borderlines.

With schizophrenic patients, the anomalies

Included: presence of Insight and affect
but little behavioral change

and thus very low "cure" rates;
reciprocities of health and disorder

among family members as the schizophrenic
member's condition changed;
change In schizophrenic condition with
contemporaneous change in a

6
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Phrenic co»u„ication
.

Borderiine anomalies Included:
.he fetation o£

transferences despi.e a markedly
narcissistic clinical picture,
the
precipitation of psychoses
ycnoses
mfh^y than
n,
P
rather
cure during analysis; and
the
lack of change despite
insight and affect.
The DB proposed a problem
solution to these anomalies
in which
the Batescn ideas on levels
of co..unication and
paradox addressed the

difficulties of schisophrenic
con^unication and Jackson's
ho.eostatic
Ideas,

the conple.entarity,

reciprocity and relapse anomalies,

less

directly, the DB was a solution
to precitipation of
psychoses.
Jackson and Weakland, 1958).

(See

The problem solution constituted
a new way of seeing things,
essentially a reconceptualization of
schizophrenia as a psychological,
rather
than organic disorder (Bateson,
1956; Jackson, 1957a, p. 181; Haley,
1959a, pp. 322-323), and as behavior
that was organized and learned

from an interpersonal context where
such behavior was both meaningful
and appropriate (Abeles, 1976,
p. 113).^

The new viewpoint emphasized

the interpersonal aspect rather
than intrapsychic and held the opinion

that the etiological factors were
nondiscrete and continuing rather than
a circumscribed trauma.

1

As Abeles (1976, p. 117) later points out, the
basic assumption
of the social intelligibility of symptoms in
schizophrenia is shared
among several other other formulations; she included
those of Laing;
Searles; and Wynne, Ryckoff, Day and Hirsch.

257

The OB se..e. .He
anal.,.e

,u„cUo„

oehe. ps.c.oses,
.He
neuroses (!), delinquency
and the Hun^n
condition
uunaition.
It was sufficiently
unprecedented to attrarf -^^o

^""^

°'
"P^lally a^ong tHose
working with schizophrenia
n.a, or
or- new
r.o,
.
to cUnlcal work
and as yet unco,™itted
to a particular
approach.
-,

Model problems and
solutions emerged
^^a as the DB n
.
paradigm
was elabora-d. several sucH proHle.s
Included: developing
tHe Ho^eostatlc
aspect
to tHe sa^e level
as tHe co^.nlcatlonal.
controlling and developing
tHe
boundaries of definitions
for Important concepts.
sHlltlng fro.
nderVlctl... to .utual-Mndlng,
moving to tHe
»ore-tHa„-t„o-person syste.
developing tHe splrallng
concept to account for
tHe pervasiveness of
double binding In a fa.Uy,
elucidating preclpltants.
developing a
Change „echanls. for family
therapy, and setting the
BB In so.e relation
ship with other formulations.
•

Finally the DB provided the
nexus about which group
co™it.ents
and Identity could be developed.
The formulation was clear,
explicit,
and radical enough that a
clinician could not accept It
by default or
slide into It; one had to adopt
it from whole cloth, or not
at all.
Since the DB provided a formulation,
change agent techniques and
theory,
it was virtually Impossible
to re-interpret into any other
formulation,
as any component so interpreted
would bring in by association other

elements, until the whole system was
in evidence.
Finally, the paradigm emerged during
a period in which there was

an awareness of crisis and controversy
regarding fundamentals of the

classical psychoanalytic framework.

.

CHAPTER

VI

IHE DOUBLE BIND DISCIPLINARY
MATRIX
In 1951.

Gregory Bateson and Jergen
Ruesch published Co^unlcatlon

Ih^Soci^n^of^s,,^

^^^^

logical Types to analyse
co™„Icatlon.l

Russell^T^;;;^

A„o„g

Inslgh.s generated
was the Idea of dual levels
of co^unication; each
"unit" of communication was perceived as having
both a report and a co^and
aspect.
The

report aspect conveyed
Information ("Nice day, Isn't
it?"), while the
command aspect aetined
defined or
nr- limits
inmnt-^ the
conversation (implicitly - "We'll
talk about the weather now.").
This dual structure of
language formed
the foundation of the DB
paradigm and project begun by
Bateson one year
later. (Clearly, the report aspect
is analagous to the idea of
meta-

communication)

2

The inception of the DB DM,
particularly as it relates to the

development of the communicational and
relational aspects of the DB
paradigm will be the present focus.

The DB DM had a formal life span

of ten years (1952-1962) and was
enormously successful in terms of

originality and productivity

;

^

the project was established, funded,
and

^Bateson is customarily credited with this
particular development.
2_,

The command function was later developed
by Haley in his work on
control over the definition of relations, to be reviewed
shortly.
3

Haley (1976a, p. 110) credits the group with more than
70 papers.
(He IS including apparently Bateson, Weakland
and himself as "group
members" and Jackson and William Fry as "consultants.")
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functioned as a research
group for various
i-xous facets
tacets of communication,
all
based upon the Russellian
level
tk^
levels.
The project also
satisfied the formal
criteria for DM status.
st^fnc- 1)
^^ a
^
u
coherent
research tradition; 2)
a consteUa-on Of sroup co„lt.ents
("conceptual, theoretical,
and ^ethodoloslcal")
Which define a scientific
co^unlty; and, „ore l.pllcltl,,
3) a set of
"scientific hahlts" (Including
Intellectual, verhal, mechanical,
and/or
technological)
c;

,

A DM also has an internal
structure comprised of at
least one (or

-re) paradigm(s), symbolic
generalizations, values,
or metaphysical models.

and heuristic and/

Finally, it serves several
functions in the

conduct of scientific activity;
a DM provides structures
and processes
by which paradigms can be
articulated with relative unanimity
of problem-choice, adequate solution, and
communication.

Essentially a DM

provides a "sphere of facilitation"
in the conduct of scientific
activity, as well as a framework
of scientific accountability.
All of
these functions or characteristics
were fulfilled by the DB project.
In this chapter,

the focus will be on the inception
of the DM,

particularly as expressed in the group's
formation around

a

developing

paradigm, and the DM's subsequent
characteristics and development.

The

time span considered will be the decade
of the group's formal existence,
that is 1952-1962.

Although the members continued

to produce papers

after the 1962 dissolution, they did so as
individuals or occasionally
pairs, but on clearly diverging pathways, and
not as a coherent research
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Sroup; „o.eove., no.

aU

.He,. „o.. .e.ained
ecns.s.enUy on BB issues/

Inception of fh. C
oMnunlcatlonalJRe
in 1952 Gregory Bateson
received a grant fro. the
Roctefeller

Foundation to study the general
nature of co^unlcatlon
In levels (.ased
upon the previously mentioned
Russelllan Theory of Logical
Types). Previous to this. Bateson had
studied h^an and animal
co^unlcatlons and
most recently communication
among otters.
dmong
otters.
T.w u
i
Jay
Haley
and John Weakland
joined Bateson early 1„
1953.
The group was organized
and funded as a
research group Into the nature
of co^nlcatlon and In
fact Haley (1972,
p. 114) co,™ents. "It was not a clinical
project and was housed In the
Veterans Administration Hospital
only because Bateson was
ethnologist
there."

'

This point meets one of the
supplementary characteristics for a

paradigm as yet not met (i.e., the
development of the paradigm arising
from normal science efforts directed
at different goals)
By 1963 the
.

group was quite aware that its work
was often seen as exclusively or

most importantly the DB, while they
(and especially Bateson) reiterated
that the focus of efforts was toward
communication in its various aspects

4,

At many points, Haley's 1976a account
of the history of the DB
group has proved invaluable; Bateson 's
comments upon it, the DB papers
during and after dissolution, and the family
therapy literature in
general, has provided the information for this
section.
Unless otherwise noted, I am relying on Haley's 1976a history.
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^^^I^'^e^s^^^\~^ ^ ^ doubling
^efif^hfr^ — ^ ihHiir'
ileS St^'

subject-matters nor this
core of ^;iirWk-7F

attentloTrTaTTf
o XL
»

tseems

l£ecific

speclfir.f "^^^^T^

t
tnat a number
of

""""^ ^^''"''1

exi^Mno

•

"

work, and nly not have bee;'!'?
IcLnn' emphasized or clear
'"^'^"'^ly
in our 1956 paner
"""f
'^°™"''""l°nal approach to
the study of a "de ranJ

Z /IT

^-.irf it^f rf^
general and inclusive framework.
(Bateson, et al., 1963
J-^D-i,
155; emphasis added)

p.

'

Prior to the 1956 publication,
the group had examined "the
nature
of metaphor, humor, popular
films, ventriloquism, training
of guide dogs
for the blind, the nature of
play, animal behavior, the
formal nature
of psychotherapy, and the
communication behavior of individual
schizophrenics." (Bateson, et al.,
1963, p. 154)

Haley and Weakland joined Bateson
early in 1953.

viously been working on the social and
psychological
tasy, particularly as seen in
popular films.

Haley had preanalysis of fan-

Weakland, though earlier

trained as a chemical engineer, had more
recently been working in cultural anthropology with emphasis on
China.

Later in that same year.

Dr. William Fry joined the project as
a part-time consultant, immediately

upon finishing his psychiatric residency (Haley,
1976a, p. 61).

In a

particularly nasty trick of fate, Fry was summoned by
the Navy for

a

one and a half year tour of duty in 1955-1956
and was not a co-author

on the paradigmatic 1956 article.

Haley says about Fry, "Had he not

.
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been gone that year he would
have Joined the rest of
us In siting that
article." (1976a, p. 108)=
(.ack.on Joined the group
early In 1954 and

was a co-author)

With their backgrounds and early
training, Bateson, Haley and
Weakland obviously qualify as
Master.an's "rank outsiders" with
respect
to schizophrenia,

a clinical phenomenon
which of course meets another

supplementary paradigmatic criterion.
The first year of the group's
collaboration was spent primarily in
trying to find what Haley characterizes
as "a common approach," (1976a,
p.

61)

and Bateson as "an adequate language"
(Bateson, 1976, p. 108).

The first difficulty that confronted
them was whether levels of communi-

cation and paradoxes were "relevant to
anything important in human life"
(Haley, 1976a, p. 61).

In particular,

the question of truth and un-

truth became controversial; to logicians,
truth in reality was often

irrelevant; in human interaction, that was rarely
the case.

This point

became increasingly important; Haley in particular,
adopted a "valuefree" stance in psychotherapy which appears related
to this issue.

For

instance, using Laing's progression of "from bad to mad",
a DB tech-

nique of reframing would shift a family's perception of the
identified

patient's behavior from "mad" to "bad" or vice versa.

The truth of

One wonders in fact, why he was not so included among the authors.
If he'd been part of the project from 1953 and left in 1955, and if
the article were written in 1955 (as it must have been), it is apparent
that he'd had at least indirect influence on the paper, particularly
during the crucial early years.
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of the characteristics was
essentially Irrelevant: the reframing
and
shifting of the family's behavior
was primary and constituted the
goal
of that intervention.

Development of the Communicational Aspect
of the ParaHi gm
As a common language began to develop,
a set of virtual synonyms

1953.

developed (Logical Type, Levels of Abstraction,
Levels of Communication,

Message and Metamessage, and Metacommunicative
Level) which addressed
the relationship between a message and
the message which qualified it.

A beginning development in terminology occurred
with the
idea that one message 'frames' another message...
it became
possible to see a relevance between a paradox such
as 'All
statements within this frame are untrue,' and a piece
of
human communication where one person indicates with a
framing message how his subsequent message is to be
received. (Haley, 1976a, p. 62)

Obviously, with this development, the project had found or constructed,

relevance for human affairs in the paradox's reflexivity.

Bateson used

film excerpts of otters to see if they qualified their messages.
did, e.g.,

(They

"This is play.")

Haley states that the work of that first year was "diverse" (1976a,
p.

62).

It is apparent that,

in Kuhnian terms,

have a coherent research program.
(a

the project did not yet

They investigated: 1) otters playing

new interest in line with the project's future developmental direc-

tion; 2) an analysis of a popular moving picture (an old interest not

directly relevant

to

the project's development); 3) a filming of
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Mongoloid children in a

aro„r,

(

i

.

""J-^ -clear); 4) analysis
..... ana a .en.Uo.nls.
an. p„p,.,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
speech Of a scM.oph.enlc
„Hen a sroup .e.,e.
interviewed
'

'°

i:;"He^^'rhe^",?:Li"\?:r:::::r

ff

self, it was uncertain
e™„
from; the authorit.es
doubLd hborn "on Mars" and thaft

-

-

""^

=l^s="ied

hir,-

°"
"-'^
statement that he was
"^^^^aret Stalin.

Another patient JnvervLwL''
culty wi?h class. Lai
oT
"hen he did he would
rape Ut^velrsfv
IS not good." (Haley,
1976a,

tVZ^'^T^
p! 62)

^

"f L'T''

thinking

At this Phase in the
project, the members had
begun the development
of a con^on language,
the kernel of an idea,
and appear to have been
casting about for a real,
of application.
The interview of a
schizophrenic patient early in
1,53 appears fortuitous, a
combination of being
located in a psychiatric
hospital and having a resident
half-time psychiatrist on the roster.
(The Inference here is that
it was Fry who conducted that interview.)
In 1954, Haley presented the
project's first papers and a fil.
by
Bateson on otters, illustrating
paradoxes in a variety of areas^
to
the American Psychiatric
Association in Mexico City (Haley,
1976a, p. 62).

In general, during 1953,

the group had shifted to
emphasizing the poten-

tial conflicts between a message
and its qualifier, so that in some

instances, a paradox occurred.

6,

"Paradoxes in play, fantasy and psychotherapy,'
P^bli^l;^;^
IQSS by Haley, and "A theory
1955,
of play and fantasy," 1955, by Bateson.
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Very Important to this i-la,-if,-„
clarification of paradox
was Milton Erickson's work wltK K.pnosls.
Erlckson's work was
apparently Introauce. to
the project By Weakland
and Bateson; Haley
and Weakland Began
their
series of what ca.e to he
annual meetlnss with
Erlckson In 1,53. Krlckson^s re-conceptuallzatlon
of hypnotic trance fro„
an Inner state or

mtra-psychlc process,

to a for. of relationship
with Interpersonal

processes, clearly constituted
an Important Influence
on the project
particularly with respect to
the Ideas of control
and Induction of
"altered states." "aley s

Un_ Thea^i: lis Ps,c|^

of Milton H. Erlckson,

M^.

(1973) directly credits
Erlckson's contri-

butions (as the various group
members did at other times
as well).
Erickson's work with hypnosis
is also evident in Haley's
recurrent interest in the notions of power
and control (to be discussed
later In
this chapter).

Erickson's work with hypnosis
was a crucial influence on
the DB DM, particularly with
respect to induction as an
Interpersonal
process, which the DB later used
with regard to explaining pathology,
and for therapeutic strategies.

During 1953, then, the project shifted
its attention from a multi-

plicity of areas relating to levels of
communication,
cation of schizophrenics.

to

In the later months of 1953,

the communi-

they began to

record schizophrenic communication (Haley,
1972, pp. 113-114; Weakland,
1969, p. 172).

In 1954,

with schizophrenia.

the project shifted to a temporary preoccupation

.
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terminate, an. was not
renewed (Haley, l,7ea,
p. e4) , (aUHon.H
Is
unclear whether the. ha.
appUed for such a renewal).
Hale. Indicates
^hat parti, for ..practical
reasons.. (aifflc.U.
fnndln^ esoteric co^nlcatxonal research) anda partly
parti v trom
fr-on,
^
a developing
tendency in that
direction, it was decided to
apply
^.
for a grant
FFJ-y ror
Pranr to
investigate schizophrenic conmiunication."
V-L^/oa,
(1976a nn
pp. 64-65).
They obtained a two-year
grant from the Macy Foundation.

U

.

-,

•

During January of 1954, Bateson
invited Don Jackson to join
the
project and the latter, though
nominally a consultant, beca.e
a central
member

From the development of the
project, it is clear that project
interest in schizophrenia "was at
first only an outcome of Bateson's
prior
interest in the general nature of
communication" (Weakland, 1969,
p.

171);

that is, it was adopted in the
course of normal science endeavors
in
other directions. Weakland
(1969, p. 171) credits Haley with the
shift
of interest and the insight that
the distunbed communication of
schizo-

phrenic patients was of potential interest
to the group.

During 1953,

the group taped interviews with
schizophrenic patients and paid close

attention, not to the content of speech, but
to the formal aspects of

communication, which led them to perceive certain
confusions in "dis-

criminating the logical types of messages as
characteristic of the
schizophrenics we studied," (Weakland, 1969,

p.

172);

this research was

regarded as anthropological in method, almost like a form
of naturalistic

i

.
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171 and 172)

For the next two years
(1954-1,56).

for^l Characteristics

the ptoject focused
on the

of schisophrenic
speech.

Haley (l,7ea, p. 55)

presents a section of the
Macy grant application.
The proposed researrh
i
aspect of schizophrenir.n

oversensitive

to such sipnp1«

'

^K

entirely different

^^S^^-^^-

They may be

which indicate whether a given
utterance Is ujejal of
^etaphoric. jocular or serious,
sincere or histrionic etc

(H^lejll^^ef/,^-?^;

""^

'-"^^

,uaUfler;.^"-

Haley parenthesl.es that during
that period, "reality qualifiers"
were
also called "mode Identifying
signals;" they described the
metamessage
that describes, or frames, what
sort of message the communication
Is.'

During this two year period
(1954-1956), when formal aspects of
comi^unlcation were the explicit focus of their
work, the project members had

moved into a revolutionary position with
respect to scientific activity.
The focus shifted to schizophrenia and
attention was paid to psycho-

constitutes language and concept formation by the
UM, and both terms qualify as Kuhnlan symbolic
generalization.

^
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analysis, if only obliquely
queiy (e.g..
fe p

symbols
i

...

,

displacement

projection,
The group had begun the
shift from what Griffith
and Mullins
(1972) call an elite to a
revolutionary research group.
,

'

etc.")

.

A series of important
developments ensued which eventually
coalesced
into the 1956 paradigm. After
considerable debate the project
members
differentiated between -contradiction"
and "incongruence." The term
"contradiction" was used for messages
which qualified each other in
a
conflicting manner at
«^ same level whereas "incongruence" was reserved
to described messages that
qualified each other in a conflicting
manner
at different levels
The emphasis rested on this
latter case, as it was
,

an example of conflict in the
discontinuity of Russellian class and
mem-

bers; it was at the site of this
class-member conflict that paradox was

generated (Haley. 1976a,

p.

65).

The complexity of communication was

becoming very apparent and attention began
to be paid to the perception,
or interpretation, of this complexity.
a complementary set of foci:

of such communication.

wa^

Haley (1976a, p. 66) points out

of communicating and the interpretation

He states that when Bateson, in a letter
to

An elite group is "recognized as being of central
importance to
their respective disciplines even while [it was]
developing." (1972
Obviously, while the project was a general communications
p. 960)
research group, particularly as it was directed by Bateson
who had just
published a well-known book of research into communication, the
DB
project was an elite research group; with the shift in content area
(schizophrenia) and focus (the formal aspects of szhizophrenic communication), they entered a transition from an accepted elite group
to a
potentially revolutionary one. It is always a question at what point
something becomes revolutionary: with the change in perspective, or with
the publication?
Griffith and Mullins' (1972) work proved helpful in
this analysis and will be partially reviewed in Chapter VIH when the
strengths and weaknesses of the Kuhnian applications are delineated.
_
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of levels of co^unlcatlon,

the DB was first
formulated.

m

wrltins to Welner, Bateso.
first discussed
language and metalanguage
(,ualiaers). paradoxes, and
deutero learning
(learning sets or learning-to-date),
then formulated the
prototypic DB
paradigm, incidentally casting
rh^ ^r.the
y
injunctions into negative
rather than
positive form.

to"s"ts°oVtwo't' 'T'''
i:ngua\1;°La"ni:r:

'''''''

-

whether these

^^^^f^^-'^^
^rsu^^'X^^:!^-^

both independent!? operating

Doth message and metamessage
contain negatives.
On thic,
prxncxple we can imagine the
generation'of pa?;dox in Jhe
deutero-learning system when an
organism experiences
punishment following some failure
and learns that J must
not learn that punishment
follows failure.
This would be
^'^'"^^ °' ^
been pJni ed
^-^"^
tor failure Lt'^
?or'?:nure
later is punished for showing
his exnert;, t-i on nf
punishment after failure, e.g., is
punished or wringing.
cring"
(quoted in Haley, 1976a,
66)
p.

The deductive quality in Bateson's
thinking is quite clear here.
As Haley (1976a, p. 67) has put
it: "At this time,

there was no example

of a double bind drawn from
natural-history data; it was a hypothesis

about what sort of thing "must have
happened in the life history of the

schizophrenic given his confusion of Logical Types."

quality of the formulation was repeatedly alluded
p.

358; Bateson, et al.,

9

1963, p. 154).^

to

The deductive
(Haley, 1959b,

At least at this point, in a

It scarcely need be mentioned that this completes
the supplementary
criteria for the development and characteristics of a Kuhnian
paradigm.
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1954 grant application, the paradigm
was presented as being
both Induct ive
and deductive; "The theory Is
derived In part deductively
tro. what has

already been said about the
capabilities (of schizophrenics],
and In part
inductively fro. experiences with
schizophrenics and the literature
describing their conmunicatlon."
(cited in Haley, 1976a,
p. 66)

By the end of 1954, with
Jackson now in residence for several
months,
the language becomes clearly

«re

clinical.

For Instance, from that

same grant application:

Aetiology.
It is suggested that the base
for later
psychosis may be laid in infancy by the
experience of
dealing with a mother who both punishes
the child for
certain actions and punishes the child
for learning that
punishment will follow those certain actions,
i e
she
generates paradox in the child by combining
negative
learning with negative deutero-learning
(cited in Haley
1976a, p. 67)
1.

.

During this period, the project gradually
abandoned the term "paradox" for "double bind."^°

During 1955, the DB was defined as both a

conflict between levels of messages and a conflict
between levels of
learning.

The abstract logical puzzle became increasingly
tied to be-

havior and the project continued to interview and tape
schizophrenic
speech.

The unenviable position of the receiver of the double bind

messages was considered and the 1956 "victim" was generated.

Finally,

term "double-bind" was coined by Gregory Bateson (Haley,
1972, pp. 113-114)
"'^The
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the article was written
and published.

Don Jaclcson Joined the
DB project early in
1954, at Bateson's in-

Fro^-Reich.ann lecture at the
Palo Alto V.A.^^

.ackson had spoken
on his concept of fa.ily
homeostasis, and Bateson, a
.e.ber of the
audience, approached hi.
after the talk to say that
the concept related
to work he shared with
Haley, Weakland, and Fry.

Jackson Joined the DB group
after an important controversy
between
Haley -Weakland, and Bateson
over the nature of the
paradoxical relationship.

Bateson at first apparently
argued that the relevant
paradoxical
relationship was specifically the
mother-child relationship wherein
the
child was punished for expecting
punishment; Haley-Weakland argued
that
this was the specific case of
a general form of relationship
relating
to double negative injunctions
and that the paradoxical relationship
was pathogenic regardless of who
the family member or significant
other
might be.

Bateson, usually the most abstract
thinker of the group,

appears to have agreed with this change
in content.

Haley mentions

11,
Jackson s talk was in January of 1954 (Jackson,
1968, p. V). Prior
to joining the DB project Jackson,
Jack and Jeanne Block and Virginia
Patterson had studied the families of neurotic and
autistic children
at the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute
from 1953, Jackson
ending his commitments at Langley Porter in
1956. (Jackson, 1965 ^p
2 footnote)
,

_

.

'

\

a
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that he. Batescn an,

WeaUand "s,.n.

t„o days in seclusion
in .he mount-

ains outlining the research
to be done." (l„6a.
p. 67)
Obviously
Jackson was not there. He
is. however, credited
in the 1956 article
Which was developed and
written In 195. and 1,55,
and which depends
large part on his ideas
regarding family homeostasis.
In terms of
a Kuhnian analysis
ysis, the
fhp article
aT•^^o^^ could
ij
not have been formulated
without
the homeostatic concept
concent hp
nT-r,-.T-;^^j
a..
he provided.
At
times, the necessity of
both
the co^unlcational and the
relational concepts was
appreciated by
Jackson and Ueakland (1961,
pp. 15 and 16), for instance.

m

Jackson -s 1954 formnl _tion.

Jackson presented the Freida
Fromm-Reichmann

lecture in January of 1954, at which
time he spoke of his concept of
family homeostasis. He then presented
the concept at the American Psychiatric Association meeting in St.
Louis, Missouri on May
same year (Jackson, 1957b.
p. 79);

7

of that

the formulation finally appeared
in

written form in 1957.
In this article (formulated in
1954). Jackson alluded to the work
of Horney, Sullivan and Fromm in
elucidating the importance of inter-

personal processes and addressed himeself
to interactional patterns

within the family which serve

to

maintain family constancy.

His con-

cept of homeostasis was explicitly based upon Claude
Bernard and Cannon's

work on homeostatic mechanisms which maintain relative
constancy in
the body through the interplay of dynamic processes (Jackson,
p.

79).

1957b,

Jackson regarded "family homeostasis" as "depicting family

)
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interaction as a closed
i.,o.^.io„ syste. 1„ „HicH
va.iaMons in o..Put o. ,e.avio. a.e ,e..ac.
in o.,e. .o co„ect
.He s.s.e„.s response "
(PP. 79-30)
SUCH ho.eostatic
„ec.anis.s operate i^piiciei,
and .eesta.XisH .He status <,no.
H.a„pies o. sucH .ecHanis^s
in a .a.ii. .i,He
occur .Wnever .He „i,e
sHows a certain degree
of resent^en. Her Husband deprecates Hi.seU.
whenever. .parents ,..rrel,
.Heir cHiid diverts
the™ by becoming troublesome;
whenever another child
shows a certain
degree of independence, his
.other labels it as dangerous
or disturbed..'
.

(First, 1975, p. 9)

Jackson's purpose in the paper
was
of family interaction
patterns:
fainil^

ine^

1)

to

address to particular types

those changes that develop
in other

as a result of changes in
the identified patient
during

psychiatric treatment and

2)

the relation of specific
fa.ily inter-

action patterns to psychiatric
nosological categories (1957b,
p. 79)
The first category, obviously
addressed one of the central anoznalies
in
the treatment of schizophrenia,
the emergence of pathology or
disturbance in a hitherto healthy family
member coincident with the improvement of the identified patient in
treatment. A variant of this is
also
considered: "Most of us are acquainted
with situations where one person
has started treatment, and soon the
entire family has been parcelled

out among the circumambient psychiatric
brotherhood." (1957b, p. 84)
(The wording here, as elsewhere with Jackson,
is quite Sullivanian.

Pursuiant to the question of etiology, Jackson
contended that
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schizophrenia orieina^P<^
xglnated, t^^,*not xn consUtutional
factors, and not In
the Ereudlan idea of the sinni. .
single traumatic event,
but rather in the
concept Of repetitive
trauma.
Such repetitive trauma
was the
•

result
Of distorted interpersonal
processes not Isolated
events, and „ere a
contemporaneous rather Mn^n
K-r^.than historical question
"not [of] who does
What to whom, but how who
does what." (1957a,p.
184)
Bateson, et al
develop this Idea
the 1956 paper deductively,
wondering under what'
conditions or continual processes
a person must live, to
develop schl.ophrenia.

m

Jackson addressed other anomalies
as well: the necessity of
seeing
a child's "significant-others,"
(1957b, p. 81) and neurotic
complementarities.
(Jackson's manner of stating the
latter was rather different:
"The fact is sometimes overlooked
that one reason manj- of us
continue
to

jgnlfest our

2ih2!5 to

neuro^

integrate

™

a

^

neuro^

(p.

SU;

his emphasis)

These

points, especially with respect
to the reciprocity of health
in schizophrenic families, of course meets the
Kuhnian criterion that a paradigm

address the anomalies of the previous
system (as the communicational

aspect addressed the mystery of schizophrenic
"word salad", Investigating the form rather than the content
of communication and homeostasis)
The homeostatic mechanisms Invariably
involved interpersonal pro-

cesses and at least two, and usually three,
people.

Jackson's illus-

trations were always more clear if several people
were Involved (and in

,
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tact,

see

family therapists prefer
worUng with a large rather
than
small number of peoole
pc, It
pcu^ixe as
-itm,i,^
makes it easier
easipr ^o
to v,r^«-K
both spot^ and intervene
in typical family patterns')
Thno
n illustrated
P tterns;
This is^ well
in one of Jackson's examples (1957b,
p. 82).
,

-;

•

.

-,

.

The paternal uncle of a woman
patient had lived with hpr

seeded to aeflect L„e of
^hn^^her'^r s^u
her husband away from the
husband, and the brotLriave
uncle's dL
^rtirr'L°" ''""""'^ occurred thast seemed
hardly coinclr'.!
quarreling,
mde
^dTa^o
a potentially
:„?"ir= serious suicide attempt, th^ ^^he
the father

u/L^rf

r

"1

"

"

pho^LI:

--"^

The role of the third, or fourth,
person in a system, and not only
the
relationship of patient and symbiotic
parent, was repeatedly emphasized
by Jackson; until his work, the
dyad had been regarded as a closed
system; with the Introduction of
Jackson's concept of homeostasis,

the

system opened up to include the entire
family and the theory was cast
in systemic terms.

Subsequent development of the homeostasis
idea

.

The ideas first for-

warded by Jackson in 1954 were developed somewhat
in the 1956 article,
then in a number of other articles between 1956
and 1968; though he

wrote many other papers, only a portion were on the DB
per se (e.g.,
1960,

The Etiology of Schizophrenia ), rather than a development of
the

relational aspect of the paradigm, while still others were elaborations
of earlier interests (e.g., 1958, "Guilt and the control of pleasure
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in schizoid personalitipc;"^
alxtxes ).

Several papers, however,
do stand out as
developments of the homeostatic
and/or r-ow
relational aspects he
contributed
to the DB paradigm.
,

in 1957(a), Jaclcson
extended his concept of
repetitive traun.,
rather than the isolated
traumatic event, as
responsible for schizophrenia.
Two following papers
are in some sense
collaborations with
Weakland, who seems to have
fully appreciated the
homeostatic implications,
1958, they collaborated on the
idea of the repetitive
trauma,
by documenting the precipitation
of a psychotic episode
by double binding

m

communication which occurred in
the father-mo ther-adult-"child"
triad.
Weakland wrote a paper on the DB
and three-party interaction
(obviously
homeostatic) in Tl^ Etiolo^ of

Sch^^

(I960) which Jackson edited.

The extension in that paper
was from the dyad to triad, an
elaboration
of Jackson's 1954 work on the
third person in relation to the
usual

pathologenic dyad.

Later, in 1965, Jackson published
"The study of the

family," which was a further elaboration
of the homeostatic theme.
Soon thereafter,

(1965), Jackson and Janet Beavin wrote and
pub-

lished "Family Rules: Marital Quid Pro
Quo" in which they examined the
12_,

,

The dates of publication might engender
some mild confusion about
^^^^^
""^^^^
1957a a paper could elaborate upon
^
iQ.?ur^*u
a iy:3/b/
The problem dissolves when it is recalled that
the 1957b
paper was published in 1957, but written and at least
twice presented
to public forum in 1954 (once in January at
the annual Freida FrommReichmann lectures and later in May at the American Psychiatric
Association s annual meetings).
The article on family homeostasis was published in part for historical reasons, in 1957 and only
by accident
later than its progeny.
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—
—

development of family
rules
ules, hm-h
both xmplxcit and
explicit and some of
the

""^^

i

^

•

.

(-t.la.ie. and Wea.land,
1.7,

p

-

-tension of his 1.3. .or.
in which his second
focus was thee
correlation kbetween
.
typical interpersonal patterns and
nosological categories
cegories.
ThP
Their
primary point with
respec.
.„.es „as ..a.
.... „„e .He .es...
30..H.„,
•

_

.

•

u..

individual decisions o.
acUons. so .Ha. .He
pa..ne.s „e.e .a.ei, awa.e
of them and neither could
be perceived as
having any real intentionali.y
In .heir establishment
(Watzlawlck and Weakland,
1977, p. 20).

What is regarded as Jackson's
final comprehensive
presentation
(Watzlawick and Weakland.
1977. p. 193), "Schizophrenia:
the Nosological
Nexus," was initially presented
.0 the Pirst Rochester
International
Conference on "The Origins of
Schizophrenia" in March of 1967."
In
this. Jackson developed
several points demonstrating
.Ha. individual

personality theories and .rea.ment
were insufficient for schizophrenia
and also demonstrated .he
correlation be.ween .he Identified
patient's
behavior and typical family in.erac.ion
patterns; this latter point is
an extension of both his work
with correlation between family
patterns
and nosological categories (e.g.,
1954 and 1965b), and also of Jackson's
an d Weakland

1371

te,

's

1958 paper on the precipitation of an acute
schizophrenic

"Dr. Jackson died suddenly on January
28, 1968." (Publisher's
in Jackson, 1968, p. viii)
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episode
Finally, he introduced
the concept of
'rastrlctlveness" as a
.^ior factor in family
systems processes.
Restrlctlveness" applies to
an Implicit family rule
against changing la„ll,
roles, which are In
themselves tacit. This in ifc:c.if
xtself creates a
paradoxical situation
(Watzlawick and Weakland,
1977 np. 193).
]9^^
tk
The concept of restrictiveness
is operationalized by
u
nomeostatxc^ ^„
y homeocjf^
mechanisms,
and constitutes one of
Characteristics of particularly
powerful sets of homeostatic
mechanisms.
This point both extends the
homeostatic notion, and addresses
a characteristic of schizophrenic
families recogniaed by several
researchers-

m

.

a marked tendency toward
difficulty in changing an almost
obdurately

dynamic system in which, the
more things changed, the more
things stayed
the same.
Wynne, et. al., (1958) refer
to a "rubber fence" by
which
such families seem to allow the
therapist to enter, but not in
fact

allow him/her any impact. Bateson
(1961,

p.

119) also addressed this

point with regard to family development
over time.
The families containing schizophrenics
exhibit a stability
that is,
general, not present in normal families.
Many
descriptive statements about the relationships
between
members remain true much longer than in
usual families.
Indeed, these statements may be said to
be stable under
the impact of the processes of maturation
of the independent members. The growing up of the identified
patient
and the senescence of the parents scarcely seem
to affect
the patterns of behavior between parent and
offspring.
Overprotectiveness, if present, continues undiminished
and the incessant inconcistencies of relationship that
we
have called "double binds" continue unabated.

m

Obviously, the homeostatic mechanisms that comprise restrictive-
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ness acoun.
^.e..

one o. .H. ..ass.c
e„o.aUes

tHe low .a.es o^

„U. scM.opH.enU

pe^anen. cu.e o. su.s.a.Ual
a„eX.o.a.,o„ an.

the very high rate of
relapses.

shc„. Jackson's p.i„a.y
Unes of development „1,H
rega.d
homeostasis, .e.lnnln,
1„., addressed tH.ee-pa„,
in

m

,o

Interactional

processes (wit. some
elaboration

WeaUand here) and systems
dynamics

family rules and cybernetic
patterns of feedback and
correction the
correlation between repetitive
Interpersonal patterns and
certain nosological categories and the
rule of homeostasis and
restrlctlveness In
relapses and poor therapeutic
uxc resultq
K
results w-ffh
..kwith schizophrenics.
By his 1967
paper, Jackson was explicitly
referring to cybernetics,
particularly
with respect to homeostasis;
he appeared comfortable
and facile with
General System Theory, referencing
von Bertalanffy and using
several
of his systems concepts, (e.2
vc.g., "eani
f
f i n^i n
equitmality
as well as Garfinkel
)
>

(1964) and the ethnomethodologists

'

(also in California) concepts
(e.g.,

"constitutive rules"), and Sullivan
with respect
and clinical nosologies.

to

interpersonal patterns

He was clearly attempting to
provide, or to

tie-in to, a meta- theoretical framework;
the DB project had dissolved
and many of the differences in scientific
and/or clinical approach he
had had with other members had widened and
become elaborated.

By the

time of his death, Jackson had widened the
conceptual and clinical

breach between himself and the mainstream DB position
tent,

to such an ex-

he was developing an intellectual approach
traditionally at odds

with that used by the DB.

As review of Jackson's precursors, and
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development will make clear
Clear, ^h;,^
that separation was
not at all coincidental,
nn t.^i
'Precursors a nd influences
-JiSSSes^ILiaSksonls^.
i

Jackson's background and
influences were quite diffprpr.^
different from the other
three paradigm-makers'
intellectual antecedents,
.ackson, first of all,
was an experienced
Clinician. Neither Bateson
nor Weakland had had any
such experience
and Haley had begun some
clinical work around 1952
or 1954 (though

it
is unclear where or when
he received his training
or what type of clini-

cal work Haley was doing),

.ackson's experience as a
clinician, of

course, provided the basis
and the empirical ^terial
for his homeostasis concept. It also
apparently impelled him to deal
with the clinical community years before the
other three paradigm authors.
It was

Jackson who, as early as 1957(a),
addressed the issue of repetitive
traumatic conditions vs. the classical
psychoanalytic single traumatic
event, for instance.

Similarly, analogies and differences
between DB

therapy and other traditions,
especially psychoanalytic, continued
to
interest him. (See, for instance, Jackson,
1961a, pp. 270-278).
His clinical experience also contributed
greatly to the success of
DB therapy; Jackson provided a perspective
that the three others prob-

ably could not have brought

to

treatment.

For instance.

Manipulations or interventions must not be employed if the
therapist has any negative feelings toward the patient and
if they are especially counter-indicated as a way out of
some sort of therapeutic impasse. That is, when the therapist
feels that he does not know what is going on, things bog
down and then a bright idea occurs to him. This is exactly
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be wrong if his intervenUo?
f ^^L^o^
'I'lZTel'
becomes angry... He should
accept his DoSiMnn
defensively and be free to
lose a patJent

"

'

interpreted as a "cookget around the need for
inten'° '° Psychotherapy; the op osi^e
xs
s the case,
c^'s^for
for only an experienced
therapist can tailor
an appropriate intervention
to each individual
pa^ienj!

book course, designed
b'ook'co^^:r-T"''
T''
to

This is one of the paradoxes,
and one of the stumbling
^^°^^-^Py^ the experienced therapist is
best able
^bie ?f
to conceive and execute
innovations; yet his
experience is apt to render him
chairbound and a devotee
of his own style.
(Jackson, 1961b, p. 259; his emphasis)

Jackson had, according

to his

own account (1957a, p. 181) become

interested in the etiology and pathogenesis
of schizophrenia since 1943
when Jacob Kasanin first introduced
him to this area. During the ensuing years, Jackson saw schizophrenic
patients in a variety of thera-

peutic modalities ("...I saw schizophrenic
patients in collaborative
therapy, group therapy, intensive individual
therapy, and multiple

therapy.", 1957a, p. 181), yet felt he'd not
any real understanding of
the origins of the disorder until the DB
project.

His own concept of family homeostasis was sparked by
an early

paper on the treatment of schizophrenia by

R.

Laforgue (1938).

Laforgue mentioned that at a significant point in his
female patient's therapy her sister (with whom she lived)
became severely depressed. He attributed the sister's
difficulty to a manifestation of the same unfortunate
genetic structure that had caused his patient's schizophrenia. He did note that the sister's depression was
coincident with a sudden improvement in his patient. (1957b,
p.

88)
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in point of fact,
laforgue's article did
so.ewhat

»re than that
he did Identify the
processes as ho^eostatlc.
.aforgue clearl,
described two ho^eostatlc
sltuatlons-one In „hlch the
"health.- fa^U,
AUhoush

member declines with
Improvement of the Identified
patient, thus revealing latent depression
on ^usually),
fusuanv^ and
^r.A
also a situation wherein
the
individual patient's disorder
serves as a screen behind
which another
family .e.ber can avoid a
loaded developmental or
interpersonal task.
i

In this admirable excerpt,
Laforgue also draws attention
to substitution
for lost objects which Normal
Paul and also Peter Mueller
regard as

important in the etiology of
schizophrenia.

—

^^^^l^ t^dentif led patient] behavior when faced with
any sort
Z'^afTJ"'
of danger was different
from what it had formerly been
Tn
^^^^^^-^^^^
^ion fortrbSt-nof
:
She a'^o'^d
avoidedr?:^
it. she ^1
had become as timid and fearful
as a child.
'

T

^"^^^ "^^
highly satisfactory but for one
°^
unJoJoTK/^':
uncomfortable obstacle. For some time
I had been reflecting on
tSe
reactions which Odile's progress might
possibly produce S?he elder
sister who was still looking after her.
The more the patient improved
her sister become and. after the
latest transf™';
in'od'^r:.'
in
Odile, the gloom deepened into definite
depression.
This reaction
might seem paradoxical to anyone who has
not studied family-neuroses
very closely. But it did not, in fact,
take me by surprise.
I had
noticed at the beginning of the treatment
that the elder sister who
cared for Odile so devotedly was terribly jealous
of her authority over
the patient.
This devotion, manifesting itself in a spirit
of complete
self-sacrifice on behalf of her sick sister and in a
strong inclination
to give up having any life of her own, had struck
me as suspicious. When
examined more closely, these symptoms revealed a powerful
attachment to
her sister, an attachment which she had in the first instance
displayed
towards her mother and which, when the latter was taken from her, had
prevented this daughter from developing in the direction of a normal
family-life. Like the patient, the elder sister, though quite capable
of an occasional flirtation, had eliminated men from her affective
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vited this girl
5-i-i.x
to
Lu stav
bcay vn>h
with them.

goxng to
whphhav

ten hL'Shat

:

4°="
on

'

I
Barbara
Pvhi K-;

^

in the
hf ho
h'^
house and
^^^^^
^hild,
e^c
?o
^^1^
^-Ply quietly,
"Ye;'"
^^^^ ^^^^
of h;rs
^ ^--^
'nr'^^'^^
^^^^
sincrtL d?vorce"::3\:i' La?"'
'
since the husband
^^^^1'
might ask for ^h!
J'''/
°^
"^^1^' P^^haps it was
nofsiUv In ^ t
Genevieve with suspicion.
I sugges^ed
ted thl/.^
that they u
have her stay in a nearby
motel rathef than
xn an already crowded house.
They also had no Sea of
how long she would stay because
they failed to ciarity
clarify
this. (Jackson, 1961a,
p. 284)

tMs"r\°'

^

'

^LrirwL

Essentially, the double binding and
homeostatic maneuvering served
to reinforce the idea of the
patient's lack of decision-making ability

and the idea of her as impaired or
disordered, while maintaining her
in a non-adult position,

thus making it well nigh impossible
for her to

leave or disengage.
The homeostatic concept also addresses
two important clinical issues

regarding the etiology of schizophrenia. It helps
to answer the questions
about what researchers concerned with longitudinal
risk for schizophrenia
refer to as "high-risk invulnerables,

"

that is,

those individuals at

risk for schizophrenia along some number of dimensions,
who do not
develop the disorder.

Jackson (1961a, pp. 281-282) facetiously points

out when the sibling of schizophrenics have been investigated, they
are

usually preceived as "fine" and the conclusion has been that schizophrenia is a recessive disorder, since it only strikes one in four or

.
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importance of the ccacepc
connAr^t- of
lo„ self-estee™ in
schizophrenia and concomitantly, the Importance
of
Of havxng and
showing respect for
the patient

(.acson, l,3.a.

p.

la.)

-

^^^^^^^
papers Is vl.ldl, reminiscent
of SuUlvan's rather
„r„ and at times
notoriously difficult style.
(Por Instance, „hen
.ac.son refers to
.he "clrcu^namhlent
psychiatric brotherhood.

"

or when he describes
the

expression of hostility
towards one's mother as
an activity "which
among sophisticated people is a .-,,1,
IS a rather common
Indoor sport,"

(1961b,

258.)

Examination of Jackson's
work before the DB project
(e.g.!
"Some factors Influencing
the Oedipus complex,"
1954), during (e.g.!
"Guilt and the control of
pleasure In schizoid
personalities." 1958)
and after (1963-1,69) clearly
reveals Sullivan's influence
and Jacksl's
retention and elaboration of the
Interpersonal approach in systems
ter.s.
It was this factor, more
than anything else, that
resulted in the split
in the DB DM in 1959.
p.

Jackson's shift from primarily
individual clinical work to family

work followed his change in working
context from Chestnut Lodge

to

Palo Alto.
I became interested in family
therapy about seven and a
half years ago, when I went from Chestnut
Lodge to Palo
Alto. At Chestnut Lodge, we had treated
schizophrenics

15^
u
My thanks
to Dr. Harold Jarmon for pointing out
that Sullivan
frequently alluded to the dynamic equilibrium of
relationships, the
quid pro quo" aspect of relationships and the
crucial role of communicational processes in relationships.
,

.
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with psychotherapy, so T of
"°
But, at the Lodge we
Alto,
had
r.^'''
""^'^'"^
their families.' ihls
^°
-i^h
? undT%
^as changed somewhat now. But in my
^aJ "^f
the therapist
to\:Lu:^;r\^r:aJ::L'' \t'''''''
thing he avoided and
.''^^
always left to\h'
administrator,
In Palo Alto, which
is
^
avoid the reiativ:s;^:nd
Ti

L

^

Hli?

^ed^^^fSt^r;

"^^^^ -^"^^^
most n.arked\rt^rfaLli"'
''k
schizophrenic
was able to
patient
at home
If k".^
therapy and benefi ed f?;.
P^^^^^"
anv
°^ u'"'^""^'
usually produce all lr^° J
P^^^ would
1"'"'';^"'
ly, there is ver^
Surprisingi ?L .r 1

iL

It was in early
^xy 1954
ly^^ that r-h-«
Bateson approached Jackson
after the

latter

m

Fromm-Reichmann lecture
t:L.Lure in Falo
^
Pain Alto,
A^^o and
invited his participation in the just developing
DB project.
's

I^^^^^^^n^^o^^he^^

•

•

The importance of the
homeostatic

aspect occurs in two different
areas: the first in Kuhnian
second in clinical terms

.

ter_ms and

the

First, Jackson's concept of
homeostasis add-

ressed several anomalies including:
reciprocities in mental health,

(particularly wherein the identified patient
improved and a family member became disordered); the exceedingly
high relapse rate in schizo-

phrenia, and the general lack of therapeutic
success with schizophrenic

patients

Homeostasis served three functions with respect

to a

digm, which the communicational aspect alone could
not.

Kuhnian paraFirst, homeo-
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-Sht

one

Have a sch..op..e„,c
o«.,..„,

^^^^^ ^^^^
a
family, even If double
binrlint,
bindxng, had a reasonably
healthy parent
or even parent
surrogate who eould
intercede, a child „as
decldlly
less lively to become
schisophrenic than In
those families where
the

homeostatlc mechanisms
precluded rather than
fostered that be„l,„
third-party contact. Such
third-party contact could
ameliorate

the

pathogenicity of the s.tuatxon
s^^l,^,^-,•^r, a
desprte the fact that
It did not eliminate
the double binding.
secondly, the homeostasis
provided the foundation
and operation by
Which double binds could
be ^de applicable
to human affairs
1, a
-iXi^ -Z. Bertrand Russell had been concerned
that, while the Theory
Of Logical Types was
Interesting
i-Lxng, It
it might
imVhr hhave been
irrelevant for
anything significant (Abeles,
1976, p. 118).
Bateson apparently suffered
Similar qualms Insofar as he,
WeaUand and Haley felt the first
important question facing the early
project (after they had developed
a
common approach), was whether
the "paradoxes of abstraction
were relevant to anything Important In
human life?" (Haley, 1976a,
p. 60)
Homeostasis provided the non-trlvlallzlng
element by providing the DB with
an Interpersonal, or relational
arena. A common source of
bewilderment

^.

wlthttie DB hypothesis has centered
around the question:

these people just leave?"

"Why don't

That Is, If double bind communication
Is so

pathogenic and aversive, why don't the
"victims" merely leave the .scene?

\

r
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Such questioning revealq
veals ^a lack
^
of understanding
with respect to
the homeostatic element.
Abeles (1976
^'0, pp.
pp 115
115-116) appears to
understand this element quite
c:u^
well
well.
^
She
emphasizes:

so imbedded in the
that they are hard

reUtLn^h
lo

slT jT

doublT-biT^dT^

f

°'

'""'^

^

P-^

^""^ relationship with
history, the factors arP
a
'° ""^^^'^ ^^^^t an
observe; is likely norL w
of a given
^^^-^^
stat:L'nr:ay"be'°:v:n\'f^"^ ^^^^"^^
were the main means of
^^^^alizations
\'
com^^nilation
?h
Though
every
communication savs ',n^^^\T
I

co^unlcants.

ZlZTlTl L^n Wt'^^^T
""^

of a relationship with
a few ITr^.
tures are difficult to filT
ref erring to isolated i

^

However/the

oo^"

T

epf caTb fbeljr"'

.

°'

l^^Udatlon

8«-

°^ "'^'^''^

"""^s" In
'""^

P^""""

^P?""""'' ^"
more encompassing
P'^"?"'
appUcatlon '^^
ili21i£!12MP Is a bind.
Isolated example! of donhir^
"'"^""^
the relations^!
ac
i ed aTlt" 1^"^"°"
of Invalidation, (her
e.phasL)

1

If it is further recalled
that any appropriate
within-paradoxical

frame response is necessarily
paradoxical in turn, then an
implication
is that over the course o£
years, a person has learned
that structure
of relationship (the reverberating
cycles, or spirals of binding).
To
leave a DB, essentially „eans
to leave the relationship.
The person in
a double bind remains in a
bind "to preserve an essential
relationship."
(Abeles, 1976, p. 120)

The relationship is essential
because by nature

of the DB, neither party in a dyad
can gain closure, nor have the re-

lational needs been

B,et,

particularly if one of the participants had

been double bound as a child.

As Abeles points out (1976, p. 121),

this

.
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has of.en been .isconst.ued
as -dependence."
as inev..abX„

U

an .nd..,dnal „e.e

More

abs^ad,.

bu. Ju..

.

s.o„ np ,n a ,a.U. be.n,
donMe
bound, s/he would learn
both rh^t
,k,that this was the
structure of relationships, and would learn to
double bind in turn,
as a participant In
the
spiral.
II such a person could
gain enough closure,
seU-estee„. n.tu-

ratlon (whatever) to begin
a relationship and
fa.U,. naturally both
his/her expectations and
co-unlcatlonal pattern would lead
to another
double binding family.
The third function served
for the paradigm Includes
areas of sensitivity in each ta.Uy. Those
areas around which ho.eostatic
^echanls^s
co.e into play, and with which
double bind co™,unlcation is
used, point
to particularly sensitive
family areas. (This is potentially
an area of
link-up with another family framework
through the concept of the "family
secret.")
Jackson provides an illustration
of both such mechanisms

being brought into play around the area
of the patient's ability

to make

decisions
One of the most rewarding occurrences
in family therapy
IS the concordance between a symptom
in the patient and a
piece of family interaction that explains
the symptom.
In
this sense, I am stating that schizophrenia
or schizophrenic
symptoms are adaptive behavior. For example,
Barbara's parents
complaxned more about her indecisiveness than about
anything
else.
Evidently, it is a problem when she gets up in the
morning as to what she will wear and everything else
in the
day becomes a similar crisis. When one listens
to the
sessions, it is striking that when Barbara makes a decision,
the parents refute it in some fashion and then she backs
out.
Yet, they in no way see themselves as having anything to do
with her indecision. One striking example was an incident
in which a friend of her ex-husband was going to visit them.
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so siblings.

His ho.eostatlc view would
,ues«on both the well-being
of the Siblings and the
etiological formulation. For
those family .embers „ho remain well even if
the patient improves,
homeostasis would
predict the presence of a
relationship with a third-party
which attenuated the effects of cne
the special
^DGr^;^^ r-oi^^-;
relationship to the symbiotic
parent.
Similarly, this explanation accounts
(at some level) for why one
child in a family is chosen or
overlooked for the symbiotic relationi.

•

ship, or the ameliorating third-party
bond.

At a more fundamental level,

however, the homeostatic process
cannot, it seems, account for
parental

choice in symbiotic object."^^

DM Development from Paradigm

to Dissoluti on

Between 1956 (paradigmatic statement) and 1962
(dissolution), the
DB DM was extremely productive; from
1959-1962, it was divided into two

institutions, yet maintained its productivity.

It was during the 1952-

1959 period that the paradigm was elaborated and the major
portion of DB

work done, yet the differences in intellectual traditions
eventually
resulted in a schism between Bateson's Communication in
Schizophrenia^^

project and a project formed by Jackson in 1959, the Mental Rsearch

16,
^
It does
seem to me, however, that I. Boszormenyi-Nagy s (197 0)
framework can account for such a choice,
'

"'^This was the official name by which the project was known.
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Institute.

In retrospect at

middle DM development
emergerge.

.

'™

'-"-is in early and

thpr„ ^developed
,
'here
an Increasing
emphasis

on describing family
organization then changing
It u.e.,
s ug ic
(I e
d
.
doing
therapy)
and with this shift
^
camP a
widening split between
the adherents to
the
coinmunicational and the
rel;,t-ionai
relational aspects of
the paradigm.
•

,

.

,

•

^^^^^^-^^-^^^^^=^::L^I^^

During
ring 1953
1953, thP
the project had begun
to tape
schizophrenic communication
n as part
nart of their
t-i.
early communications
research (Haley. 1,72,
p. u,)
„3,, ^^^.^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
Kosen. (a therapist „ell-.„o„„
for his approach „lth
schisophrenics, and
began to study a nu.her
of psychotherapists
(Haley. 1,72, p. n.).
During
1935, a good deal of time „as
spent In formulating and
refining the paradigmatic 1956 statement,
hut In Pehruary,
1956. the project Brought
In
the parents of a patient
who consistently panicked
within several minutes
of each parental visit
to the hospital (Haley,
1976a. p. 72).
This first
in Vivo family session
occurred in xyjo.
1956
Un
hh-;. point,
.
up to this
research on
schizophrenia had been largely
deductive, with some Induction
work on
the audio-tapes.
With the Inclusion of this
particular parental pair,
the DM embarked on their
future mode of focusing on the
actual behavior
of families. At this point, they
began using video-tapes, in
response
•

•

.

m

to

•

the need to adequately capture the
multiple levels of communication,

particularly the non-verbal aspects (as
they often functioned as qualifiers)

.

Their first documented full-family
Interview occurred sometime

during 1957.
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1.

.a.U. sessions.

™

p^,,.^^ .e,a„

and vocal intonations,
but these apparently
became dead-ended (Haley
1976a. p. 73).
The 1,58 WeaUand and
aac.son article on the
precipitation Of a schizophrenic
episode appears to he an
expression of hoth
the atte.pt at description
and the ne„ly „or.ed
out specific connection
between double binding and
acute psychotic reactions.

With the new focus on actual
fa.lly behavior, differences
a^ong
DM ™e.bers which had been
Inherent but quiescent became
„ore evident
and divisive. Haley
(1976a, p. 73) perceived the
differences In ter.s
Of "...what aspect of
co^unicatlon to focus upon and what
terminology
and theoretical models to
"
use
use.
Qni-r.- .1^,
^i
j ^
A split
developed
between a "strictly-

communicational approach
FHi-udcn aeaimg
dealina with
xiitu ^-k^
a
the description
of observable
messages in terms of Logical Types,"
and an "internal processes
wing"
which emphasized the codification of
messages,

or the internal processes

of the receiver, and centered on
perception and learning." (Haley,
1976a,
p.

73).

belonged

Though implicit, it is obvious from
Haley's account that he
to

the first group.

The first group, termed the "behavioral wing"
by Haley, argued for

attention only to observabl^s, (in this case,
"strictly observable
messages") (p. 74) in the interests of avoiding
"age old problems of
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the interchange of
messages.

'"""""

tion must and there
in terms of message

complete,

(p

1?^?. "'P""^^
'

"-"^

=''==«iP-

also described
tL
"'^ H
descriptive system becomes
more

Sucb a series of descriptions
could lead to a systems
tbeory of Human
beings (Which was the
explicit goal of both wings,
according to Haley
fp. 7M0.
They also preferred to
not generalize the DB
pattern, feeling
it would lose explanatory
power.
The "internal processes"
wing argued that this
appellation was a
misnomer because the distinction
between a message and the
codification
of a message by the receiver
was fallacious.
They later argued that the
terminology should be established
as a higher level of
generalization
than the description of messages
(Haley, p. 73), in other
words, that
there be developed "meta" concepts.
(For this reason, they were
characterized later by Haley (p. 74)
as the "higher generalization"
wing).
Thus, they objected to restricting
the double bind specifically
to the

interpersonal patterns pathogenic for
schizophrenia and preferred to use
it more broadly, even to help
explain evolutionary processes and the
telencephallzation of the brain (p. 74).

Concepts used comfortably by

this group apparently included: "learning,
perception, awareness, ex-

pectation and the language of emotion" (P.
73).

At Issue were such

concerns as whether the receiver was aware, or was
perhaps mispercelving
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or Misinterpreting, and
what his/her experience
was.

included a pheno.enological
element.

Clearly this wing

One infers Jackson helped
consti-

tute this wing, because of
his occupation with
interpersonal processes
and clinical work; Bateson
.ay also have had so.e
participation herethe emphasis on higher
generalization would appeal to
hi..
Though it
is .ore difficult to guess
what his stance would be with
regard to

phenomenology, he differed sharply
with Haley (Bateson, 1976,
p. 106)
over the power dynamic, so
perhaps he was not averse to
pheno.enological
concerns. Balanced against this
is his predilection for
abstracted

systems approaches, and the integration
of experience and systems might
or might not have seemed dubious
to him at that point.
Obviously,

Bateson's position here is unclear;
so is Weakland's. It is difficult
even to speculate about the latter's
position here, though it would not
be surprising if he were wholly identified
with neither wing and in
fact, served a mediating function which
helped the project to produce
as much as it did over the next six years.

Certainly, some cohesive-

ness remained; it would not be surprising to
find out that Weakland
had supplied some of it.

What is surprising is that the rift continued.

"The higher

generalization wing argued that the behavioral wing was too narrow
in

approach and the behavioral wing argued that the other was too diffuse
and ambigious to have useful application to the data." (Haley, 1976a,
pp.

74-75).

in 1958,

These differences in approach began to appear in papers

the next year that the project members published (Haley, p.

75)

.
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The

next expressed

Use„

.^j,,,,,

.bout fa.U, organization
during 1936 and probabl.
1957 also. Again
the pressures ol
e^plrlcall, observing
ia.lUes brougHt out fundamental
Characteristic differences a.ong
project members tbat tbclr
earlier

.ore abstract work bad
allowed to re„ln submerged.

Haley (1976a.
points out that within a
general framework of
agreement there
was considerable agreement.
Disagreement arose over choice
of theoretical model. Whether to
focus on total family
processes or partial family
processes, and differences In
assumptions regarding motivations
of family members
P.

89)

^^^^I-t-i^ti^^I^^

With regard to family organiza-

tion, Haley (1976a,
pp. 89-90) has pointed out that any
description of
a family must hang upon -some
implicit or explicit analogy"
(paradigm?)

and with the shift from individual
to family processes, the
previous

psychiatric analogies were inappropriate.

Though there was project

consensus that the preferred model
was some form of homeostatic system
that involved levels, there was
debate about what specific form it
should take.

Bateson wanted to use some adaptation
of Von Neumann's

Theory of Games despite protests from other
project members and his own

awareness that the assumptions of Game Theory
would not work for family
interaction.

Haley wanted a model using homeostatic organization
where

rules for the family were Level

I

and rules for who was to make the

family rules at Level II; Bateson objected to the
assumption that a

family should be described in terms of members seeking
to control other
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He

p„.e„ea

.Ha.

... „

^„ ^^^^^

"""""" "
-»U..

m

,.,,,.3. pa„e.ns

„a.e..s po3U.o„

the DM,

,ra..n. .ec.e

«p,.3.e.

.,,.3o„.

except In Bateson's
own work.

With regard to what
aspect of

^

or,,ni^

should he fo.
Jcused
"Pon. Bateson.s preference
was to e„phas..e the
OB as a characteristic
-anSSCe in schizophrenic families,
then to generalize
gcueraiize that
tZt sequence to
other phenomena whereas ofhp-r t,v-^
other project members
preferred to focus on
patterns of families' oreani 7;,h-,'^r.
organization, almost a set
ot typologies.
Though
Haley does not elaborate
on the origin of this
latter position it
appears related to .arson's
interest in correlations
between characteristic interactional patterns
and psychiatric nosology.
Here Bateson's
position apparently prevailed.
•

i

Each project member had a
different position on the issue
of individual motivati^

that is, on assumptions about
why people in families

did what they did.

Haley preferred the idea that
people did what they

did in order to control, govern
or influence events in
relation to
other people; Weakland proposed
no motivation for parents
posing a

double bind to a child, but emphasized
the motivation of attempting
to
conceal it once it was done; Bateson
posited both his original idea that
a central motivation was concealment,

(with punishment if concealment

was breached) and also ascribed to more
traditional concepts for motivation, e.g., fear, hate, love, threats
of punishment and avoidance of

pain (Haley, 1976a, pp. 90-91).
Haley.

Jackson's position is not reviewed by
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What is quite obvious,
however
r, IS
is that
thaf th.
the positions taken
by each
member durine thp^^i i-nrs
™^
two
n^jor
8
controversies was characteristic
tor the
Individual and relatively
consistent
with his previous and
y
future work
For instance. Bateson's
position favored abstracted
fornul ations and a
largely (though of course
not completely) deductive
approach; Hal ey
has what see.s to „e an
apt description of
Bateson's approach.
Bateson's lifelong preference,
in general w,. t„
•

i,

v,

CO generalize that
sequence into the field of evaluation, biological processes
and so on. (1976a,
p^gol

It would
.

^ke

abstractedness.

sense that Haley in particular
would notice Bateson's

One of the prevailing values
of the DB DM was a strong

positive valuation on efficacy;
the practical, effective
and/or productive
was highly regarded. Therapy
was regarded as a for. of
problem-solving
(e.g., see Haley's

Problem-Sol^^

1976b) and the project prided

itself as having had success with
families that had been therapeutic

failures in other therapies.

The positive valuation on efficacy
was

certainly held by all the DB members,
but none with such a single-

mindedness as Haley.

Haley's style was to home in on a problem
and ob-

literate it, often with what feels like
paradoxical judo, always reframing a situation into the guise of a
problem circumscribed enough to
solve.

Haley was particularly good at getting change in
obdurately

irrational and paradoxical families.
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One Of .he conco.i.ants
to this concern
for efficacy, however

Haley's lasting preoccupation
with the power dynamic.
the

for^l life of

was

His work dur ing

the DM and afterwards
centers ahout the issue
of

control.

His early interest in
hypnosis displays an interest
in control, particularly of the
paradoxical kind. In
1957(a), .ackson (footnote, p. 184) Cites Haley's
help for "the idea that
the control of the

definition of

a

relationship .ight he used as
a descriptive tool
for

depicting family interaction.

m

1959(a), Haley developed the
con-

trol issue .ore fully,
crediting Bateson with the
communications hypothesis that it is difficult
for a person to avoid
defining, or talcing

control of the definition of,
his/her relationship with another
(1959a,
In
324).
other
p.
words, a person cannot not
qualify a message (1959a,
pp. 323-324).

A person must speak

a verbal message in a
particular tone
of voice, and if he says nothing,
that, too, is qualified
by the posture he presents and the
context in which his
muteness appears ... For example, if a
person is silent when
he is expected to speak, the silence
becomes a qualifying
message, and if a man neglects to kiss
his wife good-bye
when she expects it, this absence of
this movement qualifies
his_other messages as much as, if not more
than, the presence

The only way, according to Haley's analysis,

that a person can

avoid indicating what is to take place in a
relationship and therefore

18-.

Note the 1956-1957 concern with descriptive language
for family
processes.
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avoid defining
^^
nc-ns .t.
.3 to xnco^gruently negate
sc^e crucial part
of his
statement along any of the
four formal characteristics
"-ci-xiaLxcs of
o£ any
a„v message
(19593, p. 325):
(1)

I

(2)

am saying something

(3)

to you

(4)

in this situation

A person can Incongruently
negate any of these
characteristics and
avoid defining the relationship.

However, a sugary of
these ploys reads

like a list of schizophrenic
symptoms:

^h"

^e^nifh^rLrLia^ttghf

.°:ir^h'
head is in good shape;
orlhe"
,
smxle or odd tone of voice.
If the patient desJes
thltt
IS speaking, either by
referring to himsel in he
person or calling himself by
another name, the psychJatrist
notes that he is suffering
from a loss of identity
?f he
person indicates that "voicesare saying these things
'

he

nis message is a message,
perhaps by busily spelling out his
words the psychiatrist considers
this a maniLta^Ln of
dissociated thinking. When the
patient denies that Ms
message is addressed to the other
person, the psychiatrist
considers him delusional. If the
patient denies his presence
in the hospital by saying that
he is in a castle or a prisoS
the psychiatrist notes that
he is withdrawn from reality.
When the patient makes a statement in
an incongruent tone of
voice, he is manifesting inappropriate
affect.
If he responds
to the psychiatrist's behavior
with messages which qualify
that behavior incongruently, he is
autistic. (Halev 1959a
'

p.

'

327)

These linguistic maneuvers are implicit ways
to avoid defining a

relationship or the behaviors

to

take place as constituents of it.

In

fact, Haley (p. 324) regarded interpersonal
relationships as classifiable

300

with regard to the
ways people used to
deal with Hdefinition
^^^1
f
(i.e., control), problems.
•

The strategies and
ploys devised by
naiey in his
hi. ^.
y Haley
therapy with schis
phrenic families exemnlifv
-Plxfy the issue of
control to the point
that the
DB approach has been
critici^PH
criticized
this area (First,
1975).
Haley's
more recent works, (e.g

m

-;

m

.g.,

•

Prnhi^,. c
Proy^-solv^l^
i

•

The^

1976b) use the issue
of control rather
unabashedly,
^^ as merely
y, excusing it
explicit in DB
therapy and implicit in
other therapies
nerapies.
R.^.
Bateson,
again being consistent With his position
throughout DM development,
took serious exception to the concentration
on control.

Tbi ie::d"tt-°f.L"t::^^tj

m^

the
of po'er alway
a falfr(thou^gh

"

^rruoL^h

--^-1^-:!
strongly- that

conir^^iona^ire^ls^eL^ly:^

all such metaphors derived
from pleroma and applied
lo crea
direction, and the direction
is not less wrong or less
socially pathogenic because
the associated my^hoLgy
is in
part self-validating among
those who believe it' and
It. [his emphasis] (Bateson,
1976, p. 106)19

Obviously, the differences between
Bateson and Haley over the
issue of control ran deep.

To look at a broader perspective
for a

moment, it was Haley who did a greater
share of therapy where the issue

of control and strategies is, of
course, more pressing than in theory.

Moreover, the structure of reality in the
DB framework is conducive to

in this vein, see also Bateson, 1976,
p. 86.
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a po„er interpretation.

If one cannot not

such cedents hold so.e
power,

cogent on

(which they do),

a message, and

U

then a power Interpre-

tation is a consistent
interpretation.

Jackson's primary line of
development has already been
reviewed
With regard to the development
of the paradigm's
relational element.
Weakland's main interests are
persistently more difficult to
discern.
He published fewer papers
than did the other project
members, yet a high
proportion of his works were
landmarks (especially 1956;
1958 with Jackson; I960; 1972 with Fry;
and 1974).
He presented a chameleon-like
image, extending Jackson's
homeostatic concept (1960), and
also Fry's
work on third-party and institutional
double bind (1962).
1974, he

m

attempted to tie the DB to a larger
framework and cast a perceptive eye
on its history. He appears to
have been equally facile, with
therapeutic work, at least toward the
later years of the project after
dissolu-

tion, when he concentrated on brief
family treatment.

Organizational schism

.

Suffice it to say, there were persistent
and

fundamental differences among project members.

Although these differen-

ces probably included personality frictions,
it is also apparent that

these individuals were approaching the project
from disparate intellectual traditions.

They differed in their assumptions about human nature

and motivations, the nature of relationships (e.g.,
Jackson's position
vs. Bateson's vs. Haley's power dynamic), and epistemologies

;

their

view of what constituted important problems differed somewhat: Bateson
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stressed abstracted
vlewpoint.j
wpomts, H=i.
Haley strategic and
Jackson experiential
t.e pressure
empirical contact, t.e
differences In temperament and tHe co™it.ents
to disparate
Intellectnal traditions
developed
into an organizational
schism.
In November
vemoer, 1958
ly^B, Jackson
t
v
.
founded
the
Mental Research Institute.
Jackson v-L^oo,
(1968 p
v; a^
p. v)
at one point briefly
described MRI's inception:

-er

Our first grant started
in March ]9Sq
consisted of .yself. J.les
^ul^.T,]

Xr^iltliT'"
sTZVrTi..

^^^^""-^

tt;so^;rotcr.:Sd^"=f'

l>"'

had a close
'"^ umbrella
of the Palo Mto
Marcus Krupp)
Dr.
"""'.""'^^-^ it split off as
an autonomous reqppi-r-h
j ^adminlstratlve staff a^d^^of^Dl^e^to":.""'^

working relationship

?he l^t
Medical R.

TT'"'

^J'^^^T^^;::^'^

Desplte numerous efforts at
clarification (Bateson, et al.,
1963;
Haley, 1976a and 1976b;
Jackson, 1,68),

ship between them was often
confused.

the two projects and

the relation-

It may well be because
they

shared membership to some
extent, and even at one point,
the same building.
Jackson, 1968, p. V) has said
that Haley and Weakland
subsequently
(after 1962) joined MRI as
full-time principal Investigators
and that
Bateson became a research associate,
participated in treatment, and

served as an Informal research
consultant.
p. X),

Haley (1976a, p. 92 and 1976b,

however, has indicated that Bateson
had no part in the MRI.^"^

After the 1962 DB dissolution then,
Jackson, Haley and Weakland were
"Although the two groups have been confused
with each other in
actuality Mr. Bateson declined to be a member
of the Mental Research In"^^^
^^^^ ''^^ project to be confused with that group."
M^Q7^^^
Uy/bb, T'^
footnote, p. X) "...Bateson would not allow his
project to be
part of the Mental Research Institute and so
no personnel or proiects
were shared." (1976a, footnote, p. 92)
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once
^^^^^^
MH. . app„..H.

^^^^^^^^^

^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^

p3«.e..„.,
^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^

indirectly relevfln^ to
hr. ^
a larger conceptual
view, is Satir's
Conjoint
Family Therapy (1967).

urse

i

The organizational
schls™ gained expression
in late 1,58 and
early 1959 and was based
on fundamental
differences
j-j.it:rences in temperament
te.
and
intellectual framework
ework. mi
>/n?T
has continued to the
present time. The DB
project continued to function „„j ^tunction, productively
and creatively, from
1959 to
1962, elaborating the paradigmatic
elements laid down during
the early
years.
The ability to do so
speaks clearly of the
ability of the DM

m

,

members to work concertedly
towards certain goals while
screening important differences.
If nothing else, the
DM functioned to allow that
collaboration, at the expense,
no doubt, of the refinement
of individual
positions, but With the result
that the productive life
of the research
g^^ouP was extended by a third.

Haley (1976a, p. 91) has given
a clue
that facilitated the collaboration:

to the

DM validated standards

that is, he later articulated
the

"framework of consensus" within which
the members could work.

To this

extent, the DB project remained a
coherent research program during its

last three years.
It would seem apparent that the
disagreements within the
project appeared when there was an attempt
to look at real
people communicating real messages. At the
more abstract
level, there was surprising agreement. All
project members
believed the best approach was in terms of some theory
of
systems with an emphasis upon rules and patterns and
upon
stability and instability over time. All project members

.
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8°vernln8 process.
Additionally, all consldekd
If
"""^""^
that the sch zophrenL's
behai,"""^ "^5' '"i^P"ve
to the particular
uli of
organization In which he
was raised.
It was also
'""'"5' "^''-rs
responded in errorfactlva^ed
'
w
the governing proce:rsL:
Tdes^rlhel
described "'^''k^"'
in an hierarchical
way. (Haley, 1976a,
91)

"

aff^

p.

The list Of consensual
points reviewed by Haley
reads like a su^-ry Of the paradigm's characteristics.
There are Russell's levels,
the
ho.eostatic mechanisms, and
the reconceptualization
of schizophrenia as
adaptive and meaningful.
That this set of consensual
beliefs facilitated the
continued existence of the DM Is Obvious.
The schis. occurred when
the DB had turned

almost exclusively abstract
work to .ore empirical concerns,
particularly with respect to the
issues of family organization
and family
therapy. The consensual beliefs
allowed them to pursue these
issues in
fron,

concert

Second shift:

f

amil^_the^

With the attempt to describe family

organization, the DB project began
to think about changing it.

It is

very clear this was a derivative
goal, as they had originally had
no
plans for family treatment (Jackson
and Weakland, 1961).
Haley (1972,
p.

114) portrays the shift as the idea occurring
to them that the way

to

change schizophrenia would naturally be
to change family organizations,

This occurred in approximately early 1957.^^
21

Later in the year they

The project began seeing families with a diagnosed
schizophrenic
family member in 1956, but Jackson at one point
(1961, p. 272) indicates

.
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discovered that several
other people
pxe had
P
nad also
al.o begun to try
and change

WUes

(Hale,. 1,72, p.
115,, ,3 f a^lly-o.lented

than in collaborative
1„.1.«„,, .He.aples.^^

cUnlelans .ather

1„ ,3c., .ac.son and

WaaUand. writing 1„ 1951,
state, that though fa.lly
treatment was

a

growing trend, there wa=:
Qt-in ^
was still
only a limited amount of
such work being
done, and even less
published.
i

In 1958. they applied for
a grant to change
fa.Ules, and began to
further reconceptnallze
adolescent (and early adult)
schizophrenia as
an outcome of difficulties
in disengaging fro™ the
family (Haley, 1972,
pp. 115 and 116).

During their efforts to change
families, the DB DM

developed a clinical therapy and
theory that was both consistent
with
the paradigm and DM characteristics
and was easily differentiated
from
other, later forms of family therapy
developed around different paradigms
For instance, they point out that
as a clinician moves from indivi-

dual work to family treatment, s/he
will become more active, less interested in psychiatric diagnoses or
dynamic formulations and more interested in describing the identified patient
in terms of an inter-

locking milieu in a social or subcultural
context; s/he will also
that just prior to joining the project he had been
seeing patients and
parents together. The patients in this case, however,
were neurotic
and autistic children, not schizophrenic adults. (See
Jackson, 1965,
p. 2 footnote)
'

22

In fact, I. Boszormenyi-Nagy had begun his experimental family
treatment unit for schizophrenic women at Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute in 1956, and Bell and Ackerman had been seeing families.
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increase the number of
peoole xn
people
in the .treatment
(per case) (Jackson
and
Weakland, 1961, p. 31)
.

A bo.y Of technique and
..eory „as developed,
the

^Hucu^e

Of the

fa^l, and

„Uh

.he e.pHasls on

the interpersonal
co^unieatlons, not

the content.

Thus, a well-tested
fltst session ga^hlt Is
to asse.hle
the fa.113,, ask the™
to pick one of thelt
problems and negotiate a

solution.

The family therapist
then listens, not for the
content of
their process, but for the
structure-the characteristic
sequences of

interaction that occur.

These can take a variety
of for.s: Individuals

blading each other "or a child
[„ho raises] his demands
each tl.e the
parents are about to agree,
or one person [who "Invalidates")
another's
perceptions." ^(First
irst, ly/:,,
197S p.
n
Q^
tt,
9).
The
structure of these interactions
become the focus of the change
efforts.

A favorite DB change technique
is "reframing" or "relabeling,"

which by changing the context of
a behavior, changes its meaning,
and
thus often changes people's behavior.

Thus, behaviors of the identified

patient are relabeled as normal, as
rational tactics, to look positive
if possible (First,

1975).

At times "mad" behavior is reframed
as "bad",

or vice versa; either shift in direction
can take the identified patient

out of pathological position.

First (1975) points out some spectacular

examples of reframing.

Probably the boldest example of this was the husband who
chased his wife with an axe, and was told he was trying
to get close to her.
Candide was clearly a talented
relabeler, and so too was Tom Sawyer, whose "reframing"
of the task of whitewashing a fence is quoted as exemplary
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by the authors of Chanop
labeling in practiSf^'

Ho».^

"^^"^P^^^ °f re-

The family of an anorectic
1.
is askpH
"h^
i
you had this fasting problem?"
m^^t'lgy^P

'^^^
9)

Other techniques were frankly
irrational:
Don Jackson, asked how
he might try to produce
insight
^^^^ ^h:rj?^t;eat
thJ i^^ugh^^rihi^rsif
r^^^
let them dLc^^r'^LrL y'^
e^L^a^ J^f Lr"^^'r^^^"
'

they.re^doing!:!'^.i.t:
At times,

i9?r;!ir

^'^^ ^'^^

'

''''''

the irrationality could
culminate in a full-blown thera-

peutic double bind, such as
prescribing the symptom.

Accompanying, or following, the
efforts at therapy, were developments in family theory, e.g.,
Bateson (1961, p. 139) pointing
out that

when they attempted to determine
the location of control in
schizophrenic
families,

they found "something very
peculiar- that control and responsi-

bility are not located in the same
person."
Several issues emerged during the
development of their family
therapy.

Weakland directed his attention

to a

particularly behavioral

concern, one consonant with the
communicational aspect at a technical
level, and to the relational at a
meta-theoretical one.

This increasingly appears as _the most important
question
in family therapy, or even for schizophrenia
or psychopathology quite generally. Unless one is to fall back on
some idea that people by fundamental nature are
oriented
toward disease, so that pathology is inherently selfsustaining, rather than "normality is normal," the central
issue is not the question of the original root causes of
schizophrenia. It is not even the question of what sort
of present family interaction leads to schizophrenic symptoms

308

in one member.

Instead, the central issue
concerns the

makes for the fundamental
stability and persistencP of
these family systems that
is so

st^iking'in'he "ace of

--^^^^^'^^^ of%h'rL:bers,
hli?^:::t d'd::iref r^'T
^""^ ^^^"g^' ^nd often the
best efforts
nTJft
of
a therapxst?
(Weakland, 1962, p. 68; his
emphasis)
^^^^

r

Also of theoretical concern was
the effect of family therapy
on a
variety of areas; the prognosis
of the identified patient,
other family
members, long-term change.
The issue of therapeutic efficacy
was re-

peatedly addressed (Haley, 1976a
and 1976b; Jackson and Weakland,
1961,
pp.

34-35; Weakland, 1962).

Also,

the shift the DM implied, from
disease

and medicine to the social sciences,
was of particular interest to
Jackson;
he and Satir pointed to some developing
family concepts they thought par-

ticularly promising, including: "family
homeostasis, coalitions within
the family and their stability,
role-playing, acquisition of family models,

three-generation theory, the theoretical applications
of the game theory,

decision-making [and] recognition of resemblance..."
(Jackson and Satir,
1961, p. 46).

Another, less insistent, concern was the nature of
change.

The DB

notion of change, according to First (1975) originated in
Bateson's work

with Russellian levels and levels of learning.
As I trace it, this notion of change first appears,
innocently enough, in Bateson's thoughts about a porpoise: the experimenters were trying to teach the porpoise
to produce new behavior.
Each time it did something new
accidentally, they would reward it. The porpoise would
begin each show by displaying its latest "new" trick, but
it wouldn't get a reward unless it did something still
newer, by chance.
The porpoise grew understandably moody.

.
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of behavior never be
oje observed
observe^""."""""'
the species.
learned to learn.

m

It had

This corresponds with the cvKo^n.^is "first order- chaLI
°*
T>^<=^thL
T'""
^"''"i'^^ing one
Item of data (or behavior)
T^"
"^"'^
second order change:
Sis if °
Clon that is carried
21 operaou" "I ch
way of behaving." Second „r/
™"P"t«'s]
"meta-level" of prog^^^L":'" ''"^"^
^
'° ^

L

T
T

"

^

This second-order change
corresponds to Bateson's
"deutero-learning." Fro. accounts, it
would appear that families
treated with DB
therapy would be Induced
into first-order changes,
but Ironically, not
second-order?

These theoretical concerns
continued

to be

articulated throughout
the development of their
mode of family therapy until
the DMs dissolution, and to a lesser extent
by some members, afterwards.

Wldlssolutio;^l^m2,

Word reached the professional
public of the pro-

ject's dissolution in Family Process

.

Gregory Bateson is disbanding his
research group after
nine years of research on the nature
of connnunication
His Family Therapy grant terminates
in August of this
year and he plans to release his
associates. He will
then prepare a book on the project work
and study the
metacommunicative behavior of the octopus.
(1962,
13A)
p.

At the time of dissolution Bateson had
remained Director, Haley
and Weakland were Research Associates, Jackson
and William Fry were

Consultants (Haley, 1962,

p.

69 footnote).

Haley later (1972, p. 117)

stated that Bateson had plans to study communicational
phenomena in
\
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In 1967 Hale. wen.

,He

PKUadelphla CMld Guidance
CUnic.

to hi.

and Salvador Minuchin's
mutual benefit.

Bateson (1976f.,

n
p.

ln';l aptly
105)
considered the ten year
project "enor-

mously and nontrivially
productive...
In ten years time,

„e, as usual. „as
,uite correct

they produced: a
revolutionary paradig. for
a mys-

terious disorder; a
productive BM that elaborated
the paradigm itself.
extended it to new ai-cdis
areas and
.^h-ifi-o^ p
ana snitted
focus twice
LWice (.CO
( tn
f^m-ii,,
tamily
organization,
^hen therapy); a clinical
practice-one of the forms of
family therapywlth its theory, techniques
and rationales; and a
body of related work
that fills out the framework.
Xn addition, mi was
established and continues its „orU to the time
of this writing. Also.
Jay Haley founded
PiScess. the first Journal for
clinical family concerns; he
served
as its editor, from 1962-1969.
The DB project pubUcally
reconceptuali.ed
a human psychological disorder
and helped to open up the
family therapy
field as a field (along with
such other '.pioneer-types., as
Ackerman,

Boszormenyl-Nagy, Whitaker. and Bowen)

.

This opened up family work in

schizophrenia as both a content area and
a reconceptualizntion of the
disorder.

Their reconceptualization. interestingly,
did the same

thing for schizophrenia that Freud had
done for the neuroses: defined
the behaviors as adaptive, and
meaningful,

then provided a revolutionary

reconceptualization.

Formal DM characteristics.

Another Important point is the congruence

.

311

between DM develoomenf
in the DB
opmant xn
project and Kuhnlan DM
characteristics
is ohvlous. nrst Of
an. that the BB project
had a paradl,™,

l„
a revolutionary one,
and a coherent research
structure, as well as a
constellation of .roup
co™it„ent3-those consensual
points, especially

"scientific hahlts-lncludlng
Intellectual, verbal, mechanical
and/or
technological" Is also the case,
except for "Intellectual."
There.
the members clearly differed
and differences
j-iierences in rho=„
,
these intellectual
habits
developed into an institutional
split. Also, the.e was only
the

,,1^

unanimity that Kuhn and Master.an
so practically qualified,
in proble.choice, adequate solution
and
coiranunication

The project met the criteria
of internal DM structure.

It had

heuristic models-levels or
hierarchies and Logical Types, as
well as
closed-system homeostatic devices.
Its symbolic generalizations
included
such terms as: message and
meta-message, reality markers, double
bind,
therapeutic bind, incongruence,
identified patient, and reframing.

Its

values included: the positive valuation
of efficacy in treatment, and
a bent toward problem-solving;
delivering care to as many as possible

as quickly as feasible; as well as
the ambivalence in values between

science and clinic work, complexity and purity
with triviality.

It

even had the prescience to provide instrumentation;
the project made
extensive, and early, use of video-taping in clinical
work.

Finally,

it provided theories for both schizophrenia
and clinical practice.

\

CHAPTER

VII

During the preceding
cnapters,
g chapterq

T
I

have used a modified
Kuhnian

analysis to elucidate and
internrp^
interpret the emergence
of family therapy.
It is now necessary
to ev^ln^ho
evaluate +-u
this interpretation
y
with respect to the
emergence of family therapy,
m.^
^cthe efficacy
y theranv
of this form of
modified
Kuhnian analysis and, in
Chapter
r VIII
viii, the implications
F
nn.m
and applicability
of such an analysis to
the contemporary
felt
r
j-cxL crisis in n.
.1
psychology.
•

•

J-

of_th e Shift

to

Family

m

Th»_^

It is my contention that
a modified Kuhnian
analysis allows an in-

formative interpretation of
events preceding and
co-existent with the
emergence of family therapy,
and that the analysis provides
a useful

interpretation of at least one family
therapy approach, the DB, from
inception through formal dissolution.
Such an analysis allows us to
interpret some events in a different
manner than previously, and
occasionally, to find sense in what
had appeared to be random processes.
This analysis has identified and
interpreted certain problems in

classical psychoanalysis as related to the
emergence of family therapy.
This set of problems

the anomalies were obdurate discrepancies
be-

tween framework-generated expectations and
empirical findings.

Though

psychoanalysis encountered a variety of problems, not
all were anomalies
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nor were they related t-n
to the emergence
of

pewits

fa.Uy therapy.

The analysis

the

.l„ere„tlatlo„ o. ..anomalies.ro„ ^ohle^s as
Class... the laentines
those „hleh

a ,e„e.al

„e.e .elatea to the
lesO's fa.Uy

therapy shift.
Similarly, the „aifled
Kuhnlan analysis e^phasUes
out of all the
controversy swirling ahont
psychoanalysis, certain
controversies .nrln,
the early and middle
1950's as related
rp^=,^^^ .to the
appearance of family
therapy during the latter
part of this
Lnxs period.
^
period
A v
Kuhnian
interpretation
allows us to View these
controversies as constituents
of a '.felt crisis.,
during the first part of
the IWQ.s In classical
psychoanalysis. The
interpretation highlights the
presence of controversies,
the re-exa.l„atlon Of fundamentals and
the awareness by the
people Involved that there
existed a crisis. Although
the question of parameters
in psychoanalysis
is often regarded as
important, only within a
Kuhnian interpretation is
it related to the emergence
of family therapy and is
it identified as a
bona fide crisis for classical
analysis. Moreover, a Kuhnian
analysis
provides an interpretation for
the emergence of family therapy
in the
1950's; with the emergence of anomalies
in the
c risis

in the early inO's,

mO's

and 1940's and

the Kuhnlans would interpret this
sequence

a s probably evolving toward
the emergence of a new paradigm,
and would

predict this paradigmatic emergence as
occurring soon after the aware ness o£ felt crisis.

Previously,

therapy had remained obscure, even
example, speaks to this issue:

the
to

timing of the emergence of family
the participants; Halye,

for
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"

meetings, so their ^ork
^'""'^
was knoL""'
locally, if at all.
Curiously a decade later^!
pists stLi
1'"^harn:tt're:cTo:^:r'\"rth'^"i'^
°'^"erIf they had been
Introduced, thev still h=j
'°
cuss thelr'work a d
eek a ^olo'" °""
°"
"
'changing
a family Is all abou^!

^

---=c^L"-^"jrthrindr"j"r
individual,
and
psychoanalytic
I"? rhinh:

treat^len^

'""^''''^
the Psychia^rL
esLwLLeft I^terTl
struggle.
one who was respectablP
Every'° Practice psychoanalysis
or at least ^n
u
^^.P^^^^-hoanalytically oriented
treatLnt.
(^aLy'
V
!
li^/xD,
lb p. Z; emphasis added)

f

The Kuhnian interpretation
places the emergence of these
nearly
Simultaneous family therapy
groups within an intellectual
and historical
framework.
The analysis identifies
the inception of at least
one of
these approaches, the DB. as
a revolutionary paradigm.
The "paradigm.,

cancept expresses the combined
conceptual and technical power of
an
innovation like the DB hypothesis.
A Kuhnian interpretation helps
to

explain not only why such

a

"paradigm" becomes so influential (it
answers

questions, solves problems and attracts
adherents) but how (through

elaboration by normal the science activity
of adherents into

a DM).

The paradigm concept also provides
a crucial perspective by which to

differentiate the DB family approach from the
classical psychoanalytic
(and also the relational);

the paradigm in these clinical approaches

depended upon mechanisms of change and the
techniques by which to gain
such change.

Their criterion serves to differentiate approaches
more
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reliably than disciplinary
name, or the
tne trainin.
training and
.
credentials of
therapists
.

A Kuhnian analysis
using th^
usinp
the

paraaign."„ and "DM"
concepts allows
^

•

an interpretation of
the DB group
ernnn'os work as
the elaboration and
protection/nuturance of the nar^r^^c^
paradigm. This analysis
allows a non-intuitive
interpretation of
the 0„ „as ahle to
function fro„ 1„,-1,«
aes-

P"e

its institutional
division;

the structure and
functions of the

'W.

provided the hasis for
sufficient consensus, and
the ^echanis^s h.
„hich
divisive concerns were
suhdued, so that
productive „or.
th,
could continue.

^

The Kuhnian analysis,
however, cannot explain
why the DM underwent
this institutional split.
snlit
^a,,
(An
attempt will be made to do
so in Chapter

VIII)

.

A Kuhnian analysis allows
an interpretation about
the relationship
of periods of fundamental
innovation in science, with
periods of accretionary progress, highlighting
the dialectical relationship
between
them, and implying a model
of scientific development
more complicated

than the linear accretion of
facts.

It is particularly interesting
to

note that though normal science
is "usually considered the
real, or usual,
(or -normal')", a DM both
begins and end in revolutionary
science.
Finally, it should be noted that members
involved in the same

processes for which the Kuhnian schema was
designed, have found it
helpful in interpreting their own activities
to themselves

.

At least

some of the DB adherents, for example,
have late in their work referred

.

.
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to

KuHnUn concepts

elation

to ..ei. own

(Wa.Uwic. an,

Weakland. 1977; Weakland,
1974).

ControversipR

A ".odlfied Kuhnian analysis
of long-standing
controversies can
provide interpretations
particularly

relevant to debates between
the

adherents of different
approaches. I.e.,

m

Kuhnlan ter.s, 0„s.

The
analyses allows us to
Interpret certain of the
controversies Involving
BB „e.hers. Interpretatlonlsts
and relatlonlsts. (As
this Interpretation
has not, to .y knowledge,
been done previously.
It will be explicated
in rather more detail than
the preceding section).

There were a number of
controversies which were carried
out in
methodological terms, but which
upon examination with the
Kuhnlan schema,
are more productively
Interpreted as debates between DMs;
that is, they

are only ostensibly methodological.

If this type of controversy
con-

tinues to be debated at the
methodological level, it Is unresolvable
If it is debated at the
tne DM
un level,
IpvpI

^^
i
it is at least
potentially resolvable.

One such long-standing, sterile
controversy took place between Kurt

Eissler. an interpretationist, and
Freida Froimn-Reichmann, a relational

analyst

Ostensible methodologic al controversy between
the interpretatlonlsts
and the relationists

.

A good deal of the disagreement between these

two groups took the form of ostensible
methodological debates.

To
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illustrate, a segment of the
ne Eissi
er-v-rr.^Tn
u
i^xssier-Froimn-ReichTnann
ostensible methodological controversy will be
reviewed, with consent pointing
to the
implicit DM vs. DM quality
allowed by a Kuhnian
interpretation.
t>

Over a period of several
years, Eissler and Fromm-Reichmann
argued
in the literature,
Fromm-Reichmann emphasizing the
techniques which
fostered the therapeutic reality
relatior^ and Eissler concentrating
on the crucial role of
interprtation
Occasionally, Fromm-Reichmann
would take a swipe at interpretation
(and Eissler), while he would
more
than occasionally criticize her
technical innovations, rarely
confrontin;
.

directly the differences in mechanisms
of change.

Also, Eissler had a

number of colleagues, also interpretationists,
who took up the debate;
their comments and positions on these
subjects will be included with

Eissler

's,

as will some small examples of true,
intra -DM debates.

These

intra-DM disagreements are actual methodological
or semantic controversies (not ostensible) and thus, argument at
that level can produce
resolution; these will be included to provide
contrast with the inter-DM
debates.

Fromm-Rei chmann 's position

.

In 1943, Fromm-Reichmann discussed

"technical requirements" or modifications to classical psychoanalysis,

which had gradually developed during clinical practice with psychotics.
Since the ostensible methodological controversies largely involved
these seven "technical requirements", they will all be reviewed here.

As will become clear, many of the modifications were directed towards

.
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facilitating the therapeutic
reality relationship.
The first technical
modification concerned "the
couch."

It

was Fro^-Relchn^nn-s
contention that the "couch
regulation Is neither
understood nor followed by the
psychotic patient" (p. 133),
and sitting
behind the patient In the
heglnnlng of treatment was
contralndlcated as
It fostered unreality,
the therapist serving a
hrldge to reality for
the psychotic patient.
Moreover, depending upon

Uf e-hlstorles

and habits of neurotics.

It may or may not be
appropriate to lie on the couch and
so, she recom-

mended any position that allowed
patient and analyst to look at each
other whenever the patient wished.
Seated behind the patient, either

participant may mentally "wander away"
from the Interpersonal relationship

Fromm-Reichmann (1943, p. 133) also elaborated
on the analyst's
position, which later drew fire from Eissler.

Freud remarked that he could not endure to
have patients
gazing at him for eight hours. This suggests
a change in
the eight-hour system rather than the
maintenance of invisibility for those who share Freud's feelings.
Personally,
I have found a ten- or fifteen-minute
interval between
interviews most helpful.
Froimn-Reichmann's second technical modification addressed
what she

felt to be the rote, unspontaneous, going-through-the-motions
quality

which at times was found in the free association pattern, where for
the most part the patient talked and analyst listened.

She felt that

such an attitude at times masked the analyst's personal timidity.

The

319

the atteneion of a
ps.cMat.tst „Ho is ca.eful
.o s.ow .Hat He

Senu.„el. eonee.nea

„UH

.He

paUen.. „.„„e

quire
,s

an. .Ha. He ,3 .e.Hoa.-

call. .r..n, .0
.e-es.aHUsH .He .os. .po„..„.,,,

acive i„.e.ac.io„. s.^icl,
„UHin
pa.len. relations.

"

.He reference f.a„e
of .oc.o.-

(1943_ p. jj^,

Fromm-Relchinann's .hird terh„i^.i
.ecHnlcal modif ica.lon
was .he abandonmen.
Of free association;
she feU .ha. 1. „3S
'VUe unnecessary" .0 encourage free association
„lth ps.cHo.lc pa.lents
as the, e.Hlhl.ed
wi.hou. probing or pro^p.lng.
.he ea.erlal .Ha. .he
.echnl,ue of free
association was used .0 ellci..
she elabora.ed, moreover,
.ha. „1.H
increased experience, Insigh.
and s«U, 1. „as of.en
possible .0 proceed .0 the sa.e goals "by
an utterly unconventional,
direct, and precise

questionning." (p. 134)
Fron.n-Reich.an also abandoned
the technique of interpretation,
which
It soon will be seen, was
crucial to the practice of
psychoanalysis to

Eissler and other interpretationists

.

Fronun-Reichmann felt that psy-

chotic patients were able to
understand their verbal productions
far
more clearly than the analyst,
and as such, Fronnn-Reichmann felt
it to
be -crudely redundant for the
psychoanalyst to explain what he believes
he has understood." (p. 134)

indicated.

Rather, an appropriate response would be

At the time of writing (1943), she felt
that interpretation

of content had largely been abandonned and
interpretations regarding

transference, resistances, and defenses had been
reduced.

Fronun-
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anal.e.c .„3.,..,

.Wae„

provoking interpretations.

p..,en...
Further
i^urther,

.ess nee.

.He

,„3..H.

th.
there
was a danger of
inducing

what she termed
"anti-therapeutic
cic self
F
con.
seif-consciousness
by excess
5sive or
untimely interpretations"
(p. l-i^),
135)
, process
^P.
a
she felt had not he
)een
sufficiently attended to
in the literature
xLerature.
nm
Only .dynamic and interpersonal processes
.^ed.a.el, .eU.e.
.,e eUolos. o. a
ps.cHos.s
required interpretation
.
135). If I understand
(p. -LJ^),
a
^Pthis correctly
the
in.e.p.e.«o„3 „o.la p.ov..e
assocUUons .e.„ee„ .eU.onal
..na^.cs
and/o. events an. .He
.e.elop.en.
ps,.Hos.s. P.eCpUaUn,
.ac.o.s
would be very Important
In tHls form of clinical
«-xxnica± work.
«rk It appears that
the form of Interpretation
referred to Here Has to
do „ore „ltH relational than intrapsychic
dynamics, thougH both
produce InslgHt.
In
•

.

the relational DM, however
wever, insight
inq^c.h^ did
a^a not occupy
the same central role
in the change mechanism.

Fromm-Relchmann's fifth modification
concerned etiology, and parcularly "repressed content."
SHe felt tHat the contents
of repression
were not "all sexual
nature nor all due to hostility,
as advocated for
awhile by some psychoanalysts."

m

(p.

135)

Rather, all emotions, thoughts,

impulses, etc., which the patient
Had experienced regarding
significant

people In his life can became pathogenic
and the contents of repression.
If they are Incompatible with the
patient's private standards-learning

from the social standards of significant
persons in his/Her life. "It
is not the biological aspect of
sexuality but the pathological features

.
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Of .hei. interpersonal
relations wHlcH „ore
,re<,uentl. create sexual
problems." ^-L^'^-^,
(19A3 n
tu
p. 135)
Thus, the etiological
v^i^iudi clac,c-,v.i
cxassicai sequence is
stood on its head.

Fro™-Reich.ann-s sixth change
In technique „as
out Impulses to so„e
extent.

to •allow" acting-

Acting-out was regarded
as a not un-

con^on necessary preliminary
to verbal expression;
the latter should
never he forced, as any
heglnnlng rapport .Ight he
destroyed and preclude the possibility Of
further treatment,
light of this, Pro„™Relch.ann questioned whether
analysts should continue,
1„ all cases, to

m

suppress acting-out hy neurotic
patients during Interviews,
and whether
this suppression was always
directed to furtherance of
therapeutic a«s
or to fear of what the
patients would do If the acting-out
were permitted
Fronun-Reichxnann's last major
modification in technique involved
that

the therapist examine his/her
value system and be aware that
it inevitably

influenced the treatment of the
patient; psychotherapy, according
to her,
was not a value-free enterprise and
could not be.
"Psychoanalysts pretend in vain that their values are
irrelevant in therapy or influen-

tially non-existent in the psychotherapist.
for every psychoanalyst."
(p. 136)

There are legitimate values

In particular, Fromm-Reichmann

stressed examination of the degree of conventionality
held by each analyst; she felt that for psychotic patients,
particularly schizophrenics,

recovery did occur, within somewhat unconventional
expectations,

(p.

The analyst whose values included a marked conventional
set was often

136)
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disappointed In the adjustment of former
patients, and by establishing
these somewhat arbitrary guidelines,
at times Impeded that very adjustment.
Five years later, Froirnn-Reichmann
presented the changed engendered
by the relationalists as "changes
in the technique of psychoanalytic

treatment during recent years [with] regard
to both the establishment
of the doctor-patient relationship and
the approach to the contents of

psychotic communication." (1948, p. 164;
emphasis added).

By now, with

the assistance of the paradigm and DM concepts,
it's clear that these

modifications were far more than only methodological
or technical
disagreement.

The differences in the doctor-patient relationship
were

at the heart of the relationalist position; the reality
relationship,

not the transferential, was held to be both contextual and
curative

,

and as such, constituted a different mechanism of change, and therefore,
a different paradigm.

Similarly,

the differential treatment of verbal

content, with the relationalists eschewing interpretation, is related to
the relationalist paradigm and is an abandonment of the psychoanalysts'

therapeutic mechanism of change.

Interpretation was held

to be un-

necessary (as the problem was a surfeit of insight rather than too littl
in psychosis), and "inadvisable if not much of the time redundant."

(Fromm-Reichmann, 1948, p. 167)

With the abandonment of interpretation,

and the change in the doctor-patient relationship (from transferential
to reality-based),

Fromm-Reichmann was clearly commited to a different

paradigm and DM, the Sullivanian interpersonal.

With a Kuhnian analysis

.
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see

Of the controversy
between

Fro^-Reich^nn

and Kissler can be

seen as controversy
between two different
DMs
In 1948, Fronnn-Reichmann
defended the reality
'.^aj.xLy relation.!
relational element
from one of i^issler
Eisslp-r'cs criticism,
adopting a technical stance
1

•

^^^^^^^^

^L°L°L^"ie^:r:Lra"wo.id

:t:-a:rorr--n.

i^rwa"
as Kurt

:ft^';:t':?^L^S:e

r

Eissl^rhar'i^tLled!

''-'^ P^-isslveness, treat-

ZTs^^^

^''^^'^

Fromm-Reichmann here, argued in terms
of technical points in clini
cal practice to avoid while
establishing a therapeutic reality
relation
ship.

She did not deal with any of
those interrelated commitment
as-

pects of scientific practice now
termed as DM and she certainly
could
not have talked in terms of
differeing paradigms.

Eissler's position

.

In 1953, Eissler responded to some
of Fromm-

Reichmann's technical modifications.

Her modifications, particularly

with regard to the use of the couch,
provoked his ire; for example
(1953, p. 106):

1

Kurt R. Eissler, "Limitations to the psychotherapy
of schizophrenia,
Psychiatry 1943, VI, pp. 381-391.
'

.

-
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Freud reported some
of ^ho o u'"'^^"^^
Influenced the evolv^n
which
'of
in explaining his
^''^"Pl^requL?
Patient take the
supine position durlnnLithat
dislike Of
belng's-tLldTL^^^evI^al-hr™""^

p^o°:u°o"„':.eit:ht!

analyst

--rLt-'j^s:-

L"^:r^ihlh tlo^fr^nH^

"^^^

a face-to-face
P^f^'
technique
What^ve^ '^hnique
t^^
a therapist
may devise can be
used in
°'
principle. The valu" of
a JechnJLT measure
must rest on
'
objective factors
If if
therapist's
pleasure all the better
but'^h

decisive factor
technique:

,•„,!•

coincidence is not a
^"^ evaluating the given

Eissler continued in this
fashion regarding Freud's
reasons for
instituting the couch and
supine position. Besides
the slightly inappropriate air When attributing
the face-to-face seated
position to the
therapist's possible
exhibitionism, his rejolner
in the debate Is certainly strong, and put in
technical ter.s. With so
.any fundamental
points of disagreement between
the., representing different
DMs and
ranging through mechanisms
of change, diagnostic
categories appropriate
for treatment, mentors,
and roles and approaches of
the therapist, Eissler waxes wroth about the
couch, a relatively minor
point of technique.
Neither Eissler nor Fromm-Reichmann
discussed the differences between
the respective mechanisms of
change, or conceptualization

of disorder;

they skirted the fundamental
differences differentiating their DMs, and

debated about relatively minor technical
points as though they were
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indeEendent of their respective
frameworks.
This is an example of an
ostensible methodological
controversy that
can more helpfully be regarded
as expressing inter-DM
differences.
Obviously, the techniques were
embedded each in their own
DMs, and the
differences in technique expressed
(at least in part)
differences between the DMS. When the debates
revolved around only these
technical
differences, no resolution was
possible for several reasons.
First, each
debator was hearing the other's
technical argument in terms of
his/her

own DM, and thus it probably, and
necessarily, made little sense.

Second,

the technical differences were
an expression of several
interrelated

points of difference, so that continuing
to debate only on the technical
level continued to obscure the other
points of difference, impeding
their clarification and possible
resolution.

At a different point, Eissler
(1958, p. 222) disagreed with Loewen-

stein regarding use of the couch
...whatever Dr. Loewenstein s final decision
regarding
terminology may be, I think we ought to
distinguish
strictly between variables and constants within
the
classical technique. I would count the patients'
recumbent position as a constant and not as a variable—
as
Dr. Loewenstein does at one point.
'

This small debate, contrary to the above, is a valid,
resolvable

intra-DM methodological debate.

As both Eissler and Loewenstein shared

an interpretationist psychoanalytic DM, a disagreement about a tech-

nical point could be debated with recourse to the same network of
commitments, paradigms, meaning sets and goals.

The crucial difference

.
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is whether the
participants share a DM
uii, or are a^^
<^
attempting to settle
a technical point

across DM boundaries.

Addressing a more important
point. Eissler v,-l:?->j,
(1953
the lack of distance
or persDer^^.,«
perspective,
or rather,

schizophrenics

to dif
f erenti
k^irterentiate
between

p
p.

136) considered
ijb)

the lacR of ability
in

the possible and the
real at

times

'-^''^^^^
that of neurotics if one
extenrlQ
i
treatment of the ego .odifL^t
n '\rir::^L" to^
notice
technical problem_which is
mos
;p a of
the treatment of
schizophrenics is barely mentioned
cuLionea
in the contemporary literatnrp
"literature on the psychotherapy
of
schizophrenia.

^

In a footnote, Eissler
(p. 136) continued:

Fromm-Reichmann seems to claim that
there is essentially
no difference between the
technique of treatment of schLo- P°-t of View which Tn my
n
p
IS tenable only if the field
^s'tei^bl'"'
of therapeutic action is
^^he patient's interpersonaj
relationships with
,
l^Zl
disregard of the patient
'T^iii^^^dlfii^^
.dded)

T

Obviously, Eissler was addressing
the two differential ^oals of

treatment for the respective DMs under
the guise of "technique of treat-

ment."

In point of fact,

that "technical problem" was rarely
mentioned

in the contemporary literature because
it was not a technical issue.
If an analyst dealt only with patients
of basically reliable, or un-

modified, ego, s/he was not seeing schizophrenics
and the issue for

him or her was largely irrelevant.
phrenics,

If an analyst were treating schizo-

the classical objections regarding the treatment of modified
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egos generally held
little salience
xience for the
th. therapist;
this was the
case partially because
the theraDi..^
therapist would very
probably not have embarked on treating
schizophrenics if the
classical nr
Classical
proscriptions had
been saUen. Mo.eove,
..ea..„, scM.opH.enics,
e.e .He„p,s. was
U.el, .o be heavily Influenced
,He SulH.anlan
Interpersonal fra^ework, and thus would
have
ave had
haH little
Hi-n„ use tor a
concept like the modified
ego.
The schisophrenic
patient's lack of distance
on his/her phenomenology was not the technical
issue as presented hy
Eissler, hecause it
was not an issue for those
treating or those not treating
schizophrenia.
The inability to achieve
distance was not a technical
issue for the
relationists and was an issue
only for the interpretationists,
who
most often did not treat this
sort of patient in the first
place.
The basically reliable ego.
or, the unmodified ego,
was a central
concern for Eissler's and the
other interpretationists'
approach.
In•

•

U

terpretation was efficacious only
with the basically reliable ego,
both
theoretically and in fact.
The set of technical arguments
regarding the "basically unreliable

ego" or the "modified ego" is largely
an ostensible methodological con-

troversy about DM differences in subject,
goal and change mechanism of
treatment;

the latter were rarely,

priate level of discourse.

if ever,

discussed at their appro-

Their expression was usually limited to the

technical level.
For instance, according to Eissler (1953,
p. 116),

the legitimate

clinical population was comprised of those individuals for whom, despite
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"their symptomatologv,
gy,
by trauma or whatevp>Thatever.

Pon had
u^a not been
the ego
noticeably modified..."
i_

tv.^,
They

were appropriate since
the "basic model

technique- could be used
"without emendations."
preserved its integrity
It will
Tt
^''.""^^^^y'
TlTZlT"'
make maximum use of the
sunnorf
support ^it^ >-receives from
the analyst in thp fnr-^
.
-elusive
technical problem in sucS

^^^^^a?ion

i't^''^'^''^"^'

Which
ro^"dr?he"ego^1j;
^" th restitutive
phases of the treatmsnf .h^k
'
="PP°"(1«3, p. 116;
emphasis added)

^

'

Such an ego would be able
to enter into the therapeutic
work.
The
patient's ego would be sufficiently
strong to worR towards recovery
and
the tool with which the
analyst can accomplish this
recovery is Interpretation. With the reliable ego,
"The problem... is only when
and what
to interpret; for in the
ideal case the analyst's activity
is limited
to Interpretation; no other
tool becomes necessary."
(Elssler,

1953,

Eissler then considered the modified
ego, and ruled it out of
DM activity (in a process similar
to the DB DM's ruling out phenomenp.

108)

ology as metaphysical).

At the end of the scale is the ego of the
psychotic, with
whom the analytic compact is impossible. There
is scarcely
anything to say about this end of the scale
...

(1953, p. 122)

Turning to schizophrenias, where the ego modification
is most obvious, Eissler stated that the most remarkable
difference in treatment

2

.

This IS not to imply an analogy of content, merely a parallel
in process; this process was discussed in Chapter 1.
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concerned

..essentUU,

ference" (p. X34)

Specincall,, he feU ,hat

„Uh u„™o«fled

e.os

transference developed
spontaneously, „hereas with
the schisophrenics
It had to be produced.
The technique
of j-Lce
free assoclatlr^
M
association could not be
used as the patient would
probably
uxy be
oe incapable
incanahlp of cooperating
and the
technique might precipitate
o
regression n,. any
p
1-^ "resresqion"
case. Lastly,

m

pretation was "thrown out of cear" ;,nrl a^a
gear and did not convey
insight
patient. (1953, p. 113)

inter-

to

the

Eissler's reasons for discouraging
the psychoanalytic treatment
of
modified egos were perfectly
appropriate of course. Within the
framework of his DM, his DM arguments
were logical, meaningful and
helpful;
they can be construed as "true."

For instance, free association
often

did produce "regression" (or a
recurrence of the psychosis) in schizo-

phrenic patients; similarly, interpretation
was not efficacious in

clinical practice with this population.

It is perhaps a difficult

point to appreciate how "correct" Eissler was
within his DM and how

completely besides the point his arguments were
for those adherents

to

other DMs who were more successfully treating
schizophrenic patients.
Yet,

from within his DM, Eissler continued to pose their
differen-

ces in methodological terms (as did many of the proponents).

Thus, he

defended the role of interpretation and its eventual goal, the structural change of the ego, from recent pressures (1953,
p. 126; emphasis
his)

.

It is well known that the proper use of interpretation is
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difficult and complicated. But
so central is this
tool that any proposed
variation or addition s^o^L
be scrutinized with the
greatest care. The int^o
duction of parameters, even of
such simple ones as
°^
contains danITr.^'lVT''''
gers
which must not be overlooked.
Each parameter
increases the possibility that the
therapeutic process
be falsified, inasmuch as it
may offer the pit
ego the possibility of
substituting
~ obedience for a
structural change

"

's

^

.

The term obedience, not entirely
an accurate one, is
used here to designate all those
improvements which
a patient may show under the
pressure of the therapy
but which are not based on a
dissolution of the corresponding conflicts. A patient often
prefers to produce
adjusted behavior instead of a structural
change.

Moreover, he later implied some deficits
in the skill of those
therapists who introduced modifications
into the classical interpretative

technique (1953, p. 127)
Again, this paper is not the place for a
discussion
of what a proper interpretative technique
is; it is
mandatory, however, that a warning be raised
against
the quick introduction of parameters under
the
justification that interpretations have been of no
avail. There is a great temptation to cover up,
by the
introduction of parameters, one's own inability to use
properly the interpretative technique.
The issue of expediency particularly disturbed him.

Eissler at

several points (1953, pp. 113, 125, 126, 127) felt that
expedience was

often followed, rather than a stricter course dictated by theory.

Remembering that the goal of interpretationist DM is ego reconstruction (rather than the disappearance of sjrmptoms or changes in
interpersonal relationships), both the DM meaning of Eissler

comment and the ostensible technical quality are obvious.

's

next
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The content of this footnote
is of

fnr-™-;^

ui

-

^""'^ ^ safeguards against the
^'^^
efLt
thp%h
of the
therapist's personality- in
situations where a
structural change, induced by
the analytical process

lilt

i:

lit

^^^^-^

foiziT'

Other inte rpretationis^

Eissler was not alone aiBong the
inter-

pretationists who were concerned about
the relationalist modifications
in treatment.

With the Kuhnian analysis at our
disposal, it is possible

to interpret their differences
as fundamental because of the
different

paradigms; at the time, however, the
controversies were couched in
terms of technique,

though the veheiivence of the debate
partially ex-

presses the realization of the participants
that a good deal was at
stake.

For instance. Stone (1954, p. 567)

Eissler

's,

takes a position similar to

regarding the reliable ego, and the modifications
in tech-

nique and goals:

We would, while acknowledging that other psychotherapeutic
agents play an important role in the psychoanalytic process,
assign to interpretation the unique and distinctive place
in its ultimate therapeutic effect. We would, I think,
require
that the interpretations achieve this effect through the
communication of awareness of facts about himself to the
patient, with the sense of emotional reality that comes only
with technically correct preparation, rather than through
certain other possible effects in the transference counter transference system, which occur so frequently in other
psychotherapies.
(Certainly, they occur also in psychoanalysis, but they are regarded as miscarriages of effort.)
(Stone, 1954, p. 574; emphasis added)
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stone's

systeW
"oula

_ts

tHis

can

about the

'^.nsfe.ence-couneert.ansference

co„.e« oWio.s., .e.e.

the ..tHe.ape.t.c

to

„Hat tHe .e.etionaUsts

.eaKt. .eUt.onsH.p,

„H.. the, .e^a^.e.
as essential to .eeo.e.,
an. not as ..sca„,a,es
o. e„o.t... XH.s
so.t
Of debate is obviousl,
an inter-BM ostensible
.etbo.ological controversy, and Just as obviously,
Is not likely to be
resolved at this
methodological level.

m

1958.

the papers were
published fro™ a sy„poslu„
on the widening

scope Of psychoanalysis
and the need to adequately
differentiate classical analysis fro. analysis
with certain variations
In technique arising
fro„ the exigencies of
treating unreliable egos.
The sy.poslu™ used
Elssler's 1953 paper on
parameters as their starting
point.
The panel's
task was to help differentiate
a.ong "variations of technique
which In
no way conflict with the
basic rules and goals,
.odlticatlons which ™ay
be necessary but temporary
interruptions of our procedures and
aims, or

i-iatlons which lead

to a permanent change in
the psycho in the psycho-

analytic method with a consequent
renunciation of its results." (Greenson, 1958. p. 200; his emphasis)

This symposium can be Interpreted
to

be a response of concerned
Interpretationists to the Increasingly in-

fluential (and adherent-attracting)
relationalist group.

Greenson,

Elssler, Loewenstein and Stone, among
others, participated.

That there

were fundamental agreements among them was
recognized by the participants themselves (see, e.g.. Elssler. 1958.
pp. 223 and 227; Greenson.
1958, p. 200; Loewenstein. 195fb.p. 241)

They agreed on the InadvisabiUty

.
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Of treauns .he
....eaU,

.„eUa.le

e^o an. .he nee,

..3.a,.
in the
cUs..cal i„.e.p.e.a.„„,3.
Unes. .ho.,h .He.
•

trea.e« „UM„

.he

adniteea .Ha. a. .i.es
.ecHnical ^o.inea.lons
„e.e necessa.., .He.
an fel. ...o.,l, .Hi. .HouH
He as inf.e.uen. an.
„a„e„ as

poss.Hle

and sHould

wa,

aUer

.He classical
re-s..uc...ln,

thro.sH in.erp.e.a.lon and
„o..ln, .H.ousH.

.He ego

XHe. „e.e unaHle .o
a«.Iress

dlrec.1, .He p.essu.es
f.c. .He rela.lonaUs.s
In .e^s of para.l,matic issues. Instead,
Eissler
ssier, et al.,
al
became increasingly
concerned
with classifying any "devipt-ion"
y deviation from classical technique
and controUin.
its effect in .rea.ment,
particularly with respect to
interpretation.
In this symposium, several
definitions and explanations
of the

classical approach were made
(e.g.. Greenson,
p. 201; Loewenstein,
pp.
and
202
205). all stressing the role of
interpretation.
(Loewenstein,

1958a

In fact, went on to elahorate
the various aspects and
types of inter-

pretation (pp. 207-208).

The symposium expressed both
their awareness

of the necessity of in some
way addressing the new clinical
populations
With their non-classical treatments,
yet also their commitments to
the

classical approach.
sentations:

This duality is expressed in the
form of the pre-

an opening statement explaining
the classical position,

consideration of a new clinical population
(usually schizophrenia and
very occasionally delinquency),
reiteration of the classical approach
with some small modification to accomodate
the non-ideal patient.

Very

clear boundaries were erected around these
small modifications and they
were portrayed as unfortunately necessary at
times, always dubious and
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neve, as

„ea.„en. ..Her

trea.e„. poss..^.

..ese

..a.a.a.ons „e.e .es.sne.
.He „o.,n„.,.„3
„e.e a:„a.s

.

make

.

.ecHn.cal an. ...
not address the
important Inter-DM
differences
lerences relaf
relating to mechanisms
of change or role of
the therapist.

The resurgence of
interest in classical
techniques at that par.xcular time is not
surprising if a Kuhnian
analysis is used. The
1,58
symposium was a gathering
of respected and
concerned interpretetionists
coming together to thrash
out a response to
.hat must ha.e seemed
li.e
.issuided, ,uic. and
easv.personali.ed therap,.
Simultaneously, the
symposium was obviously
designed to meet the
challenge and put it to
rest by establishing those
conditions under which
modifications were
necessary, and those rules
under which modifications
of technique could
be made, yet still be
classical analysis,
in the course of the
efforts.
the symposium members
ensaeed
ngaged in ^a n,,n,K«>number of^

m

•

mter-DM ostensible metho-

dological controversies with
respect to differences with
the relational
DM; they also engaged in
some valid intra-DM methodological
or ser^ntic
debates among themselves that
were resolvable when argued
on that level.

i^l^-l5M_sol^^^^
meters" might have

to be

they should operate.

Eissler conceded that at times,
"para-

introduced and gave four criteria
under which

Briefly, a parameter was a modification
of tech-

nique introduced onl^ if the basic
model did not suffice; it must "never

transgress the unavoidable minimum, must
lead to its own self-elimination" (1953, p. Ill) and the parameters'
effects on the transference

must never be such that they could not be
abolished by interpretation
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(1953, p. 113).

stone (1954. p. 576)
engaged in a

s^U

mtra-DM technical debate

With Eissler's fourth point.
o?

Zr^rTZ^^^^j:^

exeenent.

for

The exceptor Is^he^^e
the parameter must terminate

acceptaMlUy

i 0^?:,^^"^;

before the end of^n!^

stone felt that the fourth
criterion was "altogether too
severe" and
that if the usual conditions
of a classical psychoanalysis
had been adhered to, he would consider the
patient adequately analyzed.
The Important point here is
that these two analysts were
differing
on a technical point that was
Imbedded in a shared network, and
as such,
was potentially soluble.

Several of these intra-DM debates
arose in the symposium, albeit

about small points.

For example, Loewenstein (1958,
pp. 202-203) pre-

ferred the term -intervention" to "parameter",
as the former was more

neutral and thus pointed "more clearly to the
need for greater precision
and differentiation with respect to these
various actions."
later,

A little

(1958, p. 222), Eissler challenged Loewenstein' s recommendation

of "intervention", stating that interpretations
are interventions,

they

might be confused rather than specifically differentiated
and therefore,

"in order to avoid further confusion," Eissler suggested that

Loewenstein "coin
(1958b, p.

a

more neutral term."

Loewentsteln then rebutted

241) Eissler with regard to the intervention/interpretation

.
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debates, while explicitly
recognizing that there was "so.e
basic agreement between [the.]."
1 would regard the basic agreements
between the.
to be their shared DM.
Kuhnlan terms, this minor skirmish
would be
an mtra-DM debate with regard
to symbolic generalizations
(those consensual terms used across the DM)

m

In response to gentle pressure
from Loewenstein who pointed out
that some tools which could not
correctly be termed interpretations,

nevertheless had the effect of
interpretations (Eissler, 1958,
p. 224).
Eissler proposed the term "pseudo-parameters"
(pps)
These were used
.

when resistances were sufficiently
high

to

prevent interpretations from

being useful (p. 224), and helped the
analyst to "smuggle interpretations into the pathognomonic area with
a temporary circumvention of

resistances."

(p.

224)

the right moment or,
(p.

225).

According

Examples would include the right joke told at

the repetition of what the patient has
just said
to Eissler,

when resistances once again decrease,

interpretation can once again come to the fore.
Eissler

's

pps strike me as a device for acknowledging those actually

therapeutic processes that do occur, without according them therapeutic
status and without dethroning interpretation as the sole therapeutic
tool.

The pps concept was an intra-DM accomodation to empirical find-

ings that did not impinge on the paradigm.

Finally, Stone's (1954, p. 572) account of change in classical

analysis can illustrate an intra-DM theoretical debate.
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iLtiTf'll". f"'^'"
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This small theoretical debate
about transference exemplifies the

potential solubility of theoretical
issues if they are embedded within
the same DM.

A Kuhnian analysis of these controversies
of the late 1940'

s

and

the 1950's allows an interpretation
that they are in part, ostensible

methodological controversies, that is, debates
about important DM vs.
DD issues expressed in methodological terms,
with little awareness that
the differences were not primarily at the
methods level, but rather at

the paradigmatic and DM

level— the one fundamental,

the other interrelat

and both implicit.
Thus,

the relationalists and interpretationists debated in technica

terms: about the couch; free association; dealing with acting-out para-

meters vs. deviations and other modification necessary in treating un-
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reliable egos - but rarely
addressed their fundamental
differences.
A Kuhnlan analysis of these
debates would lead to an
interpretation
that these two DMs differed
fundamentally with respect
to their paradigms and early technical
problem solutions; thus,
their fundamental
differences would include: change
mechanisms (working through
repetitions
in the transference ys
emotional re-learning in a
reality relationship),
locus of change (the ego
vs narcissism); techniques
(free association
and interpretation vs dialogue
and relationship; etiology
for schizophrenia, unreliable ego vs.
vs
lark ot
nf self-esteem);
coip
^
±actc
conceptualization of
disorder (intrapsychic vs
interpersonal).
In the debates just documented,

these fundamental (inter-DM)
differen-

ces were expressed in primarily
technical terms and the inference
is that
these are not soluble.

Kuhnian analysis of other controversies
is similarly helpful; for
instance, another, different group of
interpretationists engaged in

ostensible debate not with the relationalists,
but with the growing
trend toward family work in the late 1940

's

and the early 1950 's.

Ostensible methodologi cal controversy between
interpretationists and
therapists.

During this same time, the growing trend toward seeing

family members began to draw fire from interpretationist
analysts;
their criticisms were quite often of the ostensible methodological

category.

That is, rather than addressing the fundamental differences

concerning etiology, operative change processes or mechanisms, and locus

.
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of disorder (individual
historical
storical intrapsychic
inty.r..
vs. contemporaneous
systemic and intraosvrhiV
^
t-u^
trapsychic),
the criticisms focused
on methodological
issues

w

.

Thus,

(as reviewed in chapter
III, Edward Glover,
Karl Mennlnger

and Leon Saul were all
critical of seeing fa.ily
„e™bers of the identified patient. They believed
that such contact would
be disruptive to
the transference or would
impede its development
altogehter; the implication of course is that not
seeing the family members
facilitates the
development of the transference
neurosis, which is probably
correct.
Similarly Kubie thought it unwise
for the same analyst to
conduct the
analyses of both marital partners
simultaneously as this practice
could
well induce one or the other
partner to lose confidence in the
analyst
yst s
impartiality. Grotjahn replied in
technique terms; that is, when some
degree of paranoid ideation emerged
in such arrangements, he
recommended

either the immediate resort to separate
analysts, or planning a "joint
family interview" of patients and analyst.

He felt that this technical

change made the paranoid distortions less
destructive; though the
technique could not avoid some degree of
argumentation, he felt that it
did protect the sanity of saner partner by
providing some reality testing (Grotjahn, 1960, pp. 68-69, 273 and 281).
At other points,

interpretationists criticized the loss of the

one-to-one relationship which was regarded as the foundation
upon which
analysis was built.

Its disruption was ascribed to the lack of skill

and as obvious attempts to correct the countertransf erence difficulties
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to the analyst.

Criticises progressed fro.
attacks on an analyst's
technical expertise and facility
to attacks on his/her
personality,
motivation, or mental health.
'^^^^^^

unresolved interest
^^T^
in watching
the primal scene.
He may be accused of havin!
a
papa complex," or of attempting
'
to become the pater
familiae, who God-like guides
his flock of sheen
k
accused of a great unconscious
need to

pLylhe'^mnLofent

God-like, father-motLr Beca:
;
of the dependency phobia of
rthe'T''
our time, he may even be
suspected
of ^trying to enslave whole
families. (Grotjahn, 1960,
276-

f

p^

Grotjahn's rejoiners regarding the
necessity of seeing family members all revolved around the
increased efficacy that technique
lent to

psychoanalytic treatment, especially
with intellectualizing patients.
Differences in fundamental areas
regarding change processes in individuals as family structure were not
discussed, rather, seeing family members as a

techni^

was bandied about, as either facilitative
of working

through emotional material or as destructive
of the transference neurosis

Ostensible metho dolo g ical controversies involving
the DB DM

.

Some of the

controversy which swirled around the DB work could
also be characterized
as ostensibly methodological.

For instance, while referring to the early

period of family therapy. Freeman (1964, p. 36) describes
seeing the
family unit or group as a whole in these terms: "...group
problems and

group goals are of primary concern and the group process is the pre-

dominant methodological frame of reference, with the intent being to
exclude the "one-to-one" therapist-individual interventions", (his

.
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emphasis)

While no one would quibble with
Freeman that seeing families

as a whole involved methodological
innovations, in light of the DM

concept, it's fully as obvious that
the "frame of reference" is
not

merely methodological, but also conceptual.
At times,

the controversies have been both
very specific and some-

what besides the point.

A case in point was an exchange between
Jay

Haley and Frederic Schlamp regarding some
"family experiments" designed
and conducted by Haley before dissolution
of the DB DM as a functioning
group

Haley and Weakla nd vs. Schlamp ostensible
methodological controvers^.
issues:

Haley's two "family experiments (1962) responded
to two separate

Haley's interest in the classification of families by
charac-

teristic, stable transactional patterns rather than by the
diagnostic

categorization of an individual family member; and recent criticism
the
DB hypothesis had met, particularly around the lack of "scientific

verification" for its observations and hypotheses.

Haley's experiments,

by attempting to demonstrate stable and statistically significant diff-

erences between schizophrenic families

and normal families in a

laboratory-experimental situation, can be seen as

a foray into

providing

that "scientific verification".

3

"Schizophrenic families" in Haley's experiments were families
with one so diagnosed child or adolescent member; Haley, it should be
noted, was well aware of the difficulties in nomenclature and interjudge reliability regarding schizophrenia.

\

342

Haley's experiments
were pu.Ushed in
.he con.ove.3.

SchW

.

Be expiiea.ea

.esarains .He a.s.

occ.„.. .e.ween .3.
Haie. an. ..e^e^c

Haley's .„o pn.iications

points on., eHis ,i.s.
e^e.i.e„. Ha.
was

al^s. identical

large experiment.

Pa^

pa„s, .n.

i. „as puHlisHed
and nsnali,

Ciqfi?^
C1962)

Haie,

as .He .e.Ho.oio.y

.e,e„ed

Its two segments will
.e reviewed.)^

critiqued Weakland and Fry's
ry

Us

.

.

as one

ScHlamp also

r..r.
paper
on "Letters of Mothers
of

SchizopHtenics" Hnt as ScHlamp
includes tHeir papet in
the critiques
for the same reasons as
Haley's and does not
elaborate, Haley's work
will be emphasized.
ii^i^Z^sJesisn.

Haley presented a series
of assumptions to family

Study which read like DM
tenets:

WHICH family mem.ers^'':^^ro::i
uL^fair^^to'pa^^^Jn":^^
P-=i=t Within a family for manv years
'
and
in?i
^
= expectations of, and iehavior
tTth other people when
with
he leaves the family

wm

wUh
p

him

266)

Tl

"

and (d) Ihe
°'
Paren s do
co-creator of family patterns.
(1962,

Elaborating on these assumptions, Haley
(p. 266) pointed out that
the various family groups working
with schizophrenia were in general

agreement that there were similarities
across schizophrenic families

4

Haley's experiment will be reviewed only
extensively enough to
provide explanatory background for Schlamp's
ostensible methodological
argument and the Haley-Weakland replies.
^
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(othe. .Han .he inclusion
of a schisophrenic
.e*e.,
All .hese groups
had attempted .o find
see way of describing .he
unique .Ind of Interactive process observed
when these fa^U, „e.bers
are brought together
Haley's further goal was
to "phrase such a
description In a way which
»ould Ultimately per.it
cuantltatlve validation of
descriptive statements (pp. 266-267). He
went on to consider the
proble. In experimentation posed by working
with families, problems
of the Individual vs
the family as a unit, the
family as opposed to the
small group, sampUn
.

problems Of "normal" and
"schizophrenic" "families" and
the search for
experimentally testable hypotheses.
A saving grace in all this
was the
assumption that the formal
structure of Interacting patterns
were
stable over time within each
family; this was possible
because homeostatic factors came into play
whenever any behavior or interactional

process deviated outside the limits
of a family's usual range.
To verify the DB view of families,

the incongruence between levels

of messages had to somehow be
expressed or operationalUed

.

Haley hy-

pothesized that if Incongruence were In
fact at work, and family members at some level disqualified what each
other said, they would have

difficulty forming and maintaining coalitions
in the family.

Clinical

observations supported this train of thought, and Haley
devised an
experimental procedure that allowed family members the
opportunity to
both form alliances and to communicate at two levels. (Haley,
1962,
p.

281).
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Briefly, Haley chose to work,
for simplicity, with a
thtee-person
system of father-mother-formerly
schizophrenic child.

°^her side of
°"
?he paitiMon
R
^k'' ""'^"^
^"'^'^^
^^"^^
°^
buttons,
for
examo^e mother can signal
example,
father or child. All of thLe
buttons are connected with pens
on an event recorder in the
''''
^^^'^'^^
^^^^^^ ^-^nl

^

th^e^xperrn?!

The table is wired so that the
counters begin to add up a
score whenever two people choose
each other by pressing
each other s coalition button. When
mother presses the
button labeled husband, nothing
happens until father presses
hxs button labeled for her. When
both buttons are pressed
at once, then both counters add up
a score at the same speed
and continue to do so (making an audible
sound) as long as
both buttons are pressed. Therefore each
person can gain a
score only if he joins another person,
and then he and that
person gam exactly the same amount of score.
Each person
can signal another with the signal button
to invite a
coalition. The family is asked not to talk
together during
the experiment so they can only communicate
by button pushing.
'

Father, mother and child are placed at this table and
told
this is a game they are to play together. They are
instructed
that they should each try to win by getting the highest score.
They may push buttons one at a time or two at a time or not
at all.
The only rule is the prohibition against talking
during the game.
The 'game' consists of three rounds of two minutes each which
are begun by the experimenter and ended by him. At the end
of each round the family members are asked to read off their

.
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-"-^

^^^^^

?hr:::.?:^3tc\t ::To
^^"^^^^^ive
In addition to the three
.'^^ ^^^'^^^
^^^^^
to have a fourth
ro^nd
Rpf
^^e fourth round,
they are asked to talk' to^pf^'
tha^ round and who ? 'to
fose" ?h n'^f
another two .inute rou^d aL'
^ee'
^c^n^Ike'^h:
scores come out the way they
planned
^h?
tion
is recorded. (Haley,
1962, p. 284"

ith:roL
^T'

.

.

^

The design, according to
Haley, would reflect the
family .ember's
difficulty in forming and
maintaining stable coalition
in the family,
as an expression of their
disturbed family structure and
co^ication.

Haley's sample consisted of
sixty families; the thirty
normal families were selected by random
choice from students in a high
school direc
tory.

The parents were telephoned
and the sample was comprised
of those
families whose members had not
had psychotherapy and who would
be willinto come in to their laboratory
for the experiment.

m

The children ranged

age from 14-17, with thirteen
girls and seventeen boys in the
sample.
The thirty schizophrenic families
were chosen by availability from

a family therapy program,

the records of state hospitals and
other in-

cluded children actually hospitalized at
the time.

The children ranged

in age from 11 to 20, with only three
girls and twenty-seven boys,

Haley adds that a more equal distribution could
not be found.

The

educational levels were slightly lower in this group.
Of the sixty families,

twenty normal and twenty szhizophrenic were

instructed that they could push buttons in any way they pleased
and
therefore they could form coalitions with either one or two people

simultaneously.

This was the first experimental condition.

In the
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Les

.ns..c.ea .Ha. .He. ..1.
^

fore coula no. score

„UH

.„o people a. once.

Schlamp's methrvWi^^T^^i
critinn^
^_ai_critiaue.

interesting for a nmnber of
reasons.

were

^^^^

(Hale,. I,e2, p.
,35,

ui
,
Schlamp's
(1964) critique is
c

,

First
xL^L, several of hhis comments

were of methodological
interest; these will he
pointed out as the. ar.
encountered. His appreciation
of the two papers
('.etters" h. Wea.land
and Pry and Haley's first
"Pamil, Experiment" paper)
is evident,
and he

points out that among those
in family therapy, only
the DB group had
produced "controlled
experimentation." (p. 229) He
is generally very
approving and focuses immediately
on their research methodology,
citing
the two papers for having
presented "meaningful, systematic
and testable
hypotheses within an experimental
frame of reference."
(p. 229)
At no
point in his analysis does
Schlamp step beyond the consideration
of
methodology and at no point does he
take the DB system as a system
into account,

preferring to critique the system via
methodological

criticism, especially of Haley's paper.

My impression is that Haley's

paper is particularly singled out as it
is couched in Schlamp's view of

legitimate science.

It is an experiment, in a laboratory
no less, and

as such approaches a form of discourse
resembling Schlamp's.

would be on familiar territory and also more
likely

to

Thus,

he

attend to this

particular form of demonstration.
Schlamp then presents his description of a normal family,
then

"
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son^e

alternative interpretations
of Haley's
-Ley s data
data, soe
f methodological
specific
criticisms, diiu,
and. ixnaiiy,
f±na^^^r
some suggestionq
SStibtions tor
fnr "m^
more critical research
designs
,

•

.

.

Because Schlamp's descri nt-i o,. o j u
description and characterization
of a "normal
family- is absolutely
central to his critique
-Li-xque, It
it will
will ube reviewed as
he presented it.
Let me first describe
what I will call
'r.
r
normal' family.
Let me further hypothesize
th.l
^^^^^ '^^^ 'nor^^V
family has been ^osDita^H h
diagnosis
of schizophrenL. The parents a^d ^h
^-/-^^-^^-ly the
-ther, is qui^rc^o^^e n dtr^L'
^°^^^Pt of mental
illness is not out of the
ranL nf
The dread, fear, awarene
s "f' ociars'^^r
'""^
ings of personal inadequacy
arS felt bv f^f
^^"^ ^'^ the same way
that it is felt
...
^.r.-,
'^^^^^^^^^^ P^^^^otic
individua s
Ove? ^^^.P^^^°^
thTpe^iod °f y^ars the parents
have built
up a deeo 1 ov. f
concerned about the
nkelihood of hfr
^oth of the parents, and to a
lesseJ extent ^h' Siblings,
of the psychotic patient
wish to
do all lu
they can to help him recover
and to hejp Mm sha^e in
an active outgoing life.
They are unaware, however ofthe
-ny
^^^^
superltJ^ious
a?tUude% and
attitudes
'T'°''^unspoken feelings conceTiu^
psychotics and are
about'what ?h;y
"^"^
'sL Id ''r''^r''"^'^^^
^^^^> although in remission,
^
shares thp°'
the customary
aftermath of a psychotic episode in
that
^P^thetic, has problems with communications,
^^n^M
probably centering around his own
ambivalent feelings, and yet
once having committed himself to a
method of action, he can
maintain this adequately for some time
before his own self
doubts and recriminations (partially
unconscious) block
further single purpose behavior.

\

T

^

i

-

•

^

In such a situation we introduce the
family experiments of
Haley. Essentially this consists of father,
mother, and the
schizophrenic child forming various 'coalitions' with
each
other.
This means that a button is pressed signalling
a
desire for a coalition with another partner and leaving
the
way open for a mutual scoring between these two partners.
Implied in the instructions to the 'players' are that
each
person is supposed to try to 'win', probably with some

3A8

reference to seeing how they
work as a family,
familv or at
least there will be imnl-fo^ ^
i"^Plied to most parents
"how good
are vou^'
Jn tt
^^tuation the parents I have
descr^h^H would be most
cribed
solicitous towards their
"sick"
son, and yet also anxious
to do well
rhT
u
That is, once having responded,
he would tend to ner^
severate for d
a perioa
neriod ot
r>f time,
t-^r,.^
as is characterictMV of
many schizophrenics in
partial remission.
remission (Schlamp,
r^K^
1964, pp. 229-230)
,

Schlamp then specifies
iries thrtt
F
that ho
he rr-m
x^ill examine the
hypotheses and
conclusions of the Haley dTLicie,
"nnH^ri-u^
under ^hese
y article
circumstances. " i.e.
under the circumstances he
has just added,
a rudimentary

wtUc^^^^^^^

M

3^,^^^^
has introduced several assumptions
that the DB DM does not; these
include: the mother being
particularly concerned, the operative
presence
of deep love developed over
the years, the efforts to help
the identified
patient recover, the uncertainty
about the best course to take, the

£uasi-superstition, the son "in remission"
with this "customary aftermath" of apathetic behavior, including
problems in communication about

ambivalent feelings and finally the capacity
course of action once committed.

to

function in a concerted

While the DB DM might well "allow"

some of these assumptions (e.g., mother's
particular concern), they are

irrelevant to the DB formulation.

Moreover, many of them partake of

"internal processes" which the DB DM explicitly eschewed.
Essentially, Schlamp' s description establishes for him

allows him to view Haley's data through his own (Schlamp

's)

a

DM and

DM, which

makes possible the alternative interpretations he makes of the data.
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By arguing over these
alternative interpretations
Fi-cLdcions, ti..
. energy
time and
is
spent on what appears to
be a process of «i
elucidation wh€
lereas it more
•

rean.UcaU. .ese.Mes

.

3HcoUns an a..ow a.

.He

seen

crossed e.es

B. exaelnln, Haley's
„ethodclog, and data through
his
own DM, it is not
surprising
ng that Srhl,mn
bchlamp comes up with
different interpretations, conclusions and
methodological demands.
He initially considers
Haley's first hypothesis,
that schizophrenic
families would have more
difficulty forming and
maintaining coalitions
and
would
therefore have a higher percent
(
of time when no member
of
the family was in coalition
with any other member)
Haley reports this
hypothesis to be supported at
the .05 level (1962,
p. 286).
Schlamp
counters with:
.

.

It is not surprising that
a significant difference
at the ns
level was found. All that
would be
be I slower

required™

"^^^^^ -ill
that in this case the
diffiLtv
difficulty of maintaining any continuous
coalition is reduced
by two-thirds. (Since of the
three coalitions possible
mother-son, mother-father, father-son,
two of these ar;
reduced or eliminated.) Under such
circumstances one would
difference was significant only at
thT'ns
? '"f under such
rne
.ui level,
circumstances. (1962, p. 230)

"Under such circumstances" anything
might be possible.
is that Haley was not operating
"under these circumstances."

The point

His

t)M

did not include the presence of an apathetic
post-psychotic button-

pusher, and thus Haley's interpretation and
significant .05 finding
stand legitimate, notwithstanding Schlamp
tical critique.

's

re-interpretation and statis-
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Me..oaolos.caX... ScH.»p..
even

.....

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
„.
^

to

what economists
-Lscs cal
call
1

a
a

"ou
shock
i

^^^^^^^^^

variable."

Shock variables
onocK
vpr-iaKi
are those
variables introduced to exnl;,-;r. u
explain why a prediction
or analysis did
not
function as anticioafpri
tt,
cipated. Thus,
tha soybean Projection
^ould have been
accurate i. it had not
been .or the 1,„
dronsht, the dro„,ht
..^c^i
as the shoe, variable,
or, the 0,. would
have achieved such
and such
levels had it not been
for an unexplained
coal stri.e (oil e.bar.o
unexpected sovern„ent policy,
etc.).
Sehla^p uses apathy in
.his way
It allows his analysis
to answer empirical
events, even though the
Shoe, variable has no
integral role in the rest
of his analysis, and
certainly not arr^ role in
Haley's
DB un.
UD
DM
"ADarhv"
Apathy Kbears no relation
y
to
Schlamp's other assumptions
diiQ
and xn
.
in
^,
fact
ract,

i c=
is
tacked on to

the end of his

description, with no connections
to the rest of the
analysis. Vet it
allows hl„ to interpret,
into his own DM, Haley's
first finding and

then

several subsequent to it.
so, he again uses apathy,

to re-interpret Haley's
second hypothesis

that the family of the
schizophrenic would have longer
continuous periods
of tin,e when no two family
members were in coalition.
(This hypothesis
was supported in Haley's study;
Haley's Interpretation, in DM ter.s,
is that this demonstrated the
difficulty schizophrenic families had
In

forming and maintaining coalitions
con,pared

to

"normal" families.

Though

Schlamp does not in this case dispute
the method, or the empirical finding,

he re-interprets the finding
so that it "fits" into his own DM;
he
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ass^pao.. .....
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^

Thus

^^^^s^^^i::"^^ -

-p—

The

account for the difference
'1''^'' """^'"^ ^^^^^ ^^^ily
In
we must remember that
""/^
however,
the Darpn^^
schizophrenic son.
^^^^^
°^
a resuU
thp' f'^''^"^
up too high a scorP .L .J
^ish to pile

L

'

^

that they are taking
fP^^^''
King It
it on^
out on the son.

^he experimenter
(Schlamp, p. 230)

Schla.p .,e„ uses .„o
othe. of Haley's
«„.i„,s .o supp„„ His
interpretation. B.

„-interp„ti„,

supports His

o™

.He

«nai„,

i„

.He

«rst pUce.He

DM using Haley's empirical
results essentially out
of

context, i.e., "i„,ported"
into Schlamp's
"11.
f = DM.
lend strength to his own

view

AS
As such,
such they
rH
supposedly

in actuality,
actual, f,, off course,

they do no such

thing.

Though both .en are talking
about coalition behavior,
the
Of
a-ina
each Instance of this
behavior is very different,
and the
Implications for the re„.inder
of each of the two
respective DMs are
similarly different. This is
because sub-sets of concepts
and empirical findings are of course,
not necessarily the same
across DMs and
thus "coalition behavior" has
a different "place" in
each DM, with a
different set of articulations to
other concepts, different meanings
and sources of verification.
By supporting his interpretation
through the use of two of Haley's

findings, Schlamp compounds both
the spurious support of his own
inter-

pretation and the illegitimate form of
methodological critique.

After
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ecu.. Have .a.en
.He

.0™

a...e3..n, .He
.e.HoaoXos.cal
critique (as Haley did),
addressing "errors" 1„
^" ,he critiquer's
critic
approach,
cit.„s f.nd.„,s supporting
one's o™ „or., or
e.Har.lng on a searcH
to
ana tHe "crucial e.perl.ent"
„HlcH „in convince
HotH sides tHat one's
approach and Interpretation
are, In ,act, correct.
Uhat aU ol these
partake of structurally
Is ostensible
methodological dehate. And
•

as
^he debate becomes
„ore and ™ore elaborated
„lth critique, counter-

crltlque, and supporting
data taken out of context.
It beco.es easier
to focus on one tiny
methodological point of
difference and Invest It

With terrific Importance,
as

l^pUclU,

It carries the burden
of an

entire DM behind It, and
expresses the multitude of
differences between
two DMs in conflict.
This is What occurred with
the Schlamp methodological
critique.
At no point does he deal
with their DM differences
(in any vocabulary
or system of thought), but
rather he presents His
methodological critique
as though he were within
the same system as Haley.
Any indication of
their basic differences must
be Inferred by reading
between the lines,
as Haley sometimes does.
For instance, at several points
Schlamp reinterprets findings in

such a way that the explanatory
concepts are placed within the schizo-

phrenic child.

Haley's second hypothesis predicted
"the family with a

schizophrenic [member] would have longer
continuous periods of time

when no two family members were in
coalition." (Haley, p. 286)

Schlamp
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addresses the second half of
the experiment, where
individuals could

was Significant at the .01
level in support of the
hypothesis that the
schizophrenic famlies would have
longer continuous periods of
no

coalition.

Schlamp challenges Haley's method,
then his interpretation,

subsequently forwarding one of his
own.
...the difference was significant
at the .01 level on this
hypothesxs. This may mean logically
that the differenced
between famxlxes is greater in the
latter experiment. But
what would cause this greater
difference? If the parents
really had difficulty communicating
with each other and
with the son, as well as the admitted
difficulty of the son
in communicating with the parents,
the experimental restriction
of being allowed to score with one
person only would not have
mucheffect upon this family since they are
having difficulty
scoring anyway. That is, since both
coalition buttons may
be pressed by any player without penalty
the restriction of
only score with one at a time' would
have less effect upon
a group of players that already was
having a difficult time
scoring.
This is true because the restriction does
not fine
the two who would have been scoring
together anyway. With
families who have no difficulty in mutual scoring,
their
responses will be sensitively and mutually regulated
between
one and another.

The normal family thus should be more seriously
impaired by
this restriction since they are communicating more
sensitively
and accurately to determine their own and other
member's score.
Thus the differences, when tested for this particular
hypothesis, should be less in the second experiment rather than
greater.
This can be resolved by imaginin g, as we have done
here, that the difficulty lies not with the family but with
the schizophrenic son.
(Schlamp, p. 231; emphasis added^
,

If Haley's method is examined in the light of Schlamp

latter

's

's

DM,

the

methodological critique is well taken and in fact, the differ-

ence should indeed be less in the second experiment rather than greater.

However, that is not the point.

The point is that in the research
\
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critiqued, the differences
were -ai^lter
greater in ^h
the second experiment
as
they "should- have
been in Haley'ss
system
system.
S.hl
y
Schlamp is attempting
to
explain away a predicted
dxcted ^.nri
and demonstrated
finding within Haley's
system because it does
not agree
aeree wxth
^h c
ui
Schlamp 's own interpretation
of what
should happen.
This occurs in the
process of what is titled
a ^ethodolc
Sical orit.,.e. SchXa.p
has ta.en his o™ OH
as a sta.ti., poi„t
here
and has huUt a method
and interpretation
around it, fauitins
Haley's
for not being the same!
In these situations,
<.^^„.^-,•
a Kuhnian analysis
would
i»ply .hat hecause of
the stron, and nsuali,
i.pUeit co™it.ent

m

•

m

m

BM.

to one'
it is very difficult
for participants to
notice that their .ethodolo

glcal disagreements are
embedded in

DMs

based
oased „„„nH-„
upon different para-

digms, of which they
fundamentally disagree.

At issue here are two DMs,
and particularly the
differences between
them that relate to the
issue of individually vs.
family based psychoPathology. schlamp specifies
that the methodological
difficulty about
hypotheses "can be resolved by
imagining, as we have done here,
that the

difficulty lies not with the
family, but with the schizophrenic
son."
Haley picks up on the conceptual
(p. 231)
discrepancy between the individual and family approaches
somewhat, but also attempts to
counter
Schlamp methodologically.
Conceptually, Haley does address the
individual vs. family approach.
He addresses the necessary conceptual
shift a "family caused" process

requires and the "century of investment
in the idea that psychosis is

produced and persists independent of the
current life experience of the
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patient." (p.
\f'

240")
^HKj)

He also DOinfc

*-u

crucxal axpar.„ent
to demonstrate
once and for all „H t.
"hether psychosis
"has a V.
cause' „,thln the
Individual or whether
wnetner it is
i
a product of i
network of relationships."
(„
2km h p
explicitly refers to
the shift
Viewpoint necessary
to seek the
""^ ""=e: in the
"context
relationships rather
than within the
individual."
.

.

m

"

(p

Haley.s co™„ents
ahout Schlamp's
methodological reco^endations
at
hi,hli.ht
points
the difference
hetween the individualistic
vs. family
orientation, .hus. he
is ahle at times
to counter Schlamp.
methodology
suggestions with conceptual
points.
points
v.
For
instance, Haley objects
to
Schlamp.s recommendation
ahout havin,
non-schi.ophre„ic parents
participate With schisophrenic
hoys on the hasis
that his task was
"not to
measure the differences
which occur when an
individual from one family
Placed
in circuit with
.3
another family, it ,was,
to measure his
habitual patterns in his
own family." (Haley,
p.
The tenor of
schlamp.s recommendation
indicates that he was an
individual theorist
and did not really
understand the underpinings
of the family approach
Moving a disordered child
in to a "normal" family
would not suggest
Itself to family therapists
as a way of finding out
ahout the disordered
family.
Actually, it probably did
not occur to Schlamp
either; his
focus was on the child
rather than the family.
As mentioned previouslv
Pieviousiy, Haley at times
responded conceptually,

giving some sense of resolution

to an issue;

in the preceding example,

by pointing out that the
methodological reconunendatlon was
inappropriate
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dat.o„ is ae.e. .pon

sue. a „a, .Ha. a
aec.s.on Has .een
.eacKe..
The recommendation is
useful.

At

Che.

.i„es. Hale. .e.

.e.Hodoio,,eal defense.

ScHU^p's .e.Hoaologlcal
crlM,.es „UH

„Uh

.e^a.a .o ano.He. aspec.
of .He sa^e iss.
(the individual vs.
fa^il, f.,„s) ScHla.p
c.i.ici.es Haley's .esea.cH
using a chicken-or-egg
argument.

- "r^r^JL^rtSir

a^^rijutJ!;:
bind

communication within the
schizophrenic flmUv Jrih

"Sd r-j; Se"fa\?r"°^"

^

Postps.c^hfuc^LdivS::i

IT

psychosis or whether the
psychosis has caused he LeaLown
in communication.
Exactly the same dilemma was
presented In
an earlier article by Weakland
and Fry (1962) "Letters of
Mothers of Schizophrenics."
(Schlamp,
p! 233)

While Schlamp's basic question
is of course valid, his use
of it
here as a methodological critique
is not.

Haley's experiment was desig-

ned to measure and quantify
certain family interaction, not
to assign

causality.

To answer Schlamp's question,

long-term prospective study

-

the researcher would need a

an enormous effort in time, energy
and

money entirely appropriate to the
etiological issue, methodologically
powerful, and directed

_to

criticisms leveled at

_the DB

DM as a whole.

Schlamp's critique here is demanding that
Haley's experiment meet

criticism applicable to the DM as

a whole.

If Schlamp had directed

this point to "the DB hypothesis" or any
such rubric, his point would
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Have .ee„ vaU..

Co.H.n,

...

„e.o.oXo,.ca.
not

vaU. ana sa.aUs

ha. aisc.e«o„ ove..

tHe e.pe..„e„.al
„eeHo.

...

.3

„ea„.„,

U„.o«u„a.el„ Hale, encase.
ScHU.p.. cnu,.es

here on a methodological
al rather m,.„
than conceptual level.
g
At one point
for instance, Hale.
(1,«,
^^^^ ^^^^
^j^^
Of View 1. pnrsned. the
next reponse Is to loo.
lor a ..crucial., experiment Which will conclusively
demonstrate whether psychosis
has a ..cause.,
within the individual or
whether It Is a result ol
a network of relationships.
'""^
conceivable that either of two
ITnZ of
'f''investigation
kinds
might answer the question rn

T

f

""^ ^" overwhelming
amount of research has failed
f,??J in the endeavor
to demonstrate
this
tn l^^^^""''

I

he

interactfrhL'"'"

^""^

'°

'hat

from"h"rL'rera':::a\rp^^'S.ra'„5\^hUd"%h'^"^
the hypothesis that the^hLd
L^p^ ch^Uc'he
sTo'fT^a^r-'"^

ticular sort of relationship with
his parents.
In ?his endeavor we face a difficulty which
is becoming more ev dent
It the psychotic child Is
Included in the test interacting
With his parents, it can always
be argued that he '.caused"
whatever results are obtained, yet
the child must be "eluded
*"= ^^''1= ""h his parents and
they
S
With him. (Haley,
p. 240)

JZ\"^

In the DB DM,

"

the schizophrenic "child" necessarily
had to be in-

cluded in the interaction, yet that left
any research design, but the

long-term prospective project, open

to

Schlamp's criticism.

Unfortunately

instead of pointing out that the critique
was an inappropriate demand for

research already completed,^ and that it criticized
a point he had, in

Haley (p. 240) indicates that his experiment was a
"first attempt
to provide families with a similar context
to see if

measurable differences could be found between supposedly different
types of families."
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no. ....

a.,™e„. ....

-e„

-

^„ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^

.^e

scM.opH.en.c c.Ua

.,pe3 o. ,a.n.e3

sense .,a.

U

e.pe.,„en.3 .3

eanno. .e

unive.3aX exp.anaUon
(p.

..eau3e3..

p_„

„,

.

..e ....e.enee .e-

.„e.„.Me

no. .,3p„.en ana
.3

HaU. po.n.e. on.

(p.

essenUaU.

,
a

.Ha. e3sen..aU.

wha.ever Un^.n^s „e.e
oH.a.nea .n .He e.pe...en.
conU He expU.ne. H.
the dl3turbed cHUd
interpre.a.ion.

^^""^

3\'o«e\'°::a!uio°f3''-.l3T''^""^<=
"'^ "'^ aHnormal cHlld is
unresponsive
StoilH.H

'^^^ """"^^
had 3Ho™ ::;e
n
r '^Zll^
that .he dis.ress of .h! ^
''^gu'^d
If the Paren.3 a e
\n Jo iu°:n*'^H'''"
^" """"^ parents,
It is because .heir
relaMo^^hr
have gotten together Uss
"^"^y ^f""""
J. ^o
'"'^
trying to gain a response
'f Jo "an
P""^^^'^ <^hlld.
If the
father wins the game
i,
"^^^"^
^"'^h ^ Ptoblem that the flflv
lean upon
fa.her.
If the falha? 2o"l"u""^''"' "'"'^'^
couid be said''L^rL-H:xi^

r
L

"

..

U

tiL'
=,^A

5^

3s".h\"

/

T

"

""f

™"

Xr::«:;i:dii.t\r:ifir
"
'ofiuion
normal,
»?::r^r"'
it xs h'^^-because the child is erratiV

press her buttons it would be
because of apathy ^^«"iting
resulting
from having a disturbed child.
242)^
(Haley, p.

Obviously, Haley was nettled by
Schlamp's re-interpretation of
findings.
However, instead of pointing out
that the re-interpretations

were irrelevant to his point of
view, or that they constitute
ceptual and conceptual system of their
own, Haley engaged in

a pera

methodolo-
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Sical .epx.

,e.. .He

Poin. .esa...n,

"

""ue".

U

conve.an.

.„e...aMU.,

o. .,e

is u„do.b.edl, not
the

so„

an ..passe,

..3.„,e. cHUa .n..p.e..o„
of

(particularly as the
distu.bed-chil. idea is
position.

Ha.e.-s

He cannot ..aifo.a to
abandon i.)

^l

^^^^^^^
to ScHXa^p's

This ieaves Haie,.s
.athet
nice point not convincing
Schla.p, Schla^p's
intetptetation not convincing
Haley, and the methodological
argument untesolved and
available for yet
another round of ostensible
methodological debate.
.

Lest Schlamp^s other
methodological criticisms be
overlooked It
Should he noted that he
further criticizes Haley's
overlooking of a significant chi-sq^re for
hypothesis 6 (p. 233), proposes
four designs
necessary in follow-up studies
(pp. 234-235), for Weakland and
Fry's
paper (1962) as well as three
"critical experiments" for Haley's
work
(p. 235) and "a more appropriate method"
based on three-person non-zerosum non-negotiable games
(p. 235)
He ends with the common
left-handed
compliment regarding the experiment's
usefulness in generating new

hypotheses and stimulating further
research, (p. 236) Within the
context
of his own DM, it should be
emphasized, his points are well-taken
and
potentially helpful.

Directed across Dm boundaries, they
are irrele-

vant and obfuscatory.

Haley responds methodologically more often
than not. For instance:
A reply to these alternative explanations
could only be
made with data on individual families which
were not included in the article. To some extent the
total figures
do not reflect the great variation found
in the schizophrenic families, and although the schizophrenic child
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Haley^ further criticizes
Schlamp's alternative
experiments (p. 243).
and then proposes an
experiment that methodologically
controls for the
disturbed Child
influence, but which would
«t give him a measure o,
parental response to their
child.
"stiEll is. £resumabl£ the
of
tZE£ of research."

^

(p.

2A4; emphasis added).

Thus,

to meet

Schla.p's

central methodological criticism.
Haley must give up the central
goal
of his research!
That, it appears to me Is
the hallmark of an ostensible
methodological controversy.

Inter-DM symbolic .enPr^alization^dj^^

When two DMs differ

as drastically as those represented
by Schlamp and Haley, with
differen-

ces in crucial areas (e.g., individual
vs. family interpretations of
data), it is relatively easy to see
why ostensible methodological con-

troversy can lead to long-lasting sterile
controversy.

Yet at times.

""^^^^ appears fairly evenly split between pointing
out
thexr (Weakland/Fry and Schlamp) conceptual
differences and engaging in
methodological debate. Thus, he comments on conceptual
differences
regarding individual or family approaches
(pp. 236-237 and p
237)
addresses the disturbed child alternative interpretation
(p. 237) Ind
later objects to it as an "alternative line of
explanation" (p. 238)
and finally comments that there is no crucial test yet
and there is
not likely to be one (p. 239) Methodologically, Weakland
quibbles about
Schlamp 's definition of normal family (pp. 235 and 237) and
defends the
letters as "interactional" against what he terms Schlamp
's "scientific
objection" (p. 239) On the whole, however, Weakland managed to avoid
a good deal of the ostensible methodological debate.
•

,
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even less crucial i„.er-B„
differences add t.eir weish.
.o .he conf usion
A case in point is an
interchange between Jackson
(1963) and Pan! eve
symbolic generalization.^
In 1963. in a

cogent

in

Pa^u^

p^o^^

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
iect of language, i„pl,ing
,hat when family therapy
gained a better
theoretical base, the necessity
for a new language would
arise; in particular, differentiation frc„
the language of
psychoanalysis would be
necessary (p. 182) Interestingly
enough. JacUson cedents
that the
"individual-oriented framework" of
psychoanalysis and the "group interactional" framework of family
therapy are essentially
"discontinuous systems" and that the language
of one will not be
appropriate for the other.
Moreover, the two systems are
not strictly comparable and
therefore, one
cannot be better than the other
(p. 182).
(These are remarkably Kuhnlan
views to be appearing in 1963.
While Kuhn's first edition was
published
In 1962, it seems unlikely that
Jackson could have so quickly
encountered
and Integrated it into something
published early in 1963. In any case,

Jackson's view here is quite like Kuhn's
1970 revision).

Jackson felt that psychoanalytic terminology
was often too imprecise
to risk further imprecision or
confusion by its being "dragged

into

Symbolic generalization" was the term used
by Kuhn for a DM component.
Symbolic generalization" denoted those terms or
expressions
used consensually within a DM; thus, within a
DM, such a term referred
to the same thing for everyone, and it
conveyed the same meaning. The
same term used in a different DM might refer to something
else, or a
different aspect of the same thing, or mean something else.
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another field of usage"

(p.

182)

;

he demonstrated his
point by dis-

cussing some of the confusion
engendered when terms were
applied to
fanaiies (pp. 182-184),
mentioned such terms as
"transference and

countertransference, sadism and
masochism, ego strength and
Oedipus
complex, "(p. 184) Finally,
he recommended that the
temptation to
borrow a language ready-made be
resisted, and that family
therapists be
gin constructing their own
language
system.

In the next Issue of Family
Process. Paul challenged the
necessity

of a new language, pointing out
that "there Is a language
available In
which human conduct, passions,
relationships and dealings with one

another can be described.
p.

397)

This Is the everyday language."
(Paul, 1963.

This was also an example of an
obvious and Irrelevant point.

Jackson was arguing against Che use of
psychoanalytic-terminology (and
by Inference, language from other
psychiatric thought systems); he was

not recommending neologisms.

Paul's recommendations and illustrations
run afoul of just the

problem Jackson was addressing.
term "role."

Among Paul's recommendations is the

Jackson points out that the usual individualistic
orien-

tation of this term, its connotation from other
systems and the difficulty of using such a term for interactional processes.

He finishes

by commenting that "The usual definition of role is quite
different

from the one

I

have offered." (Jackson, 1963, p. 397)

While not strictly a methodological controversy, this small debate
is valuable in highlighting what happens when one person in a debate

.
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reaU.es .Hac che.e

enough.

is a ..sc.epanc,
i„

A .e.„„ ,oUo„ed

3...oUe sene.aU.aUons

appa.enU. ..s.eaa J.e.son's
„ea„.„,.

or If not,

that was patently
xireievant, r-P.
y irrelevantrecoimendations were made
and
Jackson connnented on
symb^^
gen
generalization
~
eralization discrepancy
("The
usual .eunluon of .ole
is <,ui.e aiHerep.

^

.

,

(.aCson, i,S3.

p.

3„>

,3 such, .e

vers, ova. a DM component.
the

fo™

ave»ea

a

„

pcssiMe s.e.iie cou.„-

Such a con..„.e.s.. ,0.
instance, coul. ta.e

Of two people arguing
that their respective
tern, was the
appropriate one for such and
such (-such and such" of
course helng not
Identical across the DM
boundary and therefore though
both are "correct"
for their own leaning of
"such and such," neither will
prevail and con-

vince the other to adopt their
usage, as that usage will be
"incorrect"
in the other DM)

When DM differences are dealt
with on a DM level, however,
the controversies are resolvable.
A Kuhnian analysis, of certain
methodological controversies, then,
has allowed the interpretation
that what differed between each
of the
pairs of groups arguing was paradigms
and DMs; method or technique also

differed, but were not the sole area
of difference, nor necessarily the

only such area.
First,

A Kuhnian analysis allows us

to

infer a number of things.

the debates were between Dm, based on
different paradigms.

Second,

method or technique was a focus of debate as
it was a relatively ex-

plicit component of what we have termed the DM;
thus, it at least was
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available fo. .e.ate.

Thi...

„eeho.olcs.cal de-

bates

„ni

not Be .esolve..

type

.e.ate .s an expression
o£ „o.e

fundamental differences
(paradig. and DM,

„Mch

„ould re^in even if the
technical debate were resolved,
which It necessarily could
not he, as
technique and method are not
Independent of either paradigm
or DM.
Differences In technique hased
upon different paradigms
cannot productively
be debated as though they
were Independent of their
respective paradigms.
For these reasons, the
debates about technique
between the relatlonallsts
and interpretatlonlsts, and
the debate about method
between Haley and
Schlamp were unresolvable at
the technical and methodological
level.
The fourth possible Inference
Is that this is the case
for some other

methodological and technical debates;
some of these, if analyzed with
the present modified Kuhnian
schema, will be seen to be Inter-DM
differences being argued at the wrong
level.

Fifth,

Inter-DM differences

debated at the DM level itself will
probably have greater potential for
resolution. While the attitudinal and
commitment aspects of DMs would
of course, make .agreement or conversion
unlikely, these aspects would
not necessarily preclude resolution.

A successful such resolution might

be the Identification of points of
difference, differentiation of trivial

from crucial differences, and the avoidance
of protracted sterile osten-

sible methodological controversies.

Because these controversies are an

expression of often fundamental differences, they are often
Invested
with acrimony and frustration; as they are essentially
unresolvable, they
continue and continue, draining effort from more fruitful endeavors
and

.
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further obscuring the issues.

A sixth inference would Hp
be that ^controversies
likely to fall into
the "ostensible" category,
cate^orv and
^t,^ u
hence to benefit by this
type of

interpretation, would be controversion
roversies th=f.
that: were long-standing
and protracted; appeared acrimonious
at ti.es. too. place
between what appeared to
be adherents to so.e
sort of rival approaches
or "schools"; and had
produced no resolution or
progress toward resolution
More subjectively
these debates ^y have a
so.ewhat "ostensible" feel
to the™, as though
the participants were going
over old ground and they
were well-rehearsed.
With the present modifications
of Kuhn's schema, these
types of
controversies can now be Interpreted
such that resolution is at
least
possible
.

Group Structure of Scientific
Activit
Use of Kuhn's scheina to examine
the emergence of family therapy

emphasizes the group structure of
research and practice.

Particularly

because of Kuhn's DM concept, with
its procedural, theoretical and
conceptual consensus across a group, the
analysis allows several elements to emerge.

Facilitation of

c onsensus,

cooperation and productivity

.

First, as has

been mentioned with respect to the DB .commitment
to the same DM allows
several individuals to work together, despite some
level of individual

differences.

Obviously,

the differences,

if too great,

preclude ad-

herence to the same DM, or contribute to its splitting; nevertheless.
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Within ce...n

U.Us,

a

OM se.vas a cc.es.ve

,..nUa»„,

for a sroup of individuals
anC as such, engenders
.eU.ivei,
.a.es
Of "productivity... An
interesting question would
be to inquire what
constitutes, specifically,
these li.its.
Also, presupposing DMs
to
differ in their ability to
'.tolerate., individual
differences, what

characteristics would „ake for
greater and lesser '.tolerance?"
A group of people, working
in concert, is often
™re productive than
those Identical people working
in Isolation; the existence
of several
individuals working __n
u
j
concert xrnhh-ir,
withm a^ shared
^ in concer^
framework was very import
ant to the DB's development
and influence.
r-

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-^21^^

The DM concept also

emphasizes how interrelated its
various components are, and thus,
indicates how interrelated the
commitments are amon^ practitioners
that
share a paradigm.

To

take an illustration from the
DB DM, it becomes

clear that one reconceptualization
necessarily leads to another, and
another; thus, the concept of homeostasis
led to the extension from

"victim" and "binder" to three-party systems,
then family rules; moreover, reconceptualizations became
operationalized through the DM's

particular set of methods and techniques.

(Conversely, it will be

pointed out later, different techniques and methods
between DMs are
often expressions of different sets of conceptualizations.)
Thus,

for the DB DM, one change in thinking inevitably led
to others

When one accepts the idea that a problem involves more
than one person and is a response to a current situation.
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it necessarily fnllnTic

appropriate

t-v,^*-

d^llllT

fimpM-nr, nr,
Is not iri^f

,

r"""""

Z sZTeTZT'
"

system has an ^^T"'"'
adaptive
'-""'^"^ "l-"onship and

.ind Of adaptatL:!"po1
depressed, Che question for

raT^oHs""
the family ^heJaplst

•sr.r.sK-S

r;.:.'

^^"^^^^^1^' ^^^her than assume
?hat a nerinn
r'"'''"'^ °^ relationships
because of his inner dynamics,
it is assumed that his
relationships in which
'
lives. What was'''"'^f
Uvr^Wha't
considered primary and secondary
gain
IS reversed. (Haley,
1971b, p. 282)

T

L

The internal coherence of a DM
points to the internally consistent
set of commitments which underlie
the activities of scientists
working
on the same (or a very similar)
set of problems from the same
perspective, and as such, underline the
often implicit group structure of such

activity.

As such, recognition of the group
structure of science and

the internal coherence of DMs can help
to avoid a prevalent situation

in what Masterman has called the social
and information sciences.

Masterman talked about the lack of long-term
progress in these areas
as the result of multiple paradigms.

In a multiple paradigm area,

Masterman points out that technology develops

to high levels,

little in the way of guiding framework or goals.

with

If the interrelated-

ness of DM commitments is kept in mind the willy-nilly extension
of

methodology and high technology from a DM to some problem outside it
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will seem less valid
and -^cgj.txmate,
legitimate nr.i
unless the DM'q^ o^Ko>.
other components
no. t.ea.e. as
.Housh tHe,

a„

inaepen.en.,
,,,,

were independent, we
end up
P with a sort
sort- of
nf

"

„^

mercenary methodology."

Similarly
^ cixmxiariy,

th.
the present Kuhnian

analysis Has e.pHasi.ed
.he .acU« or procedural
aspects „, sclenUflc
actlvu.. Hsuall,. .He
e^ll.u aspects, „He.He.
.Heo.eUcal o. ™e.Ho.ological receive .He Uon's
sHa.e
ac.en.lon. an. a.e In so„e
„a.s
better understood. Hence.
Anna Freud's (see CHapter
IV, p. 58) argument that technique follows
theory.

A Kuhnian analysis hy
emphasising the Implicit
procedural elements
particularly with respect to
the prohlem-solvlng ..trick",
wHlcH
Becomes

a

paradl^, obviously turns this
priority on Its Head.

develops prior

to

Technique often

theory; at least, the .'early
technical problem-solu-

tions" that in part comprise
paradigms are prior to the theory.
The
theory usually emerges during
the elaboration of the paradigm.
Then
obviously, more techniques and
procedural elements follow as part
of the
DM.
The application of Che Kuhnian
analysis to the emergence of the DB

DM demonstrates the priority of
procedure.

"bvlously,

So,

In 1971b(p. 4), Haley

being Michael Polanyl's well-known term
fo r
rh. non-explicit
the
aspects of what a person knows or what s/he
can do.
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stated:

struggUng to find a theory to
fit their practices
There was no theoretical
model which could be "sed'
to describe behavior In
natural, ongoing groups and
there was no language for
describing thii?
rel^k^n-

Similarly, when Beels and Ferber
(1972) watched family therapy
through one-way screens, examined
video-tapes and Interviewed family
therapists, they decided that "We
avoided the evaluation of theory
because we believed that in many
cases the theory advanced was a
rational
zation for the practice..."
Also, once a paradigm has been
developed, the DM is often extended

procedurally, with the theory following.
It would be preposterous to claim
that from the outset
our work was oriented along such
advanced epistemological
principles. Rather, what led us in this
direction, for
which we may invoke epistemological
justification a posteriori
were eminently practical, mostly clinical
considerlti^^^i
which we were able to conceptualize only
after Gregory
Bateson and his original research team at the
Veterans
Administration Hospital in Menlo Park had begun
to apply
anthropological and cybernetic rather than psychiatric
principles to the study of families with an
emotionally
disturbed member.
(Watzlawick and Weakland 1977, p. l)

'

,

During DM development, or when an individual attempts
or "learn" a DM,
to

to "enter"

these tacit, procedural elements may be very difficult

articulate and may require

a good deal of

trial and error by the

"outsider" attempting to join the group structure.
Attempts at formal training in family therapy also began
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T^eTsMlll

he

f

ions, such as "What

knows how to do but Sas

^^^erapist teach what he

H ?f
iTH Tl^ol^ifld^arf ^if^i^
""^^^ therapy

treatmenr?.^r

describinir- When
iF^^^FTl^thod of

students like to have a
"method" which thej can learn*

f

^

o\^;ri;a?nid^Lr:- -ar^rnro^T.t;-i-h^Lv^::
(HaL„ i9nrpp"T7r:^;h\":L\^^\^;"-^"
Essentially, rather than being
taught the approach, Haley is
advising
learning by"ostension", Kuhn's
version of learning by relevant
and re-

petitive problem exposure.

Rather than explicit teaching and
learning,

the process resembles socialization
over time, similar to what is
found
in professional or graduate
training programs.

Similarly, the tacit elements often
include values, a DM component

recognized as influential in scientific
activity, but usually disregarded,
at least, by other meta-scientif ic
systems.

Values operate across a

scientific group, influencing problem choice,
approach and standards of
solution.

These values in fact, operate as one of the
few "automatic"

points of agreement; that is, they are usually
not subjected to verifi-

cation or debate, in part because they are seldom
recognized.
DM

rather than "discipline" helpful

.

The emphasis in group structi
:ure

is helpful in two more respects on different
levels.

First, by regarding

scientific activity as usually occurring in a group structure, formerly

371

chaouc suuaeions sain
co.p.ehensiBUUy.

.o. e.a™ple,

ey s account

Of the

.He.ape«ic i„„o..,.„3
in .He X,50.= ien.s
remterpracatxon along DM or
group structure

UseU

to

Une=.

Ti:nT:il.°l

IZT:,

In the 1950 's a

j=

^n-^^ons

number'ortheraDj'tJT'"

opener up
^PP^^-^hes.

^*^" '° '"'^"8 "l-ol^
families Into treatment
.
seS^^r
the relationship among
'^'''"'^"S
the ?amnV"
K'
members.
Often a theraplat began to do this „^fh„ ^
'hat others were
dolng It too
wltMn r ?
distfnct sctool! of Lmllv^r"' J"""'
""^ '"^1-^
^^^^^-l^P^^ -"d different
approaches con Luf o
appea^'to'^
""^^ different family
therapists do not necessa?itv ,^
=hare
a
common
method, but
they share the Idea chaf^he^

Finally, as Weimer and
Palermo C1973

9^q^ u
239)
have pointed out,

n
p.

Kuhn has made this point
well in 'Reflections'

A^.n

^,^—^^^^"8 a part-^ui^rLcideTt- r"'
uuimax or revolutionary. To d^riAt^
tizTf:::::,
^n
t

i-k

,

or^ret^^i^LL^rf^r^hr^^hru^t
o°ra:r!y\L"th"^ h°™^^
'^^^^^
^"""^^^h
sfientifl.

I""

d™!!,:;"'^^'^'

"""^^

g^°"P
than a
°^ institutionalised academic

This shift in focus, from
"scientific subject matter" or
"institutionalized academic discipline" to
a particular research
group proves helpful
when perusing the scientific
landscape.
For example, early in this

essay (see Introduction),

I

found it intuitively necessary
to choose a

"school" of family- therapy, the DB
group, as my focus, rather than all
of family therapy; moreover, a
disclaimer was necessary, to the effect
that "family therapy" as an activity
spanned a number of academic dis-

ciplines and professional groups (i.e.,
psychology, sociology, education
and Ph.D.'s, M.D.'s, M.S.W.'s, R.N.'s, etc.).

Attempting

to

delineate
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Wl.

.He.ap...

.3.„s .he usual .eco,„..ea ca.e,o.,es

uot „o..
Whereas focussin, on one
of ehe groups which
comprised family .he.apy
did wor..
The fa.Uy therapy
aeld is .ore helpfully
categorized or
viewed ,y OM rather than hy
academic or professional
discipline; family
therapy Is comprised of
several distinguishable DMs,
none of who. respect disciplinary boundaries,
sociologically or conceptually.
This view is helpful In
other areas of the social
sciences

as well;
for instance: psychoses
tics, forensic psychology
and psychiatry, neuropsychology. While It is quite
possible that any of the above
can be

investigated or scientific activity
can proceed within one
discipline
(e.g., medicine, psychology,
psychiatry, psychoanalysis, stress
research
for psychosomtlcs, etc.) the
relevant structure is usually not
the
name of the discipline (or even
sub-discipline) but rather the problem
addressed and _the ^roup workina
£" it. In scientific practice, these
groups are often interdisciplinary
and individuals identify themselves

with the problem/working group rather
than the disciplines at large.
To a large extent,

the ability of the Kuhnlan schema
to highlight

the group structure of science was made
possible only after Kuhn began
to explicate

structure,

the DM Idea.

While the paradigm concept implied a group

the relationship was sufficiently ambiguous
and tenuous

that no one wrote of Its possibilities in terms
of group structure.

With the DM obviously a group concept, the group activities
and processes in scientific activity emerged.

Using the DM concept as the

relevant structure of scientific activity,

a

Kuhnian analysis allows
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interpretation of the rp^;,^.•^ urelat.onshxp of the
Interpretatlonl.ts, relat
ional.sts. and fa.lly
therapists than an
analysis In academic
terras would
preclude.

^^^^^^i^^^^^^i2-°i-DB_Jan^

theranv to

.1

•

.

The

Kuhnian analysis allows
us to interpret rh.
the relationship
between DB
farail, .herap. and
classical psychoanalysis;
BB
i

•

Wly

contrary to an often-found
misconception
pinion,

therapy was not,

a reaction
reactio ^to psychoanalysis
or else how coula one
explain fa.Il, therapists
(and founders of para-'
<iiS»s I„ their o„n
rl.ht) li.e Hathan
.e.er^n or l.an Bos.or.en.I-«as.
both of „ho„ can ha
regarded as psychoanalytic
In the larger sense.'
ACer^an and Bos.or.enyl-.agy
responded to certain
ano^lles In psychoanalysis hut neither
rejected psychoanalysis
In toto (as have
of
the behaviorists) nor
did they
ney establish
establi<.h their
i-h.paradigms in reaction to
it as a system.

^

Neither, however was DB
family therapy Independent
fro. psychoanalysis. DB family work
was related to psychoanalysis
In that the
9

By this I mean that both dp^l t7H-u -fr,*-^
as family structure and
as well
dynamics both are comfortable P^°f-^<=^
with
psychoanalytic concents thonph fh.
,
f

co'^T^"

ML

n the

rict

1

e

'c?™"";
classical

^^^^^^^

^

Psychoanalytic

or Interpretative sense, by
virtue of
their
P-cesses, as well as lnt;aplychlc:and
not the
thHeasr
least, by
bv" their
th
b"' founders of family therapy
being
DMs.
'
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la... p.ovi.ed
we.e

.He

ano^aUes .pon „hUh

THe OB ,.o.p .esponae.
.o

.He OB pa.aa.,„

ee«a.„ .„„..aes

PsycHoa„al,si3. an. no. .o
.He ,.a„e.o.. a.
U.^e. Po. .ns.ance
no. .He case .Ha.
psycHoanaiy.is "did no. „o.,...
Hecanse

nsoally,

„3s

u

Clearly did and was
successful bo.H conceptually
and clinically. THa
Kuhnlan analysis allows
ns .o perceive .He
connec.lon He.ween OB fa.Uy
therapy and specifically
psycHoanalysls did no. wor.,
under wHa.
circumstances (ex.enslon).
and „Hy (concept of anomaly).
Kor Instance
extension to borderline
patients produced anomaly
(discrepancy between
paradlg^-lnduced expec.ancy and
.He empirical findings)
wi.H respect
jp.
to the psychoanalytic
concepts of narcissism
and transf:erence.

Relationship of

i^SlahH-alXsls.

J;e^elaMonaL_DM^^

t

,1,,,^^^

Lassical

The analysis also Helps
to clarify the relationship
of

Harry S.ack Sullivan and .he
rela.ionalis.s to both psychoanalysis
and
family therapy DMs. The
relational DM, founded by Sullivan,
originated
in different circumstances
.Han .He early psychoanaly.ic
framework, .hen
developed parallel to .he classical
psychoanalytic line of development.

Wi.H the extension of classical
psycHoanalysls, problems in clinical
work impelled the more adven.urous of
the psychoanalysts

to cast

abou.

for assis.ance in dealing wi.H .Hese
difficul.ies and many of chem en-

countered .He Sullivanian interpersonal approach.

By the 1940's, when

anomalies were apparent (a. leas, among those
analysts treating the
new clinical populations), Sullivan's system was
well articulated, and
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clmican,

..ecess.ul. an, s„U,va.

M.seU

ready an Influential
psychiatric facility.

was a. C.es.n..
,o.,e

A Kuhnlan analysis in
DM ter„s allows the
observer
^hose analysts and
therapists

al

to identify

who are relationalists.
and to differen-

tiate the„ fro. Classical
analysts and other
therapists.
The criteria
Of differentiation
re^in the paradises regardins
how to effect cure
Keeping the criteria in
.i„d, it heco.es clear
once again that the
OB family therapy
paradig™ „as revolutionary
and responsive to prohle.3
the classical
interpretationist DM. and not
the relationalisfs.

-

The Kuhnlan analysis
highlights another important,
and related point.
The problems in individual
psychoanalytic treatment discussed
here, were

iHt a disconflr^tion of the psychoanalytic
paradigm, DM, or clinical
practice.

They were not areas of
error or mistake or theoretical

clumsiness in an otherwise adequate
framework.

The framework remains

confirmed in a number of theoretical
aspects over almost a century
of
clinical work. The anomalies
occur onl^ i„ areas of extension
to new

phenomena and only during that
process of extension.

Anomalies occur

as the result of a framework
being pushed too far; essentially,

they

identify the phenomena beginning
with which a particular paradigm and

DM do not work.

It

would seem that each paradigm and DM must
have such

a "border of applicability" that
in time and extensions, becomes in-

creasingly obvious and eventually acknowledged.

A Kuhnlan analysis

allows differentiation between disconf
irmation at the heart of a
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framework, and anomalies
^
u
at xts perxphery.

Both processes
eventually
result in the replacement
nf at least
of
parts of the framework,
but the
route is very different
n-; ^
rferent. Disconf
.rmaticn can occur at
almost anytime;
but anomaly can occur
only
niy after
aftpr the
fh„ paradigm
has preyed Itself
successful and was then extended
to new phenomena.
i

in Short, evaluation
of a modified Kuhnlan
analysis would Indicate that It is enormously
useful historically,
sociologically, and
intellectually. The modified
Kuhnlan

analysis allowed

a

productive
interpretation of the events
surrounding the emergence
of family therapy
it provided a potentially
helpful form of Interpretation
for certain
sterile controversies, and
the analysis highlighted
several important
features related to the group
structure of scientific activity.

CHAPTER

VIII

PROBLEMS, REQUIREMENTS AND
USES OF THE KUHNIAN
ANALYSIS
""^"^^^
FOR PSYCHOLOGY'S FELT
CRISIS
In the preceding chapter,
a revised Kuhnian
analysis was said to
be helpful in a number
of „ays.
In .his chapter, two
Important deficits
in the Kuhnian schema
will be aiscussed,
discu^spH and
a,.^ ^
two proposed solutions
presented.
Then some conclusions will
follow.

e

'-^^^^^^^^^^^^^-^^^^^
of Scientific Activity

As was pointed out in Chapter

'

although Kuhn's concept answered

several of the criticisms which
had been levelled at his
overall schema,
it introduced some new
problems in turn. Of particular
importance, Kuhn's
DM statements merely implied
rather than defined, the size of
a DM.
Two
sorts of boundaries

are required to determine the
"inclusive perimeter"

of a DM: one sociological and
the other conceptual (or structural).
Neither

the size (structurally, conceptually
or sociologically) nor the boundary

criteria were explicated by Kuhn.
Thus, Kuhn was not quite clear as to
whether the DM was constituted

by the adherents to the same paradigm(s)

by the network of

c ommitments

(a

(a

sociological criterion) or

conceptual or structural criterion).

My strong impression is that he favors the latter;
hence, he explicated
the internal structure and constituents of a DM (i.e.,
the paradigms,

symbolic generalizations, models and values, as well as habits,
instru-
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-tation.

etc.) an. also
speciUcall, .e.e„ea

neewor. of

0,™^^.

.

i^eUectual HaMts

^^^^^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^
his conceptual/s„uot..al
.ea„i„, (,.e.. ,He "network
of co^u^en..'
sense of .He DM concept,
„as used as the BM.
,^en usin, this version
a %oundar/. is available
which helps to differentiate
one DM £ro„
another and within which a
single paradig™ (or paradi,™
set) .ay he
elaborated
This boundary was Introduced
earlier as the -border of
applicability."
.

S^ll-^l^EElicabillt^.

Such a "border of applicability"
Is established

by the gradual emergence of
anomalies as the paradigm is
elaborated and
extended to new phenomena. With
successful extensions, that Is,
where
empirical findings are consonant
with paradlg^-lnduced expectations,
the

DM constituents remain productively
applicable and the DM Is extended.
When the extensions continue

"Into" new phenomenon-areas where
anomalies

begin to occur, that is, where
there occur obdurate discrepancies
between paradigm-Induced expectations
and empirical findings, then the DM
framework Is no longer applicable or helpful
and a gradually recognizable
limit is reached.

As the DM matures and is extended by
adherents to new

areas then a boundary will begin to be
discernible, to those who think
In such meta-sclentlflc terms, and the real
limits of the paradigm DM

will become obvious.
If a DM is visualized as a framework
extending either as a circle
(or sphere),

or as a "fan-shape" from the paradigm as focus,

then the
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"^or,.r of .ppUcaMUt...

„ui

.e ei..e. close, o.

,„.Her aependln,
upon .he congruence
between t.e characteristics
of the phenomena and
^hose Of the paradigm and
OM.
.ot alx gto.ps of
phenomena „ould lend
themselves as easily, or as
poorly, tc a particular
DM.
.or example,

-th

respect to Preud's classical
paradlg..e«enslons to other
neuroses
fro. hysteria, and to
psychotic depression reached
the borders of
applicahllity .uch later than
in schizophrenia.
Almost as soon as
schizophrenia was investigated
by the classical
psychoanalytic DM
anomalies began to emerge.
With respect to the borders
of applicability
When the DM extended into
the area of schizophrenia,
the border or
limits occurred quite soon
and "clo<5e"
Close tn
to ^ho
the paradigm.
Viewed in this
-ay a DM seems amoeba-liUe,
gently extending its boundaries
and finding
some areas more congenial
than others.
Structurally, the limits of a
DM's applicability become
discernible with the emergence of
anomalies.
There are no criteria in Kuhn
for the sociological size of
a DM.
In what ways can the number
of DM adherents be ascertained
and where is
the limit set by which one can
assign individuals in or out of
a DM?

Taking particularly a paradigm
as the focus, and surveying a
geography
of researchers, at what point
from that paradigm is an individual
a DM

member?

How directly must s/he work with
the paradigm to be functioning

within a particular DM?

At what point do the problems, methods
and

solutions of that researcher cross over
into a different DM?

Kuhn's

analysis requires answers to these questions,
but does not include any
starting points.

A series of studies about coherent group structure
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m

science, however, provide
this element and ts not
incompatible with
Kuhn's analysis.

Co herent grou ^^tructure.

Recent work by Griffith and
Mullins (1972)

provide a necessary
supplement to the Kuhnian schema. ^

Griffith and

Mullins (1972) and Small and
Griffith (1974) have investigated
small,
very active scientific research
groups that had proved scientifically
••successful."

Based on Crane's (1972) work on
"invisible colleges" where

she "mapped" the structure of
some specialties, Griffith and
Mullins
(1972) contend that major scientific
changes are generated within small,

"socially coherent" groups with
similar characteristics.

They differentiate between the "loose networks"
that appear normal for science and

the occasional formation of small
socially coherent groups that formu-

late "radical conceptual reorganization(s) "

Loose networks

.

(p.

960) of their field.

Across these loose networks, different
groups used a

variety of means to facilitate communication.

Hence, one research area,

speech perception, was small enough that few
communicational problems

arose despite the relatively low level of social
organization

(p.

959).

In other groups, conference series and exchanges
of papers before pub-

1_

.

This is not to imply that Griffith and Mullin's material
must
necessarily be subsumed within Kuhn's; my impression is that
it can well
stand on its own.
ITowever, since it does meet a perceived need in the
Kuhnian analysis very well, I will present it with special reference to
this problem of the "inclusive perimeter."
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lication .e.

_icational

needs

(p.

959).

However, Griffith and
Mullins found that the adoption
or development of a
particular pattern
Of co^ication within
these specialties was
determined, not solely by
•

the structure of any
particular group, hut also
by the problem it was
currently investigating.
(The importance of the
problem under investi-

gation Clearly provides a
point of compatibility with
Kuhn's schema which
also emphasizes problems and
their solutions.)
For example, psycholinguists
seemed to develop differpn^
in the process of applying
psychological theories and metho
dology to studies of language
(as they did afte^
the

deveL;.
°'

research in Ih
ef? ct of
ettects
oTdr'T'
drugs on behavior formed a small
specialty in which
°^ Indivilu
'^'"^''^^
r ^^aJc'h: s'^Sd'th'^'^ ""t^'T^'
membership of groups in close
communicatlon

Tr^^-

^

^"^''^

-

—-^T

f

^°
Interes?s'
""^^ particularly well served
by journlll thus informal contacts
nals
were not supplementing or replacing publications. (1972,

T^f

.

^

pp.

Griffiths and Mullins

(p.

959-960)

960) regard these loose networks of re-

searchers as resulting from "'normal'
scientific activities" and thus

conforming generally to the conventional
scientific wisdom of objectivity
and emotional neutrality.^

They mention that a Kuhnian might regard

such groups "as working to fill out existing
paradigms" i.e., to be
DMs.

This appears to me to be a legitimate
identity to make.

2

A Kuhnian analysis would of course disagree
regarding their point
about neutrality and objectivity.

.
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^^^^^iil^oUer^BL^,^

^^^^^^^
^^^^
^
further di«er.„„a.ea
between the loose networks
of „o™al science
and .o.e tl^htl, .nit
sronps tHat appear to
.e essential!,
.evolntlonar..
They studied six of these Prnnnogroups, the phage workers
In biology. Skinnerian psychologists, the
,uantu. physics group
Copenhagen, the Coettlnge,
mathematicians, the audition
researchers in psychology and
the ethnomethodologlsts in sociology
^.

m

(p.

960)

All six groups achieved a
"radical conceptual
reorganisation within
their field... The .e.hers
of each group were
convinced that they were
achieving either the overthrow
of a .ajor position In
their field, or
making a ™aJor revision in
methodology,
fact, each of the six
groups
did offer a distinctively
different theory or methodology
which both
countered the currently dominant
approach and became influential
in its
own right. Each group
maintained its beliefs over a
protracted period
and each eventually demonstrated
substantial achievements. According

m

to Griffith

and Mulllns (1972. p. 960) none
of the groups consistently

maintained the attitude of "disinterested
objectivity that Is regarded
as a norm of science..."

m

fact,

these groups often entered the
politics

of science to further their
beliefs by obtaining or protecting
appoint-

ments and research supports.

Finally, each group operated through

close and continual interaction..,.'
...when an audition researcher was asked whether
he and
others in his field exchanged preprints (prepubllcatlon
copies of papers), he said that such exchange was
usually
unnecessary because they followed one another's work so
closely that often a single, newly found constant sufficed

)
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to inform others of
an important advance.

(1972, p. 960)

internany, all six groups
were characterized by the
presence .£
an acknowledged intellectual
and organisational leader
(or leaders)
a
geographical center, and a
brief period of comparatively
intense activity
For instance, in quantum
mechanics, Bohr was both the
intellectual and organizational
leader; the geographical
location was
Copenhagen and the period of
intense activity from 1920-1934
(inclusive)
(p. 961).
(P.

960).

toong the Skinnerians,
Skinner was the acknowledged
intellectual
leader, while organizational
leadership was assumed by what
Griffith
and Mullins refer to as a
"cadre of students and postdoctoral
fellows"
at Harvard.
The period of Intense activity
occurred at both Columbia
and Harvard from 1947-1960.
(Palo Alto was clearly the
DB's geographical
center
.

The intellectual leader was
conceptualized as laying the original

conceptual foundations for the work,
as making public statements of
theory and research, resulting in
an acknowledged theoretical break,
and
as approving or validating other
members' work (p. 961).

The intellec-

tual leader was largely responsible
for establishing the innovative

conceptual base.

Clearly in the DB group, Gregory Bateson
fulfilled these

roles and can be regarded as the intellectual
leader.
The organizational leader in all six groups
was a respected researcher
in his own right,

(e.g., Klein in the Goettingen mathematicians with

Hilbert and Minkowski as the intellectual leaders.)
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tacilities for research and
means for conununicatine

Internally, the organizational
leader functioned to maintain
scientific activity within the
group's program.
Griffith and Mullins
(p. 961) felt that their findings
generally indicated "a conscious
effort to direct the group's
work toward a specified series
of problems, from a particular
perspective, with a stated goal."
(p. 961)
In Kuhnian terms, the organizational
leader could be said to maintain
the focus on the elaboration of
the paradigm, within DM boundaries
(with

regard to models, values, etc.).

An inference could be made that while

the intellectual leader could
be primarily credited for the
paradigm
(as s/he established the
innovative conceptual base),

the organizational

leader could be credited for maintaining
and guiding the DM, in both
the sociological and conceptual
aspects.
Thus, the organizational
leader, according to Griffith and
Mullins. arranged appointments, con-

ferences, and research programs - fostering
the research activities.

At the same time, s/he would maintain that
activity within paradigm-

directed boundaries, e.g., the organizational
leader functioned with a
"conscious effort to direct the group's work toward
specified problems,
from a particular perspective, with a stated goal."
(1972,

p.

961)

It appears to me difficult to tell which of
the central DB members

fulfilled the role of organizational leader.

In later years

(after the
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1962 dissolution) WatzlawlcU
filled this position In
organizing conferences, publishing reviews
and editing compilations.
More personal,
and/or detailed information
regarding the Internal
organization and roU
Of the DB DM would be needed
to accurately ascertain
who. and whether,
there was an organizational
leader(s).

Each of the six groups
established theoretical and
sociological
boundaries and provided identity
and In-group versus out-group
lines
(p.

960).

(Thus, for the operant
conditioners,

theorists were the out-group.

the

HuUlan learning

For DB members, the individualistic
psy-

choanalysts constituted the out-group).

Also, the boundary served to

severely limit the range of Incoming
information regarded as relevant.
Griffith and Mulllns (p. 961) refer
to "their general Indifference
to
the work of other researchers..."
which, naturally, helped to
generate

antagonism.
Each of the six groups also concerned
itself with recruitment of

new members

(p." 962),

facilitation of communication

(p.

962), and the

protection of priority rights of discovery of
its members.
There are several points of compatibility
and complementarity between Kuhn's schema and the Griffith and
Mullins work on "invisible

colleges."

Both emphasize the importance of "the problem"
as a focus

for organization of the research group; they
emphasize the group struc-

ture of science and the importance of the "socially
coherent" work group

with respect to communication, productivity, originality,
and identity.
They appear compatible in seeing science as having "normal" and
revolu-
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tionary phases, with
^ between
progress ^it^^r.
alternating
the accretionary and
the revolutionary (or
"innovative");
Griff."
^h and
^ m
Griffith
Mullins make a
differentiation Kuhn does not
between innovative
revolntiona., an.
innovative elite but do not
identify „,at is f u„dan.entail,
different
about the..3 ^uhn's sche^
i^pUes that the .evolutionary
groups Have
a truly revolutionary
paradigm for a large proportion
of the relevant
disciplines, whereas for
elite groups, the innovative
paradigm is not
so Clearly opposed to
the dominant framework
in so.e way (whether conceptually or proportionally
to number adherents of
the dominant approach)
Finally, both analyses
perceive sceince as conducted
In groups
Which have developmental aspects:
inception, intense activity
and either
dissolution or absorption as
beliefs gain adherents and
respectability.
.

-

Supplen-enting Kuhn's sche.^ with
the work of Crane, and of
Griffith

and

MuUlns and S^ll provides both direct
information

heuristic uses.

and also some

For Instance. Small and Griffith
(1974, p. 35) Indicate

that the structure of biomedical
literature differs from that of the

physical sciences, they provide a
methodology using citations in publications they had found useful.

Taking Into consideration their point

Elite innovative groups such as Bohr's
quantum mechanics groups,
w^.„ recognized by other members
were
of their field, as being of central
^"i^^ly diverging from those other researchers
^"^"J
The audition
(p. 960).
researchers and the Goettlngen mathematicians
were also in this category. The Sklnnerlans,
phage biologists and
ethnomethodologists were perceived by Griffith and
Mullins (p. 961) as
revolutionary: as both more highly organized,
and more clearly opposed
to the outgroup.
Their criteria appear not as firm as Kuhn's for his
revolutionary paradigms.

(r°Mm"
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resa.d.„s dU.e.en.
...c..es, o„e can .peculate
.... .He
Xite.a.u.e in .He .ocUX
sciences .a. He au.e.en.
.Ha„

-

s.^e...
eUHe.

of the physical or
biomedical sciences.

.Ha.

The ..invlslHle collese.'
„or. also sheds some
11,H. on .he unresolved
problem of DM "inclusive
perimeters"
P rimeters
in th.
u
the v
Kuhnxan
analysis.
Kuhn does
no. specif, .He average
"si.e.. or Incl.siveness
o£ a CM, nor how closely
a researcher «s. work
with .he paradigm .o He
a legl.ima.e memHer
of
a DM.
Griff i.H and Mullins' work
suggests .ha. revolu.lonary
DHs are
rather small in number and
.hat researchers deal
with the paradlgm(s)
rather directly. Normal
science DMs appear larger
and more diffuse, with
more permeable boundaries
and less antagonism
He.ween in- and ou.-groups.
-

Need for the "Meta" DM Con^Pp ^

Kuhn's formulation of the DM
concept brings up a second major
problem.
This problem is pointed to by
two different types of
issues.
The
first concerns the relationship
of "clusters" of DM's within
the family
therapy field.
The second concerns controversies
that appear to be

either methodological or inter-DM
debates, which, upon closer inspection,
cannot adequately be accounted for
by either method or the DM concept.
To take the first issue first:

it is obvious in perusing

the family therapy landscape that
there are a number of DMs.
is one.

The DB DM

Others include the DM developed around the
work of Nathan

Ackerman in New York City, and that around Lyman
Wynne's work in Rochester.
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in Philadelphia,
Salvador Mlnuchin's „o..
Has been developed

weU-.„o™

i„o

a

OM. a„d I. Bos.o™en.l-«a...3
„o.. I3 heco.in,
l„e.easl„,l,

influential.

Mo.eove.. several other
0„s are belns. or have
heen. developed (e.s.. around .he
Ideas and practice of
Hurra, Bo„e„, of SpecU
and
Attneave, and of Bell.)

several of these separate
and dif f erentiable DMs
in fa.ily therapy
see. to "belong with" or
cluster with the DB DM.
Such a DM would be
Minuchin-s structural fa.ily
therapy DM.
Though the two DMs are based
on different paradigms and
use different symbolic
generalizations, heuristic .odels, techniques and
goals, there are so.e
affinities between the™.
Structuralists can be comfortable
with DB techniques and vice
versa.^
Both groups stress problem
solving, change, and short-term
work rather
than insight, explanation, and
"deep- change.
Both groups exclusively
focus, in conceptualization
and clinical practice, on the
and not

s^

with the individual.

Yet adherents from each group
would bristle at being

asked to cross their respective
DM boundaries into the other DM.
and their
own DM identities are firmly
maintained.
Kuhn's DM concept can neither

explain the ways in which these two
DMs cluster with each other, nor why
this cluster is so far removed from another
found in the family field.

4

In fact, after the dissolution of the DB DM and
Minuchin's establishment of his DM, Jay Haley left Palo Alto and
joined Minuchin in
Philadelphia.
They apparently worked closely together for some
time,
then parted their association, neither one of
them "crossing" into the
other s DM. and both continuing after the separation,
to exemplify and
develop their respective DMs. Minuchin staying in
Philadelphia and
Haley going to Washington, D.C.
(Minuchin. 1974)
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This second cluste. of
DMs Includes Ivan
Bos.o^enyl-Nagys DM
Philadelphia, AcUe^an's
in .e„ York, „el„
sti^rlin's in West
Ce^an, and R.o. .ains's in
C.ea. B.i.ai„.= .u
of these B„s deal
„itK
the integration of the
fa.ily s.ste. and the
individual, and allow
phe„o.enolos, in their practice
and conceptualisation.
Ml these groups
emphasise understanding,
insight and explanation
in relation to changealso, treatment tends to
be longer than in the
first cluster and is
directed toward "deeper-changes.
There exists a good deal of
acrimony
about this issue; the DB and
related DMs deride Nagy,
Acker^an, etc..
as being psychoanalysts,
while this second cluster
usually regards the
techniques of the DB and Minuchin
cluster to be conducive to
only the
most superficial of changes.
Also, this second cluster
will occasionally
address larger issues, (e.g.,
role of childhood, adolescence
in the

m

20th century, changing role of
the fa.lly, etc.) while the
first cluster
will almost never engage in such
discussion. Those in the second
cluster
often have their conceptual roots
in psychoanalysis (e.g., Acker„an.

Boszormenyi-Nagy)
,

though they are obviously family therapy
and not

psychoanalytic DMs.^

^Although I am not very familiar with Norman
Paul's work reeardine
unresolved grief reactions across generations,
it seems that hL DM
also belongs here.
6

It should be pointed out that the
conceptualizations and values
^° psychoanalysts; nothing is being implied here
^''f^^P
fK^^^.^
about
the training of the therapists before
they became

family therapists.
Thus, Salvador Minuchin and Donald
Jackson were both trained
as analysts.
Minuchin's paradigm and DM, however, are not
related in
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Kuhn-. DM concept, unfortunately,
cannot explain the basis
under
which these clusterings occur,
nor what n«.es the two
clusters so obviously disparate ,ro™ each
other.^ «,at is obvious is
that so.a 'WtaDM concept is re,uired-one
which provides both the
criteria of inclusion
within cluster and the criteria
of disparity between DM
clusters.
For
instance, about what kinds of
things do the Intra-cluster
DMs agree?
One example .Ight be that
the DMs .ust agree with regard
to metaphysical
models; while Kuhn has included
both metaphysical and heuristic
models
as DM components, I would reeard
legara hP^r^Q^^r>
neuristic m^^^i
models as appropriate to the

DM concept level (e.g., cybernetics
as a heuristic model for the
DB

homeostatic aspect of the paradigm),
but metaphysical models as in-

appropriate to that DM level.

The other DM components are rather

narrowly focused: thus, "values" relate,
for Kuhn, primarily to good
theory construction.
at this DM level.

Heuristic models, like cybernetics, are
appropriate

Metaphysical models fall outside this type of
narrow-

concept, practice or concerns with Ackerman's
or Nagy's, but is related
to the^ DB s.
Apparently when Minuchin formulated his paradigm, he
"left
behind the psychoanalytic thinking. Jackson, on
the other hand, did
not.
Though he formulated the DB, his continued adherence
to his former
training eventually resulted in a split between him
and the mainstream
DB formulations; for instance, his insistence on
the legitimacy and
necessity of phenomenological issues is similar to a
psychoanalytic
position, but resulted in the 1959 DB DM split. This
insistence upon
phenomenology is also present in Ackerman's and Boszormenyi-Nagy
s work.
'

am not implying here that there are only two of these DM clusters
in the family therapy field; there may be several more.
These two are
the only ones I have discerned.
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focus conceptualUatlon.

metaphysical models.

The function served by DMs
do not use or requir

They belong probably to
that "meta-DM level; a

further point of Inquiry should
focus on

a

comparison of metaphysical

assumptions across the DMs within
one o£ those large clusters
and then
between these large clusters.
Another issue that suggests the
need for a meta-DM concept concerns

ostensible methodological or inter-DM
controversies which, upon close
inspection, are actually debates about
typical and repetitive inter-

cluster issues which are fundamental
and often pre-logical.

An example

of this type of "meta-DM" controversy
took place within the DB DM in

the guise of a methodological debate,
and led directly to the 1959 split.

"Meta"-DM debate.
early 1957.

The debate very probably occurred in late
1956 or

Haley (1976, pp. 72 and 75) states that early in
1956, the

project shifted to emphasize actual family behavior
and that differences
surfaced with the pressure of dealing with actual
families; also, he
states that these differences in approach did not begin to
appear in

publications until 1958, "the next year that project members published
papers."

(p.

75)

It became obvious to the project members that there was a large

gap between their conceptualizations, particularly the double bind idea

itself and the raw data of family interaction.
8

They felt that some

It might be recalled here that the DB paradigm had been formulated
deductively; as such, when the group came to "test", compare or apply
it to actual data, some degree of bridging material would almost inevitably be lacking.
It is probably only a point of curiosity but, if all

"
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type of theoretical ^odel
„as necessary to describe
both fa.il, patterns
during conversation and also
those characteristic
patterns of behavior
of families Which contained
a schizophrenic ™e„ber.

They agreed that

the "theoretical .odels
and terminology of
psychoanalysis and other

psychological approaches were
Inadequate for the proble." (Haley,
1976a,
but
began to disagree upon what
p. 73),
sort of approach to use fro.
there.

P^°je^t Which had been inbeginning became more evident.
?here hid
- controversy ove;
llTt .t t 7"^°"«>"^i-ation
to focus upon and what
terminItl £nd .theoretical models to use.
£i21Z
A schism devel^^S^
between (a) a strictly-communication
approach dealing with
the description of observable
messages in terms of Logical
Types, and (b) an approach which
emphasized the codification
of messages, or the internal
processes of the receiver and
learning. 9
(Haley, 1976a,jfp. 73;
IZl
emphasis added)

tro"^"''^!

The debate centered upon the paradigmatic
"levels of communication",

particularly with respect to the message and its
qualifier.
to Haley's account

(1976a, pp.

According

73-75), the "internal processes wing"

argued that the distinction between a message and
the codification of
a message by a receiver was
fallacious.

Later they argued that the

revolutionary paradigms are developed deductively,
as Kuhn has implied,
IS there always this difficult point of
convergence, when empirical
material is brought to bear on the idea? This
process certainly occurred
in relation to the theories of relativity forwarded
by Einstein, whose
paradigms had been deductive. Whether this is also
the case for less
widely known paradigms is unclear.
9

The first of these approaches was labelled the "behavioral wing"
and the second the "internal processes wing" or the "higher generalizations
wing.
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terminology should be maintained
at a higher level of
generalization
than the .ere description
of messages.
The terminology of this
vlng
included such concepts as
"learning, perception,
awareness, expectation
and the language of emotions."
(p. 73)
Important questions for then.
were whether the receiver of
nf the
hV.o ^^^^
messages were aware, whether
s/he was
mispercelvlng or misinterpreting,
and what his/her experience
might be
••was he suffering trauma,
was he experiencing grief,
was the experience
hurtful, and so on." This wing
objected to restricting the use
of the
DB to specific interpersonal
situations and preferred to use
the concept
quite broadly; thus, they felt
the term to be applicable
to evolutionary
processes and telencephalization of
the brain as well as an
interactional
pattern in families conducive to the
development of schizophrenia. From
the positions argued by this
internal process wing, it can be
inferred
that it was comprised of Jackson and
very probably Bateson.

Haley was clearly a member of the
"behavioral wing."^^

This wing

believed the preferable approach to be
the study of -strictly observable

messages" (1976,

p.

74), and argued that an "age old problem of
psychology-

could be avoided if they studied only
those things which could be directly observed and verified.

This wing believed that the concept of levels

of communication made it appear possible,

for the first time,

to develop

10^
Once again, Weakland's position is more difficult to
discern here.
He might not have had a firm position but rather
may have served as a
mediator and helped the DM to produce as much as it did from
the split
in 1959 to dissolution in 1962.

•
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a systematic
description of human
behavior
navior.

^
To on
continue
to deal with

metaphoric statements
about the internal
internal processes
of the individual
even if conceived in
a different
(p.
perceived as leadini
project bac. to
psycholosy^s preoccupation
.ith the individual
and away from its
identity with the ^Luay
study or
of inter.n^•
interactive processes.
It
was argued that the
more the focus
focu^ ^^<.
was upon the interchange
of messages
the more complete the
description.

The .ore highly general

S

the'

deflnuZ^rr

°'
as the double bind
such
the r,r,r. di«icult
it would be to
develop a systematic
the daL.lfcSyriS^^^p^Nl?
^PPli<=d to

The internal processes
wing argued that the
behavioral wing was too
narrow in its approach, and
the behavioral wing that
the other was too
diffuse and ambiguous to have
useful application to actual
data (pp. 7475).

The two Wings differed with
respect to: type of approach,
admissible
types of data, degree of
generalisation for the DB concept;
also whether
certain processes fell into their
own. or the other, wing.
Thus, they
debated upon where "learning"
belonged: the behavioral faction
argued
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.hat the

te™

'learning.. „as not a

'

co^icaticn te™

for descriptive

purposes, while the Internal
processes group ..argued that
It certainly
was and should be wae^A
-i-n
^
^
used rn a description of
the data/' (Haley,
1976a, p. 75)
It is apparent that
Haley recognized these
differences as very
serious and perhaps fundamental,
certainly „ore than methodological.
Haley remarked that these
differences were Inherent .'from
the beginning.,

(p.

73) of the project, and that the
positions taken antedated

the DM Itself.

These positions ware increasingly
reflected in the work

in progress when It was subjected
to the pressure of direct
empirical

application.

Methodology develops within
constituents.

a

DM and is related

to

the DM's other

Arguments about methodology can be resolved
within a DM

as the adherents share other DM
constituents, especially the paradigm,

and as such have a shared context, set of
goals, terms, etc., through

which to argue the specific differences of
method.

It is specifically

because method is not independent of DM that
inter-DM methodological
debates are fruitless.

Each side is arguing a DM-dependent methodology'

to another DM-dependent methodology as though
the methodologies were

DM- independent

.

In the present case of the behavioral vs. internal processes
debate,

the differences stem not from different DMs, but rather from

antecedent and fundamental differences in conceptual-philosophical
orientations, which will be designated as "meta-DMs" (MDMs)

.

Questions

regarding whether behavior or phenomenology is more important, and
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Which can be studied and why,
are answered at .he M,„
level and not at
the DM level of symbolic
generalization, heuristic
™dels. paradigms
and values regarding theory
construction. The choice
between behavior
and phenomenology occurs
because of prior adherence
to a M,„.
Haley
identified their differences
as predating the project,
as Inherent
in

the position they took, and
as persistent through time.

These are the sa„e MDMs alluded
to in the foregoing
discussion of
"clusters" of DMs. The
me Clusters
cluqtPrQ nf
of hmo
DMs occur within one MDM, and
the
•

,

.

two MDMs provide the criteria fr^y -tr.^!
for inclusion and the boundaries
between
,

,

those two family therapy clusters.

^^^^i^-£^^ii5linar^^

Some preliminary constituents of

MDMs can be identified by examining
what is shared by DMs within their

respective MDM's and also by examining the
areas of consistent differences between the two identified MDMs.

It should already be clear

that the MDM constituents would have to
include both explicit and

implicit aspects, and both intellectual and
atcitudinal components.
In the following discussion the cluster of
DMs formed by the DB

DM and Minuchin's DM will be referred
formed by Boszormenyi-Nagy

referred to as MDM II. 12
12

'

s

,

to as

MDM

I;

the cluster of DMs

Stierlin's and Ackerman's DMs will be

Reviewing the DM clusters several patterns

This IS not to imply that other family therapy DMs do not or
cannot fall within one or another of these MDMs, or some other MDM.

.

;
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emerge

'-^^^l^^^^l^iS^^

ri.3t,

the DMs Within ^^.M

I ascribe to a
logical positivistic
orientation, whereas those
DMs in the second >.M
all ascrihe to a dialectical
orientation ^3 This difference
in philosophical orientations
corresponds to differences in
what Radnit.Icy has
termed the Anglo-Saxon
intellectual tradition (for
logical positivism)
and the Continental intellectual
tradition (dialectics). (Parenthetically, the Continental
tradition in this country is
markedly less
powerful than the Anglo-Saxon,
and most of the DMs which
adhere to it
occupy a counter-dominant
position in their fields. Thus
BoszormenyiNagy's DM is counter-dominant
to Minuchin's in terms of
influence,
number of adherents and to a
certain degree, their perception
of their
.

own positions vis-a-vis each
other.

The way in which these two MDMs

conceptualize what the problem is and
what their goals are, is heavily
influenced by their (usually implicit)
adherence to either pisitivism
or dialectics.

One of the constituents then
differentiating the two

is a difference in philosophical
orientation

.

This point receives some

support if one recalls the reservations
mentioned earlier regarding

metaphysical models.
13

My strong impression was that, while heuristic

For instance, with respect to MDM II, see:
Laing and Esterson's
Sanity
r» Madness and the Family (1964); Boszormenyi-Nagy and Spark, (1970)
and Stierlin (1968) for family therapists who could
be considered to
cluster in MDM II; for MDM I family therapists, see Haley
(1973), and
Minuchin. 1974.

.
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models were indeed constituents of DMs,
metaphysical models had no
place in the DM as narrowly defined by Kuhn
and Masterman and as used
in the present analysis.

There is obviously a similarity between
the

ideas of "metaphysical models" and of
"philosophical orientations",

and they appear to occupy the same, more abstract
level of thinking

than the heuristic models.

For this reason, heuristic models appear

appropriate to the DM level of conceptualization and philosophical

orientation (and metaphysical models) the MDM level.
Value systems.

Secondly,

they differ with respect to the values to

which they adhere and these values are consonant with the philosophical
orientation of the respective MDMs.

A particularly strong contrast in

values between the two MDMs corresponds to the differences between
predictive understanding and interpretive understanding.

Thus, MDM I

values prediction, control, results as measured by change in family
structure (either as expressed in communication or subsystem coalitions
and splits)

.

MDM II on the other hand values understanding, insight,

and dialogue and what Radnitzky (1973) has called an "emancipatory

interest

,,14

Thus, DB and structural family therapies have been criticized by

14

An "emancipatory interest" is usually defined as a concern with

the forces influencing or acting upon an individual in his/her social
and economic context; the well-being of the individual is of concern.
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non-aahe.en.s fo. .a.n.ainin,
..e oppressive s.atus
in so.e .a.iUe
and for .he fact that it
is not at all unco^^on
for the. to reinforce
cultural, social, or gender
stereotypes in what they
state is in the
service of change. They are
often criticized by the
II adherents
for .aking only '.surface"
changes which either back-fire
or dissipate;
I adherents clai.
that the MDM II therapists
are really psychoanalysts and in their pursuit
of "deep" changes, require
either a
select population of families
or lose .any families to
premature termination.
In general, MDM I therapists
use a rapidly .oving short-ter.
approach while the MDM II prefer
longer treatment.

Focu^of^ttentio^

Related to the above two differences,
these

two MDMs differ with respect
to their foci of attention
or their choice
or level of phenomena.
Thus, MDM I DMs focus on behavior
while MDM II

emphasizes (though not exclusively)
phenomenology.

Similarly,

the DB

and Minuchin's group focus exclusively
on the family systems level for

both conceptualization and clinical
practice whereas MDM II groups distribute their attention between family
systems dynamics, individual

phenemenology and the integration of the two.

In the latter MDM there

appears to be an attempt to balance the roles,
prerogatives and ob-

ligations of the individual with those of the
family.
MDM,

In the first

the individual, particularly with regard to
his/her phenomenology

is actively ruled out,

debate in the DB group.

e.g.,

the "internal processes" vs.

"behavioral"

The "behavioral" wing prevailed and the DM
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renamed in

the same line of development
in which it had started.

This issue raises an
important point.
II were represented in the
DB DM,

How,

if both

MDM

1

and

could the DM function and
survive.

the group debated and why
Jackson eventually established
his own group
at mi (the Mental Research
Institute). Jackson's orientation
was ob-

viously toward MDM II while the
dominant group orientation was
MDM I.
While Jackson contributed to the
paradigm, it should be recalled
that
his contribution,

the homeostatic aspect, was
consistently downplayed,

and the communicational aspect
emphasized and more fully elaborated.

My impression is that the newly
emerging paradigm and DM could not
"afford" to elaborate the homeostatic
aspect because it implied a

return to traditional individual psychiatric
thinking rather than the
family-systems viewpoint.

If the DB DM had not subdued or
de-emphasized

the MDM II component and instead elaborated
its dominant MDM

I

aspects,

my impression is that it would not have been
revolutionary-not because
the MDM
it was.

I

Gestalt is revolutionary, but because their
paradigm within
As it was, Jackson joined the DM in 1954 and the
debate erupted

only two years later; this set of differences between the
two ^©Ms is
best exemplified in the behavior vs. phenomenology issue,
the set of

differences Haley refers

to as

"inherent" from the beginning.

In short, a DM cannot be split between two MDMs and any elements
of the counter-dominant MDM must be vigorously subdued, particularly
in the early paradigm-DM stages.

Griffith and Mullins (1972) refer to
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.his suppression function
f.o. another angle;
they indicate that
one of
the functions of socially
coherent research groups,
and especially one
of the leaders, is to
suppress tangential or
alternate lines of investigation within the group
and to provide a relatively
i.per.eable

barrier to such information
fro™ outside the group.

Research generated

Within or by other M)Ms than
that MDM dominant in a
particular research
group is precisely the sort
of research which "should"
be subdued,
par-

ticularly in early phases of
the DM; its presence is
divisive in the
extreme, as the fundamental
belief systems of any two >ms
are different
To be articulated, a paradigm
requires a period of uncontroverslal
and

consensual effort, and this Implies
the operation of only one MDM.

If

the two clusters of family
therapy DMs are any measure, MDMs
differ

sufficiently to effectively preclude
concerted effort for any reasonable
period of time.

Models of explanation.

A final discernible constituent of MDMs

is a preference for a particular model
of explanation.

The MDM

I

DM's

characteristically preferred mechanistic explanations
and conceptualizations.

The fact that they deal with family systems
should not be taken

to mean the MDM I DMs deal with "open"
systems;

the characteristic

system found in their conceptualization is the simple,
closed system.
("Closed" systems are usually defined as those systems with no
in-

coming or outgoing elements, whereas "open" systems exchange elements,
across the system's boundary, with the environment)

.

Their systems
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approach is limited to the
cybernetic model of closed
rather than open
systems and while this is a
far cry from the linear
thinking of
their

predecessors, it is also a far
cry from the conceptualisation
required
for the open system.
It is the second MDM
that prefers the open
systems as a model of explanation.
This latter group characteristically
will deal with the system
formed by family-individual
and individual/
family nexus, as well as the
individual-family-society configuration.

11-im.^-talt.

It becomes increasingly clear
that the constituents

within each MDM are closely related.

For instance, predictive rather

than interpretive understanding is
often associated with logical positivism, which is in turn usually
associated with a preference for mechanistic types of explanation.

Similarly, many of the MDM II characteristics

are often associated with each other,
e.g., dialectics, phenomenology,
an interpretive understanding and an
emancipatory interest.

What this

suggests is that the constituents of MDMs
are neither random nor in-

dependent.

They probably function with some degree of
integration and

certain characteristics are much more likely
than others.

For instance,

to be found in

concert

though probably not necessarily impossible,

it seems that predictive understanding (as a value)
is much less likely
to be found with phenomenology (as a focus of attention)
or with organis-

mic types of explanations.

However, the combination of predictive

understanding, focus on behavior, and mechanistic explanation is more
likely, makes "intuitive" sense, and is in fact encountered, for ex-
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ample, as MDM constituents
for behaviorism.

Though arrive, at
Inductively lro„ a review
of fa.U, therap,
o„
Clusters and though
preUmlnar,. the constituents
for the ^.„ concept
fit each cluster and
appear
ciL
to
CO "fif"
tit T,-!^K
with each other
L-iicL
nv^n
AS a preliminary
hypothesis, MDMs could be
said to be constituted
of:
•

.

1.

a philosophical
orientation

2.

preferred model or type of
explanation

3.

a value system, and

phenomena of focus (focal
phenomena of observation)
independent corroboration for
the presence and Internal
coherence
of such conceptual
constellations comes from such
„ork as Coan's (1963).
Factor analysis of characteristics
of important works in the
field of
4.

psychology demonstrated six
contlnua, which split up into
three sets
of complementary, or
antagonistic, pairs. The first
pair of charactarls
tic tendencies in these major
works was termed a synthetic
vs. analytic
approach. The synthetic continuum
was characterized by a subjectlvlstic
holistic, and qualitative approach,
whereas the analytic continuum was
characterized by what was seen as an
objectlvlstlc, elementarlstic, and
quantitative trend. Coan regards this
pair of approaches as roughly
equivalent to Allport's Leibnitzlan and
Lockean categories.
The second pair of antagonistic
approaches was a functional vs.

structural dichotomy, roughly exemplified by
William James and the

experimentalists respectively.

In Coan's study,

the functional approach

was comprised of a dynamic personal approach
which emphasized internal
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or biological sources of
behavio.. wHe.eas the
struc^.^'s tendency
emphasized a static, t.anspetscnal
approach. Finally, a wea.et,
yet
still distinct pair of
contlnua „as the fluid vs.
restrictive tendencies
Along the -fluid" continuum
there was a "basic"
predisposition

latxon of entities and events.

(1973, p. 240)

Coan's work demonstrates the
presence of the tendencies identified
in the mns.
Clearly, Coan's analytic,
structural, and restrictive

tendencies would be associated
with the MDM

I

DMs, and their predilec-

tion for a logical positivistic
orientation, mechanistic models of

explanation and predictive understanding.

On the other hand,

the

synthetic, functional and fluidity
characteristics are associated with

MDM II and their dialectical, phenomenological
and organismic preferences.

What is particularly useful in Coan's work
is the demonstration

of the presence of these characterizing
tendencies,

their non-indepen-

dence from each other, their close correspondence
with the MDM constituents and finally, their arrival by inductive
means.
The MDM constituents were arrived at primarily
deductively; the

DM clusters were examined for the aspects which
allowed certain DMs to
cluster and those that differentiated the clusters.
teria were used as MDM constituents.

Then,

these cri-

Coan's continua, however, were

arrived at largely inductively in a factor-analytic study.

As such,

very similar conclusions were reached from two separate directions and
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this underscores the
substantiality of these
tendencies and the i„portance of investigating them
further.

Moreover, these tendencies
were found by Coan to occur
in several
areas of psychology and the
present dissertation found the.
to occur
in family therapy as well,
it is apparent that these
divisions or
continua hold for areas besides
family therapy,
if these continua, and
M.MS are appropriate for other
areas as well, this would imply
that such
a Kuhnian analysis which
included the MDM concept, could
appropriately
be applied to an endemic,
dialectical tension in psychology
While
the Kuhnian schema implies some
sort of progression (if not
necessarily
.

progress) or evolution of DMs, from
one to another through time, the

MDM concept and Coan's work imply a
continuing dialectical tension
between MDMs.

There may be no progression from MDM
to new MDM, but

rather the persisting tension between
constellations of belief.

It

may be that, in the social sciences, this
conceptual structure persists and should be recognized.

MDMs as "constitutive realities."

MDMs could effectively function as

what the ethnomethodologists term "constitutive
reality."
Wood, 1975)

(Mehan and

Briefly, ethnomethodology is described by some of its

adherents (Mehan and Wood, 1975) as a reality system
that investigates

15^
u
My thanks
to Dr. Park for pointing out this important MDM
1

aspect to me.
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those common features of all
realities.

realities do nor merely occur,
ceaseless activity.

A central thesis is that

they are constructed and
maintained by

These constitutive realities
are based on incorrigible

propositions, on "unquestioned and
unquestionable axioms" (Mehan and
Wood, 1975, p. 9) which establish
the facticity of the world
for the
holder of the proposition. The
incorrigible propositions of a reality

system serve as criteria

to

judge other ways of knowing
(1975, p. 14).

Thus, if an individual knows the
world in mystical terms, s/he cannot
be

convinced or persuaded out of that
reality system, and in fact, many of
the arguments used in the attempt
will be re-construed by the individual

into mystical terms, which process
functions as additional support for
the incorrigible propositions.

In other words,

the arguments will be

translated into the person's reality system
and as such, will serve to

^"PP°^^ rather than relate his/her particular reality system.
The alternative reality is filtered through
the individual's own

reality system, which is effectively incompatible
with the alternative,
and the reality work justifies the incorrigible
propositions, upon

which it rests.

Mehan and Wood (1975, p. 12) see this as a self-

preservative reflexive process which occurs in oracular, scientific
and commonsense reasoning.

All the features of reality systems dis-

cussed by Mehan and Wood (e.g., coherence, interaction, fragility and

permeability) are maintained reflexively; so, for example, research

questions are asked in terms of the system's incorrigible propositions
and investigated with methods of that system

,

which "prove" the
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factlcity or existence of the reality
syste™ ltsel£. regardless of
whether
the hypothesis Is confirmed or
dlsconf Inned
MDMs function as reality
.

systems; with their philosophical
orientations, .odels of explanations,
values and relevant phenomena, MDMs
define, delineate and constitute
a reality system for the scientist.

MDMs provide the basis for what
is

perceived, and what Is "known" to exist
in the world; as well, they
provide a preferred, correlated type
of approach or explanation and
the

values within which to negotiate.

Further, MDMs display the same fea-

tures Mehan and Wood attribute to
reality systems, e.g.. internal co-

herence, interaction, etc.

The contention that MDMs function as
reality systems for scientists

implies that often, or usually, their effect
is implicit and they can

function both before and after the development
of a paradigm.

MDMs can both precede and follow paradigms.

As Masterman has

pointed out, something precedes the paradigm;
it is my impression that
it is the MDM that precedes the paradigm.

An individual, or set of in-

dividuals, perceives a particular problem through the
filter of his/her

MDM and is able to arrive at a problem-solution.
the DB paradigm,

As was the case with

the revolutionary problem-solution was reached by
a

group that approached the problem with a different MDM
than had been
,

used.

16

^
By
essentially re-constructing the problem, it is able to be

16^
In terms of the two MDMs explicated here, psychoanalysis would
appear to adhere to MDM II; it is primarily interpretive, dialectical,
phenomenological, etc.
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solved.

The

mn

concept as so constituted
would help to explain Master-n's point (corroborated In the DB
DM) that revolutionary
paradigms are
achieved by "rank outsiders";
these paradlg„-.aUers probably
adhere to
a different ^mM, one which
can successfully handle the
problem at Issue.
This was the case with Freud.
His perception of hysteria
In a primarily
dialectic framework rather than
neurology's logical posltlvlstlc,
mechanistic approach allowed him
to reconstruct or repercelve
the proble. and
propose a fruitful solution.
This type of situation leads to
an interesting question.

Is it the

case that an^ change in perception
(or problem re-construction)
is helpful or is it rather the case that
some approaches are more conducive
to

solving certain types of problems
than others?

That is, are all MDMs

equally helpful with all types of
problems, or are some approaches more

conducive of solution?

For example, Freud approached hysteria
with a

primarily dialectical MDM^^ and was successful
in his problem-solution;
prior positivistic mechanistic approaches had
not been successful.

Is

it the case that the opposite change
would have been similarly success-

ful:

if,

after viewing hysteria dialectically with no
success, a mechan-

istic approach were suddenly brought to

MDM have been successful?

bear— would just

the shift in

Or is it the case that for certain reasons

a dialectical, interpretive, phenomenological approach
was more likely

17

For arguments that Freud's conceptualization was primarily dialectical despite his early efforts to inject logical positivism
see
D. Bakan's Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition. (1958)
,
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to be successful?

It seems difficult to
believe that a change in MDM
£er se Is

sufficient to induce or allow
such a solution; in this
hypothetical case
of an anomaly with hysteria
if dialectics were being
used, It is difficult to imagine that a change
to a positivistic, mechanistic
approach
would be helpful.
Instead, the constituents of
mH II rather than MDM
1 seem more conducive to dealing with
hysteria.
In general, the characteristics of various MDMs appear
to make a difference in
approaching
different types of problems and
there is some indication that some

MDMs may be more suitable, or more
helpful, with some problem types
than others.

The idea of a science for meaningful

phenoT^

,

can again provide some insight into
this issue.

The ethnomethodologists

One of their central

tenets is that some distortion is inevitable
in investigating a reality

system because one reality cannot investigate
another without "running
it through its own knowledge and reasoning
system."

1975, p. 70).

In particular,

(Mehan and Wood,

the imposition of one reality on another

necessarily distorts the reality being studied.

(1975, p.

38)

scientific activity, the approach of the scientist imposes

a

During

structure

on the respondant "that may not be consistent with the
respondant's

daily life." (1975,

p.

62)

Mehan and Wood are not objecting to the

abstracting from phenomena which they perceive all scientific work
as
doing, but rather they object to the dissonance between features
of the

approach and features of the phenomenon under study.

Here,

they are
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considering sociology specifically.
sociology is that its
abstraction systema^1^"n'
tematically distorts what
common sense tells us was Se

social life of human beings.
In the sociologist's tables
of data, and even more
in the theories made up
abou those
tables, one cannot find a
sense of the person's da^lv
tdiK about.

^^-^P-duced-thTTIrious

ph™a\h:se^ables

(1975, p. 48; emphasis added)

Essentially, what is being
proposed by Mehan and Wood is that
some
distortion is inevitable while
investigating one reality system
through
another, there are degrees of
distortion. The -fif' between the
two

reality systems is either more,
or less, conducive to distortion.

When

the "fit" is fairly close
between the investigating and the
investigated

systems, the findings convey a sense
of the original phenomena of interest.

If the fit is poor,

the phenomenon will either be
unexplainable,

or its sense will no longer be
apparent.

They proceed further, by stating outright
that ethnomethodologists
are agreed that methods borrowed from the
"natural sciences are inappro-

priate for the study of meaningful phenomena"
(1975,

p.

150).

They

apparently demand a new methodology, one that is
"more becoming to the
phenomena realities display" (1975,

p.

225).

This new sort of metho-

dology retains, or allows, the retention of the
"meaningfulness" of the

phenomenon being studied; that is, they demand that those qualities
the scientist seeks to study in a phenomenon he retained and
revealed

by the method, not obscured or "controlled out".
If the MDMs are indeed closely related to, or roughly identical
to,
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these reality systems, the
sa.e observations and
conclusions would
apply.
To wit, methodologies
imported from the natural
scienc:es excessively distort meaningful
phenomena (e.g., dialogue,
psychotherapy,
Psychopathology, social behavior,
political practice) whereas
methodology
designed to take into account
these meaningful aspects could
be less
distorting.
If this is the case, then
Bateson's point that the DB was
an epistemology and was
therefore not testable in the
"usual" scientific
manner is very appropriate. On
the other hand. Haley's family
experiments attempted to impose a natural
sciences MDM or reality structure
on meaningful interactions-a
process conducive to significant distor-

tion of those meaningful elements.

Essentially, what is being argued is
the necessity of an appropriate
science for meaningful phenomena.
The idea has been presented before
(Hudson, 1972; Raush, 1974), and
deserves discussion.

The MDM concept

provides an expression of scientific reality
systems in such a way that

conceptualization and method are linked to the
scientist's reality view.
As such, it provides a framework within
which to evaluate scientific

approaches to see whether they distort, or reveal,
the meaningful aspects
of human phenomena.

The MDM concept, then meets a number of needs.

It helps to explain

the basis of DM clustering, and also the differentiation
between clus-

ters in family therapy, as well as assisting to unravel some contro-

versies (e.g., "behavioral" vs. "higher processes" debate) and research
group splits; it answers, at least in part, the question of what it is

412

that precedes the paradig.,
while also answering
Shapere's la.ent that
with revision, Kuhn deleted
the paradig. of its
"overarching" power in
scientific activity. The
physical sciences share not
an overarching
paradig., as Kuhn and Shapere
have implied, but an
overarching MDM;
specifically, the physical sciences
subscribe to MDM I, which is

mechanistic, positivistic and
prefers predictive understanding.
The
MDM concept, by thus subsuming
.any DMs with a nu.ber of co^on
characteristics, serves some of these
"overarching" functions.
Moreover, it is at this level
that the "conversion" experiences
occur; Kuhn's critics have been
correct in not understanding in
what way
conversion experiences relate to
methodology a paradigm.
It does not;

"conversion" experiences occur at
the MDM level.

Conversion at the MDM

level has direct implications for
the DM used, in which is found con-

crete and specific methodological
functions.

Finally, the MDM concept,

when joined by the paradigm and DM
concepts, can also help to interpret the present day felt crisis in
psychology.

Implications fo r the Present Felt Crisis in
Psychology
Essentially,

I

am proposing that the modified Kuhnian analysis

developed here would be helpful in understanding the present
felt crisis
in psychology if used as a framework of interpretation.
Using the paradigm, DM and MDM concepts, and emphasizing the group structure of

scientific activity, the analysis would shed light on several facets of
the crisis.
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The felt crisis has been
documented to be a complicated
and multifaceted situation, with a history
of its own.
In general, it can be

characterized as a search for guiding
and limiting frameworks.

Paramount is a sense of impasse, of
enormous effort with little advancing

knowledge.

The lack of long-term progress
is a manifestation of this

duality; on the one hand, enormous
effort has gone into the accumulat
ion
of mountains of "facts", upon
which few can agree, and even fewer
can

state to what goals this accumulation
leads.

Psychology's high tech-

nology and advanced methods are often
used in the services of ambigious
goals.

This sense of impasse is often expressed
in controversy.

Upon

examination, some of the long-standing
repetitive methodological con-

troversies will very probably show themselves
as amenable to a Kuhnian
analysis; some will appear to be searches for
an appropriate DM and

others for comfortable MDMs.

For instance, the psychologists who write

of crises of identity for their sub-disciplines
will often be drawing

attention to the search for a viable DM.

The identity of individual

scientists and of groups focuses on the problems they address
and the

approaches evolved to solve these problems.

These clearly are paradigm

and DM issues, as such, and amenable to a full Kuhnian analysis.

On

the other hand, other types of controversy appear to point to MDM

issues: including such issues as the increasingly elaborated difficulties with the traditional subject-object split in research, or with the

observation that a large proportion of significant and original contributions have come from practitioners who have dissociated themselves
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fro. formal psychological
research methods.
are clearly related to

WH

These two crisis

1,
-ssues

concerns; when the •scientific
.ethod-^^

is being questlonned
and/or abandonned for
alternative approaches, we

are seeing individuals change
their mUs.

What is particularly striking

about these doubts and the
occasional MDM changes, is that
scientists
are ^king the., not because
of persuasive philosophers
or meta-scientlsts. but because their
approaches have Increasingly proved
unsatis-

factory to the scientists
themselves.

As Mehan and Woods (1975,
p. 210)

point out,

lliTatT/^l^
r'-^^
that demand abandoning

convinced by opposing philosophies
a form of life that demonstrates

Its power^daxly.
To tell scientists that their
proofs
are only reflexive accomplishments
does not alter the
experiential validity of those accomplishments.
Science
as an activity does not rise and
fall on the consistency
of Its reconstructed logics".

The fascinating point here is that the
scientists themselves have
begun, in sufficient numbers to bring about
a crisis, to openly doubt
the appropriateness of their approach and
some are casting about for

what they refer

to as a

"new methodology."

What should be obvious by

now is that when such a term is used, what is actually
being referred to
is a conceptual constellation of intellectual and
attitudinal components

with which certain methods and designs are related.

18„

Some of these "new"

Scientific method" here refers to the dominant MDM I approach
which, in this country, is or has been virtually synonymous with
science itself. Because of the preponderance of MDM I scientists,
changes in approach would usually be from MDM II, which is, I believe,
actually the case at present.
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methodologies" wiu
will in fact
f^^i- turn
out to be DMs, and
others
ae„ conceptual constellation
I have proposed,
MDMs.

win

be this

Conclusions
In the course of using
a Kuhnian analysis for
the emergence of a
family therapy group,
1 have found it necessary to
.alee several modifications or additions to
Kuhn's revised schema. Using
Mastern^n's criti,.
I have regarded
psychology as a multiple
paradigm and multiple-DM discipline, and have chosen to
use a narrow rather than
broad interpretation of the paradigm and
DM concepts. Thus, both are
used only with

respect to characteristics and
criteria delineated by Kuhn, or
Masterman.
Additionally, I have emphasized
the relationship of DM and
methodology,
drawn attention to the problem in
identifying the "inclusive perimeter"
of a DM, and proposed a "border
of applicability" which delimits
the

practical and conceptual bounds of a
paradigm and points
and difference between disconf
irmation and anomaly.

to

an import-

While using the

narrow interpretation of the paradigm
and DM concepts,

I

found that this

usage was quite compatible with events
in the development of the DB
family therapy group, though not sufficient
to explain the behavioralinternal processes controversy, the 1959 split,
or DM clustering within
family therapy.

For these reasons,

I

have proposed the meta-DM concept.

With this concept included in the Kuhnian analysis,
the emergence of
the DB DM was fully interpreted and an analysis
of the present felt

crisis will very probably be productively interpretable
and helpful in
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resolving certain aspects of
the crisis If the
distinction between,
and relationships among,
methodology. DM and HDH are
kept clear.
This
type of Kuhnlan analysis
will require detailed knowledge
of the particular controversy, problem
area, or Issue; as such,
these Kuhnlan
analyses will probably be most
helpful 1, carried out by
individuals or
groups close to, but not directly
Involved In the particular Issue.
If
such an analysis were attempted
by someone not Intimately
familiar with
the Issues and the history or
development of the problem, the results
could miscarry, what is required
is a detailed knowledge of this
re-

vised Kuhnlan analysis, keeping the
levels of conceptualization quite
clear, and a specific and detailed
knowledge of the relevant problem
area.

Under these conditions,

I

would see such an analysis as highly

beneficial to the relevant area, and as at
least one way to begin dissolving the Impasse and developing

a

psychology of many MDMs, all of

which would be appropriate to the meaning of the
phenomenon they were
attempting to study.
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